ORDER M.N. Shukla, J. - This government appeal arises out of the order of acquittal dated 16-5-1969 passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Kaimganj district Farrukhabad. 2. The Respondent was charged with an offence u/s 25 of the Arms Act on the basis of the alleged recovery of a bhala from him on 15-2-1969 at about 11 a.m. in the Shamsabad town district Farrukhabad. 3. The defence of the Respondent was that he being a barber was asked by the police to render free service which he declined and therefore, the police was annoyed with him and was falsely implicated. 4. It appears that the learned Magistrate had fixed 16-5-1969 for the purpose of recording prosecution evidence. On the said date a report was received from the Station Officer, Shamsabad stating that constable Mohan Singh who had prepared the recovery memo happened to be absent and consequently the witnesses could not be sent to court. On those grounds an adjournment of the case was sought The learned Magistrate refused the adjournment sought for and expressed an opinion that it was not unlikely that constable Mohan Singh had manufactured evidence in order to implicate the Respondent. It is obvious that no witnesses on behalf of the prosecution were present on 16-5-1969 which was the date fixed in the court of the Magistrate. The adjournment was refused on the basis of suspicion that perhaps constable Mohan Singh was responsible for implicating the Respondent. I am unable to find anything on record to warrant such suspicion and hence the order refusing the adjournment appears to have been passed in haste by the learned Magistrate. 5. Apart from the impropriety of the refusal to adjourn the case, there is yet another material aspect of the matter which seems to have totally escaped the attention of the learned Magistrate. I find on record an application made on the same date i.e. 16-5-1969 wherein it was expressly prayed that the prosecution witnesses may be summoned. In fact, a composite prayer was made which runs as follows: It is requested that the case may be adjourned and P.Ws. may be summoned. I find on record an application made on the same date i.e. 16-5-1969 wherein it was expressly prayed that the prosecution witnesses may be summoned. In fact, a composite prayer was made which runs as follows: It is requested that the case may be adjourned and P.Ws. may be summoned. This application was summarily rejected ay a single worded order of the Magistrate who does not seem to have applied his mind to the merits of the application, in view of that application the Magistrate was bound to summon the prosecution witnesses and he acted illegally in acquitting the accused merely on the ground that the witnesses were not present on the date fixed for their examination. He seems to have completely lost sight of the amendment which was introduced in Sub-section (6) of Section 251-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. By Section 3 of the U.P. Act 31 of 1961 full stop after the word 'witnesses" occurring in Sub-section (6) was" changed into a semicolon and the following was added: and shall summon the witnesses, documents or things specified in any application made on behalf of the prosecution before the said date for summoning the same, unless for reasons to be recorded he deems it unnecessary to summon all or any of them. This amendment had the effect of curing the lacuna which existed in the section. Under the unamended provision the Legislature had conferred the right only on the accused persons to ask for the issue of process for compelling the attendance of any witness for the purpose of examination etc. and an imperative duty was cast on the Magistrate to issue such process. There was no similar provision for examining witnesses at the instance of the prosecution but by means of the above mentioned amendment this lacuna was cured and a similar right was conferred on the prosecution to apply to the court for summoning all the prosecution witnesses. 6. The learned Government Advocate has strongly contended that it was mandatory for the Magistrate to summon the prosecution witnesses and the order rejecting the application of the prosecution made for that purpose was manifestly illegal. I think there is force in this contention. 6. The learned Government Advocate has strongly contended that it was mandatory for the Magistrate to summon the prosecution witnesses and the order rejecting the application of the prosecution made for that purpose was manifestly illegal. I think there is force in this contention. On behalf of the Respondent it has been submitted that the application for summoning the prosecution witnesses must be made "before the said date" which refers to the date fixed for the examination of the witnesses Under Clause (6) of Section 251-A. Since in the instant case, it was argued, the application was made on the very date which was fixed for the examination of the witnesses, it was not obligatory for the Magistrate to utilise the coercive powers of the court for the purposes of securing the attendance of the prosecution witnesses. This argument on behalf of the Respondent is untenable. Sometimes it may not be possible to perceive the necessity for applying for summoning the witnesses prior to the date fixed for that purpose. It is only when it is eventually discovered on the date fixed that for some unforeseen reason or the other the fitnesses are not present that it may become necessary to apply for issue of summons to secure their attendance. Hence the words "before the said date" may not be strictly construed. 7. In my opinion the provisions of Sub-section (6) of Section 251-A as amended should be read along with the provisions of Sub-section (11) of the same section which runs as follows: (11) If, in any case under this section in which a charge has been framed the Magistrate finds the accused not guilty, he shall record an order of acquittal. The words "finds the accused not guilty" are most material and reflect the intention of the Legislature. The word "finds" is of particular significance. It appears that a duty is cast on the Magistrate after examining the evidence to come to a decision as to whether the accused is entitled to acquittal or not. If the Legislature had intended that an accused person be acquitted only on account of the fact that the prosecution witnesses were not forthcoming at a certain stage of the proceedings, it would not have found it necessary to provide that the Magistrate must record a finding of the guilt of the accused. If the Legislature had intended that an accused person be acquitted only on account of the fact that the prosecution witnesses were not forthcoming at a certain stage of the proceedings, it would not have found it necessary to provide that the Magistrate must record a finding of the guilt of the accused. A mechanical test would have sufficiently served the purpose but since the Magistrate is called upon to record a finding of "not guilty" with respect to the accused which is possible only when the requisite evidence has been recorded and appraised, the Legislature has advisedly used the word "finds". Thus even apart from the aid of the Amending Act passed by the U.P. Legislature in the year 1961 the scheme of Section 251-A leads to the conclusion that unless on appraisal of the requisite evidence the Magistrate is able to record a finding of no guilty, an acquittal should not be lightly ordered. Sri Malviya appearing for the State cited a number of authorities wherein even without the aid of any such corresponding provision as is to be found in the U.P. Amending Act of 1961 it had been held that the accused should not be acquitted merely on the ground that the prosecution witnesses were not present for examination. 