JUDGMENT 1. THIS is a reference under Section 66 (1) of the Income-Tax Act, 1922. The facts material for the purpose of the present reference may be indicated. 0the assessee is a Hindu Undivided family governed by the Dayabhaga school of Hindu Law and resident in the taxable territory and is named in the Style of Messrs. Amarendranath mukherjee and Brothers. The relevant assessment years are 1951-52, 1954-55, and 1955-56 for which the relevant previous years are the calendar years 1950, 1953 and 1954 respectively. The assessee had a tea garden named Parkul Tea estate situated in East Pakistan. In the original assessments for the aforesaid years only 40% of the income from the said tea garden was included in the assessee's total income and the balance of 60% was treated as the assessee's agricultural income. This treatment was in conformity with the assessee's claim in returns filed. Later on, the Income-Tax Officer was of the opinion that since the Tea Estate was situated in a foreign territory the assessee should have shown the entire income from the tea Estate as the same was liable to inclusion in its total income. Since that had not been done, the Income-Tax officer initiated proceedings under Section 34 (1) (a) of the Indian Income tax Act, 1922 and brought to assessment 100% of the income from Tea Estate in East Pakistan for the aforesaid years. The order of the Income-Tax officer upon reassessment indicates that the Income Tax Officer had in view at the time of the reassessments the provisions of Indo-Pakistan Agreement for Avoidance of Double Taxation and had directed that the Tax in respect of the income from the Tea Estate in pakistan should be kept in abeyance for one and had allowed the statutory deduction of Rs. 4,500/- as no part of the income arising in Pakistan was remitted to India, in accordance with the provisions of the said agreement between India and Pakistan. 2. AGAINST the said order of the I. T. R. the assessee preferred an appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The assessee in the said appeal challenged the validity of the proceedings u/s. 34 (1) (a) and also questioned the quantum of Pakistan income which had been assessed. 2. AGAINST the said order of the I. T. R. the assessee preferred an appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The assessee in the said appeal challenged the validity of the proceedings u/s. 34 (1) (a) and also questioned the quantum of Pakistan income which had been assessed. The appellate Assistant commissioner held that the Assessments had been validly made under s, 34 and with regard to Pakistan income he directed the Income-Tax Officer to adopt the figures returned by the assessee subject to rectification on receipt of Assessment orders of the assessments made in Pakistan Regarding the contention of the assessee with regard to Pakistan income, the Appellate Assistant Commr. in his order has recorded "the next contention is that the Pakistan income can be included in the assessment only for rate purpose. This position is further shifted by the assessee when his Advocate filed a claim stating that it cannot be included ah all even for rate purpose. The assessee has given his arguments in the statement filed on 21. 2. 1962. In support of these contentions the appellant relies on the provisions of Indo-Pakistan agreement for avoidance of double taxation. In my opinion, the appellant's reliant on the provision is not correct, nor his interpretation of the same is sound under Art 4 each dominion is to make assessment in the ordinary way this is the first step Thus under the art full income had to be brought under assessment. The next stage is that if Indian subjects to assessment an amount of pakistan income in excess of what it should assess, in respect of the tax on such excess of what should assess, in respect of the tax on such excess it should by way of abatement the lower amount of tax excess resulting from the assessment other dominion. Arts 5 and 6 deal with the question of abatement and how it is to be calculated. Hence, it is not correct for the appellant to say that the income from Pakistan should not be included the assessment. In result, the assessment of Pakistan income of Rs. is confirmed". The assessee appealed to the Income Tax appellate Tribunal from the order of the Appellate Assistant Commr. Hence, it is not correct for the appellant to say that the income from Pakistan should not be included the assessment. In result, the assessment of Pakistan income of Rs. is confirmed". The assessee appealed to the Income Tax appellate Tribunal from the order of the Appellate Assistant Commr. Before the Tribunal the contention of the assessee about the validity of the reassessment proceeding u/s. 34 was given up and the assessee had raised only the two following contentions : (i) computation of taxable income from Parkul Tea Estate now lying in foreign territory of