JUDGMENT T.S. Misra, J. - This appeal has been filed by the defendant No. 4. It arises out of a partition suit filed by Sri Mahesh Prasad, who is respondent No. 3 in this appeal. The facts giving rise to this appeal in brief are as follows : - Sri Raghunath Prasad was married to Smt. Triveni Devi, who is dead. She gave birth to Tribhuwan Prasad, Rikheshwar Prasad and Gokul Prasad. Gokul Prasad is also dead. Raghunath Prasad married Subhagwati who gave birth to Mahesh Prasad, Kishan Prasad, Rajendra Prasad, Bindeshwari Prasad and Kunwar Prasad is also dead. The aforesaid Mahesh Prasad filed suit No. 315 of 1965 for partition impleading Raghunath Prasad, Smt. Subhagwati as well as all other sons of Raghunath Prasad as defendants. Me alleged that the ancestral joint family property was partitioned amongst his father and uncles in pursuance of a final decree in suit No. 75 of 1930, in the court of Civil Judge, Agra. As his uncle Trilochan Singh died issueless, another partition was affected by a registered deed dated 7/9 April, 1941. Thus the properties mentioned in schedule `A' to the plaint which fell to the share of defendant No. 1 and his branch and which were said to be ancestral properties were sought to be partitioned and the plaintiff claimed 1 /8th share in the said properties. The defendant No. 4 contested the suit, inter alias, on the grounds that the attitude of his father, defendant No. 1, towards him and his three real brothers has been unfair and partial due to the influence of defendant No. 2; that he and his brother defendant No. 3 had been living out of Agra for a long period; that the defendant No. 1 had pocketed the zamindari abolition bonds of the value of about Rs. 45,000/-; that the defendant No. 1 sold some valuable properties, viz., shop situate in Agra and pocketed the sale proceeds thereof and that the defendant No. 1 also usurped entire jewellery of Smt. Triveni Devi as well as that jewellery which he has received under the decree passed in suit No. 75 of 1930. 45,000/-; that the defendant No. 1 sold some valuable properties, viz., shop situate in Agra and pocketed the sale proceeds thereof and that the defendant No. 1 also usurped entire jewellery of Smt. Triveni Devi as well as that jewellery which he has received under the decree passed in suit No. 75 of 1930. He gave a notice to the defendant No. 1 for partition of the entire family assets in November 1960 on receipt of which an oral family settlement was arrived at between the parties in pursuance of which he and the defendant No. 3 were allotted the residential house at Agra and a grove, agricultural holding and a `katcha' house in village Son. The costly carpets, furniture and other goods were taken away from the residential house by the plaintiffs and the defendant Nos. 1, 5, 6 and 7. He also pleaded that the suit is bad because all the family assets including zamindari bonds, sale proceeds of the shops, jewellery of Smt. Triveni Devi as well as her jewellery which the defendant No. 1 had received in pursuance of the decree passed in suit No. 75 of 1930 have not been included in the suit. He alleged that as the defendant No. 1 and his other sons by the second wife want to reside from the aforesaid family settlement this suit has been got filed to cause injury to the defendant No. 4. The defendant Nos. 1 and 2 in their written statement alleged that the dwelling house in dispute, if partitioned would not remain fit for dwelling purposes and as such those defendants who wished to have their share demarcated by metes and bounds should be paid the value of their share. They also alleged that the grove in village Son, district Agra and the bhumidhari plots were not liable to be partitioned inasmuch as the same were the absolute 1 property of the defendant No. 1. The defendant No. 3 in his separate written statement raised the same pleas , which were set up by the defendant No. 4. 2. The learned trial court held f that the properties Nos. 3 to 5 mentioned in the schedule 'A' of the plaint were the self acquired properties of the defendant No. 1 and were not liable to be partitioned. 2. The learned trial court held f that the properties Nos. 3 to 5 mentioned in the schedule 'A' of the plaint were the self acquired properties of the defendant No. 1 and were not liable to be partitioned. In regard to other properties the suit for partition and possession of ?th share of the plaintiff therein was decreed. The trial court also held that no compromise as alleged by the defendant Nos. 3 and 4 in their written statement took place between the parties. While dealing with the plea for partial partition, the trial court observed that Raghunath Prasad being the father of the plaintiff and defendants No. 3 to 7 was the manager of the family and gave education to them and incurred expenses in their marriages. He also incurred expenses for running the family. The defendant Nos. 3 and 4 did not allege any fraud or misappropriation or improper conversion of any property by the Manager. The trial court placed reliance on the statement of Raghunath Prasad which was to the effect that whatever ornaments he received from his wife Smt. Triveni Devi and on the basis of partition decree passed in suit No. 75 of 1930, he had given the same in the marriages of his sons and that no ornaments and zamindari compensation; bounds were thus available for partition at the time of the filing of the present suit. The trial court also held that the sale proceeds of the shop sold in 1957 were also not available for partition at the time of the suit; hence the suit was not bad for partial partition. 