JUDGMENT-[His Lordship after stating the facts and considering points not material to this report, proceeded.] It is well settled that an Appeal Court will be ordinarily slow to interfere with the decision of the trial Judge on questions like the balance of hardship, for this is primarily a question of fact. To succeed the appellant must show that the trial Judge misdirected himself on a question of law or that he based his judgment on some finding of fact on which there was no evidence. If in drawing up the statutory balance sheet of hardship, there is some evidence of hardship on each side the decision of the trial Judge must be normally final. See Sims v. Wilson., referred to above. The appellate Court can interfere in certain circumstances, for instance, if there is no evidence of hardship on one side or if the trial Judge has held to be relevant some matter which in law is not relevant such as the absence of a view of a neighbouring hill, river, tree or something pleasant of that kind. 2. Turning now to the judgment of the Appellate Bench, I find that it has reversed the finding of the trial Court in a manner, which would render section 13 (1) (g) nugatory, so far as Greater Bombay is concerned. After merely summarising the contentions of Hansraj in his evidence, the Appellate Bench went on to observe, " ... According to Mr. Khambatta, the requirements of Hansraj can be satisfactorily met by a flat of 1200 sq. ft. The learned trial Judge has observed that the family of Hansraj can be suitably accommodated in a flat of 1000 sq. ft. In our opinion there is no warrant for this observation. As pointed out by the learned trial Judge, the area of the premises in the occupation of Hansraj is 4730 sq. ft. Hansraj has been living in these premises with his family for a number of years. In considering what is suitable alternative accommodation for a tenant, the mode of living he is used to is a material factor. In our view therefore, the whole family of Hansraj must be taken into account in deciding the question of hardship. The learned trial Judge has remarked in his judgment that on his inspection of the premises, he found that the entire premises were not really needed by Hansraj. In our view therefore, the whole family of Hansraj must be taken into account in deciding the question of hardship. The learned trial Judge has remarked in his judgment that on his inspection of the premises, he found that the entire premises were not really needed by Hansraj. In our opinion, the learned trial Judge was wrong in allowing his judgment to be influenced by the impression which was made on him when he saw the premises. There is nothing to show whether that impression was correct or not. The question must be decided on the evidence on record. It can be argued that the alternative accommodation for Hansraj need not be of the same size as the premises in question viz. 4730 sq ft. Even so, we do not think that an area of 1000 sq. ft. or 1200 sq. ft. can be considered suitable for Hansraj and his family who have been accustomed to live in larger premises for a long period ... In our view he was not expected to make efforts in this behalf in every part of the city. It cannot be urged that he must take up his residence wherever he could get it within his means. It also cannot be urged that he should secure a flat on lease even by paying premium for it. Another factor which must be taken notice of is the extreme difficulty of securing accommodation in the city. In these circumstances, we are satisfied that Hansraj could not obtain suitable alternative accommodation in spite of efforts made in that behalf." This conclusion of the Appellate Bench, in my judgment, is a total distortion of the requirement of section 13 (2). The section does not require "suitable accommodation" to Le available to the tenant. It required "reasonable accommodation" to be available to the tenant. 3. What is reasonable under section 13 (2) will depend on the circumstances of each case. Reasonable cannot mean equally convenient or luxurious, though it may not necessarily exclude ideas of convenience and comfort. The expression used in section 13 (2) is "hardship" and not "inconvenience or "unsuitability". The Appellate Bench has assumed that section 13 (2) refers to suitability. The said assumption is in my opinion, patently illegal. Reasonable cannot mean equally convenient or luxurious, though it may not necessarily exclude ideas of convenience and comfort. The expression used in section 13 (2) is "hardship" and not "inconvenience or "unsuitability". The Appellate Bench has assumed that section 13 (2) refers to suitability. The said assumption is in my opinion, patently illegal. The Appellate Bench has further ignored the detailed, relevant and cogent reasons given by the trial Court (including what was observed at personal inspection of the said premises) for holding that greater hardship would be caused to the trustees by refusing to pass a decree. It ought to have properly considered the fair and reasonable offer made by the trustees to Hansraj. On these grounds alone the finding recorded by the Appellate Bench must be set aside. The Appellate Bench misdirected itself on law, illegally ignored the reason given by the trial Judge and erroneously reversed the correct findings of the trial Court under section 13 (2). 4. Mr. Chitaie, the learned counsel for the respondents sought to support the decree passed by the Appellate Court by arguing firstly that the requirement of the trustees for constructing marriage hall, clinic and hospital etc. is not requirement for residential purposes and, hence, any decree that would be passed on that ground evicting the tenant would be contrary to section 25 (I) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, which prohibits conversion of residential purpose to non residential purpose. The trial Court has rightly negatived this contention on the ground that the requirement cannot be considered to be for non-residential purpose because a !arge portion of the construction will be used by the doctors, nurses and patients who would be residing therein although for different times and sometimes temporarily and the present use of the building itself is not wholly for residential purposes. 