JUDGMENT V. Balakrishna Eradi, J. 1. The main question that falls to be decided in these writ petitions concerns the interpretation and scope of R.39 of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1958 and also S.2 and 3 of the Kerala Public Services Act, 1968. The petitioners have challenged the validity of certain orders passed by the State Government in purported exercise of the power conferred by R.39 aforementioned. One of the important points raised by them is that the only authority empowered by the said Rule to exercise the power conferred by it is the Governor of the State and since the orders impugned in the writ petitions were passed only by the State Government without even submitting the files to the Governor those proceedings are illegal and without jurisdiction. 2. After the commencement of the hearing of these cases the Government of Kerala in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-s.(1) of S.2 of the Kerala Public Services Act,1968 read with S.3 thereof issued an amendment to the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules whereby a new provision was substituted in the place of the original R.39. This amendment was made as per notification SRO. No. 379/72 dated the 10th July, 1972 published in the Kerala Gazette dated the 18th July, 1972. It is stated in the said notification that the amendment shall be deemed to have come into force with effect from 17-12-1958 which is the date on which the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules were originally brought into force. The petitioners have challenged the validly of the said notification in so far as it purports to give retrospective operation to the amendment with effect from a date anterior to the date of coming into force of the parent enactment under which the amendment purports to have been issued, namely the Kerala Public Service Act, 1968 which came into force only on the 17th September, 1968. It is also contended by them, in the alternative, that even if the amended provision is to be regarded as having been validly given retrospective effect, it has not brought about any change in the scope of the power conferred by the rule (R.39) and that the orders impugned in these writ petitions are wholly beyond the competence of the State Government even under the rule as now amended. 3. 3. R.39 as it originally stood was in the following terms: "Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules or in the Special Rules, the Governor shall have power to deal with the case of any person serving in a civil capacity under the Government of Kerala or any candidate for appointment to a service in such manner as may be appear to him to be just and equitable: Provided that, where any such rule is applicable to the case of any person, the case shall not be dealt with in any manner less favourable to him than that provided by that rule." After the amendment dated the 10th July, 1972 the rule reads: "Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules or in the Special Rules or in any other Rules or Government Orders the Government shall have power to deal with the case of any person or persons serving in a Civil capacity under the Government of Kerala or any candidate for appointment to a service in such manner as may appear to the Government to be just and equitable: Provided that where such rules or orders are applicable to the case of any person or persons, the case shall not be dealt with in any manner less favourable to him or them than that provided by those rules or orders." 4. In addition to the contentions referred to above concerning the retrospectively of the amendment of R.39 and the competence of the State Government to exercise the power conferred by R.39 prior to its amendment, various other points have also been raised in common by all the writ petitioners. The petitioners contend that there has been a violation of their fundamental rights under Art.14 and 16 of the Constitution by reason of the denial to them of the right to have their seniority and rank reckoned under R.27 which is applicable to all other Government servants. It is argued on their behalf that what had been done by the State Government under the impugned orders is to grant a special treatment to an undefined group of officers by exempting them from the relevant rules and consequently to deprive the petitioners of the rights which have legitimately accrued to them under the existing rules and that this action is not supported by any valid or reasonable classification which has a rational relationship to the object and purpose of the Rules in question. It is also strongly contended on behalf .of the petitioners that R.39 does not confer a blanket power to abrogate or nullify by an executive order all or any of the provisions contained in the General or Special Rules in respect of any group of officers governed by those provisions. It is submitted by the petitioners that the object and purpose of the said rule is only to reserve power with the authority named in it to deal individually with the case of any particular officer or officers and to pass any order as may appear to the authority to be just and equitable, notwithstanding any of the provisions contained in the General or Special Rules. The petitioners' argument is that R.39 does not confer any power to grant a general exemption or en masse relaxation of the provisions of the General or Special Rules in favour of a class or group of persons but warrants only a special treatment being given in any specified case or cases where after due application of the mind of the competent authority a satisfaction is arrived at that it is just and equitable to pass such an order. Another point that is taken on behalf of the petitioners is that R.39 does not empower an order being passed in direct contravention of any substantive provision contained either in the General or Special Rules; it merely permits a relaxation of the rigour of such provision so far as they pertain to procedural or incidental matters in respect of which no vested right can be postulated as having accrued to any of the other officers in the service. Counsel for the petitioners very strongly put forward the plea that the power under R.39 having been avowedly conferred for the purpose of enabling the authority named in it to deal with the case of any person in a just and equitable manner, it is implicit that the said power cannot be exercised in favour of any particular officer in such a manner as would cause injustice or inequity to other persons in service. Counsel went further and urged that no order under R.39 can be validly passed if it would have the result of prejudicially affecting the rights of any other person in service. Counsel went further and urged that no order under R.39 can be validly passed if it would have the result of prejudicially affecting the rights of any other person in service. Alternatively, it is argued that, in any event, it is incumbent on the authority exercising the power under R.39 to take into account the repercussions that the proposed action will have on other personnel belonging to the service before any conclusion is arrived at as to whether such action would be 'just and equitable'. Lastly, it is submitted on behalf of the petitioners that the impugned orders which have the direct effect of disrupting the settled seniority and rank of the petitioners and thereby visiting them with adverse civil consequences, were issued without giving any opportunity, to the petitioners to make their representations against the proposed action. It is said that if only the petitioners had been given an opportunity to represent their case before the Government it would have been possible for them to place all the relevant facts and circumstances and prove to the satisfaction of the Government that the proposed action was neither just nor equitable. It is accordingly urged that the impugned orders should be declared to be null and void on the ground of contravention of the principles of natural justice also. 5. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State Government the petitioners' contention that the power conferred by R.39 is to be exercised only by the Governor and not by the State Government has been strongly refuted The stand taken in the counter affidavit is that the expression 'Governor' used in the rule denotes only the State Government and that it is not intended that the power should be exercised by the Governor himself in the exercise of his individual discretion. Elaborate arguments were, therefore, advanced by the counsel for the petitioners in support of their contention that R.39 has conferred a special power on the Governor treating him as distinct from the State Government. The learned Government Pleader had also addressed his arguments touching this aspect of the case in part and it was at that stage that R.39 was amended as per the notification dated the 10th July, 1972. The learned Government Pleader had also addressed his arguments touching this aspect of the case in part and it was at that stage that R.39 was amended as per the notification dated the 10th July, 1972. In the light of the said development the hearing of the case was adjourned by us on the request of the petitioners' advocates in order to enable the petitioners to amend the writ petitions by incorporating certain additional contentions which they wished to raise concerning the validity and scope of the amended rule. When the bearing of the cases was resumed on 31-7-1972 the Government Pleader submitted before us that he was no longer pressing the contention originally raised by him that the expression 'Governor' occurring in R.39 as it stood prior to its amendment should be understood as denoting only the State Government and that the power under the unamended rule could be exercised by the State Government without the files being placed at all before the Governor. The Government Pleader further told us that the impugned orders are now sought to be supported by him only by relying on the amendment made in R.39 by substituting the word 'Government' in the place of the expression 'Governor' with retrospective effect from 17-12-1958. He contends that the said amendment has the effect of validating all the orders previously passed by the State Government in purported exercise of the power conferred by R.39 even though at the time when those orders were passed the State Government was not really the authority competent to exercise the power conferred by the said rule as it then stood. In view of the above submissions made by the Government Pleader it has become unnecessary for us to deal with the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioners that the Governor alone could have exercised the power conferred by R.39 as it stood prior to the amendment, We may, however, observe that after having heard the arguments addressed to us on this aspect by the learned advocates appearing for the petitioners and by the Government Pleader who too had submitted most part of his arguments covering this matter before the hearing of the case was adjourned in view of the introduction of the amendment, we were inclined to take the view that the power under R.39 as it stood prior to the amendment could be exercised only by the Governor of the State acting on the advice of the Cabinet and not by the State Government without any reference of the matter to the Governor. The concession made by the Government Pleader has only obviated the necessity for an elaborate discussion by us in this judgement dealing with the arguments advanced by both sides on this aspect and stating our reasons in support of the conclusion indicated above. 6. For the sake of convenience, we propose to treat O. P. No. 5157 of 1969 as the main case and to refer to the facts of that case while dealing with the common questions of law arising for decision before us. After recording our conclusions on the said questions we shall be dealing with the facts of each of the remaining cases separately in this judgment. 