3. Aggrieved by the said decision Sri Rikheshwar Prasad filed the first appeal No. 483 of 1964. The learned appellate court below on a consideration of the evidence, recorded a concurrent finding that no family settlement was effected between the parties on 31st December, 1960 as alleged by the appellant. The appellate court below also held that at the time of the institution of the present suit for partition the jewellery and money received on account of compensation and rehabilitation bends were not available for partition. It was held that the defendant No. 1 had to execute the sale deed, Ex. B-3 to pay off the joint family debts and to meet the legal necessity. It was held that the defendant No. 1 had to execute the sale deed, Ex. B-3 to pay off the joint family debts and to meet the legal necessity. It was, therefore, held that the said suit was not bad on account of partial partition. In regard to the cross-objection filed by the plaintiff, the appellate court below held that the properties Nos. 3, 4 and 5 were not joint family property but were the self acquired property of Raghunath Prasad and as such were not liable to be partitioned. The appeal and the cross-objections were, therefore, dismissed and the decree passed by the trial court was confirmed. 4. Aggrieved, the defendant No. 4 filed this second appeal. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant urged that the suit was not maintainable inasmuch as some properties belonging to the joint family were not included in the properties sought to be partitioned. The jewellery belonging to late Smt. Triveni Devi as well as the ancestral jewellery recovered by the defendant No. 1 in pursuance of the decree in suit No. 75 of 1930, the price received on the sale of the shops as well as the zamindari Compensation bonds should also have been included in the suit for partition and as the same has not been done the suit is had and untenable in law. The defendant No. 1, who was the `karta' and, Manager of the joint family, however, asserted that name of the said properties existed at the time when partition was demanded. Both the courts below have recorded a finding that the said properties did not exist at the time when partition was demanded. The jewellery was given away at the time of the marriage of children of the defendant No. 1. The money received from the sale of the shops and Z. A. Compensation bonds had been spent by him in making payment of old debts and in maintaining family expenses and giving education to children. It was not established that the defendant No. 1 committed fraud or misappropriation or made improper conversion of the said properties or any part thereof. The money received from the sale of the shops and Z. A. Compensation bonds had been spent by him in making payment of old debts and in maintaining family expenses and giving education to children. It was not established that the defendant No. 1 committed fraud or misappropriation or made improper conversion of the said properties or any part thereof. It is also not established by cogent and convincing evidence that the appellant or his real brothers were entirely excluded from enjoyment of the joint family property or that they made efforts to enjoy the same but they were not allowed by the plaintiff or other defendants to do so and were excluded therefrom. It is said that due to the influence of the defendant No. 2, the defendant No. 1 was not kind, fair or unbiased to the appellant and his brothers and they were compelled to go out of the family to live elsewhere but this by itself would not be sufficient to hold that they were completely deprived of the enjoyment of those properties. Denial of enjoyment ought to have been established. In my view the appellant has failed to establish that by any reliable and independent evidence. A coparcener is entitled to ask for partition of joint family property as it exists on the date of demand for partition but he is not entitled to call upon the Manager of the joint family to account for his past dealing with the family property except in the case of misappropriation or fraudulent or improper conversion thereof. In the absence of any proof of misappropriation or fraudulent or improper conversion of the said properties by the defendant No. 1, the appellant or the plaintiff or any other coparcener was not entitled to call upon him to account for his past dealings with the joint family property. The plaintiff has sought partition of all the joint family properties which existed at the time when partition was demanded. The court below was, therefore, justified in holding that the suit is not bad for partial partition. 6. The other submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant is that both the courts below have erred in holding that the Bhumidhari land and the grove in question were the exclusive properties of the defendant No. 1 and were not liable for partition. 6. The other submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant is that both the courts below have erred in holding that the Bhumidhari land and the grove in question were the exclusive properties of the defendant No. 1 and were not liable for partition. The defendant No. 1 admitted in his depostion before the court below that he was the zamindar of the land which has been recorded as his bhumidhari and was formerly the khudkasht. Thus prior to the abolition of the zamindari the agricultural plots in question were the khudkasht of the intermediary. After the enforcement of the U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act the defendant No. 1 acquired bhumidhari rights therein. The courts below relying on the decision in the case of Rana Sheo Ambar Singh v. Allahabad Bank Ltd., AIR 1961, S.C. 1970 : 1961 A.L.J. 716 held that the bhumidhari rights created under Section 18 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act were not compensation but were special rights conferred on intermediary by virtue of his cultivatory possession of the land comprised therein and the old proprietary rights in sir and khudkasht land vested in the State of U.P. under Section 6 of the said Act. It was, therefore, held that the properties Nos. 3, 4, and 5 were not joint family properties but were the self acquired properties of Raghunath Prasad, defendant No. 1 and were therefore, not liable to be partitioned. 7. In the case of Rana Sheo Ambar Singh, it was observed that the way in which Section 18 is worded shows that the three kinds of property vested in the State under Sec. 6(a) (1) of the U.P. Z. A. and L.R. Act and were then resettled with the intermediary on a new tenure and not on the same right which he had in them before the vesting. The legislature thus created a new right under Section 18 of the said Act and the old proprietary right in sir and khudkasht land and any intermediary grove land vested in the State. The bhumidhari rights created under Section 18 are not compensation. They are special rights conferred on the intermediary by virtue of his cultivatory possession of the lands comprised therein. 