D. A. DESAI, J. ( 1 ) A very interesting question as to the interpretation of Order 33 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been raised in this petition. Opponent No. 1 Bai Chandbu made an application for permission to sue as a pauper. This application was presented on 5th April 1968. A notice was issued upon the petitioner respondent No. 2 and the District Government Pleader fixing the day for receiving evidence as the applicant may adduce in proof of her pauperism and for hearing any evidence which may be adduced in disproof thereof as provided by Order-33 Rule 6. The application was taken up for hearing on 2nd April 1970. When the applicant tendered evidence in proof of her pauperism a question was asked in her cross examination on behalf of the opponent that her husband died leaving some property and in answer to this question the applicant Bai Chandbu stated that her husband died about six months back leaving the house and lands bearing S. Nos. 281 372 and 43/2. It was then submitted to the learned Judge inquiring in the claim of pauperism by the applicant that she had a share in the property left by her husband and therefore she was possessed of sufficient means which would enable her to pay court-fees prescribed by law for the plaint and therefore her application for permission to sue as a pauper should be rejected. The learned Judge rejected this contention observing that while making an inquiry under Order 33 Rule 7 the inquiry has to be made with reference to the date on which an application for permission to sue as a pauper is presented and at that stage it would not be relevant to inquire about the subsequent events which if taken into consideration may have a bearing on the question whether the applicant continues to be a pauper or not. Thus observing the learned Judge granted the application under Rule 8. Original defendant No. 1 has challenged the correctness of this order in this revision application. ( 2 ) THE question that arises for determination is as to which is the relevant date with reference to which the inquiry into the status of the applicant who has made an application to sue as a pauper should be made. Original defendant No. 1 has challenged the correctness of this order in this revision application. ( 2 ) THE question that arises for determination is as to which is the relevant date with reference to which the inquiry into the status of the applicant who has made an application to sue as a pauper should be made. In other words while making an inquiry under Order 33 Rule 7 to ascertain whether the applicant who has made an application for permission to sue as a pauper is a pauper or not the circumstances bearing upon the subject as in existence on the date of the application should alone be taken into consideration or whether some subsequent events which may have a bearing on the subject may also be taken into consideration before granting permission to sue as a pauper. There is Explanation appended to Rule 1 which is material. It reads as under :-EXPLANATION. A person is a pauper when he is not possessed of sufficient means to enable him to pay the fee prescribed by law for the plaint in such suit or where no such fee is prescribed hundred rupees other than his necessary wearing apparel and the subject-matter of the suit. Rule 2 provides that very application for permission to sue as a pauper shall contain the particulars required in regard to plaints in suits; a schedule be annexed thereto showing the movable or immovable property belonging to the applicant with the estimated value thereof. Rule 3 provides that application for permission to sue as a pauper shall be presented to the court by applicant in person unless he is exempted from appearing in court in which case the application may be presented by an authorised agent. Rule 4 provides that where the application is in proper form and duly presented the court may if it thinks fit examine the applicant or his agent when the applicant is allowed to appear by the agent regarding the merits of the claim and the property of the applicant. Rule 5 confers powers upon the court to reject the application at that stage on any of the grounds mentioned in clauses (a) to (e) of Rule 5. Rule 5 confers powers upon the court to reject the application at that stage on any of the grounds mentioned in clauses (a) to (e) of Rule 5. If the court sees no reason to reject the application under Rule 5 it has to fix a date under Rule 6 for receiving evidence as the applicant may adduce in proof of his pauperism and for hearing any evidence which may be adduced in disproof thereof. For this purpose the court has to serve a notice upon the opponents that is the defendants and the District Government Pleader. Then comes Rule 7 which reads as under :-7 (1) On the day so fixed or as soon thereafter as may be convenient the court shall examine the witnesses (if any) produced by either party and may examine the applicant or his agent and shall make a memorandum of the substance of their evidence. (2) The Court shall also hear any argument which the parties may desire to offer on the question whether on the face of the application and of evidence (if any) taken by the court as herein provided the applicant is or is not subject to any of the prohibitions specified in rule 5. (3) The court shall then either allow or refuse to allow the application to sue as a pouper. Rule 8 provides that if the application made by the applicant is granted it shall be numbered and registered and shall be deemed to be the plaint in the suit and the suit shall proceed in all other respects as a suit instituted in the ordi-nary manner except that plaintiff shall not be liable to pay any court-fee. Then comes rule 9 which provides that the court may on the application of the defendant or of the Government Pleader of which seven days clear notice in writing has been given to the plaintiff order the plaintiff to be dispaupered on any of the grounds mentioned in the rule. One of the grounds on which the plaintiff can be dispaupered is if it