JUDGMENT N.D. Ojha, J. - This appeal has been filed against the judgment of a learned Single Judge and arises out of proceedings under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) . When the village in which the plots which are the subject-matter of the present appeal are situated, was brought under consolidation operations the names of appellants along with others stood recorded in the statement of tenure-holders published under Sec. 11 of the Act as it stood before its amendment by U.P. Act 38 of 1958. Several sets of objections were filed under Sec. 12 of the Act. One set of these objections was filed by Pheku Singh, respondent No. 1, who claimed to be the sole sirdar of the plots in dispute on the allegation that his father Narottam Singh was the sirdar of these plots and on his death in April, 1955 these plots devolved upon him. The Consolidation Officer allowed the objection of Pheku Singh and dismissed those filed by the others. The order of Consolidation Officer was, however, set aside on an appeal filed by the present appellants, Pheku Singh thereupon filed a revision. The Deputy Director of Consolidation came to the conclusion that the appellants were licensees of Narottam Singh but on his death in April, 1955 their possession became adverse and no suit having been filed within three years from 1st July following, namely, 1st July, 1955 the rights of Pheku Singh extinguished and the appellants became sirdars of the plots in dispute. Aggrieved against the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation Pheku Singh filed a writ petition in this Court. Before the learned Single Judge it was not disputed that the requisite notification under Sec. 4 of the Act had been published before the period of three years had expired from 1st July, 1955. The learned Single Judge took the view that on the notification under Sec. 4 of the Act being published no suit under Sec. 209 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act could be filed for ejectment of the appellants because of the bar created by Sec. 49 of the Act and as such the appellants could not acquire sirdari rights under Sec. 210 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. It is this order of the learned Single Judge which is under challenge in the present special appeal. It is this order of the learned Single Judge which is under challenge in the present special appeal. 2. Learned counsel for the appellants has urged that since the proceedings for consolidation of holdings in the instant case had commenced under the Act as it stood before its amendment by U.P. Act 38 of 1958 and since the wordings of Sec. 5 of the Act as they stood at the relevant time were different then those which were introduced by the amending Act of 1958 a suit under Sec. 209 could be filed notwithstanding a notification having been issued under Sec. 4 of the Act and the learned Single Judge has erred in taking a contrary view. In support of his contention learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance upon two decisions, viz. Ahsan Ali v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1965 ALJ 1161 and Garaldwaj v. Bhadeshwar, 1966 ALJ 162. The decision in Ahsan Ali's case is by a learned Single Judge who followed the decision of the unreported Division on Bench case in Noor Mohd. v. Chinnu, Special Appeal No. 384 of 1959, decided on 25.8.1959. Reference has also been made in Ahsan Ali's case to the decision of another learned Single Judge in Dwarka v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Civil Misc Writ No. 632 of 1959, decided on 16.8.1960. In that case too the observations made in Noor Mohammad's case were followed. 3. The relevant observation which was made in Noor Mohammad's case is as follows : "The suit to recover possession could not be filed before the consolidation authorities. An objection under Sec. 12 of the Act is merely with respect to the fact that the recorded entries be corrected after a decision of the rights of the parties. The objection under Sec. 12, therefore, was neither an application for recovering possession nor a suit for the recovery of possession and, therefore, Sec. 49 of the Act did not bar a regular suit or application for the recovery of possession." 4. Similar were the observations made in Garaldwaj's case wherein it was held : "Section 5 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act as it stood prior to its amendment in 1958 did not bar a suit for possession; but simply barred a proceeding for correction of records. Similar were the observations made in Garaldwaj's case wherein it was held : "Section 5 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act as it stood prior to its amendment in 1958 did not bar a suit for possession; but simply barred a proceeding for correction of records. A suit to recover possession is a proceeding quite distinct from one for correction of records." At another place it was observed : "There is no provision in the Consolidation of Holdings Act under which a suit or application for recovery of possession can be filed At the time when his application was being considered by the Consolidation Officer it could not be said that Sec. 49 barred a suit by him for recovery of possession from the respondents." 5. As would appear from the observations quoted above the ratio decided of the aforesaid cases was that since the Consolidation of Holdings Act did not provide for a suit for possession under Sec. 209 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act the bar of objection 49 of the Act against institution of applications or suits referred to in that section would not apply to the suits for possession under Sec. 209 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. 6. In Abdul Waheed Khan v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1968 ALJ 117 (FB) it was held that the expression suit or application in Sec. 49 of the Act did not comprehend a suit under Sec. 209 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and such a suit under Sec. 209 was not barred by Sec. 49 of the Act. It is to be rememberei that the village in which the plots which were the subject-matter in dispute in Abdul Waheed Khan's case, had come under consolidation operations some time in the year 1956, namely, before the Act was amended by U.P. Act 38 of 1958. The decision of the Full Bench in Abdul Waheed Khan's case was rendered on 8th December, 1967. The decision of the Full Bench in Abdul Waheed Khan's case was rendered on 8th December, 1967. Before the said date, however, the Supreme Court had decided on 26th October, 1967 the case of Ram Adhar Singh v. Ram Roop Singh, 1968 ALJ 46 in which it had been held that : "The expression suit or proceedings in respect of declaration of rights or interest in any land contained in Sec. 5 of the Act as amended by Act 21 of 1966 was comprehensive enough to take in suits for possession of land, because, before a case for possession is