7. There are two petitioners in O. P. No. 5157 of 1969 and both of them are working as Assistant Grade I in the Government Secretariat, Trivandrum. The first petitioner was originally working as a lower division clerk in the Harijan Welfare Department having been recruited thereto by the Public Service Commission in 1959. The second petitioner had been recruited by the Madras Public Service Commission and he was appointed as a lower division clerk in the Office of the Director of Medical Services of Madras with effect from 26-3-1954. Consequent on the reorganisation of States, the second petitioner was allotted to Kerala and in worked in the Directorate of Health Services in Trivandrum and subsequently in the Medical College, Calicut as a lower division clerk. Consequent on the reorganisation of States, the second petitioner was allotted to Kerala and in worked in the Directorate of Health Services in Trivandrum and subsequently in the Medical College, Calicut as a lower division clerk. Both the petitioners were subsequently recruited by transfer to the Kerala Government Secretariat service as Assistants Grade II in 1960, in order to be eligible for promotion from the category of Assistant Grade II to that of Assistant Grade I. the passing of the account test (lower) was a necessary qualification. The first petitioner had acquired the said qualification in 1960. The second petitioner bad passed the test in 1957 itself. During the period from 1-11-1961 to 25-12-1961 there arose in the Secretariat 18 vacancies in the posts of Assistants Grade I and they bad to be filled up by promoting qualified hands from the category of Assistants Grade II. The first petitioner and four others were provisionally promoted as Assistants Grade I as per the order Ext. P1 dated 12-3-1962. The promotion given to the 1st petitioner under the said order was with effect from 1-11-1961. Even though there were six other officers including the 2nd petitioner, who were also fully qualified for promotion at that time and though sufficient number of vacancies did exist, they were not then promoted. Several representations were made to Government by those officers from 1962 onwards pressing their claims for promotion. Ultimately, on 20-1-1968 the Government passed the order Ext. P2 holding that the denial of promotion to the six officers including the second petitioner constituted a discrimination which required to be set right and hence granting sanction for the notional promotion of the said six persons to Grade I with effect from the respective dates noted in the order against the names of each of the officers. The 2nd petitioner was granted the promotion with effect from 1-11-1961. Ext. P2 proceeds on the basis that the 1st petitioner and four others had been promoted regularly to Grade I with effect from November, 1951. Likewise the promotions granted to the six persons including the 2nd petitioner under Ext. P2 were also regular in character. Thus, the position was that as a result of Exts. Ext. P2 proceeds on the basis that the 1st petitioner and four others had been promoted regularly to Grade I with effect from November, 1951. Likewise the promotions granted to the six persons including the 2nd petitioner under Ext. P2 were also regular in character. Thus, the position was that as a result of Exts. P1 and P2 the two writ petitioners bad been regularly promoted to the category of Assistants Grade I with effect from 1-11-1961 and they were entitled to ranking and seniority in the said category on that basis. 8. As on 1-11-1961 which is the date with reference to which the petitioners have been granted promotions to Grade I, there were several persons in the category of Assistants Grade II who were seniors in the said category in relation to the two writ petitioners but they had not passed the account test (lower) and were not, therefore, eligible for promotion to Grade I. Some of these persons acquired test qualifications subsequently and they appear to have made representations to the Government requesting that they should be given a restoration of their seniority over their erstwhile juniors on their promotion to the higher grade. Since all these persons were recruited into the Secretariat service only after the formation of the Kerala State they were not entitled to the benefit of the order R Dis. 8207/60/CS dated the 7th May, 1951 issued by the Travancore Cochin Government and consequently the proviso to R.27(b) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules was also not attracted. However, on 3-8-1968 the Government issued the order Ext. P3 directing that, as a special case, in relaxation of R.27(a) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules such of the seniors amongst Assistant Grade !I who had passed the account test within the first two chances after the date of their joining duty in the Secretariat service will regain their seniority in Grade I on their promotion thereto. It is mentioned in Ext. P3 itself that the promotions that were granted to test qualified hands had been made by adhering to the rules which were then applicable. It is mentioned in Ext. P3 itself that the promotions that were granted to test qualified hands had been made by adhering to the rules which were then applicable. It is also stated in the order that even though the principle originally followed in the Travancore Cochin area prior to the date of issuance of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules was that a senior without test qualification who was passed over for promotion could regain his seniority in the higher grade on his subsequent promotion provided the junior who superseded him had not been confirmed in the higher grade in the meantime, the position had become altered with the introduction of the General Rules for the State and Subordinate Services and such restoration of seniority was not thereafter possible. It is then said in Ext. P3 that the application of R.27(a) has put senior hands who bad no sufficient opportunity to get themselves qualified in account test in a most disadvantageous position and that the said contingency has arisen as no minimum period of service in Grade II was required for promotion to Grade I prior to 13-11-1963 on which date alone it was laid down as per the G. O. Ext. P5 that the minimum service of two years as Assistant Grade II will be insisted on as a qualification for promotion to Grade I. It is on the aforesaid ground that the Government have proceeded to relax R.27(a) of the General Rules and to issue the direction contained in Ext. P3 that such of the seniors who had passed the account test within the first two chances should be allowed to regain their seniority in Grade I on promotion thereto. 9. Further representations seem to have been made to the State Government by some of the Assistants Grade II who apparently had not passed the account test even within the first two chances and were not, therefore, eligible for the benefit granted under Ext. P3. On a consideration of those representations, the State Government issued revised orders in the matter as per Ext. P4 dated 30-10-1969 in supersession of Ext. P3. P3. On a consideration of those representations, the State Government issued revised orders in the matter as per Ext. P4 dated 30-10-1969 in supersession of Ext. P3. By this order the benefit of restoration of seniority was extended to all the seniors amongst Assistant Grade II who had passed the account test (lower) within the first four chances and had thereafter got promoted to Grade I. In addition to setting out the very same grounds which had already been mentioned in Ext. P3 as the justification for the relaxation of Rule (27(a), a further reason is also given by the State Government in Ext. P4. Reference is made in Ext. P4 to the fact that in the case of persons appointed by direct recruitment to posts requiring test qualification two years' time is usually granted to them to acquire test qualification. Mention is also made of the circumstance that when new tests are introduced persons in service are given exemption from the test for two years and that in such cases it has been made clear that four chances should be allowed where the period of exemption to pass the test is fixed as two years. After referring to these two aspects it is stated In Ext. P4 that the Government considered that such of the Assistants who were superseded for promotion to Grade I by their juniors for want of test qualification "should be given at least the same treatment admissible to others in service in the matter of acquisition of test qualification." Accordingly Government have proceeded in Ext. P4 to expressly invoke the power conferred by R.39 of the General Rules of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules to order, as a special case, in relaxation of R.27(a) that such of the seniors who have passed the account test within the first four chances available to them after the date of their joining duty in the Secretariat service will regain their seniority in the Grade I on their promotion thereto As a result of this order passed in 1969 the rank and seniority of persons like the petitioners who had been granted promotions with effect from 1961 were very seriously affected. Thereupon the petitioners came up to this court with this writ petition dated the 18th December, 1969, challenging Exts. P3 and P4. 10. Thereupon the petitioners came up to this court with this writ petition dated the 18th December, 1969, challenging Exts. P3 and P4. 10. Subsequent to the institution of this writ petition and during its pendency the Government have again passed another order covering the same subject as per G. O. MS. 335/PD dated 25-9-1970 in supersession of Exts. P3 and P4. Ext. P9 is a copy of the said order. Government have stated in Ext. P9 that on a reexamination of the case it was found that Exts. P3 and P4 have caused much hardship to a number of Senior Assistants instead of redressing their grievances and that the purpose which the Government had in view when passing the orders Exts. P3 and P4 had not been achieved by the issuance of those orders. It is further stated in Ext. P9 that the Government was of the opinion that the only fair and equitable solution to the problem was to cancel Exts. P3 and P4 and to allow restoration of rank on promotion as Assistant Grade I to all those Assistants who had joined the Secretariat during the period from 17-12-1958 to 13-11-1963 and who were superseded by their juniors for promotion to Grade I for want of test qualification. A direction to that effect is given under Ext. P9 in relaxation of R.27(a) of the General Rules contained in the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules The passing of Ext. P9 has made the position of the petitioners much worse than what it was on the date of institution of the writ petition. In view of this development which took place during the pendency of the writ petition, the petitioners were permitted by this court to amend the two writ petitions by incorporating a challenge against Ext. P9 which is now the only surviving order on the subject in as much as Government themselves have cancelled Exts. P3 and P4. Whereas under Exts.P3 and P4 the benefit of restoration was granted only to those superseded seniors amongst Assistant Grade II who had acquired the test qualification within the first two chances and four chances respectively, under Ext. P9 which is now the only surviving order on the subject in as much as Government themselves have cancelled Exts. P3 and P4. Whereas under Exts.P3 and P4 the benefit of restoration was granted only to those superseded seniors amongst Assistant Grade II who had acquired the test qualification within the first two chances and four chances respectively, under Ext. P9 a senior in the category of Assistant Grade II can acquire the account test qualification at any time and on getting promoted to Grade I can claim restoration of his Seniority in the higher grade as of right over all his erstwhile juniors, even though they might have been regularly promoted to the higher category many years earlier. The result is that the rank and seniority of those promoted to Grade I will be indefinitely in an uncertain and insecure state because as long as there is any single unqualified senior remaining in service in the category of Assistant Grade II the Damocles sword of Ext. P9 will continue to menacingly dangle over the heads of the Assistant Grade I. 11. Against the back drop of the above narration of facts relating to O. P. No. 5157 of 1969 we shall now proceed to consider the various points urged on behalf of the petitioners, Although a faint suggestion was made by some of the counsel appearing on behalf the petitioners that R.39 itself suffers from the vice of excessive delegation and is, therefore, invalid for arbitrariness, this attack was not seriously pursued. In our opinion, sufficient indication is contained in the rule regarding its underlying object and purpose in as much as it is expressly stated therein that the power conferred by it is only to deal with the case of any officer in a just and equitable manner which is not less favourable to him than what is provided under rules. This constitutes sufficient guidance to the authority who is to exercise the power and hence it cannot be said that there has been an excessive delegation or that the discretion conferred by the rule is arbitrary or unguided. 12. We now come to the more important question as to the precise nature, scope and amplitude of the power conferred by R.39. 12. We now come to the more important question as to the precise nature, scope and amplitude of the power conferred by R.39. We may say at the outset itself that the amendment introduced by the notification dated the 10th July, 1972 has made no alteration at all in the scope or content of the power conferred by the rule and the position in that regard remains the same both before and after the said amendment. 