5. Moreover, the word "residence" must be understood in the context of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, as used in section 6. The words "residential use" as opposed to "non residential use" must, therefore, be use not for education, business, trade or storage within (he meaning of section 61). It cannot be said that the construction of a marriage hall or a charitable hospital would be putting the premises to use for education, business, trade or storage within the meaning of section 6. 6. It cannot be said that the construction of a marriage hall or a charitable hospital would be putting the premises to use for education, business, trade or storage within the meaning of section 6. 6. "Residence" has no doubt a variety of meaning according to the statute or document in which it is used. It is an "ambiguous word" and may receive a different meaning according to the position in which it is found. The word may receive a larger or more restricted meaning according to what the Court believes the intention of the Legislature to have been, in framing the particular provision in which the word occurs. A mans residence is very often the place VI here he sleeps at night. (See Blackburn J., Oldham, I. O’M & H. 158, citing The Queen v. Norwood2). Sometimes it is described as the place where he and his family sleep or eat though he carries on his business in that very place (see Lakshman v. Balkrishna3). In Sarae Chandra Basu v. Bijoy lhand Mahtab Maharajadhiraj Bahadur4, the Privy Council considered the meaning of the expression "resides" in section 33 of the Indian Registration Act and observed that, "there is no reason for assuming that it contemplates only permanent residence and excludes temporary residence". In Sri Sri Sri Kishore Chandra Singh Deo v. Babu Ganesh Prasad Bhagat5, again in the context of section 33, the Supreme Court laid down that "Residence only connotes that a person eats, drinks and sleeps at that place and that it is not necessary that he should own it" Having regard to these various meanings of the word residence and the scheme of the Rent Act as indicated in section 6, it must be held that the Legislature in using the words "non-residential purpose" in section 25 did not intend to prohibit use of a building like the suit building containing a residential flat like the suit flat and the land on which such a building stands for purposes of construction of marriage halls, charitable hospital and quarters and garages for doctors and nurses as in the present case. The said marriage halls, hospitals etc. are likely to be used for sleeping, eating, drinking etc. temporarily if not permanently, from day-to-day particularly in a crowded city like Bombay. The said marriage halls, hospitals etc. are likely to be used for sleeping, eating, drinking etc. temporarily if not permanently, from day-to-day particularly in a crowded city like Bombay. The use of the same cannot be described, in the facts and circumstances established in the case, as "non-residential" use within the meaning of even section 25. 7. The second contention of Mr.Chitale in that the finding of the two Courts that the trustees require the premises for their use is contrary to law as they have not recorded a clear finding that the trustees reasonably and bona fide require the, premise. This submission is also not tenable because in amending section 13 (1) (g), if the Legishture intended that the requirement of the trustees should also be proved to be bona fide and reasonable they would have stated so. Instead they have merely used the words, "or where the landlord is a trustee of a public charitable trust that the premises are required for occupation for the purposes of the trust." It is an alternative ground in respect of premises belonging to public charitable trusts added to the ground which originally stood in. clause (g) of section 13 (1), by Bombay Act 61 of 1953 to advance the cause of public charity by not allowing it to suffer for want of accommodation. The ground merely requires the trustees to establish that there is some requirement importing an element of necessity which compels them to file a suit for eviction. Such a requirement has been adequately established in the facts and circumstances of the present case. I do not think that anything more was required by law. The two Courts below are, therefore, right in holding that the trustees satisfied the requirement of section 13 (1) (g). 8. Lastly, Mr. Chitale submitted that it was the duty of the Appellate Bench to record a clear finding that hardship that would be caused to the tenant would be less than hardship that would be caused to the trustees and in the absence of such finding no decree for eviction could be passed under section 13 (1) (g). This contention is to be mentioned only to be rejected. This contention is to be mentioned only to be rejected. The findings of the trial Court, referred to above, sufficiently discuss the hardship both to the trustees and the tenant and clearly indicate that greater hardship would be caused to the trustees by refusing to pass a decree than to the tenant by passing a decree against him. Mr. Chitale referred in this connection to a decision of the Gujarat High Court in Abdulrehman v. Trustees, Manicu Jamat6, which merely lays down that the claim of the trustees under sect ion 13 (1) (g) is also subject to the restriction under section 13(2). With respect I agree with the view and it is unnecessary to discuss the matter any further as I hold for reasons already stated that the finding of the trial Court under section 13(2) is illegally reversed by the appellate Bench on this point. (The rest of the judgment is not material to this report.) Petition allowed.