Pakistan. (ii. deposits made in the Bank in india and repayment of loan treated from undisclosed source of income, the second contention was decided in favour of the assessee. There is dispute with regard to the same and the said question does not from any part of the reference. On the first question the assessee had submitted that u/s. 49d (3) of the Act, the assessee's Tax liability under the Indian Income Tax act on its' Pakistan income should have been reduced by the amount of agricultural income tax and such other tax that had been paid on such income in pakistan. The Departmental representative contended before the Tribunal that there was no evidence given by the assessee as to the amoun of agricultural income Tax suffered by it in Pakistan. on income from Parkul Tea Estate. The departmental representative had also submitted that in the original assessments, the inclusion of the total income from Parkul Tea Estate had not been challenged and the said assessment became final and the assesses was estopped from agitating the said issue again. It was also submitted on behalf of the Department that S. 49d (3) came into operation in the year 1956 and the benefits conferred under the said Section could be availed of only prospectively, i. e., for the assessment year 1958-57 onwards. The Tribunal in its order held "we do not find any difficulty in answering the contentions raised on behalf of the Department. So far as the sufferance of agricultural Income tax by the assessee in concerned, it can be verified by the Income Tax Officer even now. The act grants a particular relief to the assessee, which must lie given effect to by the Income Tax officer at the time when he is computing the income arising to the assessee in Pakistan. So far as the sufferance of agricultural Income tax by the assessee in concerned, it can be verified by the Income Tax Officer even now. The act grants a particular relief to the assessee, which must lie given effect to by the Income Tax officer at the time when he is computing the income arising to the assessee in Pakistan. The said having not been done by Income Tax Officer, it must be done now. With regard to the question regarding the prospective applicability of the provisions of Sec. 49d (3) the answer is to be found in the provisions of s. 49d (4) which clearly gives retrospective effect to the provisions of sec. 49d (3. 3. NOW regarding the bar of "estoppel. " pleaded against the relief claimed by the assessee under the provisions of s. 49d, we need only to say that the said provision of law having coming into being only in 1956, the assessee could not have had the opportunity of challenging the computation of the pakistan income on that basis in the original assessment. We may menjion here that the assessments in the assessment year 1951-52 to 1954-55 are the only ones which have been made by recourse to Sec. 34 of the Indian Income tax Act and when these assessments were originally made Sec. 49d (3) was not in the Act. There being thus no substance in the arguments raised on behalf of the Department, we see no ground to withhold the legitimate claim made on behalf of the assessee. The income Tax Officer will now compute the tax on the Parkul Tea Estate in accordance with Sec. 491) (3) and give the necessary relief to the assessee". 4. ON the above facts the Tribunal has referred the following question "whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribural was right in holding that the assessee was entitled to get relief under S. 49d (3) of the Indian income Tax Act, 1922 in the assessments made u s. 34 of the said Act in the years under reference". Mr. B. L. Pal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Department has raised the following contentions. (1) The Tribunal should not have gone into the question of applicability of Sec. 49d (5), since that was not subject-matter of the appeal. (2) Section 49d (3) is entire prospective in character. Mr. B. L. Pal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Department has raised the following contentions. (1) The Tribunal should not have gone into the question of applicability of Sec. 49d (5), since that was not subject-matter of the appeal. (2) Section 49d (3) is entire prospective in character. (3) Section 49d (d) applies only to assessments and not to reassessments. (4) Even it applies to a reassessment the applicability of Sec. 49d (3)could not have been gone into, since in reassessment the whole assessment cannot be reopened. (5) There is no evidence of payment by the assessee of tax in Pakistan and in the absence of any proof of such payment, Section 49 (D) (3) could not be attracted, and the onus lay entirly on the assessee to satisfy at the time of claim under Sec. 49d (3) that all requirements of the said Sec. have been fulfilled. 