13. The import, content and scope of Art.14 of the Constitution has been elaborately considered and explained in a number of authoritative pronouncements of the highest court of our country. The first part of the Article is a declaration of equality of civil rights of all citizens within the territories of India and the second part which is a corollary of the first, enjoins that equal protection shall be secured to all such persons in the enjoyment of their rights and liberties without discrimination and favouritism; it is a pledge of the protection of equal aws, that is, laws that operate alike on all persons under like circumstances. The prohibition under the Article is directed against the 'State' which expression is defined in Art.12 as including not only the legislatures but also the Governments in the country. Art.13 of the Constitution has defined 'law' as including among other things, any order, rule or notification having the force of law so that even executive orders or notifications must not infringe Art.14. The principle of equality laid down in Art.14 is reiterated in Art.16 of the Constitution which guarantees equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. All statutory rules and notifications pertaining to matters "relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State" (which words are wide enough to include conditions of service and all like matters incidental to the employment) must, therefore, conform to the principles enunciated in Art.14 and 16 of the Constitution. The principle of equality does not, however, mean that every law must have universal application to all persons even if they are not by nature, or circumstance similarly situated. The principle of equality does not, however, mean that every law must have universal application to all persons even if they are not by nature, or circumstance similarly situated. What is insisted by Art.14 and 16 is that equal laws have to be applied to all in the same situation and that there should be no discrimination between one person and another, if as regards the subject matter of the legislation or rule their position is substantially the same. The legislature or the rule making authority has the undoubted right of classifying persons and applying different rules or principles' to persons differently situated; but such a classification must rest upon some real and substantial distinction bearing a reasonable and just relation to the object and purpose sought to be served by the rules. A law will be liable to be struck down as offending Art.14 and 16 if it empowers any authority to arbitrarily pick and choose according to its sweet will and pleasure certain persons from out of a large group of individuals similarly situated and subject them either to a hostile or a favourable treatment. 14. We have considered it necessary to restate the settled legal position relating to the scope and effect of Art.14 and 16 of the Constitution because it has material relevance in determining the precise nature and amplitude of the power conferred by R.39. The attack made against the validity of the rule on the ground of arbitrariness has been repelled by us by holding that the rule contains sufficient indication of its policy and purpose for the guidance of the authority exercising the power conferred by it. We have, therefore, to so construe the rule as would eliminate arbitrariness and would also render its provisions consistent with Art.14 and 16 of the Constitution. An interpretation which would lead to the result of laying the rule open to attack on the ground that it permits dissimilar treatment of persons situated alike, has manifestly to be avoided. 15. In the light of the principles stated above we feel no doubt that the proper construction to be placed on R.39 is to understand it as conferring power on the authority designated therein to mete out special treatment only in cases where the facts and circumstances are such that a reasonable classification is possible. 15. In the light of the principles stated above we feel no doubt that the proper construction to be placed on R.39 is to understand it as conferring power on the authority designated therein to mete out special treatment only in cases where the facts and circumstances are such that a reasonable classification is possible. The classification must, no doubt, be based on some real and substantial distinction having a just and reasonable relation to the object and purpose of the rules. It is in this context that the words "just and equitable" occurring in R.39 assume great importance as they furnish the guiding principle on the basis of which the classification is to be made. In our opinion, R.39, so understood, is perfectly valid and constitutional. Any action taken in purported exercise of the power conferred by the said rule will however be liable to be set aside by the Court if it fails to satisfy the test of reasonable classification. The interference by the Court will then be not so much on the ground that the action is in violation of Art.14 and 16 of the Constitution but more for the reason of the impugned action being not sanctioned or authorised by the rule itself and hence ultra vires. 16. The setting in which R.39 appears has also a bearing on the construction to be placed upon it. It is the last amongst the general rules contained in Part II of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules. Detailed provisions have been made in R.1 to 38 laying down the conditions of service relating to the methods of recruitment, promotion, special qualifications departmental tests, the grant of temporary exemption from test qualification for purposes of promotion, reservation of appointments for backward classes and scheduled castes etc., probation, its suspension, termination or extension, seniority, principles for the reckoning of and entitlement for promotion to non selection posts, mode of making appointments to selection category, postings and transfers of officers, temporary promotions etc. etc. It is thereafter that R.39 occurs whereby power is reserved with the authority designated therein to deal with the case of any person serving in a civil capacity under the Government or any candidate for appointment to service in such manner as may appear to it to be just and equitable. etc. It is thereafter that R.39 occurs whereby power is reserved with the authority designated therein to deal with the case of any person serving in a civil capacity under the Government or any candidate for appointment to service in such manner as may appear to it to be just and equitable. In our view, it would not be correct to interpret R.39 as conferring an unbridled discretion on the competent authority to decide at its sweet will and pleasure either to apply or not to apply the provisions of the remaining rules in the case of any person or groups of persons, much less to ignore or violate all those rules. In fact, the conferment of such an arbitrary power would be plainly violative of Art.14 and 16 of the Constitution and will not be valid. 17. In a case recently decided by the Supreme Court R. N. Nanjundappa v. T. Thimmiah and Another, 1972 (1) SCC 409 their Lordships had occasion to consider the question whether it is competent for the Governor to invoke the power under the proviso to Art.309 of the Constitution for regularising an appointment which had been made in violation of the existing rules governing the subject. One Dr. Thimmiah, who was holding substantively only the post of an Assistant Geologist which is a Class III post in the Technical Education Department of the Mysore Government, was appointed Principal, School of Mines with effect from the 15th February, 1958 as per order passed by the State Government dated July 3, 1959. The post of Principal was Class I post. Under the relevant provisions of the Mysore State Civil Services (General Recruitment) Rules, 1957 and the Mysore Education Department Services (Technical Education Department) Recruitment Rules, 1964 Dr. Thimmiah was not eligible to be appointed as Principal either on deputation or by way of promotion. His appointment was, therefore, one made in contravention of the existing service rules framed under the proviso to Art.309. To get over this difficulty the Governor of Mysore, in purported exercise of the power conferred by the proviso to Art.309, published the following "Special Recruitment Rules" on February 9, 1967: "In exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Art.309 of the Constitution of India, and all other powers enabling him in this behalf, the Governor of Mysore hereby makes the following rules, namely 1. Title.-- These rules may be called the Mysore Education Department Services (Technical Education Department (Special Recruitment) Rules, 1967. 2. Provisions relating to regularisation of appointment of Principal, School of Mines, Oorgaum, Kolar Gold Fields. Notwithstanding any rule made under the proviso to Art.309 of the Constitution of India, or any other rules or Order in force at any time, Dr. T. Thimmiah. B. Sc. (Hons.) PH. D. (Lond.) F. G. S., shall be deemed to have been regularly appointed as Principal, School of Mines, Ooragaum. Kolar Gold Fields, with effect from February, 15,1958. (By order and in the name of the Governor of Mysore) (Sd.) S. N. Sreenath Under Secretary to Government Education Department." The challenge before the Supreme Court was against these "Special Rules". It was contended on behalf of the State Government of Mysore that the State bad the power under the proviso to Art.309 of the Constitution to make a rule regularising the appointment of an officer even though the appointment had been made contrary to the existing rules on the subject. This plea was rejected by the Supreme Court and the impugned rules were declared to be void. Their Lordships said: -- "Assume that rules under Art.309 could be made in respect of appointment of one man but there are two limitations. Art.309 speaks of rules for appointment and general conditions of service. Regularisation of appointment by stating that notwithstanding any rules the appointment is regularised strikes at the root of the rules and if the effect of the regularisation is to nullify the operation and effectiveness of the rules, the rule itself is open to criticism on the ground that it is in violation of current rules. Therefore the relevant rules at the material time as to promotion and appointment are infringed and the impeached rule cannot be permitted to stand to operate as a regularisation of appointment of one person in utter defiance of rules requiring consideration of seniority and merit in the case of promotion and consideration of appointment by selection or by competitive examination. Xx x x x x x x x x x x x x xx If the appointment itself is in infraction of the rules or if it is in violation of the provisions of the Constitution illegality cannot be regularised. Xx x x x x x x x x x x x x xx If the appointment itself is in infraction of the rules or if it is in violation of the provisions of the Constitution illegality cannot be regularised. Ratification or regularisation is possible of an act which is within the power and province of the authority but there has been some non compliance with procedure or manner which does not go to the root of the appointment. Regularisation cannot be said to be a mode of recruitment. To accede to such a proposition would be to introduce a new head of appointment in defiance of rules or it may have the effect of setting at naught the rules. The above observations of the Supreme Court lend full support to our view that a rule cannot be validly framed under the proviso to Art.309 conferring an J arbitrary discretion on the .State Government or any other authority to totally I ignore the existing rules governing any aspect of the service conditions and to mete out special treatment to any particular officer or groups of officers in such a way as to totally nullify the operation and effectiveness of the rules. Hence, if R.39 is to be valid it has to be interpreted in such a manner as would reader its provisions consistent with the above legal position. If, as laid down by the Supreme Court in the decision above cited, an action taken in contravention of the existing rules cannot be validated by making a special rule for that purpose under the proviso to Art.305, it is equally clear that no such action can be authorised to be done by any special provision made in that behalf under the proviso to Art.309, such as R.39 of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules; much lese can it be done by an executive order passed pursuant to the power conferred by such a rule. 18. R.1 to 38 contained in Part I of the Kerala State and Subordinate the Government as on the officers in its service. 18. R.1 to 38 contained in Part I of the Kerala State and Subordinate the Government as on the officers in its service. While framing those roles in would appear to have been, however, recognised by the rule making authority that instances may sometimes occur where a strict and rigorous application of the aforementioned rules may result in manifest injustice or inequity and it is only to deal with such an extraordinary situation that the power has been conferred under R.39. It goes without saying that the said power is to be sparingly exercised and its use must be restricted to cases of a very exceptional nature. If due regard be had to the real nature and purpose of the power as explained above, there can be no difficulty in seeing that it can be exercised only in those individual cases where the authority finds that on account of special circumstances a separate or differential treatment is justified and that such action is necessary in order to mete out justice and equity. The actual exercise of the power must therefore be preceded by a careful application of the mind of the authority to all the relevant facts and circumstances and a satisfaction being arrived at by it to the effect indicated above. In this context it is necessary to remember that the service rules framed under the proviso to Art.309 most ordinarily be taken to be in perfect conformity with accepted notions of justice and equity.' It could not, therefore, have been the intention of the rule making authority in framing R.39 that the power conferred by the said rule is to be utilised whenever it is found that the enforcement of any particular service rule results in some hardship to any officer or groups of officers. The remedy for such a situation, if it is found to exist, will be only to amend the offending rule and the power under R.39 cannot be resorted to as an easy substitute. 