Judgment :- 1. The question is whether the Labour Court, the 2nd respondent to this petition, has jurisdiction to pass the award Ext. P5 relating to the dismissal of the 4th respondent, one P. P. Chacko, from the services of the petitioner-Co-operative Society. By Ext. P5 award, the 2nd respondent has directed reinstatement of the 4th respondent as an employee of the petitioner-Society. Without going into the merits of the decision in Ext. P5 excepting in referring to the incompetency of the President of the petitioner-Society in giving consent to the reinstatement of the 4th respondent, counsel urged that the dispute about the correctness or otherwise of the dismissal of the 4th respondent from the services of the petitioner-Society is a matter falling within S.69 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969 (hereinafter called the Act) that the dispute is one falling within the definition of that term in S.2(i) of the Act and that the Registrar alone was competent to decide it. The Act was passed with the assent of the President after the enactment of the industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Therefore, it was submitted that the provisions of the Act must prevail. We are therefore asked to set aside Ext. P5 award as having been passed without jurisdiction. 2. Counsel is well supported in his contention that if the subject-matter of the dispute before the 2nd respondent is one falling within the term ' dispute' as defined in S.2 (i) and within S.69 of the Act and therefore within the competence of the Registrar to decide, this provision must prevail over the provisions in the Industrial disputes Act which provides for the settlement of disputes such as that are referrable to the Industrial Tribunals or Labour Courts. It is unnecessary to cite authorities for this proposition, but we may as well refer to a passage from the decision of the Supreme Court in Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. and others etc. v. Additional Industrial Tribunal, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad and others etc. reported in AIR. 1970 SC. 245: "The general proposition urged that the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act will be barred if the disputes in question can be competently decided by the Registrar under S.61 of the Act is, therefore, correct and has to be accepted." 3. reported in AIR. 1970 SC. 245: "The general proposition urged that the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act will be barred if the disputes in question can be competently decided by the Registrar under S.61 of the Act is, therefore, correct and has to be accepted." 3. The question for decision is whether the dispute that has been decided by the 2nd respondent by Ext. P5 award is a dispute that can competently be resolved by the Registrar functioning under S.69 of the Act. For deciding this question, it is necessary to understand the scope and nature of the disputes that can be settled by an Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court We must, in their connection, refer to a passage from the decision of the Privy Council in The Labour Relations Board of Saskatchewan v. John East Iron Works Ltd. reported in AIR. 1949 P. C. 129. The question therein was whether the provisions in the British North America Act, 1867, should be complied with in appointing the members of the Labour Relations Board under the Trade Union Act, 1944. This question turned on the further question whether the Labour Relations Board could be termed a District and County Court. The members of the Judicial Committee, considered the scope and functions of the Labour Relations Board and we think that two paragraphs in the judgment are relevant. We shall extract those paragraphs: "26. It is a truism that the conception of the judicial function is inseparably bound up with the idea of a suit between parties, whether between Crown and subject or between subject and subject, and that it is the duty of the Court to decide the issue between those parties, with whom alone it rests to initiate or defend or compromise the proceedings. Here at once a striking departure from the traditional conception of a Court may be seen in the functions of the appellant Board. Here at once a striking departure from the traditional conception of a Court may be seen in the functions of the appellant Board. For, as the Act contemplates and the Rules made under it prescribe, any trade union, any employer, any employers' association or any other person directly concerned may apply to the Board for an order to be made (a) requiring any person to refrain from a violation of the Act or from engaging in an unfair labour practice, (b) requiting an employer to reinstate an employee discharged contrary to the provisions of the Act and to pay such employee the monetary loss suffered by reason of such discharge, (c) requiring an employer to disestablish a company dominated organisation or (d) requiring two or more of the said things to be done. Other rules provide for the discharge by the Board of other functions. It is sufficient to refer only to (b) supra, which clearly illustrates that, while the order relates solely to the relief to be given to an individual yet the controversy may be raised by others without his assent and, it may be, against his will, for the solution of some far-reaching industrial conflict. It may be possible to describe an issue thus raised as a "lis" and to regard its determination as the exercise of judicial power. But it appears to their Lordships that such an issue is indeed remote from those which at the time of confederation occupied the superior or district or county Courts of Upper Canada. 