5. ON his first rontention that the Tribunal should not have gone into the question of applicability of Sec. 49d (3)at all, Mr. Pal has submitted that the question of applicability of Sec. 49d (3)was not the subject-matter of the appeal at all Mr. Pal contends that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is limited only to the subject-matter of the appeal and the Tribunal has no power or jurisdiction to pass any orders in respect of any matter which is not the subject-matter of the appeal. Mr. Pal has argued that the question of applicability of Sec. 49d (3) was not raised before the Income-Tax Officer or before the appellate Assistant Commissioner. Mr. Pal points out that Section 49d (3) toad come into effect on and from the 1st of april, 1956 and the Appellate Assistant commissioner made his order on the 31st of August, 1962, long after the said section had come into operatinn. Mr. Pal comments that the subject-matter of the appeal before the appellate Assistant Commissioner was the question of inclusion of 'the Assesse's pakistan income in the total income of the assessee and not the question of any relief and the assessee had raised no such contention before the Appellate assistant Commissioner. Mr. Pal comments that the subject-matter of the appeal before the appellate Assistant Commissioner was the question of inclusion of 'the Assesse's pakistan income in the total income of the assessee and not the question of any relief and the assessee had raised no such contention before the Appellate assistant Commissioner. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner held that the whole of the income of the assessee derived from Parkul Tea Estate had been correctly included in the assessment of Pakistan income of the assesspe and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had confirmed the assessment made by the Income Tax Officer. Against the said order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner the aseessee had preferred the further appeal to the appellate Tribunal and it is Mr. Pal's contention that the subject-matter of appeal before the Tribunal was the question whether the whole of the income received by the assessment. Mr. PY has submitted that any relief which may be available to the assessee in the matter of payment of Tax or the assessee's tax liability is something entirely different from Assessment of the assessee's income. Mr. Pal, therefore, contends that as the question f relief to the assessee and the provisions of Sec. 49d (3) were not included in the subject-matter of this appeal the tribunal was not competent to entertain the said question. In support of this contention Mr. Pal has referred to the following cases : (i) (1) Commissioner of Income-Tax Bombay v. Scindia Steam Navigation co., 42 I. T. R. 589, (ii) (2) New India Life Assurance co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income tax, 31 I. T. R. 844 (A. I. R. 1958 Bom. 143. (iii) (3) Hukumchand Mills v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Bombay, 63 I. T. R. 232 (A. I. R. 1967 S. C. 455. 6. ON his second point about prospective character of Section 49d (3) Mr. Pal has submitted that Sub-Section (4)makes it quite clear. He has argued that the two limbs of sub-section (4)have to be read together and the limitation placed by the second limb on claims for refund beyord a certain time clearly indicates that Sec. 49d (3) is intended to be prospective. Mr. Pal has next contended that sec. Pal has submitted that Sub-Section (4)makes it quite clear. He has argued that the two limbs of sub-section (4)have to be read together and the limitation placed by the second limb on claims for refund beyord a certain time clearly indicates that Sec. 49d (3) is intended to be prospective. Mr. Pal has next contended that sec. 49d (3) applies only to assessments and not to reassessments and in support of this contention he has drawn our attention to the said Sec. 49d (3) which speaks only of assessment and which does not mention reassessment. Mr. Pal has further submitted that even if Sec. 49d (3) applies to reassessment, the applicability of the said section could not have been gone into at the time of reassessment. In support of this contention Mr. Pal has relied on the decision of the Calcutta High Court in (4) Re : Satyendn Mohan Roy Chowdhury reported in A. I. R. 1930 Cal. 627 and on the decision of Hedge, J. in the case of (5) S. Natarajan v. Commissioner of Income Tax, reported in 52 i. T. R. 882. Mr. Pal has finally submitted that Sec. 49d (3) can only apply on proof of payment of tax by assessee in pakistan and unless this basic requirement of Section 49d (3) is satisfied section 49d (3) cannot be attracted. It is the submission of Mr. Pal that the onus of proof rests entirely on the assessee and in the instant case there was no evidence of payment by the assessee. Mr. Pal, therefore, argues that as the basic requirement of S. 49d (3) is not satisfied, the said section cannot be applied and the assessee is not entitled to claim any relief under the section. In support of his submission that the onus rests, entirely on the assessee to prove payment Mr. Pal has referred to the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of (6) Commissioner of Income-Tax, Madras v, R. Venkataswamy Naidoo, reported in 29 I. T. R. 529 (A. I. R. 1956 s. C. 522) and in the case of (7) Commissioner of Income Tax Behar and orissa, v. Ramkrishna Deo reported in 35 I. T. R. 312 (A. I. R. 1959 S. C. 23. 