19. We have already pointed out that it is not the purpose of R.39 to empower the authority designated in it to arbitrarily deal out special treatment to any officer or officers according to its sweet will and pleasure, by passing orders in direct contravention of any of the Rules Nos. 1 to 38. 19. We have already pointed out that it is not the purpose of R.39 to empower the authority designated in it to arbitrarily deal out special treatment to any officer or officers according to its sweet will and pleasure, by passing orders in direct contravention of any of the Rules Nos. 1 to 38. The non obstante clause occurring in R.39 cannot be construed as enabling the authority designated in the Rule to nullify by an executive order the provisions contained in the remaining rules. The expression 'notwithstanding anything contained in these rules' occurs in various other rules contained in Part II also for example, see R.3©, R.9©, R.9(d), R.13AA. R.17A, R.30, R.35(f) and R.37 An examination of the context in which these ((identical words have been used in the other rules reveals that the object underlying the incorporation of the non obstante clause is only to declare that in regard to the particular topic dealt with in the concerned rule, where the clause occurs, the provisions of the said rule shall prevail, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any of the other rules contained in Part II or in the special rules. In other words, the intention is not that the particular rule where the clause occurs will override the provisions of all the remaining rules in respect of all matters; it only means that for the limited purpose of effectuating the provision of that particular rule in relation to its subject matter the other rules would not stand in the way In our view, it is this restricted interpretation that is to be given to the non obstante clause occurring in R.39 also and it will not be correct to understand the said rule as giving a carteblanche to the authority named in it to cast to the winds the provisions contained in the general or special rules and in dealing with the cases of any set of officers. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in S. G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India & Others ( AIR 1967 SC 1427 ), "the absence of arbitrary power is the first essential of the rule of law upon which our whole constitutional system is based. In a system governed by rule of law, discretion, when conferred upon executive authorities, must be confined within clearly defined limits. In a system governed by rule of law, discretion, when conferred upon executive authorities, must be confined within clearly defined limits. The rule of law from this point of view means that decisions should be made by the application of known principles and rules and, in general, such decisions should be predictable and citizen should know where he is." 20. Ordinarily, therefore, it is not expected that the power under R.39 should be resorted to merely for the purpose of getting round the provision contained in any of the general rules or special rules. R.39 is to be invoked only to meet exceptional situations where gross injustice or inequity is seen to result from the application of the rules in all their rigour. In such cases and such cases alone, R.39 empowers the designated authority to mete out equity and justice by passing appropriate orders in relaxation of the provisions of the rules concerned. 21. We may now summarise the conclusions that emerge from the preceding discussion. We hold that R.39 is valid and that it does not suffer from the vice of arbitrariness or excessive delegation. We are of the view that the said Rule does not warrant the passing of any general order with respect to any undefined or large group of persons exempting them from the operation of any existing rule or granting a relaxation of the rules in favour of such a group. The rule only authorises the authority designated therein to deal with any specific case or cases of individual officers and to pass orders in a just and equitable manner after a full application of the mind of the authority to all the relevant facts and circumstances necessary for a proper determination of the question as to what would constitute justice and equity. In exercising this power it is open to the authority to relax the rigour of the rules to such extent as may be necessary to ensure justice and equity, but it cannot completely nullify the operation and effectiveness of the rules in the guise of relaxing their rigour. In exercising this power it is open to the authority to relax the rigour of the rules to such extent as may be necessary to ensure justice and equity, but it cannot completely nullify the operation and effectiveness of the rules in the guise of relaxing their rigour. If, however, special circumstances do exist warranting a valid classification of the particular case or cases it will also be open to the authority exercising the power under R.39 to accord a special treatment in respect of such exceptional cases even by exempting the person or persons concerned from the operation of any particular rule. In saying this we consider it necessary to emphasise that such a course will be permissible only in those rare cases where very strong grounds exist justifying a valid classification of the cases of the officers in question for the purposes of Art.14 and 16 of the Constitution. In determining what is 'just and equitable' the authority should take into account the overall effect that the proposed order would have in relation not merely to the particular officers whose cases are specifically dealt with by it but also to all others belonging to the same service, category or class. The mere fact that the enforcement of a rule creates hardship to an officer or a group of officers will be no ground for invoking the power under R.39, because it must be assumed that the possibility of the causation of any such hardship must have been duly taken into account at the time when the rule in question was made and the rule making authority has nevertheless thought it fit to enact such a provision. 22. Though it was strongly contended on behalf of the petitioners that the power under R.39 can under no circumstances be exercised in such a way as to affect the rights of any of the other persons in the service, we find it difficult to uphold the said contention when it is stated in such a wide form. 22. Though it was strongly contended on behalf of the petitioners that the power under R.39 can under no circumstances be exercised in such a way as to affect the rights of any of the other persons in the service, we find it difficult to uphold the said contention when it is stated in such a wide form. While explaining the scope of R.39 we have already held that it is permissible under the said rule to grant a relaxation of the rigour of the rules or even an exemption from any provision contained in the rules in favour of any officer or officers, in regard to whom the facts and circumstances are such that a valid classification for according special treatment would be justified under Art.14 and 16 of the Constitution. It is quite possible that when such an order is passed it may directly or indirectly have repercussions regarding the seniority, rank or chances of promotion of some of the other officers in service. That, however, has to be regarded as an inevitable incident of service flowing from the exercise of the power under R.39 which is as much a rule regulating the conditions of service of all the officers in the service of the State as the other provisions contained in the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules. The rights conferred on the members of service by the earlier Rules Nos. 1 to 38 in the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules are not absolute in character but are inherently subject to the contingent liability of being affected by any order validly passed under R.39. 23. We are not impressed with the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners that the proviso to R.39 has the effect of prohibiting any order being passed under the said rule in favour of any particular person or persons in such a way as to adversely affect other persons in the service. 23. We are not impressed with the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners that the proviso to R.39 has the effect of prohibiting any order being passed under the said rule in favour of any particular person or persons in such a way as to adversely affect other persons in the service. What is laid down by the proviso is only that in dealing with the case of any person under R.39 the order passed by the authority should not have the effect of placing him in a more disadvantageous position than what it would be if the rules in force ware strictly applied to his case; in other words, the proviso only introduces a safeguard that the special treatment meted out to any person whose case is dealt with under R.39, should not have the result of placing him in a position less favourable than under the rules. The expression "any person" occurring in the proviso has reference only to the person whose case is specifically dealt with under R.39 and it will not take in other officers belonging to the service. It is not correct or possible to construe the proviso as imposing a restriction that an order passed in the legitimate exercise of the power under R.39 should under no circumstances affect adversely other persons in the service. Counsel appearing for the petitioner relied on an unreported decision of our learned brother Govindan Nair, J. in O. P. No. 851 of 1968 wherein the learned Judge has expressed the view that "what can be done under R.39 is only to pass an order in favour of the employee provided that order does not adversely affect other employees who are governed by the same service Rules". We are informed that though a writ appeal - W. 4. No. 137 of 1970 was filed against the above decision it was dismissed in limine. 24. For the reasons indicated in the preceding two paragraphs we are constrained to disagree with the view expressed by Govindan Nair, J We do not find any justification for reading into R.39 a limitation that no order can be passed in favour of an employee in exercise of the power conferred by it if it will adversely affect any of the other employees who are governed by the same service rules. In our view, the effect of importing such a restriction would be virtually to nullify the utility and the very purpose of the rule and to render its provisions nugatory. 25. The possibility of the proposed order having an adverse effect on the rights of other employees is, however, a matter vitally relevant for determining whether the course of action proposed would be 'just and equitable". It is mandatory on the part of the authority exercising the power under R.39 to apply its mind to this important aspect also before taking a final decision to invoke R.39 in each specific case, because it will not be "just or equitable" if for the purpose of relieving some genuine hardship that may exist in the case of an individual officer, undue prejudice or hardship is caused to others. 26. We have already made it clear that R.39 cannot be regarded as conferring an arbitrary power to ignore the existing service rules and to deal with cases of any officer or officers in violation of the existing rules. Its main purpose, as we see it, is to invest the authority designated in it with the power to relax the rigour of the rule in regard to matters that are merely procedural or incidental in nature and which do not go to the root of any of the substantive service conditions dealt with in the rules. We have also indicated that in rare and exceptional cases where there are valid grounds for a reasonable classification, it is permissible under R.39 to accord a special treatment by granting a partial or even total relaxation of a substantive provision contained rules. 27. We shall now deal with the further contention advanced on behalf of the petitioners that even if R.39 is to be regarded as authorising the making of an order which will adversely affect other persons in the service, natural justice requires that any such order should be passed only after affording to all the persons likely to be affected an opportunity to make their representations. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in A. K. Kainak & Others v. Union of India & Others ( AIR 1970 SC 150 ), the rules of natural justice are not embodied rules nor can they be straigh jacketed into a rigid formula. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in A. K. Kainak & Others v. Union of India & Others ( AIR 1970 SC 150 ), the rules of natural justice are not embodied rules nor can they be straigh jacketed into a rigid formula. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case. Without intending to be exhaustive, we may state that the obligation to give a hearing to persons likely to be affected will arise in all cases where the order proposed to be passed under R.39 will have the direct consequence of affecting the settled seniority or rank of any of the other persons in the service or of upsetting promotions already given to them. It appears to us beyond doubt that any such order can be validly passed only after giving to those persons likely to be affected an opportunity of making their representations concerning the matter. 28. We are, however, unable to accept the petitioners' broad contention that in every case where action is taken under R.39 all the persons in service who are likely to be even very remotely affected by such an order should be notified and heard. We can well conceive of many orders that may be legitimately passed under R.39 giving only a relaxation of some procedural provisions, which will not have any direct effect on the rights of others in the service. Even if such orders may have some very remote or indirect repercussion on the prospects of promotion etc. of other officers, we are not prepared to recognise any obligation on the part of the authority exercising the power under R.39 to give a notice or hearing to all the personnel in service in regard to whom there may be such a remote likelihood of indirect prejudice. As already observed by us, the applicability of the rules of natural justice would depend upon the nature of the order that is passed in each given case and the consequences, if any, that it will bring about in relation to the rights of the other personnel in service. As already observed by us, the applicability of the rules of natural justice would depend upon the nature of the order that is passed in each given case and the consequences, if any, that it will bring about in relation to the rights of the other personnel in service. We have already indicated the view that in all cases where in respect of any matter relating to the seniority, rank or promotion of others which was already settled by an earlier order the existing position is sought to be altered or will be directly affected by the order proposed to be passed under R.39, the principle of audi alteram partem will get automatically attracted. 29. Having thus explained in detail the nature, intent and scope of the power conferred by R.39 it is next necessary to test the validity of the impugned orders in the light of the principles that we have enunciated. However, before proceeding to do so we may briefly advert to a contention strongly urged by the petitioners' advocate which concerns the validity of the notification Ext. P16 dated the 10th July, 1972 in so far as it purports to give retrospective operation to the amendments introduced by it in R.39. According to the provisions in para 2 of the said notification the amendments effected in R.39 are to be deemed to have come into force with effect from 17-12-1958. By virtue of S.3 of the Kerala Public Services Act, 1968, which came into force on the 17th September, 1968, the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules, though originally framed under the proviso to Art.309 of the Constitution of India, are to be deemed to have been made under the aforesaid Act. It is in the exercise of the power conferred by S.2(1) read along with S.3 of the aforesaid Act that the Government of Kerala issued the notification Ext. P16 dated the 10th July, 1972 substituting a new provision in the place of the old R.39. S.2 of the Kerala Public Services Act empowers the Government to make rules either prospectively or retrospectively to regulate the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to Government service. P16 dated the 10th July, 1972 substituting a new provision in the place of the old R.39. S.2 of the Kerala Public Services Act empowers the Government to make rules either prospectively or retrospectively to regulate the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to Government service. The argument of the petitioners is that in as much as the Kerala Public Services Act, 1968 itself came into force only on the 17th September, 1968 the rule making power conferred by S.2 cannot have the effect of enabling the subordinate rule making body to bring into force the rules framed by it with effect from any date anterior to the date of coming into force of the parent enactment. It is pointed out on behalf of the petitioners that the Kerala Public Services Act has not been given any retrospective operation and that it was brought into force only with effect from the 17th September, 1968. Counsel for the petitioners contend that just as a child cannot be older than its mother it is not legally possible for a rule framed under the statute to have operation or effectiveness during a period when the parent enactment itself had not come into force. In answer to this contention the Government Pleader relied very strongly on the deeming provision contained in S.3 of the Act. That Section is in the following terms: "3. Continuance of existing rules.-- All rules made under the proviso to Art.309 of the Constitution of India, regulating the recruitment, and conditions of service of persons appointed, to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the State of Kerala and in force immediately before the commencement of this Act, shall be deemed to have been made under this Act as if this Act had been in force on the date on which such rules were made and shall continue to be in force unless and until they are superseded by any rules made under this Act." According to the learned Government Pleader, by virtue of the above deeming provision a legal fiction is created that the provisions of the Act were in force on the date on which the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules were framed under the proviso to Art.309 of the Constitution. The correctness of this submission regarding the effect of the deeming provision contained in S.3 is strongly refuted by the learned advocate appearing for the petitioners. Both sides addressed somewhat detailed arguments concerning the interpretation to be placed on the provisions of S.2 and 3 of the Act. We do not, however, consider it necessary for the purposes of these cases to express any final opinion on the said matter because, we have come to the conclusion that even if the provision in the notification Ext. P16 giving retrospective operation to the amendments made in R.39 is to be regarded as valid, still the impugned orders are all liable to be struck down as illegal on the ground that they do not evidence a proper or legitimate exercise of the powers of the State Government even under the provisions of the amended rule and are, therefore, ultra vires. Hence we do not propose to decide the question whether the amended rule has been validly given retrospective operation but shall proceed to examine the legality of the impugned orders on the basis that the provisions of R.39 as amended will govern these cases. 30. The only material change brought about in R.39 by reason of the amendment made under Ext. P16 is that instead of the 'Governor,' it is the 'State Government' that is authorised by the amended rule to exercise the power conferred by it. Another alteration made in the rule is by the addition of the words "or persons" after the words "any person" occurring in the rule, in our opinion, this latter modification is of no consequence at all, since even without the addition of the new words it was perfectly open for the authority designated in the rule to deal with the case of more than one Government servant in an order passed under R.39. Even after the addition of the words "or persons the scope, nature and purpose of the power conferred by R.39 remain the same as before; the position continues to be that it is not permissible to make use of the said power for passing blanket orders granting eo masse exemptions or relaxation of the rules in favour of a large or undefined number of persons without specific application of the mind of the Government to the relevant facts and circumstances of the individual cases. 31. 31. We shall now revert to the facts in O. P. No. 5157 of 1969. The two writ petitioners in this case were promoted to the category of Assistant Grade I with effect from 1-11-1961 as per the orders evidenced by Exts. P1 and P2 respectively. Mention has already been made of the fact that during the period between 1-11-1961 and 25-12-1961. 18 vacancies had arisen in the category of Assistants Grade I in the Secretariat and they had to be filled up only by promoting qualified hands from amongst the Assistants Grade II. No person was eligible for being promoted to the 1st Grade unless he bad passed the Account Test (lower). Both the writ petitioners possessed the said qualification at the time when the aforesaid vacancies arose and it was in view of me said fact that they were granted the promotion to Grade I. Even though Ext P1 mentions that the promotion thereby given to the 1st petitioner and four others was provisional in nature, it is seen from Ext. P2 that the State Government has subsequently treated the 1st petitioner as having been regularly promoted to Grade I with effect from 1-11-1961. By virtue of the aforesaid promotes the two writ petitioners acquired a vested right to have their rank and seniority fixed in the category of Assistants Grade I having their length of service in that category from 1-11-1961 taken into account under R.27(a) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules. But the Government have made a substantial inroad into that right by directing that as per Exts. P3 and P4 such of their seniors in Grade II who passed the Account Test within the number of chance, specified in those orders will regain their seniority in Grade I on their Promotion thereto. In other words, the effect of Exts. P3 and P4 is to disrupt the right, of seniority and rank which had become vested in the writ petitioners by compelling them to surrender the position already acquired by them in favour of their erstwhile seniors in Grade II whom they had superseded for the valid reason that the seniors did not possess the test qualification and were not therefore eligible for promotion. If Exts. P3 and P4 are implemented the result is that the principle laid down in R.27(a) is substantially rendered ineffective. The is nothing in Ext. If Exts. P3 and P4 are implemented the result is that the principle laid down in R.27(a) is substantially rendered ineffective. The is nothing in Ext. P3 or P4 to indicate that the Government had specifically considered the individual cases of any of the seniors with reference to the relevant facts relating to their inability to acquire the test qualification and arrived at conclusion that circumstances justifying a valid classification did exist so as to warrant a differential treatment being meted to them in relaxation of the provisions of R.27(a). What was apparently done under those two orders was to grant a general exemption in favour of a large undefined group consisting of all the seniors who had acquired the test qualification within the specified number of chances. As already held by us, R.39 does not warrant any such order being passed in favour of an undefined group without specific application of the mind of the authority to the facts of the individual cases covered by the order; nor does the rule ordinarily contemplate any action being taken in direct violation of a provision like R.27(a) unless strong and exceptional grounds justifying a valid classification are shown to exist. The main reason given in Ext. P4 in support of the action taken under that order directly offends the last principle aforementioned. We may extract Para.3 of Ext. P4 which reads: "Till 17-12-1958, i. e., the date of issue of the Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules, a senior who was passed over could regain his seniority in the Grade I on his subsequent promotion provided the junior was not confirmed earlier in the Grade I. With the introduction of the General Rules for the State and Subordinate Services, such restoration of seniority was not possible except in the case of persons governed by Travancore Cochin Rules, as seniority in a grade had to be determined R.27(a) of the General Rules. The application of the above rule caused hardships to the senior hands who did not have sufficient opportunity to get themselves qualified in Account Test and to become eligible for promotion to the Grade I." The rule making authority must have been fully aware of the position which obtained in the Travancore Cochin area at the time of framing the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules in regard to the restoration of seniority of seniors superseded for want of test qualification. Nevertheless, it did not consider it necessary to incorporate a similar provision in the rules. On the other hand, a proviso was introduced in R.27 which saved only the operation of the order dated 7th May 1951 passed by the Travancore Cochin Government in relation to any person who was a member of any service on the date of coming into force of the rules. Obviously, therefore, the intention of the rule making authority was that in respect of matters not governed by the aforesaid order of the Travancore Cochin Government, the seniority of personnel is to be reckoned only by applying the principles laid down in R.27. It is not open to the executive Government to