8. I am also inclined to put a broad construction of the language of the amended Sub-section (6) of Section 251-A. In order to effectuate the purpose of the Act and fulfil the object which was clearly to cure a lacuna in the same provision, a liberal interpretation of the language of the section is to be adopted and a literal or narrow interpretation must be discarded. As I have already observed, in many a case circumstances may not arise so as to make it necessary for the prosecution to apply for the summoning of the witnesses prior to the date fixed for this purpose. It is only when witnesses have been withheld for some reason or the other that it may become necessary to invoke the power of the court for issuing summons to ensure their attendance. Hence, if the language of the section is narrowly or strictly construed the very object of introducing the amendment would be defeated. Moreover, authority is not wholly wanting for the proposition that in appropriate context the word "before" may be read as equivalent to "not after". Hence, if the language of the section is narrowly or strictly construed the very object of introducing the amendment would be defeated. Moreover, authority is not wholly wanting for the proposition that in appropriate context the word "before" may be read as equivalent to "not after". Such a construction is open as Denman C.J. remarked in The Queen v. Arkwright 1848, 12 Q.B. 960. In that case the statute 59 Section 3 required that an order of the church-building commissioners for stopping paths through a churchyard was to be made on the consent of two justices and on notice being given in the manner and form prescribed by the Highway Act. The words "on" or "upon" had to be interpreted and it was suggested that it could bear any of the three meanings. It either meant before the act done to which it relates, or simultaneously with the act done, or after the act done. It was held that any of these connotations may be accepted according as reason and good sense required with reference to the context and the subject matter of the enactment. It was observed, "It cannot here mean simultaneously with for the notice is manifold and continued for many days; if it means before all the inconvenient consequences will follow which we have already pointed out. We must, therefore, construe it as synonymous with after; that is the order must be made after the notice given. So understood, the section is reasonable throughout." I have already adverted to the consequences which might arise if the words "before the said date for summoning the same" are literally interpreted. It is therefore necessary that a reasonable construction should be put on those words. It does not mean that the discretion of the court to pass an appropriate order in the circumstances of a particular case be fettered. There may be a suitable case in which if the application for summoning of the witnesses is made on the very date fixed for the examination of the prosecution witnesses the request may be considered legitimate and worthy of acceptance. On the other hand, an application for the same purpose may be very much anterior to the date fixed for the examination of the witnesses and yet the Magistrate may find it unnecessary to summon any of them and the prayer may be rejected. On the other hand, an application for the same purpose may be very much anterior to the date fixed for the examination of the witnesses and yet the Magistrate may find it unnecessary to summon any of them and the prayer may be rejected. But it would be improper and contrary to law to reject such prayer merely because it is made on the date fixed for the examination of the witnesses and not prior to it. 9. There is yet another reason why on the facts of the present case even the technical rigour of the section must be said to have been substantially complied with. My attention was drawn to the charge-sheet submitted against the Respondent for an offence u/s 25, Arms Act. As usual, it contains a list of the prosecution witnesses, but what is more important there is also a recital in the body of the charge-sheet itself that the prosecution witnesses may be summoned. It contains an endorsement to the effect: Submitted to the court of SDM Kaimganj along with copies, site plan, FIR, RM, etc. for disposal. PWs may be summoned immediately. In my opinion this was tantamount to applying for issue of summons in respect of the prosecution witnesses. There is no form prescribed for making such application and even an oral application may satisfy the requirements of law. Surely it cannot be disputed that this request was made anterior to the date fixed for the examination of the witnesses. The charge-sheet containing the names of these witnesses was made on 29-3-1969 and 16-5-1969 was fixed for examining the witnesses who were found absent on that date. 10. Thus, in any view of the matter the prosecution had taken all the necessary steps required by law for summoning the witnesses and the learned Magistrate acted illegally in passing an order of acquittal of the Respondent only because in his opinion the adjournment of the case was not justified. Therefore the impugned order was erroneous in law. Still however, the question remains as to whether there are sufficient grounds for interfering with the order of acquittal in the instant case. Therefore the impugned order was erroneous in law. Still however, the question remains as to whether there are sufficient grounds for interfering with the order of acquittal in the instant case. Section 423 of the Code of Criminal Procedure clearly contemplates that an appeal may be dismissed by the court "if it considers that there is no sufficient ground for interfering." It is obvious that the alleged offence in the present case was of a very petty nature. The allegation of the prosecution merely was that a bhala had been recovered from the Respondent on 15-2-1969. Nothing has been brought on record to indicate that the Appellant was a previous convict or a habitual offender and I cannot lose sight of the fact that considerable time has elapsed since the recovery is alleged to have been made. In the circumstances I do not consider it expedient to set aside the order of acquittal and remand the case. In a suitable case, however, I would have had no hesitation in ordering retrial. The instant case is not of a sufficiently serious nature to justify an order of retrial and I consider that it would serve the purpose of the State in instituting this appeal sufficiently if I merely correct the erroneous view of law expressed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate in his order. 11. With these observations dismiss the appeal.