27. In the Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan the learned Chief Justice (in whose opinion the other judges concurred) accepted the view that the Board exercised a judicial power analogous to that of the Courts named on the ground that such Courts always had jurisdiction in connection with the enforcement of contracts of hiring and awarding damages for the breaches thereof. But; as their Lordships think, this view ignores the wider aspects of the matter. The jurisdiction of the Board under S.5 (e) is not invoked by the employee for the enforcement of his contractual rights: these, whatever they may be we can assert elsewhere. But; as their Lordships think, this view ignores the wider aspects of the matter. The jurisdiction of the Board under S.5 (e) is not invoked by the employee for the enforcement of his contractual rights: these, whatever they may be we can assert elsewhere. But his reinstatement, which the terms of his contract of employment might not by themselves justify, is the means by which labour practices regarded as unfair are frustrated and the policy of collective bargaining as a road to industrial peace is secured. It is in the light of this new conception of industrial relations that the question to be determined by the Board must be viewed, and. even if the issue so raised can be regarded as a justiciable one, it finds no analogy in those issues which were familiar to the Courts of 1867." 4. It is this concept, we venture to think, that weighed with this Court when it decided Malabar Co-operative Central Bank Limited, Kozhikode v. State of Kerala reported in 1963 KLT. 705 and Chief Justice m. S. Menon, if we may say so with great respect, in his inimitable style used facile language to express the same opinion: "Co operative societies are creatures of statute, controlled by their constitution, and concerned with their contracts. Industrial disputes stem, not from the subtle refinements of contractual obligations, but from the rougher jurisprudence of social justice and readjustment. The uplands of the Industrial Tribunals are out of bounds to the Registrar of Co-operative Societies." This, the learned Chief Justice said in relation to the question whether wages, promotions, gratuity and pension, medical aid, recruitment and probation and retirement, which were referred to an Industrial Tribunal, were matters which fell within the purview of the Registrar under S.51 of the Madras Cooperative Societies Act, 1932. It is unnecessary for us to read that section and notice the difference in the wording of that section with S.69 of the Act because the judgment is based on the nature of the disputes that can be settled by a Registrar under the Act. 5. It is unnecessary for us to read that section and notice the difference in the wording of that section with S.69 of the Act because the judgment is based on the nature of the disputes that can be settled by a Registrar under the Act. 5. The same learned Chief Justice had to deal with this question again and we must refer to this decision as well for it settles another principle which we find has not been noticed in the numerous decisions that have been placed before us and which turns on the question whether a dispute was one "touching the business of the society" or affecting or relating to the business of the society. The decision we have in mind is the one in Kerala State Handloom Weavers' Co-operative Society Ltd. v. State of Kerala & Others reported in 1964 KLJ.175. After referring to the passage which we have just read, and a passage from the judgment of the Bombay High Court wherein Chief Justice Chagla bad said this: "Now Mr. Rane has very rightly pointed out that the disputes contemplated by S.54 are disputes of a civil nature which could have been decided by Civil Courts but for the provisions with regard to compulsory arbitration provided in S.45. Mr. Rane has also rightly pointed out that the present dispute between the second respondent and the petitioners could not have been the subject matter of a reference to arbitration under S.54. The second respondent is not claiming to assert any civil rights against the petitioners. What he is claiming is certain rights which are now conferred upon workmen and employees as a result of principles of social justice, which are now almost universally acknowledged all the world over. There is no right of reinstatement under civil law which can be enforced by an employee against his employer. No contractor personal service can be specifically enforced by a civil court nor does a civil court determine whether the wages paid to an employee are proper wages or not. Civil Courts are bound down by the law of contract and it is under the law of contract that the Civil Courts decide disputes between a master and his servant." the learned Chief Justice observed as follows: "Emphasis was placed on the words "touching the business of a registered society" occurring in S.60(1) of the Travancore-Cochin Co-operative Societies Act. Civil Courts are bound down by the law of contract and it is under the law of contract that the Civil Courts decide disputes between a master and his servant." the learned Chief Justice observed as follows: "Emphasis was placed on the words "touching the business of a registered society" occurring in S.60(1) of the Travancore-Cochin Co-operative Societies Act. 1951, and various decisions bearing