appears that his means are such that he ought not to continue to sue as a pauper. Other two grounds are not relevant for the purpose of this revision application. ( 3 ) HAVING examined the scheme of Order 33 I may briefly state the circumstances in which the question now posed arises in this proceeding. Other two grounds are not relevant for the purpose of this revision application. ( 3 ) HAVING examined the scheme of Order 33 I may briefly state the circumstances in which the question now posed arises in this proceeding. Respondent No. 1 Bai Chandbu filed an application being Misc. Application No. 2 of 1968 in the court of the Civil Judge (junior Division) Lunavada under Order 33 Rule 2 praying for a permission to sue as a pauper. Se stated that on proper computation of the court-fees looking to the valuationplaced on the relief claimed in the suit she would be liable to pay Rs. 342/as court-fees. She has further stated that she is not possessed of sufficient means to pay court-fees prescribed by law and therefore she should be permitted to sue as a pauper. After the notice was issued upon the defendant and the District Government pleader when the inquiry was held under Rule 7 in April 1970 a question was asked in the cross-examination of the applicant Bai Chandbu that her husband had died leaving property to her to which she replied thather husband died about six month back leaving a house and three fields. On eliciting this answer an argument was advanced on behalf of the defendants in the application that she must have some share in the property left by her husband and therefore she is now possessed of sufficient means to pay court-fees. Now it is admitted that on the day on which Bai Chandbu made an application for permission to sue as a pauper that is on 5th April 1968 her husband was alive. Parties being Mohamedans the wife had no interest in the property of the husband in the life time of the husband. Bai Chandbu had further stated that she had no property exceeding Rs. one hundred in value including her wearing apparels. If the inquiry as to the means of Bai Chandbu was made keeping in view the relevant date namely date on which she presented the application there is no controversy that she was not possessed of sufficient means to enable her the pay court-fees prescribed by law. one hundred in value including her wearing apparels. If the inquiry as to the means of Bai Chandbu was made keeping in view the relevant date namely date on which she presented the application there is no controversy that she was not possessed of sufficient means to enable her the pay court-fees prescribed by law. But it was contended that before the inquiry could be completed under Rule 7 an event has occurred which if properly evaluated would show that she has now some property and if that aspect is taken into consideration her contention that she was not possessed of sufficient means to enable her to pay the prescribed court-fees cannot be accepted and therefore she should not be permitted to sue as a pauper. ( 4 ) THE question therefore is :- what is the relevant date with reference to which the inquiry under Rule 7 shall be made in order to find out whether applicant who has made an application for permission to sue as a pauper is a pauper or not. As this is the case in which the relief prayed for is capable of valuation for the purpose of court-fees case of the applicant would fall in the first part of the Explanation to Rule I which provides that a person is a pauper when he is not possessed of sufficient means to enable him to pay the fees prescribed by law for the plaint in such suit. I need not take into consideration second part of the Explanation. ( 5 ) NOW sec. 5 of the Bombay Court Fees Act provides that no document of any kind specified as chargeable in the First or Second Schedule to the said Act shall be filed submitted or recorded in any Court of Justice or shall be received or furnished by any Public Officer unless in respect of such document there has been paid fee the amount not less than that indicated by either of the said Schedules as proper fee for such document. Plaints in respect of different types of suits have been set out in Schedule 1. Whenever a plaint is presented to a court the fee payable is respect of such a plaint must have been paidbefore it is presented to the court. Unless it is paid it is not receivable by court. Plaints in respect of different types of suits have been set out in Schedule 1. Whenever a plaint is presented to a court the fee payable is respect of such a plaint must have been paidbefore it is presented to the court. Unless it is paid it is not receivable by court. Order 7 Rule 11 provides that plaint shall be rejected where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped and the plaintiff on being required by the court to supply the requisite stamp paper fails to do so. Whenever therefore a plaint is presented to a court the courtfees payable in respect of it shall be paid at the time of the presentation to the court. Of course if the court finds that proper court-fees are 40t paid an opportunity has to be given to the plaintiff to pay deficit courtfee failing which the plaint is liable to be rejected Ordinarily therefore the court-fees in respect of the plaint must be paid at the time of the presentation of the plaint in the court. Now if there was no provision such as the one contained in Order 33 no one will be entitled to present a plaint to the court in respect of which prescribed -court-fees are not paid as the plaint is liable to be rejected with this exception that the court may give an opportunity to the plaintiff to pay up the prescribed court-fees. Order 33 Rule 2 permits a person who is incapable of paying court-fees for want of sufficient means to present an application for permission to sue as a pauper. And if such an application is granted that application will be deemed to be a plaint and would be registered as such under Rule 8 without necessary court-fees. In order to be able to file a suit as a pauper the conditions