8. The land in dispute was admittedly a joint ancestral khudkasht land of the defendant No. 1. On the date of vesting the plaintiff and the defendant Nos. The bhumidhari rights created under Section 18 are not compensation. They are special rights conferred on the intermediary by virtue of his cultivatory possession of the lands comprised therein. 8. The land in dispute was admittedly a joint ancestral khudkasht land of the defendant No. 1. On the date of vesting the plaintiff and the defendant Nos. 1. 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 were alive as they are today and being members of the joint Hindu family and coparcenary consisting of the defendant No. 1 and the plaintiff and the defendant Nos. 3 to 7 they had shares in the said plots. These persons were intermediaries of the plots in dispute. Sec. 3(12) of the U.P. Z. A. and L.R. Act defines "intermediary" as a proprietor, under proprietor, sub-proprietor thekedar, permanent lessee in oudh and permanent tenure-holder of such estate or part thereof. It cannot be disputed that the plaintiffs and defendant Nos. 3 to 7 were also proprietors along with the defendant No. 1 of the zamindari property and khudkasht land belonging to the joint Hindu family and coparcenary. 9. In the case of Ram Awalamb v. Jata Shanker, 1968 A.L.J. 1108, Full Bench, it was held as under: - "(1) Where members of a joint Hindu family hold bhumidhari rights in any holding, they hold the same as tenants in common and not as joint tenants. The notions of Hindu law cannot be invoked to determine that status. (2) Where in certain class of tenancies, such as permanent tenure holders, the interest of a tenant was both heritable and transferable in a limited sense and such a tenancy could, prior to the enforcement of the Act, be described as joint family property or coparcenary property, the position changed after Act of 1951 came into force. Thereafter the interest of each bhumidhar, being heritable only according to the order of succession provided in the Act and transferable without any restriction other than mention-led in the Act itself, must be deemed lo be a separate suit. (3) Each member of a joint Hindu family must be considered to be a separate unit for the exercise of the right of transfer and also for the purposes of devolution of bhumidhari interest of the deceased member. (3) Each member of a joint Hindu family must be considered to be a separate unit for the exercise of the right of transfer and also for the purposes of devolution of bhumidhari interest of the deceased member. (4) The right of transfer of each member of the joint Hindu family of his interest in bhumidhari land is controlled only by Section 152 of the Act and by no other restriction. The provisions of Hindu law relating to restriction on transfer of coparcenary land, e.g., existence of legal necessity, do not apply". Thus the plaintiff and the defendant Nos. 1 and 3 to 7 who were members of the joint Hindu family held the bhumidhari rights, in the said plots as tenants-in-common and each one of them is to be considered as a separate unit for the exercise of the right of transfer. This right of transfer is controlled by Section 152 of the Act. The mere circumstance that the names of the plaintiff and defendant Nos. 3 to 7 were not recorded in the Village record, would not deprive all of them of the rights which they possess in the said agricultural land. Consequently, this agricultural land is liable to be partitioned. 10. In regard to grove, the defendant No. 1 alleged that he had planted the trees on the land which formed part of his zamindari land. Grove land, as defined under Sec. 3(6) of the U. P. Tenancy Act, 1939, means any specific piece of land in a Mahal or Mahals having trees planted thereon in such numbers as they preclude or when full grown will proclude the land or any considerable portion thereof from being used primarily for agricultural purposes or for any other purposes and the trees of such land constitute a grove. From this definition, it would appear that grove is different from grove land because file trees of such land constitute a grove. Intermediary's grove as defined in Sec. 3(13) means grove land held or occupied by an intermediary as such. Under Section 6 of the said Act all rights, title and interest of all the intermediaries in every estate in such area including land, cultivable or barren, grove land, forest whether within or outside village boundaries, trees (other than trees in village abadi holding or groves) have been vested in the State of Uttar Pradesh free from all incumbrances. Under Section 6 of the said Act all rights, title and interest of all the intermediaries in every estate in such area including land, cultivable or barren, grove land, forest whether within or outside village boundaries, trees (other than trees in village abadi holding or groves) have been vested in the State of Uttar Pradesh free from all incumbrances. Thus the land on which the trees in question were planted vested in the State and the same has been resettled with the intermediaries under Section 18 of the Act. However, the groves i.e. trees standing on the said land did not vest in the State and they continue to be owned by the owners thereof. The defendant No. 1 planted the trees on the land belonging to the joint family and so the same became the accretion to the joint family property. In fact he brought the same to the common stock of the joint family and it ceased to be his exclusive property. The grove in dispute is also, therefore, liable to be partitioned. 11. The court below was not justified in excluding the properties Nos. 3 to 5 Schedule 'A' viz. the grove and the agricultural plots of land from partition. 12. In the result, the decree passed by the lower court is modified and the suit is decreed for partition and possession of ?th share of the plaintiff in all the properties mentioned in Schedule `A' to the plaint. The preliminary decree be prepared accordingly. The parties shall bear their own costs of this appeal.