on those words like M. S. Madhava Rao and others v-D. V. K. Surya Rao (AIR. 1954 Madras 103) were brought to our notice. It is unnecessary to consider those decisions in this judgment. The question incases like this is not whether the dispute referred for adjudication touches the business of a co-operative society; the question really is whether that dispute comes within the category of disputes covered by S.60(1) of the Travancore Cochin Co operative Societies Act, 1951. The purpose of Chapter XIII of the Travancore Cochin Co-operative Societies Act, 1951 the Chapter in which S.60(1) occurs is not to resolve all controversies touching the business of co-operative societies under the provisions of that Chapter; but resolve only such controversies as can be resolved in an ordinary court of law. In other words the arbitration provided by Chapter XIII is an alternative to the normal processes of the ordinary courts and not to the extraordinary process of adjudication under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which has been designed to deal with controversies which by their very nature are outside the purview of ordinary litigation." With great respect, we fully agree with the views expressed in the above passage and in the light of that passage, we are not dealing with the numerous other decisions that have been quoted before us, on the question whether the dispute with which we are concerned here is a dispute touching the business of the co-operative society or touching the establishment or management of the co-operative society. We will only therefore refer for the sake of completeness, to those decisions: GIP. Railway Employees Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Bhikhaji Merwanji Employee reported in AIR. 1943 Bombay 341, The Majoor Sahakari Bank Ltd. v. N. N, Majmudar and another reported is AIR. 1957 Bombay 36, M/s. Co-operative Milk Societies Union Ltd v. State of West Bengal and others reported is AIR. Railway Employees Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Bhikhaji Merwanji Employee reported in AIR. 1943 Bombay 341, The Majoor Sahakari Bank Ltd. v. N. N, Majmudar and another reported is AIR. 1957 Bombay 36, M/s. Co-operative Milk Societies Union Ltd v. State of West Bengal and others reported is AIR. 1958 Calcutta 373, a later decision of the Calcutta High Court taking a different view from the decision in M/s. Cooperative Milk Societies Union Ltd. v. State of West Bengal and others reported in AIR. 1958 Calcutta 373 in the decision in Workmen's Co-operative Industrial Home, Ltd. v. First Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal and others reported in 1968 II L. L J. 772 and in South Arcot Co-operative Motor Transport, Society, Ltd. Devanam-Pattinam, Cuddalore v. Syed Batcha and others reported in AIR. 1961 Madras 217. 6. The real question is not whether the dispute is one touching the business of a society or its management or establishment but whether it is a dispute within the competence of the Registrar to decide. 7. The same view has been expressed by the Supreme Court is the decision in Deccan Merchants Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. M/s Dalichand Jugraj Jain and others reported in AIR. 1969 SC. 1320. Having referred to the matter as to whether the dispute was one touching the business of the Society, Their Lordships observed: "Further the word "dispute" covers only those disputes which are capable of being resolved by the Registrar of his nominee. It is very doubtful if the word "dispute" would include a dispute between a landlord society and a tenant when the land lord society has not been set up for the purpose of constructing or buying and letting out houses. In the presence of various rent Acts which give special privileges to tenants it would be difficult to state that such disputes were intended to be referred to the Registrar." 8. To the same effect is the decision in Co-operative Central Bank Ltd and others etc. v. Additional Industrial Tribunal, Andhra Pradesh. Hyderabad and others etc. reported in AIR. 1970 SC. 245. To the same effect is the decision in Co-operative Central Bank Ltd and others etc. v. Additional Industrial Tribunal, Andhra Pradesh. Hyderabad and others etc. reported in AIR. 1970 SC. 245. Their Lordships posed the question'The question, however, that has to be examined is whether the industrial dispute referred to the Tribunal in the present cases was such as was required to be referred to the Registrar and to be decided by him under S.61 of the Act." and answered it by stating: "Applying these tests, we have no doubt at all that the dispute covered by the first issue referred to the Industrial Tribunal in the present cases could not possibly be referred for decision to the Registrar under S.61 of the Act. The dispute related to alteration of a number of conditions of service of the workmen which relief could only be granted by an Industrial Tribunal dealing with an industrial dispute. The Registrar, it is clear from the provisions of the Act, could not possibly have granted the reliefs claimed under this issue because of the limitations placed on his powers in the Act itself". 