7. MR. 7. MR. B. C. Dutt, learned counsel appearing on - behalf of the assessee has submitted that in view of the nature of the question which has been referred to court, it is not open to the Department to raise the contention that the Tribunal should not have gone into the question of applicability of Section 49d (3. Mr. Dutt has drawn our attention to the three contentions which were put forward before the Tribunal by the department and which have all been dealt with by the Tribunal and Mr. Dutt has commented that the question that the tribunal could not go into the question of applicability of S. 49d (3) was never raised before the Tribunal. Mr. Dutt contends that the subject-matter of the appeal before the Tribunal was the question of liability of the assessee for payment of tax in respect of its income derived in Pakistan and in the determination of the question of liability, the question of any relief to which the assessee might be entitled was undoubtedly involved. Mr. Dutt points out that even on reassessment the income Tax Officer has proceeded to grant relief on the basis of the provisions of Indo Pakistan Agreement for avoidance of Double Taxation by providing keep tax in abeyance for one year, in the Assessment order. Mr. Dutt, therefore, submits that the question of relief to which the assessee might he entitled in respect of the assessee's Tax liability for the assessee's Pakistan income was undoubtedly the subject-matter of the appeal before the Tribunal and the Tribunal was perfectly justified in considering the question of applicability of S. 49d (3) Mr. Dutt has argued that the Department raised no objection before the Tribunal as to the competence of the Tribunal to go into this question and the department have also not sought to raise any question challenging the power and jurisdiction of tribunal to go into this question, and it is the argument of Mr. Dutt that in any event it is not open to the Department to raise this contention now within the frame of the ouesticn referred. Relying on the decision of the Supreme court in (3) Hukumchand Mills v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Central, bombay, 63 I. T. R. 232 which has been referred to by Mr. Pal. Mr. Dutt has contended that the power of the Tribunal is indeed very wide. Mr. Relying on the decision of the Supreme court in (3) Hukumchand Mills v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Central, bombay, 63 I. T. R. 232 which has been referred to by Mr. Pal. Mr. Dutt has contended that the power of the Tribunal is indeed very wide. Mr. Dutt points out that the Supreme Court in the said decision construed the relevant provisions of the statute and also of the appellate Tribunal Rules and in construing the words pass such orders as the Tribunal thinks fit' the Supreme court has observed "the words 'pass such orders as the Tribunal thinks fit' include all the powers (except possibly the power to enhancement) which are conferred upon the Appellate Assistant commr. by S. 31 of the Act. Consequently the Tribunal has authority under this sec. to direct the Appellate assistant Commr. or the Income Tax officer to hold further enquiry and dispose of the case on the basis of such enquiry. " Mr. Dutt has contended that in the instant case the Tribunal has only decided that the assessee is entitled to claim the relief use. 49d (3)and he has directed the I. T. O. to verify whether the assessee has in fact suffered tax,in Pakistan and then to grant relief to the assessee u/s. 49d (3. Mr. Dutt has submitted that the Tribunal was perfectly competent to decide that the assessee could claim the statutory relief granted to the assessee use. 49d (3) and to direct the I. T. O. to consider the legitimany and the validity of the claim or verification of necessary facts and thereafter to grant the necessary relief. Mr. Dutt has argued that there is no substance in the contention of the Department that S. 49d (3) is entirely prospective in character and he contends that sub-sec. (4) makes the position quite clear. Mr. Dutt argues that sub-sec. (4) expressly provides that S. 49d (3) which came into force from the 1st of April, 1956 will apply to all assessments subsequent to 1948 and the assessments in question are within the period specified in the said sub-sec. Mr. Dutt has argued that the applicability of Sec. 49d (3) does not depend on the question whether the liability for payment of tax has been determined on the basis of