prescribed in Order 33 Rule 1 read with its Explanation and Rule 5 must be satisfied. Now Explanation to Rule I provides that a person would be a pauper when he is not possessed of sufficient means to enable him to pay fee prescribed by law for the plaint in such suit. It is such a person who can make an application under Rule 2 for permission to sue as a pauper. Now Explanation to Rule I provides that a person would be a pauper when he is not possessed of sufficient means to enable him to pay fee prescribed by law for the plaint in such suit. It is such a person who can make an application under Rule 2 for permission to sue as a pauper. It is in respect of such a person that an inquiry has to be made whether he is one who is not possessed of sufficient means to enable him to pay fee prescribed by law for the plaint in such suit. Obviously but for Order 33 whenever a plaint is presented court-fees in respect of such a plaint ought to be paid. If therefore the court has to inquire whether the person who has to pay court-fees has made an application for permission to sue as a pauper which would mean that he is a person who is not possessed of sufficient means to enable him to pay prescribed court-fees for the plaint in such suit the inquiry must be made relevant to the date on which application is presented. It is with reference to that date that an inquiry has to be made whether the applicant is such a person who is not possessed of sufficient means to pay prescribed courtfees. Rules 3 4 and 5 provide a special mode of presentation of such an application and obligation of the court to make prima facie inquiry in respect of such an application having power to reject it in limine. In making this inquiry which would be something like an ex parte inquiry before notice to the oppposite party the court may also try to ascertain whether the applicant is or is not a pauper. Obviously that inquiry can be with reference to the ability of the application on the date of the presentation of the application. No other date can be envisaged ( 6 ) AFTER the application is admitted a notice would be issued as required by Rule 6 and inquiry would be held as required by Rule 7 Now it may be that some time may elapse between presentation of the application and return of the notice and holding of the inquiry after appearance of the opposite party. Even when the inquiry is held on such a date the relevant date with reference to which position of the applicant is to be inquired into would be the date on which he presented the application. Merely because the opposite party would take some time to appear and some time would be spent in serving notice the date with reference to which position of the applicant is to be inquired into cannot change. Therefore even when inquiry is held under Rule 7 as to whether the applicant who has made an application for permission to sue as a pauper is or is-not a pauper would have to be made with reference to the date on which the application is made. In an inquiry under Rule 7 intervening circumstances cannot be taken into consideration. There is a specific provision in Rule 9 which enables the opposite party to move the court for dispaupering the person who is permitted to sue as a pauper. Of course there is some force in the submission of Mr. S. B. Majmudar for the petitioner that if some events have occurred between the presentation of the application for permission to sue as a pauper and date on which the inquiry under Rule 7 is held which may radically change the position of the applicant it would be an idle formality first to hold an inquiry with reference to the date of presentation of the applicator and permitting the party to sue as a pauper and then face the application under Rule 9 for dispaupering the applicant. Such an eventuality cannot be wholly ruledout But looking to the Scheme of Rr. 1 2 3 6 and 7 it is indisputable that when an inquiry as to sufficiency or otherwise of the means of a person who has made an application for permission to sue as a pauper is made the inquiry must be made with reference to the date on which the application is presented. No other date can be envisaged. ( 7 ) THIS construction gets some support from the language of Rule 9. No other date can be envisaged. ( 7 ) THIS construction gets some support from the language of Rule 9. Rule 9 provides that the court may on the application of the defendant or of the District Government Pleader of which seven days clear notice in writing has been given to the plaintiff order the plaintiff to be dispaupered :- (B) if it appears that his means are such that he ought not to continue to sue as a pauper. Words to continue gives a clue to the meaning of sub-clause (b) of Rule 9. It postulates that on the date of the making of the application a person making the application was a pauper. But some subsequent events have occurred which have radically changed his position qua his ability to pay court-fees and therefore even though he was a pauper he should not be allowed to continue to sue as a pauper and therefore he should be dispaupered. Use of the expression to continue to sue as a pauper would show that on the date of the application the person was a pauper but the events subsequent to the presentation of the application would indicate that he has become possessed of sufficient means which would enable him to pay proper courtfees and therefore he should not be permitted to continue to sue as a pauper. Continuance of a status presupposes the existence of status at a certain point of time. The change brought about in the status subsequent to that point of time would indicate the time when the status was inquired into and established. ( 8 ) UPON a true construction of the various rules of Order 33 it becomes crystal clear that when an inquiry is held under Rule 7 with a view to granting or refusing to grant permission to sue as a pauper an inquiry into the status of the applicant applying to sue as a pauper has to be made with reference to the date on which application for permission to sue as a pauper