9. The Industrial Disputes Act is meant for doing social justice and the powers conferred on the Industrial Tribunals and Labour Courts functioning under that statute are very much wider. Those Tribunals and Labour Courts are not trammelled by the inhibitions of contractual obligations or rights and can, in disregard of well-known concepts of law, readjust rights and obligations in a manner conceived to be just in the light of socio-economic changes that are taking place in various countries in this century. The jurisdiction exercised by such Tribunals and Labour Courts is therefore entirely different and though, as was observed by the Judicial Committee, there may be said to be a Mis' and though there may be a judicial process involved, they do not function as courts nor do they exercise powers of a court or are they inhibited by rules of law which must guide and control the decisions of Courts, A dispute can be raised by a body of workmen, and this can be done even against the wishes and will of the concerned workman. In such a dispute between the body of workmen and the employer the aggrieved employee is often out of the picture or atleast not necessarily in the picture. In such a dispute between the body of workmen and the employer the aggrieved employee is often out of the picture or atleast not necessarily in the picture. Such a dispute and the adjustment of rights arising therefrom cannot fall within the disputes in the definition in S.2 (i) of the Act and therefore will not fall within S.69 of the Act. This is so, we think, notwithstanding R.67 of the rules framed under S.109 of the Act, the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, 1969, by which the Registrar is required to according to justice, equity and good conscience. The Registrar has not the power of an Industrial court, be himself acts, as is pointed out by this Court in Kerala State Handloom Weavers' Co-operative Society Ltd. v. State of Kerala & Others reported in 1964 KLJ.175, in the manner in which a court should function. The Supreme Court has noticed this difference in the functions of the Tribunals and emphasised the necessity of resolving the apparent but not real conflict between the two statutes, the Industrial Disputes Act and Co-operative Societies Act. We may refer to a passage from the decision which we have already cited in Deccan Merchants Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. M/s. Dalichand Jugraj Jain and others reported in AIR. 1969 SC. 1320: "The Maharashtra Co operative Societies Act was passed, in the main, to shorten litigation, lessen its costs and to provide a summary procedure for the determination of the disputes relating to the internal management of the societies. But under the Real Act a different social objective is intended to be achieved and for achieving that social objective it is necessary that a dispute between the landlord and the tenant should be dealt with by the Courts set up under the Rent Act and in accordance with the special provisions of the Rent Act. This social objective does not impinge on the objective underlying the Act. The two Acts can be harmonised best by holding that in matters covered by the Rent Act. its provisions, rather than the provisions of the Maharashtra Co operative Societies Act should apply. This social objective does not impinge on the objective underlying the Act. The two Acts can be harmonised best by holding that in matters covered by the Rent Act. its provisions, rather than the provisions of the Maharashtra Co operative Societies Act should apply. In view of these considerations S.91 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act does not affect the provisions of S.28 of the Rent Act." For the same reasoning, the powers of the Labour Court, the 2nd respondent, functioning under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, are unaffected by the powers of the Registrar under S.69 of the Act. The dispute that was resolved by the 2nd respondent by passing Ext. P5 award could not have been dealt with by the Registrar. He was not competent to deal with that question. He could not grant the relief of reinstatement which has been granted by the 2nd respondent. We also hold that this dispute which has been resolved by Ext. P5 award is not one falling within the term 'dispute' as defined in S.2(i) of the Act and is not one falling within the competence or jurisdiction of the Registrar functioning under S.69 thereof. It follows that this petition has to be dismissed. 10. Counsel on behalf of the 'petitioner, however, contended that the award Ext. P5 has been based on a consent given by the President, an incompetent consent, a consent which he could not give as only the Society has been conferred the power to compromise litigations and that the President who gave the consent bad not the sanction of the Board before he gave the consent-The President consented to the reinstatement is seen from the award Ext.P5. But we do not think that the award is based on that consent. The Cooperative Society bad all along remained exparte. It had not filed any written statement in answer to the claim put forward by the workman. There was an affidavit filed on behalf of the Secretary of the Union which raised the dispute. This affidavit has been accepted by the Labour Court as is seen from the award Ext. P5. It cannot therefore be said that the award is defective for the reason that the consent given by the President of the Society for the reinstatement of the workman is an incompetent consent. 11. No other point was urged before us. This petition has to be dismissed. P5. It cannot therefore be said that the award is defective for the reason that the consent given by the President of the Society for the reinstatement of the workman is an incompetent consent. 11. No other point was urged before us. This petition has to be dismissed. We do so. We direct the parties to bear their respective costs.