assessment or reassessment as sec. Mr. Dutt has argued that the applicability of Sec. 49d (3) does not depend on the question whether the liability for payment of tax has been determined on the basis of assessment or reassessment as sec. 49d (3) grants relief by way of deduction from the Indian Income Tax payable by the assessee in respect of the assessee's income which accrues or arises to him in Pakistan and income tax can only become payable after assessment or reassessment. It is the contention of Mr. Dutt that after the Indian income Tax payable by the assessee has been determined, whether by the process of original assessment or reassessment, the assessee's right to claim relief u/s. 49d (3) by way of deduction from the said Income Tax payable by him arises and the assessee becomes entitled to the relief by way of deduction from the Tax payable by him, if the assessee satisfies the requirements laid down us. 49d (3), Mr. Dutt has cited the decision of this Court in the case of (8) Commissioner of Income Tax (Central), Calcutta v. Burmah Oil Co. Ltd., reported in 47 I. T. R. 25. Dealing with the argument of Mr. Pal that the assessee was not entitled to the benefit of Sec. 49d (3) as the assessee did not adduce any evidence to prove payment of Tax in Pakistan. Mr. Dutt has submitted that in view of such contention raised before the Tribunal by the department, the Tribunal has directed the Income Tax Officer to verify the necessary fact regarding payment of tax and that if was perfectly open to the Tribunal to do so. Mr. Dutt has submitted that the Tribunal has really decided that the assessee was entitled to claim the benefit under S. 49d (3)which though incorporated in the statute in 1956, applies to the assessments in question and the Tribunal has directed the Income Tax Officer to grant the necessary relief after verification of the proof of payment. Mr. Dutt, therefore, submits that the decision of the tribunal is correct. 8. SEC. 49d was enacted for the purpose of granting relief to an assessee against double taxation in respect of incomes accruing or arising outside the taxable territory. Sub-sees (3) and (4)of S. 49d which are relevant for the purpose of the present proceeding were introduced with effect from 1st April, 1956 by the Finance Act, 1956. 8. SEC. 49d was enacted for the purpose of granting relief to an assessee against double taxation in respect of incomes accruing or arising outside the taxable territory. Sub-sees (3) and (4)of S. 49d which are relevant for the purpose of the present proceeding were introduced with effect from 1st April, 1956 by the Finance Act, 1956. The said sub-sees 3 and 4 may be set out "49d (3. If any person who is resistent in the taxable territories in any year proves that in respect of his income which accrues or arises to him during that year in Pakistan has paid in that country, by deduction or otherwise, Tax payable to the Govt. under any law for the time being in force in that country relating to taxation of agricultural income, he shall be entitled to a deduction from the Indian Income Tax payable by him. (a) all the amount of Tax paid in pakistan under any law aforesaid on such income which is liable' to tax under this Act also or (b) a sum calculated on that income at the Indian rate of tax whichever is less. 4. Sub-section (3) was applied in relation to all assessments for the years subsequent to the year ending on 31st day of March, 1948 and notwithstanding anything contained in Sec. 50, a claim for refund in respect of any of the years ending on the 31st day of March of the years 1949 to 1952 inclusive, may be entertained if made before the 31st day of March 1957. " Sub-SEC. (4) in express teams clearly provides that sub-sec. 3 will apply in relation to all assessments for the years subsequent to the year ending on 31st day of March, 1948. Sub-sec. (4), therefore, clearly gives retrospective effect to the provisions of Sub-sec. (3) which came into effect from the 1st of April, 1956 inasmuch as the said sub-section (4) makes the provision of sub-sec. (3) applicable to all assessments for the years subsequent to the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1948 although the said Sub-sections (3)and (4) were introduced in 1956. The other part of Sub-sec. (3) which came into effect from the 1st of April, 1956 inasmuch as the said sub-section (4) makes the provision of sub-sec. (3) applicable to all assessments for the years subsequent to the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1948 although the said Sub-sections (3)and (4) were introduced in 1956. The other part of Sub-sec. 4 which deals with claims for refund in respect of any of the years ending on 31st day of march of the years 1948 to 1952 inclusive specifically provides that a claim for refund in respect of any of the aforesaid years may be entertained if made before the 31st day of March, 1957, notwithstanding anything