ORDER K.B. Asthana, J. - This is an appeal by way of special leave granted by the High Court in favour of the Collector of Varanasi Under Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 381 of the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam questioning the validity of a decision of the Tribunal constituted under the aforesaid Adhiniyam awarding certain amount as compensation to the Respondent for compulsory acquisition of his house and land. 2. The main ground on the basis of which the special leave was granted by the High Court concerned the legality of an award of Rs. 1000/- as compensation to the Respondent for loss of business, however in the appeal before me the learned Standing Counsel not only questioned the correctness of the award of compensation for loss of business but for all other items. 3. For the purpose of widening the main road near the gate of Banaras Hindu University in mohalla Lanka, the Nagar Mahapalika of Varanasi acquired a certain area of land including an area of 4387 square feet belonging to the Respondent. On this piece of land the Respondent had constructed certain shops, workshops and residential apartments. The Respondent claimed over a lag of rupees as compensation as price of the land, houses, standing trees and loss of business. The Compensation Officer awarded an amount of compensation which did not meet the satisfaction of the Respondent who thereupon went up in reference to the Tribunal constituted under the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam. On the material on record and on the basis of the evidence of an Engineer Commissioner appointed by the Tribunal some more amount was awarded as compensation to the Respondent and the increase in compensation was mainly on account of awarding a sum of Rs. 1000/- as compensation for loss of business and the price for the land acquired at the rate of Rs. 1/4/- per square feet. 4. It appears that the Collector of Varanasi and as well as the Respondent were aggrieved from the decision of the Tribunal and both of them applied Under Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 381 of the Adhiniyam for certificate that their cases were fit one for appeal to the High Court. The Chairman of the Tribunal rejected the application of the Collector after hearing on merits. The application of the Respondent was rejected as it was not pressed. The Chairman of the Tribunal rejected the application of the Collector after hearing on merits. The application of the Respondent was rejected as it was not pressed. The Collector then applied to the High Court Under Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 381 of the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam for grant of special leave to appeal. This was granted. 5. I have heard Sri B.N. Sapru, the learned Standing Counsel, in support of the appeal. I do not find any merits in it. All the grounds of attack urged by the learned Standing Counsel raise purely questions of fact inviting this Court to review the evidence. None of the grounds raised meet the requirement of Sub-section (2) of Section 381 of the Adhiniyam. The Tribunal appointed an expert Engineer as Commissioner who inspected the spot, surveyed the area, prepared maps and estimated the value of the standing structure and the land. The Tribunal in arriving at its conclusion in respect of the various items for which compensation was claimed mainly relied on the evidence of the expert Engineer, who was examined as a witness. In doing so the Tribunal did not err and its decision cannot be said to be contrary to law or having failed to determine any material issue of law, nor do I find that any substantial error or defect crept in the proceedings affecting the decision of the case on the merits. The learned Standing Counsel has not been able to satisfy me that any inadmissible evidence was relied upon by the Tribunal or that any material evidence was omitted from consideration or that the Tribunal did not make the correct legal approach. On the other hand, it appears to me that on the point on which the special leave to appeal was granted, namely, the award being defective in regard to the payment of compensation for loss of business, the Respondent had a better case. Had he filed an appeal he would have probably succeeded as there is ample material on record to show that he must have suffered a greater loss than Rs. 1000/- in removing the Oil Mill, Atta Chakki etc. to some other place and setting them up. There is thus no force in the appeal. Had he filed an appeal he would have probably succeeded as there is ample material on record to show that he must have suffered a greater loss than Rs. 1000/- in removing the Oil Mill, Atta Chakki etc. to some other place and setting them up. There is thus no force in the appeal. The High Court cannot be asked to review the evidence and arrive at its own findings, the scope of appeal being limited by Sub-clause (2) of Section 381 of the Adhiniyam. 6. The Respondent has filed a cross-objection questioning the correctness of the amount awarded as compensation for the value of the land acquired. The cross-objection has been valued at Rs. 741650. This is the amount which the Respondent further claims to be awarded to him as compensation for the land acquired. In the grounds of the cross-objection it is stated that the Tribunal having arrived at the finding that Rs. 5/- per feet was the market rate at which the land was being sold in the locality, it arbitrarily, by ignoring the legal principles for determination of the market value in cases of compulsory acquisition, held that the rate at which the compensation be awarded be fixed at Rs. 1/4/ per square feet as structures were standing on the land. I think the Respondent has a tenable case covered by Clause (c) of Sub-section (2) of Section 381 of the Adhiniyam but he is faced with a formidable difficulty. The learned Standing Counsel raised a preliminary objection that the cross-objection was not maintainable inasmuch as under the provisions of the Adhiniyam filing of a cross-objection before the High Court in an appeal is not contemplated and the second part of Rule 22 of Order 41 of the CPC which permits a Respondent to file a cross objection by way of an appeal against that part of the decree which is against him, will not apply. 