JUDGMENT T.L. Viswanatha Iyer, J. 1. The petitioner is a Havildar driver in the Police Department. He joined service at first in the Second Travancore Infantry of the Travancore StateLater on, he joined the Travancore-Cochin. Police in the erstwhile Travancore-Cochin State and continued in the Police Department. The date of birth entered in his Service Register was 15th November 1914. Alleging that that is incorrect and that he was born on 31st October 1916 he made an application to correct the date of birth in the Service Register. In support of his representation he produced a copy of the admission register of the Government High School, West Quilon, which showed that one N. Raghavan Pillai was admitted for study in the school on 20th Edavam 1097 and he left the school on 28th Mithunam 1099. The date of birth was shown in the register as 31st October 1916. This representation for correction was rejected by the Commissioner of Police, Trivandrum, by Ext. P-2 order on the ground that as per G.O. (P) No. 586/ Edn., dated 17th December 1960 no correction in regard to age in the service book will be permitted unless it is a clerical error. Against that order he filed O.P. No. 4570 of 1969 before this court. This court set aside the order and directed the Inspector-General of Police to consider and dispose of afresh the petitioner's representation for correction of his date of birth on its merits within two months from that date. The 2nd respondent, namely, the Inspector-General of Police, considered the representation on its merits and passed an order produced in this case as Ext. P-5 on 24th January 1970. In that order the Inspector-General of Police stated, that he did not consider that any justifiable ground has been made out to alter the date of birth from 15th November 1914 to 31st October 1916 as requested by the petitioner. The correctness of this order is challenged in this writ petition. 2. The 2nd respondent has filed the counter-affidavit stating that he examined all the facts and circumstances afresh but the materials placed before him were found to be insufficient to alter the date of birth shown in the Service Book. 3. The main point urged by the counsel for the petitioner is that the 2nd respondent was wrong in not acting on the extract of the Admission Register produced by him. 3. The main point urged by the counsel for the petitioner is that the 2nd respondent was wrong in not acting on the extract of the Admission Register produced by him. The extract of the Admission Register produced in this case as Ext. P-1, according to the petitioner, showed the name of the person admitted, his date of admission, his date of birth, the date when he left the school and the reasons for leaving the school. According to him, when he has produced this extract along with his representation wherein he had stated that he studied in the Government High School, West Quilon, and that the extract of the Admission Register relates to his admission, that should have been accepted without any further proof of the truth or otherwise of the entry therein. The petitioner would further contend that when he made a representation as regards the incorrect entry in the Service Register, the matter must be enquired into. If there was any doubt as regards the correctness or the identity of the person mentioned in the extract of the Admission Register produced before the 2nd respondent, he should have been given an opportunity to prove the correctness of the entries therein and without giving him such an opportunity a decision that the extract of the Admission Register is not acceptable is not justified. The petitioner further relied on a decision of this court reported in Sukumaran v. D.S.P., Kozhikode (1971 K.L.T. 188) where in respect of a similar question that arose for determination, in paragraph 6 Balakrishna Eradi, J. observed as follows: "Rules of natural justice and fair play require that if in the course of any such investigation any material came into the possession of the deciding authority which prima facie improbabilised the contention put forward by the applicant a chance should be given to him to make his explanation in regard thereto. It is equally necessary that adequate opportunity should be given to the party who has put forward the case to substantiate his version in case the authority is not satisfied with the material initially produced by him along with his application." Relying on the above passage the petitioner contended that in passing Ext. P-5 order the 2nd respondent has not observed these rules of natural justice. P-5 order the 2nd respondent has not observed these rules of natural justice. What has been pointed out by the 2nd respondent is that he considered the evidence and the statements made in the application and also the records relating to the petitioner in the department wherein the entries of the date of birth are attested by him and came to the conclusion that there are no justifiable grounds to alter the date of birth of the petitioner from 15th November 1914 to 31st October 1916. In other words, all the materials produced by the petitioner and available in the department were looked into. The petitioner had no case that he had not attested the entries relating to the date of birth in the Service Book opened in the Police Department. Therein, the educational qualification of the petitioner is recorded as 'literate' which is the expression ordinarily used in the case of individuals who could not produce any authentic school records in support of age and educational qualifications. In the records of the Travancore State Forces his educational qualification is noted as Malayalam 6th class. The Service Book which was opened in 1952 and attested by the petitioner in English showed that the petitioner was capable of understanding the entries relating to his personal details including the date of birth which had been recorded on the same page of the Service Book. In the light of these undisputed facts the 2nd respondent thought that the entry in the extract of the Admission Register produced along with the representation is not sufficient to alter the entry regarding date of birth in the Service Book. It cannot be said that there is any denial of the rules of natural justice in passing the order Ext. P-5. When a party produces a record in support of the representation which he made and he had no other record to produce, if the evidence let in by him is insufficient, he is not entitled to have another opportunity to substantiate his case before the authority. The observation in Sukumaran v. D.S.P., Kozhikode (1971 K.L.T. 188)that, "It is equally necessary that adequate opportunity should be given to the party who has put forward the case to substantiate his version in case the authority is not satisfied with the material initially produced by him along with his application." is, with respect, very wide. The observation in Sukumaran v. D.S.P., Kozhikode (1971 K.L.T. 188)that, "It is equally necessary that adequate opportunity should be given to the party who has put forward the case to substantiate his version in case the authority is not satisfied with the material initially produced by him along with his application." is, with respect, very wide. Its correction is open to doubt. Even under the Civil Procedure Code when the party lets in evidence in support of his case there is no rule of law that if that evidence is insufficient or if the court is not satisfied with the evidence produced the court should give a further opportunity to the party to substantiate his version. In administrative or quasi-judicial matters also the rules of natural justice do not require such opportunity being given. Therefore the contention of the petitioner that if the 2nd respondent was not satisfied with the extract of the Admission Register produced he should have been given further opportunity to substantiate his case and the omission by the 2nd respondent to give that opportunity is a violation of the rules of natural justice cannot be supported. On the materials placed before the 2nd respondent he was not satisfied that there was a justifiable ground to alter the date of birth. In that region of assessment of the evidence and the conclusion based on that assessment this court cannot, under Article 226 of the Constitution, interfere. Therefore, the petitioner is not correct in contending that Ext. P-5 is illegal and unsupportable. In the result, we dismiss the original petition; but, we make no order as to costs.