contained in S. 50. This part of Sub-sec (4)does not curtail the retrospective operation of Sub-sec. (3) in relation to all assessments for the years subsequent to the years ending on the 31st: day of march, 1948 and this part makes a specific provision with regard to entertainment of claims for refund and imposes a particular time limit in entertaining a claim for refund in respect of the years ending on the 31st day of march of the years 1949 to 1952 inclusive, notwithstanding the provisions for limitation of claims for refund contained in Sec. 50 of the Act. The effect of the provisions contained in Sub-sec, 3 and 4 to my mind, appear to be, provided the provisions of Sub-section (3)are otherwise attracted, that the said sub-section 3 will apply in relation lo all assessments for the years subsequent to the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1948 and if as a result of the application of the provisions of sub-section (3) to such assessments a claim, for refund arises in respect of any of the years ending on the 31st day of March of the years 1949 to 1952, such claim may be entertained if made before the 31st day of March, 1957 notwithstanding the period of limitation for claims for refund prescribed in Sec. 50, but such claims for refund in respect of any of the said years ending on the 31st day of March of the years 1949 to 1952 inclusive will not be entertained, if made after the 31st day of March, 1957. The period of limitation of claims for refund prescribed in Section 50 of the Act is relaxed to an extent with regard to claims for refund in respect of any of the years ending on the 31st day of March of the years 1943 to 1952, arising out of the application of the provisions of contained in See. 3 to the assessment of those years and notwithstanding the provisions regarding limitation for claims for refund in S. 50 the claim may be entertained if made before the 31st day of March, 1957 but not thereafter. 9. THE assessments in question relate to the assessments years 1951-52, 1954-55 and 1955-56 and the said assessments are all for years subsequent to the year ending on the 31st day of march, 1943. S. 48d (3) will undoubtedly apply to the assessments in question, provided the requirements thereof are satisfied. 10. THE contention of Mr. Pal that s. 49d (3) applies only to assessments and does not apply to a case of reassessment is, in my opinion not sound. The object of S. 49d (3) is to avoid double taxation of an assessee in respect of the assessee's agricultural income in Pakistan in respect of which the assessee has paid tax in Pakistan by deduction or otherwise under any law for the time being in, force in Pakistan relating to taxation of such agricultural income. Such agricultural income of the assessee is liable to be included in computing the assessee's total income in India in accordance with the law of taxation in this country. S. 49d (3)seeks to grant relief to such an assessre by providing that he shall be entitled to a deduction from the Indian Income tax payable by him of the amount of the Tax paid by the assessee in Pakistan on the assossce's Pakistan income or to a sum calculated on that income at the Indian rate of Tax, whichever is less. The relief is granted against the assessee's tax liability in India which must necessarily arise upon computation of his income in India which also includes the said income accrued to the assessee in Pakistan. This relief which is granted to the assessee against his tax liability arises on assessment or reassessment. The relief is granted against the assessee's tax liability in India which must necessarily arise upon computation of his income in India which also includes the said income accrued to the assessee in Pakistan. This relief which is granted to the assessee against his tax liability arises on assessment or reassessment. The question of the relief arises on determination of the tax liability and it can be of no consequence as to how the tax liability has been determined, whether in an Original proceeding of assessment or in a reassessment proceeding. 11. TO hold that reliaf cannot be attracted to tax liability determined on reassessment of any assessee will have the effect of allowing double taxation which is sought to be prevented. I fail to see any reason why the relief against double taxation will be available when the assessee's tax liability is determined in an assessment proceeding and will be denied to him, only because the Tax liability has arisen out of a reassessment proceeding. The decision of this court in re: (4) Satyendra Mohan roy Chowdhury, reported in A. I. R. 1930 calcutta 627 and of Hegde, J. presiding over a Division Bench of the Mysore high Court in the case of (5) S. Natarajan v. Commr. of Income Tax, Mysore, reported in 52 I. T. R. 882, relied on by mr. Pal are of no assistance. The said decisions do not lay down any such proposition. The said