accepted, the court will have, necessarily, to adjudicate upon the rights or interest of the plaintiff, in respect of the disputed property, taking into account the claim of the opposite-party." In Smt. Shakuntala Devi v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1968 AWR (HC) 271 one of us (Satish Chandra, J.) doubted the correctness of Abdul Waheed's case in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Ram Adhar's case. Abdul Waheed's case was decided by three judges and the matter was referred to a larger Bench of five Judges and their decision is reported in Badal v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1970 ALJ 510. The decision in Abdul Waheed's case was overruled and it was held that a suit under Sec. 209 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act cannot be filed once a village had been notified under Sec. 4 of the Act. The reasons which impelled the learned Judges, to take this view in Badal's case are contained in paragraph 11 of the report and the relevant portion of it is as follows : "There is no provision in the Act which deals or regulates the rights of the tenure-holders. True, those rights are regulated expressly by the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act, but if the holdings are to be consolidated it must first be decided as to whom the holdings belong. The Act, therefore, provides a machinery for preparing land records. It also makes provisions for objections being filed with regard to the correctness of the land records or with regard to the rights of the persons recorded. The Act also provides a machinery by which persons who claim rights in the holdings can assert their right and have their objections decided. It also makes provisions for objections being filed with regard to the correctness of the land records or with regard to the rights of the persons recorded. The Act also provides a machinery by which persons who claim rights in the holdings can assert their right and have their objections decided. After the land records have been prepared and objections have been disposed of, a provisional consolidation scheme is framed under the provisions of the Act and objections to it are invited. After the objections have been disposed of, the provisional scheme is confirmed and possession on its basis is given to persons in whose favour chaks have been carved out in the scheme. The Act also provides for appeals against the decisions on objections and for revisions. It could not have been possible to consolidate the holdings if the question of rights and claims had not been left to be decided by the consolidation authorities. The legislature, therefore, conferred the necessary jurisdiction on them. If the regular courts continued to exercise powers to determine matters relating to the rights of the parties in an area where consolidation operations are in force, possibility of there being conflicting orders could not have been avoided." Learned counsel for the appellant, however, contended that the provisions of Sec. 5 of the Act before its amendment by U.P. Act 38 of 1958 being vitally different than those after its amendment by the said Act and subsequent Acts, the law laid down in Badal's case would not apply to the instant case, inasmuch as Badal's case never dealt with a situation that arose before sec. 5 of the Act had been amender by U.P. Act 38 of 1958. We are unable to agree with this submission. For the determination of the point in issue the provisions of Sec. 5 of the Act are really of no importance. What is material is the provision contained in Sec. 49 of the Act. The scope of Secs. 5 and 49 of the Act was considered in Smt. Shakuntala Devi's cafe as well as in Badal's case. Smt. Shakuntala Devi's case held as follows : "Section 5 froze pending suits or proceedings relating to declaration or adjudication of rights pending their adjudication under the Consolidation of Holdings Act. The scope of Secs. 5 and 49 of the Act was considered in Smt. Shakuntala Devi's cafe as well as in Badal's case. Smt. Shakuntala Devi's case held as follows : "Section 5 froze pending suits or proceedings relating to declaration or adjudication of rights pending their adjudication under the Consolidation of Holdings Act. Sec. 49 forbade the institution of fresh suits or other proceedings with respect to inter alia, any matter in regard to which a suit or application can be filed under the provisions of Consolidation of Holdings Act . . . . . . . . . Both relate to the rights or interest in land covered by the Notification under Sec.The basic aim of the Legislature was to bring all such disputes before one tribunal namely that created by the Act." 7. In Badal's case it was pointed our that the effect of Sec. 5 was to oust the jurisdiction of civil and revenue courts from deciding existing suits or proceedings or disputes in respect of land falling in an area under consolidation operations whereas Sec. 49 of the Act barred the filing of subsequent suits or proceedings in respect of matters which could be substantially decided by the consolidation authorities. (Emphasis supplied) . It is true that Sec. 5 of the Act as it stood before 1958 did not talk of any suit in respect of declaration or rights or interest in land, but referred to only proceedings for correction of records but that in our opinion is of no consequence inasmuch as the bar created by Sec. 49 against falling of suits was even then in almost similar terms as it has been after 1958, Sec. 49 of the Act before 1958 was as follows: "49. Bar to civil court jurisdiction :- No person shall institute any suit or proceeding in any civil or revenue court with respect to any matter arising out of consolidation proceedings or with respect to any other matter in regard to which a suit or application could be filed under the provision of this Act." 8. Bar to civil court jurisdiction :- No person shall institute any suit or proceeding in any civil or revenue court with respect to any matter arising out of consolidation proceedings or with respect to any other matter in regard to which a suit or application could be filed under the provision of this Act." 8. In view of the observations made in the Full Bench case of Badal v. Deputy Director of Consolidation there seems to be no manner of doubt that even before 1958 once the requisite notification under Sec. 4 of the Act had been issued no suit for possession under Sec. 209 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act could be filed. The case relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants were decided before the decision of the Full Bench in Abdul Waheed's case which took a similar view. Since Abdul Waheed's case has been over-ruled by the decision in Badal's case no reliance can be placed upon the earlier decision and in our opinion the learned Single Judge was, therefore, right in taking the view which he did. 9. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.