state that the application of the said rule has caused hardship and that therefore the seniority of certain persons should be reckoned not in the manner laid down in R.27(a) but by applying a principle completely at variance with what is provided in the rule. A relaxation of the statutory rule on the aforesaid ground is not authorised to be done under R.39. We have therefore no hesitation in holding that the orders Exts. P3 and P4 do not evidence a valid exercise of the Government's power under R.39 and are therefore illegal and void. We are fully aware that these orders have been already superseded by the State Government itself as per the order Ext. P9. But since Ext. P9 is also under challenge in this writ petition and since we have come to the conclusion that the said order cannot also be sustained, doubts may arise as to whether Exts. P3 and P4 will revive on Ext. P9 being quashed. It is to remove any such difficulty or doubt that we have thought it necessary to consider the question of validity of Exts. P3 and P4 also. 32. Under Ext. P3 and P4 will revive on Ext. P9 being quashed. It is to remove any such difficulty or doubt that we have thought it necessary to consider the question of validity of Exts. P3 and P4 also. 32. Under Ext. P9 which is the next order under challenge what the Government has done is to allow restoration of rank of all the Assistants who joined the Secretariat during the period from 17-12-1958 to 13-11-1963 and who were superseded by their juniors for prommtion to Grade I for want of test qualification on such superseded persons getting promoted as Assistants Grade I after acquiring the necessary test qualification. There is no time limit fixed within which the persons concerned should acquire the test qualification and get promoted as Assistant Grade I in order to be eligible for the benefit of restoration. While Exts. P1 and P2 limited the scope of the benefit of restoration granted under those orders to persons who had passed the test within the first two chances or the first four chances respectively, Ext. P9 extends the benefit to all the superseded seniors who had joined service between 17-12-1958 and 13-11-1963 irrespective of the number of chances taken by them for acquiring the test qualification. Ext. P9 will take within its ambit persons who have not acquired the test qualification even till the date of its passing and the benefit will continue to be available to them for an indefinite period of time entitling them to restoration of seniority in the category of Assistant Grade I as and when they get a promotion to that category in the future after acquiring the test qualification. Ext. P9 thus is an order in favour of an indefinite group of persons and all that we have said against Exts. P3 and P4 will apply here with much greater force. We find absolutely no justifiable basis for a classification of this indeterminable body for the purpose of extending to them a special treatment contrary to the rules relating to test qualification and the reckoning of seniority. It is impossible in the nature of things to think that the Government could have applied their mind to the individual cases of all the officers who will be benefited by the relaxation given under Ext. P9. The position resulting from an implementation of Ext. It is impossible in the nature of things to think that the Government could have applied their mind to the individual cases of all the officers who will be benefited by the relaxation given under Ext. P9. The position resulting from an implementation of Ext. P9 is to disrupt the seniority of all the persons who have been regularly promoted to the category of Assistant Grade I and to introduce an element of utter uncertainty for an indefinite period of time regarding the ranking of the officers in the said higher category, because it has rendered it open to all persons who were seniors in Grade II and who are continuing in that grade for want of test qualification, to pass the Account Test (lower) at any time in the future and thereafter on their getting promoted to Grade I to claim restoration of their seniority in the category of Assistant Grade I irrespective of the length of service put in by the other officers who were promoted much earlier to that category. As already observed, we see no valid or relevant reason on which a separate classification of this indefinite body of persons in whose favour a relaxation of R.27(a) has been ordered, can be said to be justified. 33. For the aforesaid reasons we hold that the action taken by the State Government under Ext. P9 is not warranted by R.39 and cannot therefore be sustained. In this view it is really unnecessary for us to consider the further contention raised by the petitioners that the said order is violative of the principles of natural justice, but we may observe that we find considerable force in that argument also. 34. In the result we allow O. P. No. 5157 of 1969 and quash Exts. P3, P4 and P9. O. P. No. 5506 of 1970 35. The petitioner in this ease is a Senior Grade Assistant in the Legislature Secretariat at Trivandrum. He was appointed as a lower division clerk in the Legislature Secretariat on 17-10-1960 pursuant to his selection for the said post by the Kerala Public Service Commission. The designation of the post of lower division clerk was later changed as Assistant Grade II. The petitioner in this ease is a Senior Grade Assistant in the Legislature Secretariat at Trivandrum. He was appointed as a lower division clerk in the Legislature Secretariat on 17-10-1960 pursuant to his selection for the said post by the Kerala Public Service Commission. The designation of the post of lower division clerk was later changed as Assistant Grade II. The petitioner had previously worked for some time in the Animal Husbandry Department as a lower division clerk and had during that period acquired the Account Test (lower) qualification" Thus, even on the date of his appointment into the Legislature Secretariat the petitioner was possessed of the said qualification which was an essential pre requisite for promotion to the category of Assistant Grade I. Since the petitioner was the only person amongst the Assistants Grade II in the Legislature Secretariat who possessed the test qualification, he was promoted as Assistant Grade I with effect from 17-10-1960. He was subsequently confirmed in the said post with effect from 4-8-1961. Respondents Nos. 3 to 6 were seniors in relation to the petitioner in the category of Assistants Grade II. But they did not possess the test qualification and hence were not eligible for promotion as Assistants Grade I at the time when the petitioner was promoted to that category. On those respondents subsequently acquiring the test qualification they were also promoted as Assistants Grade I on different dates between 21-6-1961 and 14-3-1966, the latter date being the date of permission of the 6th respondent. 36. According to R.7 of the Travancore Cochin Legislature Secretariat (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1953 "unless the Speaker otherwise directs, the conditions of service of the staff of the Legislature Secretariat shall in regard to matters not provided for in these rules be such as are admissible to the staff of the State Administrative Secretariat". The petitioner has produced as Exts. P1 to P3 the three orders passed by the State Government allowing restoration of seniority to seniors amongst Assistants Gr. II in the Secretariat service who had been superseded for want of test qualification in relaxation of R.27(a) of the State and Subordinate Services Rules. The petitioner contends that these orders are not warranted by R.39 and are ultra vires the powers of the State Government. II in the Secretariat service who had been superseded for want of test qualification in relaxation of R.27(a) of the State and Subordinate Services Rules. The petitioner contends that these orders are not warranted by R.39 and are ultra vires the powers of the State Government. He has sought to quash the said orders on the further grounds that they are violative of the principles of natural justice and constitute also an infringement of Art.14 and 16 of the Constitution. 37. The orders Ext. P1 to P3 impugned in this case are the same as those marked as Exts. P3, P4 and P9 in O. P. No. 5157 of 1969. We have already discussed in detail the question of validity of those orders and declared them to be illegal and void. In the light of the said conclusion already recorded by us, the petitioner is entitled to succeed in this writ petition. This writ petition is accordingly allowed and the respondents are prohibited from implementing the provision of Ext P3, as against the petitioner. The parties will bear their respective costs. O. P. No. 1185 of 1970 38. There are three petitioners in this writ petition. These petitioners as well as respondents No. 3 to 8 were appointed as lower division clerks in the Revenue Department in the Madras Ministerial Service and consequent on the reorganisation of the States and the formation of the State of Kerala they were all allotted to this State. The petitioners are all seniors in relation to respondents Nos. 3 to 8 in the category of lower division clerks. Under R.30(b) of the Madras Ministerial Service Rules, lower division clerks of the Revenue Department had to acquire the following qualifications for being considered for appointment as upper division clerks: (a) Pass in Revenue Test Parts, I, II and III, (b) Chain Survey Training for a period not less than six weeks, and (c) Service as Revenue Inspector in charge of a Firka for a period not less than one year. As per the scheme of the aforesaid rules the Collector of each district is required to draw up on the 15th March of every year an annual promotion list showing the names of qualified lower division clerks to be promoted to the upper division during that year. As per the scheme of the aforesaid rules the Collector of each district is required to draw up on the 15th March of every year an annual promotion list showing the names of qualified lower division clerks to be promoted to the upper division during that year. The petitioners had all become fully qualified before 15-3-1962 and they were included in the list of upper division clerks drawn up as on 15-3-1962. Ext. P1 is a copy of the proceedings of the District Collector, Kozhikode, dated 11-2-1965 wherein it is stated that the petitioners were included in the list of upper division clerks for the year ending 15-4-1962 and that they will be deemed to have been promoted to the upper division with effect from 29-10-1962. Respondents Nos. 3 to 8 who acquired the Firka Service qualification only subsequently, were included in the list of upper division clerks of 1963 as seen from the Collector's proceedings evidenced by Ext. P2 dated 20-2-1965. On 28-10-1966 the State Government passed the order Ext. P3 granting general exemption from the operation of R.30(b) of the Madras Ministerial Service Rules in favour of all the senior lower division clerks allotted from Madras who had not been able to acquire the Firka training qualification by reason of their not having been posted as Firka Revenue Inspectors due to exigencies of service. It is stated in Ext. P3 that on individual proposals from the Board of Revenue Government had already granted a relaxation of R.30(b) in a number of cases and that it was considered necessary to grant the general exemption in order to avoid the issue of orders in individual cases. 39. The District Collector, Kozhikode, however, seems to have felt doubts or misgivings about the implementation of Ext. P3 and hence for a period of nearly three years the matter was kept in abeyance. Respondents Nos. 5 to 8 had made representations to the District Collector claiming the benefit of the provisions of Ext. P3. Those representations were forwarded by the District Collector to the State Government with a request that the matter may be dealt with by the Government itself. Thereupon, the Government passed the order Ext. P4 dated 13-10-1969 exempting respondents Nos. Respondents Nos. 5 to 8 had made representations to the District Collector claiming the benefit of the provisions of Ext. P3. Those representations were forwarded by the District Collector to the State Government with a request that the matter may be dealt with by the Government itself. Thereupon, the Government passed the order Ext. P4 dated 13-10-1969 exempting respondents Nos. 5 to 8 from the operation of R.30(b) of the Madras Ministerial Service Rules in so far as the said rules insisted on one year's service as Firka Revenue Inspector as a necessary qualification for promotion as upper division clerk. In addition to granting the said exemption the Government also directed as per Ext, P4 that respondents Nos. 5 to 8 should be included in the list of upper division clerks of Kozhikode District for the year 1961. Pursuant to Ext. P4, the District Collector, Kozhikode passed orders as per his proceedings evidenced by Ext. P5 dated 22-10-1969 including the names of respondents Nos. 5 to 8 in the list of upper division clerks for the year 1961 and directing consequential amendments to be carried out in the list for 1961 which had been published as per the Collector's proceedings dated 9-2-1965. 