was presented and the events subsequent to that date should not be taken into consideration. Subsequent events would be relevant only in an inquiry under Rule 9. Similarly in an inquiry under Rule 9 events that occurred prior to the presentation of the petition and were relevant in an inquiry under Rule 7 would be wholly irrelevant. Subsequent events would be relevant only in an inquiry under Rule 9. Similarly in an inquiry under Rule 9 events that occurred prior to the presentation of the petition and were relevant in an inquiry under Rule 7 would be wholly irrelevant. Therefore there is a clear cut and well-demarcated difference between the inquiry under Rule 7 and inquiry under Rule 9. In an inquiry under Rule 7 status or position of the person applying to sue as a pauper should be examined with reference to the date on which the application is presented and subsequent events should be ignored. They would be relevant only in an inquiry under Rule 9. ( 9 ) I may now refer to some of the authorities to which my attention was drawn at the hearing of this revision application. The view that I am taking would get support from some of the observations in Bai Balagauri v. Motilal Ghalabhai I. L. R. 47 Bom. 523 that case the applicant presented an application to the court to file a suit in forma pauperis for recovering her palla ornaments and maintenance. The dependent produced a few of the ornaments and cash which. as admitted by him belonged to the plaintiff and worth about Rs. 600/and stated that he was willing to give them to the applicant and therefore she was possessed of sufficient means to pay the court-fees. The court before whom the application was pending refused the permission to the applicant to sue as pauper and directed her to pay the court-fees. This order was challenged in revision application before a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court. Allowing the revision applications it was observed that the time when the application is made to institute a suit as a pauper is the point of time which the court has to consider when the application comes to be dealt with and the subject-matter of the suit is in no case at the disposal of the applicant for payment of fees. If however at any point of time afterwards it is alleged that the applicant has become possessed of sufficient means to pay the fees then no doubt when that fact is brought to the notice of the court the question of pauperism would be considered and the party once held to be a pauper might be directed to pay the courtfees. It is thus crystal clear that the inquiry under Rule 7 is with reference only to the date on which the application is presented and subsequent events cannot be taken into consideration. While disposing of the aforementioned case the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court also referred to a decision of the learned Single Judge in Dwarkanath Narayan v. Madhaverav Vishvanath (1886) 10 Bom. 207 and declined to follow it. In fact Mr. Majmudar has relied upon to a considerable extent on this Dwarkanaths case but as the Division Bench has declined to follow it the ratio therein is no good law. In Provesh Chandra v. Municipal Commissioner Howrah A. I. R. 1930 Cal. 147 (2) the applicant who applied for a permission to sue as a pauper had prayed for two reliefs one of damages and the other of recovery of provident fund amount. At the time of the inquiry under Rule 7 the opposite party offered to pay provident fund amount to the tune of Rs. 1307-10-6 and called upon the applicant to take away the amount as and when he desired. Having made this statement in the written statement a contention was raised that the applicant could not be said to be a person who was not possessed of sufficient means to enable him to pay court-fees. This contention was negatived observing that in considering the question of pauperism one must look at the matter as it stood at the date when the application was made. If the circumstances of the petitioner on the date of the said application bring him within the terms of the Explanation and are sufficient to have him declared as a pauper the immunity that the law confers upon him for the purpose of court-fees will be enjoyed by him till the termination of the suit or until such time when sufficient materials would be forthcoming to justify an order cancelling the permission. The view that I am taking is in accord with the view taken by the Calcutta High Court. ( 10 ) MR. Majmudar referred to (Gadigi) Muddeppa and others v. G. Rudramma A. I. R. 1921 Madras 97. The view that I am taking is in accord with the view taken by the Calcutta High Court. ( 10 ) MR. Majmudar referred to (Gadigi) Muddeppa and others v. G. Rudramma A. I. R. 1921 Madras 97. In that case the applicant who made on application for permission to sue as a pauper admitted in the inquiry under Rule 7 that after institution of the petition she received some money from the person against whom she intended to file a suit and she further stated that she had paid away that amount to the creditor. The learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court rejected the application for permission to sue as a pauper observing that there was no dispute that at the date of her application she was a pauper but as soon as she received money after institution she ceased to be a pauper and therefore application cannot be granted. There is absolutely no discussion as to the scheme of Order 33 and it is rather difficult to agree with the ratio of the decision. Mr. Majmudar also referred to Nirmal Kumar Mitra v. Monoranjan Chhatterjee A. I. R. 1955 Cal. 192. The point raised herein was not raised before the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court and this decision would not assist me in any manner in this case. Head-note of a case in the Fifty Years Digest from Cuttuck was read out to me but I would not examine it for want of details. ( 11 ) IN view of the aforesaid discussion this revision application fails and is dismissed. Rule is discharged with no order as to costs. .