decisions indicate the nature and scope of any reassessment proceeding and lay down that in computation of the income in any such reassessment proceedings, allowances which might have been claimed at the time of the original assessment for computing the income of the assessee and which had not been claimed or allowed at the time of the original assessment, cannot be claimed at the time of computation of the assessee's income at the time of reassessment, in the event of the original assessment being reopened. These decisions deal with the question of computation of income of an assessee in a reassessment proceeding on the nature and scope thereof. These decisions do not consider the question of any relief which will be available to an assessee against his tax liability determined upon the computation of the assessee's income on reassessment. These decisions deal with the question of computation of income of an assessee in a reassessment proceeding on the nature and scope thereof. These decisions do not consider the question of any relief which will be available to an assessee against his tax liability determined upon the computation of the assessee's income on reassessment. The said decisions have no application to a case where the computation of the income on reassessment is not in question and relief is claimed against tax liability determined on computation of such income after reassessment. As the said decisions are of no assistance in the facts of the instant case, I do not consider it necessary to discuss the said decisions at any length. 12. THE other contention of Mr. Pai that the Tribunal should not have gone into the question of applicability of S. 49d (3), as that was not the subject matter of appeal before the Tribunal, is, in my opinion, not tenable. I have to observe that no such contention was raised on behalf of the Department before the Tribunal and the Tribunal's power and jurisdiction to consider this question were not disputed before the tribunal. The question has been raised in the instant reference also indicates that the power and jurisdiction of the tribunal to consider the question of applicability of S. 49d are not in dispute. Apart from this aspect, the subject-matter of the appeal before the tribunal, to my mind, included the question of assessee's tax liability on the Pakistan income and necessarily embraced in its fold the claim for relief against the tax liability determined on the reassessment. It may be noted that the Income-Tax Officer choose to grant the assessee relief on computation of the assessee's income after reassessment on the basis of the provisions of Indo Pakistan Agreement for Avoidance of Double Taxation. Apart from other contentions raised by the assessee before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner the assessee had denied his liability to be taxed in respect of his Pakistan income and had relied on the provisions of Indo Pakistan agreement for avoidance of double taxation. Apart from either contentions raised by the assessee before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner the Assessee had denied his liability to be taxed in respect of his Pakistan income and had relied on the provisions of Indo Pakistan Agreement for avoidance of double taxation in support of his case. Apart from either contentions raised by the assessee before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner the Assessee had denied his liability to be taxed in respect of his Pakistan income and had relied on the provisions of Indo Pakistan Agreement for avoidance of double taxation in support of his case. It is undoubtedly true that before the Income Tax Officer and the Appellate assistant Commr. the assessee had not referred to the provisions of S, 49d (3), but the assesses had all along denied and disputed his tax liability in India in respect of his Pakistan income. The determination of assessee's tax liability was, therefore, in issue in the appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and in deciding the said question the Tribunal was perfectly competent to consider the applicability of S. 49d (3. It is well settled that the tribunal enjoys very wide powers in respect of the subject-matter of the appeal before it. As the determination of tax liability of the assessee in respect of his Pakistan income was included in the subject-matter of the appeal before the Tribunal and as the determination of tax liability necessarily involves the consideration of any relief which affects the question of tax liability of the assessea. The Tribunal was justified in considering the applicability of S. 49d as the provisions of the said sec. are material in determining the tax liability of the assessee. The decisions on this aspect cited from the Bar, which I have earlier noted, are not of any material. assistance and I do not think it necessary to consider them. The last submission of Mr. Pal has