40. The 4th respondent Shri. V. P. Alavikutty was junior in relation to the petitioners in the lower division category. He bad also been included along with the petitioners in the list for 1962 evidenced by Ext. P1. But be bad been assigned only the last rank in the said list. The 4th respondent did not actually possess the Firka experience qualification at that time. But be moved the Government seeking the grant of an exemption from the operation of R.30(b) and Government appears to have passed an order dated 2 8 1965 granting a relaxation of the said rule in his favour. Similarly the 3rd respondent is also stated to have been granted an exemption by the Government from the operation of R.30(b) as per the Government order dated 14 8 1962 and on the basis of the said exemption he was included in the list of upper division clerks for the year 1961 even though the exemption was actually granted only in 1963. 41. The District Collector while passing the order Ext. 41. The District Collector while passing the order Ext. P5 has also appended thereto a list showing the revised ranks assigned to the upper division clerks by rearranging them in the 1961, 1962 and 1963 lists. As a result of the said reallocation and revised ranking so made in 1969 respondents Nos. 3 to 8 who were juniors to the petitioners in the lower division and who had acquired the qualifications required for promotion to the Upper Division only subsequent to the acquisition of the said qualifications by the petitioners have all been assigned ranks above those of the petitioners by including respondents Nos. 3 to 8 in the 1961 list. The petitioners contend that the action of the State Government and the District collector in disrupting their seniority and rank which had become settled many years earlier by passing the orders evidenced by Exts. P3 to P5 constitutes a serious infringement of the fundamental right guaranteed to them under Art.14 and 16 of the Constitution and that the said action has also been taken in gross violation of the principles of natural justice. 42. It admits of no doubt that as a result of the passing of the order. Ext. P5 the petitioners have been visited with adverse consequences in as much as their seniority and rank have been altered by placing several of their erstwhile juniors above them in the category of upper division clerks: Respondents Nos. 3 to 8 were admittedly juniors in service in relation to the petitioners in the lower division. Respondents Nos. 3 and 5 to 8 had been originally included only in the list of upper division clerks of 1963 whereas the petitioners bad all been given promotions in the 1962 list itself. The 4th respondent though included in the 1962 list was the junior most in that list. Thus the seniority of the petitioners over respondents Nos. 3 to 8 in the upper division category had become settled as early as in 1965 as per the orders evidenced by Exts. P1 and P2. More than four years thereafter the Government have passed the order Ext. P4 purporting to exempt respondents Nos. Thus the seniority of the petitioners over respondents Nos. 3 to 8 in the upper division category had become settled as early as in 1965 as per the orders evidenced by Exts. P1 and P2. More than four years thereafter the Government have passed the order Ext. P4 purporting to exempt respondents Nos. 5 to 8 from the operation of R.30(b) of the Madras Ministerial Service Rules requiring one year's service as Firka Revenue Inspector for promotion as upper division clerk on the ground that "a strict application of R.30(b) will therefore be prejudicial to their interests." It is in implementation of Ext. P4 that the District Collector has issued the proceedings evidenced by Ext. P5 amending the list of upper division clerks for the year 1961 and revising the ranks assigned to the persons included in the promotion lists for 1961 and 1962. 43. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State Government it has been submitted that the impugned orders of exemption have been passed in the exercise of the power conferred by R.39 of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules. We have already held that the said rule does not warrant the passing of such general orders of exemption as has been done under Ext P3. We have also expressed our conclusion that it will not be a proper or valid exercise of the power under R.39 to exempt any particular person or persons from the operation of a rule merely on the ground that the application of the particular rule will cause some hardship or inconvenience to them. The reason given in Ext. P4 for invoking the power under R.39 is that "a strict application of R.30(b) will therefore be prejudicial to their interests." It is manifest that the grant of the exemption on the aforesaid ground is illegal and unsustainable. 44. It is pointed out by the learned advocate appearing for the petitioners that since respondents Nos. 3 to 8 were all juniors in service in relation to the petitioners in the lower division, even if the principle laid down in Ext. P3 is to be regarded as valid, the same can have no application at all to the present case because it cannot be said that the petitioners were given any undue preference over respondents Nos, 3 to 8 in the matter of their being posted as Firka Revenue Inspectors. P3 is to be regarded as valid, the same can have no application at all to the present case because it cannot be said that the petitioners were given any undue preference over respondents Nos, 3 to 8 in the matter of their being posted as Firka Revenue Inspectors. There is considerable force in this argument. We have not been shown any special circumstances which would justify the differential treatment meted out to respondents Nos. 5 to 8 in exempting them from the operation of R.30(b) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules. 45. The orders of exemption passed in favour of respondents Nos. 3 and 4 have not been produced in the case and hence we do not want to express any opinion concerning their legality and validity. It is seen from the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State Government that the 3rd respondent was granted exemption from the operation of R.30(b) of the Madras Ministerial Service Rules as per G. O. (Rt.) 1833/63/Rev. dated 14-8-1963. It is likewise stated in the counter affidavit that a relaxation of R.30 (b) was granted in favour of the 4th respondent as per G. O. (Rt) 1266/65 dated 2-8-1965. 46. The executive orders passed by the State Government granting exemption from the operation of R.30(b) in favour of respondent Nos. 3 to 8 even if they are assumed to have been validly passed, cannot have retrospective operation and they will not have the effect of conferring on the aforesaid respondents eligibility for promotion as on 15-3-1961 which is the relevant date for purposes of inclusion in the 1961 list. See The Income Tax Officer, Alleppey v. M. C. Ponnoose and others ( AIR 1970 SC 385 ) and Ex Major M. C. Singhal v. Director General, Armed Forces, Medical Services, New Delhi and another ( AIR 1972 SC 628 .) 47. The petitioners were duly qualified for inclusion in the 1962 list and they had been granted promotions to the upper division in the list for 1962. By virtue of that promotion they had acquired a right to have their ranks and seniority in that category reckoned on the basis of the principles laid down in R.27(a) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules. The position of the officers in relation to the promotions of 1961 and 1962 had become settled at least by the orders Exts. The position of the officers in relation to the promotions of 1961 and 1962 had become settled at least by the orders Exts. P1 and P2 passed in February, 1965. No statutory appeals or revision petitions are shown to have been filed against those orders and hence it must be taken that those lists bad become final. It is not in the interests of the maintenance of the morale, efficiency and contentment in the service to disrupt after such long lapse of time matters pertaining to vital service conditions like seniority and rank which have already become settled. We may usefully refer in this context to the observations of the Supreme Court in Rabindra Nath Bose and others v. Union of India and others ( AIR 1970 SC 470 at 478): "Each person ought to be entitled to sit back and consider that his appointment and promotion effected a long time ago would not be set aside after a lapse of a number of years." It will be neither just or equitable to deprive persons who have been promoted many years ago, of the rights that have accrued to them regarding their rank and seniority by purporting to conduct a review of promotions after the lapse of many years. 48. The learned Government Pleader advanced before us a contention that the Madras Ministerial Service Rules are no longer in force and that therefore it was really unnecessary even to grant any exemption to the respondents from the operation of R.30(b) of those rules. In support of this contention he sought to rely on certain observations contained in a recent judgment of a Full Bench of this court in O. P. No. 4522 of 1969. We have carefully gone through the judgment in that case which was rendered by one of us (Raghavan C. J.) who was a member of that Full Bench also. The passage in that judgment on which reliance was placed by the Government Pleader does not specifically refer to the Madras Ministerial Service Rules and the observations contained therein regarding the operation of the Madras Special Rules must, in our view, be confined to the context of the facts and circumstances of that case. The passage in that judgment on which reliance was placed by the Government Pleader does not specifically refer to the Madras Ministerial Service Rules and the observations contained therein regarding the operation of the Madras Special Rules must, in our view, be confined to the context of the facts and circumstances of that case. We are unable to treat that decision as an authority laying down that all the Madras Special Rules including the Madras Ministerial Service Rules ceased to be in force so far as the allotted persons from Madras are concerned after the coming into force of the General Rules contained in the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules. The Madras Ministerial Service Rules were framed by the Governor of Madras under the proviso to Art.309 of the Constitution. They constitute a "law" within the meaning of that expression as defined in S.2(h) of the States Reorganisation Act. Under S.119 of the said Act the said "law" will continue to be operative even after 1-11-1956 in the territory in which it was originally applicable unless otherwise provided by a competent legislature or other competent authority. Hence until the framing of unified special rules for the concerned service either by the Governor of Kerala in the exercise of his power under the proviso to Art.309 of the Constitution or by the State Government in the exercise of the power conferred by S.2 of the Kerala Public Services Act, the Madras Ministerial Service Rules would continue to govern the ministerial service personnel who were allotted to this State from the erstwhile composite State of Madras. The contention to the contrary put forward by the Government Pleader cannot therefore be sustained. 49. We see also considerable force in the contention taken on behalf of the petitioners that Ext. P5 has been passed in contravention of the principles of natural justice. It is undeniable that as a direct result of the said order the petitioners have been made to suffer a reduction in their seniority and rank in the upper division category. What was done under the order Ext. P5 passed in 1969 was to review the promotion lists for 1961 and 1962 and to revise the seniority list which had been settled by the District Collector in 1965. What was done under the order Ext. P5 passed in 1969 was to review the promotion lists for 1961 and 1962 and to revise the seniority list which had been settled by the District Collector in 1965. Before any such action was taken, the petitioners ought to have been afforded a full and fair opportunity of making their representations before the concerned authorities. The said basic requirement not having been complied with, Ext P5 must be held to be illegal on the ground of contravention of the principles of natural justice also. 50. In the result we quash Exts. P4 and P5 in so far as they have directed the inclusion of respondents Nos. 3 to 8 in the promotion list of upper division clerks for 1961 on the strength of the exemptions granted to them from the operation of R.30(b) of the Madras Ministerial Service Rules. We hold that the said respondents are not entitled to be assigned seniority and rank above the writ petitioners in the category of upper division clerks. The original petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. The parties will bear their respective costs. O. P. No. 5104 of 1970 51. This writ petition has been filed by eight employees of the State Government belonging to the Kerala Statistics and Economics Subordinate Service. Petitioners Nos. 1 to 3 and 5 to 8 are working as junior Statistical Inspectors and the 4th petitioner is holding the post of upper division investigator in the Bureau of Economics and Statistics. Petitioners Nos. 1 to 4 are postgraduate degree holders and the remaining petitioners namely, Nos. 5 to 8 are graduates. 52. Respondents Nos. 5 to 52 are other employees belonging to the same department. All of them are seniors in relation to the petitioners in the category of Junior Statistical Inspectors. Respondents Nos. 1 to 24 are graduates and the remaining respondents are non graduates. 53. Special Rules were framed for the Kerala Statistics and Economics Subordinate Service as per G. O. (P) No. 256, Public (Rules) Department dated 22-6-1966 Ext. P1. Under R.2 of those rules the qualifications required for appointment to the various categories in the service have been prescribed. The next higher post to which those in the category of Junior Statistical Inspector/Upper Division Investigator can look for promotion is that of Research Assistant. P1. Under R.2 of those rules the qualifications required for appointment to the various categories in the service have been prescribed. The next higher post to which those in the category of Junior Statistical Inspector/Upper Division Investigator can look for promotion is that of Research Assistant. It is laid down in item 1 of the Schedule annexed to R.2 that for promotion from Junior Statistical Inspector/Investigator to the category of Research Assistant a candidate must have passed the selective test in Applied Statistics and allied subjects conducted by the Public Service Commission. The rule also lays down the conditions for eligibility to appear for the said selective test but we are not directly concerned with that matter in this writ petition. By an amendment to the Special Rules made on the 12th March, 1968 as per the order Ext. P3, post graduate degree holders were exempted from the necessity of passing the aforesaid test. Writ petitioners No. 1 to 4 being post graduate degree holders were covered by the said exemption. 54. Respondents Nos. 5 to 9 and 11 had been promoted to the category of Research Assistants even prior to the coming into force of the Special Rules and hence they are not bound to pass the test which was newly introduced by the Special Rules which cams into force only subsequent to their promotion. The learned advocate appearing for the petitioners made it clear that the petitioners are not challenging the legality of the promotions granted to the aforesaid respondents Nos. 5 to 9 and 11. 55. It took some time for the Government to prescribe the syllabus etc. for the newly introduced test and hence the first test was actually conducted only on 1-7-1968. Writ petitioners Nos. 5 to 8 appeared for the first test and came out successful. Respondents Nos. 14 to 16, 18, 22 and 24 also passed the said test at the same time along with petitioners Nos. 5 to 8. 56. for the newly introduced test and hence the first test was actually conducted only on 1-7-1968. Writ petitioners Nos. 5 to 8 appeared for the first test and came out successful. Respondents Nos. 14 to 16, 18, 22 and 24 also passed the said test at the same time along with petitioners Nos. 5 to 8. 56. The grievance of the petitioners is that even though the maximum time allowed under R.13A of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules for the passing of the new test came to a close on 30-6-1970 on the expiry of the period of two years from the date of the actual conduct of the first test, many of the respondents who have not passed the selective test and who were promoted to the category of Research Assistants during the period of exemption allowed under R.13A are being illegally allowed to continue in the higher posts while the petitioners who have acquired the test qualification are being denied their legitimate promotion. The petitioners have alleged that for the purpose of conferring an undue advantage to the unqualified hands in the service who are said to have brought pressure to bear on the State Government through the Bureau of Economics N.G.O. Association, the Government passed the order Ext. P4 dated 29-6-1970 granting to the provisional employees in the cadre of Research Assistant/Statistical Inspector etc. an extension of the temporary exemption from passing the test in Applied Statistics and Allied Subjects for a period of two years from 30-6-1970. The petitioners contend that Ext. P4 is directly contrary to the provision contained in R.13A of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules and that it is beyond the competence of the State Government to pass an executive order under R.39 granting a general exemption from a mandatory provision contained in the Special Rules. 57. During the pendency of this writ petition the period of two years mentioned in Ext. P4 also expired and thereupon the Government passed another order G. O. Rt. 205/72/Plg. dated 29-6-1972 Ext. P11- which is in the following terms: READ:- 1. G. O. Rt. 154/70/Plg. dated 29-6-1970. 2. Representation dated 25-5-1972 from the General Secretary, Joint Council of State Service Organisations, Trivandrum. P4 also expired and thereupon the Government passed another order G. O. Rt. 205/72/Plg. dated 29-6-1972 Ext. P11- which is in the following terms: READ:- 1. G. O. Rt. 154/70/Plg. dated 29-6-1970. 2. Representation dated 25-5-1972 from the General Secretary, Joint Council of State Service Organisations, Trivandrum. ORDER Government are pleased to order that the temporary exemption from passing the departmental tests enjoyed by the provisional promotees to the cadre of Research Assistant/ Statistical Inspector/Supervisor, Mechanical Tabulation Unit as per G. O Rt. 154/70Plg. dated 29-6-1970 will be extended for a further period of 2 years with effect from 30-6- 72. (By Order of the Governor) P. Sukumaran, Under Secretary." The petitioners have thereupon amended the writ petition with the permission of this court by incorporating a prayer for the quashing of Ext. P11 also on the same grounds. 58. R.13A of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules lays down that where a pass in a special or departmental test is newly prescribed by the Special Rules of a service for any category, grade or post therein or in any class thereof, a member of the service who has not passed the said test but is otherwise qualified and suitable for appointment to such class, category, grade or post may within 2 years of the introduction of the test be appointed thereto temporarily. It is further mandatorily enjoined in the rule that if a member so appointed does not pass the test within 2 years from the date of introduction of the said test, he shall be reverted to the class, category or grade or post from which he was appointed and shall not again be eligible for appointment under the said rule. The rule contains two provisos of which the second proviso alone is material and it reads: "Provided further that the period of temporary exemption shall be extended by two years in the case of a person belonging to any of the scheduled castes or scheduled tribes." It is on the strength of the temporary exemption granted under R.13A that those amongst the respondents Nos. 1 to 38 (other than respondents Nos. 5 to 9 and 11) who did not possess the test qualification were provisionally promoted to the category of Research Assistants/Statistical Inspectors/Supervisors. The Special Rules which introduced the requirement of passing the test came into force on 22-6-1966. 1 to 38 (other than respondents Nos. 5 to 9 and 11) who did not possess the test qualification were provisionally promoted to the category of Research Assistants/Statistical Inspectors/Supervisors. The Special Rules which introduced the requirement of passing the test came into force on 22-6-1966. The syllabus for the test was however, prescribed only on 3-7-1967 and as already noticed the first test was actually conducted only on 1-7-1968. Even if the date on which the first test was actually conducted is to be regarded as "the date of introduction" of the test for the purposes of R.13A, the period of temporary exemption came to a close on 30 6-1970. Thereupon the latter portion of R.13A which is mandatory in character automatically became operative and it was incumbent on the State Government and the Director of Bureau of Economics and Statistics to take immediate action to revert to the lower category all those amongst the provisional promotees who had not passed the test within the aforesaid period of two years ending with 30-6-1970. Instead of doing so what the State Government did was to pass the order Ext. P4 dated 29-6-1970 which is in the following terms: "Read:- 1. Letter dated 13-5-1970 from the Secretary, Bureau of Economics and Statistics N.G.O. Association. 2. Letter No. F5-8947/70/FSD dated 23 6 1970 from the Director, Bureau of Economics and Statistics. ORDER According to the qualifications prescribed under R.2 of the Kerala Statistics and Economics Subordinate Services Rules, a person must have passed the test in Applied Statistics and Allied Subjects conducted by the Public Service Commission for his eligibility for promotion to the post of Research Assistant Statistical/Inspector/Mechanical Tabulation Supervisor. The above test was first conducted by the Public Service Commission on 1-7-1968. Hence, the period of temporary exemption under R.13A of the General Rules expires on 30-6-1970. The General Secretary, Bureau of Economics and Statistics N.G.O. Association, in his letter first cited, has requested that the period of temporary exemption from passing the test may be extended for a further period of two years from 1-7-1970. The Director, Bureau of Economics and Statistics has recommended to sanction the above request as a special case. The General Secretary, Bureau of Economics and Statistics N.G.O. Association, in his letter first cited, has requested that the period of temporary exemption from passing the test may be extended for a further period of two years from 1-7-1970. The Director, Bureau of Economics and Statistics has recommended to sanction the above request as a special case. In the circumstances, Government order that the provisional promotees to the cadre of Research Assistant/Statistical Inspector/Mechanical Tabulation Supervisor will be granted extension of temporary exemption from passing the departmental test mentioned for a period of 2 years from 30-6-1970, or from the date of the modification to the Special Rules, takes effect, whichever is earlier. (By Order of the Governor) M. N. Elayadom, Assistant Secretary." The effect of Ext. P4 is to render ineffective the provision contained in R.2 of the Special Rules which lays down that for promotion to the category of Research Assistants, the person concerned must have passed a selective test. But, even more than that, the grant of the temporary extension is directly opposed to the mandatory provision in R.13A which enjoins that on the expiry of the period of two years the provisional promotees who have failed to acquire the test qualification shall be reverted to their original grade or post and that they shall not be eligible for being provisionally appointed on the basis of a temporary exemption. The second proviso to the rule makes it very clear that there is no power vested in the Government to extend the period of temporary exemption except in respect of persons belonging to Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes in whose cases alone the proviso specifically confers a power for extending the period of temporary exemption by two years. 59. We have already held that it is not ordinarily open to the State Government under R.39, even after its amendment, to exercise the power under the rule in direct contravention of a mandatory provision in the existing rules, and that the only exception to the said principle is that in rare and exceptional cases where the circumstances are such that a reasonable classification of the particular case or cases is validly possible for the purpose of Art.14 and 16 a relaxation of the rigour of any rule or even an exemption from its provision may be granted. We have also held that a general order granting an exemption in favour of a large or undefined group of persons is not warranted under R.39. It is seen from Ext. P4 and also from the subsequent order of exemption Ext. P11 the text of which we have already extracted, that they are merely general orders passed by the State Government on certain representations made to it by the General Secretary of a service association. There was no application at all of the Government's mind to individual cases. In the light of the principles enunciated by us earlier in this judgment it has to be held that the Government had no power to grant a general exemption from the provisions of R.13A in favour of all the unqualified provisional promotees by allowing an extension of the period of temporary exemption from passing the departmental test beyond the prescribed period of two years. 60. Exts. P4 and P11 are, therefore, invalid and they are hereby quashed. The State Government and the Director of Bureau of Economics and Statistics should take immediate action to revert from the higher category of Research Assistants/Statistical Inspectors/Supervisors, all those persons amongst respondents Nos. 1 to 52 (other than respondents Nos. 5 to 9 and 11) who have failed to pass the test on or before 30-6-1970 and to grant to the petitioners promotions to that category in as much as they are duly qualified. Such action should be completed within a period not exceeding two months from today. The original petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. The parties will bear their respective costs.