been that there is no evidence of payment of tax by the assessee in Pakistan and in the absence of any proof of such payment S. 49d (3) could not be attracted. It is undoubtedly true that no relief u/s. 49d (3) can be allowed to an assessee unless the requirements of the said sec. are satisfied and it is entirely for the assessee to establish that the assesse satisfies the conditions of the said section. Proof of payment of Tax in Pakistan is one of the basic requirements which the assessee has to satisfy before the assessee can be allowed any relief u/s. 49d (3. are satisfied and it is entirely for the assessee to establish that the assesse satisfies the conditions of the said section. Proof of payment of Tax in Pakistan is one of the basic requirements which the assessee has to satisfy before the assessee can be allowed any relief u/s. 49d (3. In the instant case the Tribunal has considered this aspect of the matter on the Tribunal has held "so far as the sufference of agricultural income tax by the assessee is concerned, it can be verified by the Income Tax Officer even now. " the Tribunal has concluded by saying there being thus no substance in the argument raised on behalf of the deptt., we see no ground to withhold the legitimate claim on behalf of the assessee. The I. T. O. will now recompute the tax on the Parkul Tea Estate in accordance with S. 49e (3) and give the necessary relief to the Assessee. 13. THE order of the Tribunal indicates, to my mind, that the Tribunal had in view the requirement of proof of payment of Tax in Pakistan and the tribunal accordingly directed the Income to grant relief to the assessee after verifying the fact of payment of tax in Pakistan by the assessee. The effect of the order of the Tribunal in the instant case, to my mind, appears to be that relief to the assessee u/s. 49d (3) will only be granted by the I. T. O., upon the assessee proving to the satisfaction of the I. T. R. upon the assessee proving to the satisfaction of the I. T. O. payment of tax in Pakistan. In my opinion the Tribunal in its order has considered the eligibility of the assessee to make a claim for relief u/s. 49d (3)and has directed that the claim should be entertained and relief granted to the assessee by the I. T. R. provided, that the assessee furnishes proper proof of payment of tax in Pakistan to the Income tax Officer. The language used by the tribunal in its order may not be very happy, but the order cannot be and should not be construed to mean that the Tribunal has graded relief use. 49d (3) without requiring the basic condition of proof of payment of Tax in Pakistan by the assessee being satisfied. The language used by the tribunal in its order may not be very happy, but the order cannot be and should not be construed to mean that the Tribunal has graded relief use. 49d (3) without requiring the basic condition of proof of payment of Tax in Pakistan by the assessee being satisfied. The Order of the Tribunal has to be read as a whole and the said Order in my opinion, directs the Income Tax Officer to grant the necessary relief to the assessee u s. 49d (3) in the event of the assessee proving payment of Tax by him in Pakistan on the incline accrued to the assessee in Pakistan. 'the tribunal was undoubtedly competent to decide the eligibility of the claim of the assessee to relief under S. 49d (3)and to direct the Income Tax Officer to grant the necessary relief under the said sec. provided the assessee proves payment of tax in Pakistan on the said income. There would undoubtedly have been a great deal of force in the contention of Mr. Pal, if I had read land understood the order of the Tribunal to mean and imply that the Tribunal had granted unconditional relief to the assessee use. 49d (3) without the basic requirement of payment of Tax in pakistan by the assessee being proved. The way the Tribunal has choosen to make the Order, Justifies to an extent, the criticism made by Mr. Pal. But in view of my understanding and interpretation of the Order of the Tribunal, i must hold that the Tribunal was right in its conclusion. 14. I, therefore, answer the questtion in the affirmative in favour of the assesses against the Department, I, however, wish to make it clear that the relief u s. 49d (3) to which the asseasee has been held to be entitled by the tribunal will only be granted to the assessee by the Income Tax Officer upon the assessee furnishing necessary proof of payment of Tax in Pakistan. I further wish to observe that if in the course of granting relief to the assesspe under S. 49d (3) on necessary proof of payment of tax in Pakistan being furnished, any question of refund to the assesses arises, the I. T. O. will also consider whether the claim for refund is barred, bearing in mind the provisions of S. 49 (D) and S. 50 of the Act. In the facts and circumstances of this case I direct that each party will pay and bear its own costs.