7. 7. Sri R.N. Singh, learned Counsel for the Respondent counters this objection by contending that by Section 377 of the Adhiniyam the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 applies to all proceedings before the Tribunal and Sub-section (4) of Section 381 attracts the provisions of CPC applicable to appeals from original decrees to an appeal from the decision of the Tribunal whether file on the basis of a grant of certificate by the Chairman of the Tribunal or by grant of special leave to appeal by the High Court and there being nothing in the Adhiniyam inconsistent with the provisions of Rule 22 of Order 41 of the CPC those provisions will apply conferring a right of filing of cross-objection on the Respondent. 8. The submission was that the words "subject to the provisions of Sub-section (1)" appearing in the beginning of Sub-section (4) of Section 381 of the Adhiniyam only mean that the provisions of Section 96 of the CPC will not apply, that is to say all other provisions applicable to appeals from original decrees in the CPC will apply but the right of appeal under the Adhiniyam not being an unfettered right that is all what has been cautioned by the opening clause of Sub-section (4) of Section 381 of the Adhiniyam. 9. On the respective contentions, summarised above, of the learned Counsel for the parties, the crucial question that arises will be one of interpreting the language and construing the effect of Sub-section (4) of Section 381 of the Adhiniyam. It is not disputed by the learned Counsel for the respective parties and it cannot be disputed that the right of appeal conferred by Section 381 of the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam is a limited right. Taking into consideration the conditions mentioned in that section right of appeal does not appear to be as wide as the one conferred u/s 96 of the CPC in appeals from original decrees. The limitations on the right of appeal u/s 381 of the Adhiniyam are in regard to its accrual and as well as to its scope. Under Sub-section (1) an aggrieved party has first to approach the Chairman of the Tribunal for grant of a certificate of fitness, if certificate is granted then the appeal as to its scope and content would be confined to the provisions of Sub-section (2). Under Sub-section (1) an aggrieved party has first to approach the Chairman of the Tribunal for grant of a certificate of fitness, if certificate is granted then the appeal as to its scope and content would be confined to the provisions of Sub-section (2). If certificate is refused and the aggrieved party approached the High Court for grant of special leave to appeal then on the grant of special leave to appeal by the High Court the appeal before it as to its scope and content will remain confined to the provisions of Sub-section (2). In so far as filing of an application for grant of certificate before the Chairman of the Tribunal or an application for grant of special leave to appeal to the High Court are concerned, they may be said to be procedural but the true effect of Clauses (a) and (b) Sub-section (1) of Section 381 of the Adhiniyam would be that the right to appeal would accrue to the aggrieved party only on the grant of a certificate by the Chairman of the Tribunal or on the grant of special leave to appeal by the High Court. There is no escape from the conclusion that the right to appeal itself is inhibited. No party who is aggrieved from a decision of the Tribunal or from any part of its decision can obtain a relief by invoking the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court unless it has obtained a certificate of fitness from the Chairman of the Tribunal or special leave to appeal from the High Court as the case be. 10. The question then arises whether an aggrieved party in whose favour a right to appeal has not accrued can yet obtain the necessary relief against a part of the decision of the Tribunal from the High Court by merely filing an objection in an appeal which the other aggrieved party has filed before the High Court on the strength of a certificate granted by the Tribunal Chairman or on the strength of the grant of special leave to appeal by the High Court? If I have understood the contention of Sri Singh, advanced on behalf of the Respondent, correctly, then such a course would be permissible to a Respondent in an appeal before the High Court from the decision of the Tribunal presented by another aggrieved party after complying with the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 381 of the Adhiniyam. That would mean that an aggrieved party without obtaining the necessary certificate or the permission, as the case be, as required by Sub-section (1) of Section 381 of the Adhiniyam can obtain a relief against a part of the decision of the Tribunal adverse to him by invoking the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court merely as the chance would have it that another aggrieved party has invoked the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court by complying with the conditions of Sub-section (1) of Section 381 of the Adhiniyam. If that were so, a situation will arise that it would be permissible to an aggrieved party to invoke the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court without complying with the statutory provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 381 of the Adhiniyam. To put it differently, such a party can achieve indirectly what it could not achieve directly as it was not always open to it to file a substantive appeal from any part of the decision of the Tribunal adverse to it. In this view of the matter, I hesitate to put a construction on the language of Sub-section (4) of Section 381 of the Adhiniyam which would permit this consequence. The words "subject to the provisions of Sub-section (1)" occurring in the beginning of Sub-section (4) in my judgment, will mean that in so far as the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by the High Court is concerned, in an appeal from the decision of a Tribunal, as if the decision was an original decree, the power of the High Court cannot be invoked unless the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 381 of the Adhiniyam have been complied with. Rule 22 of Order 41 of the CPC permits filing of a cross-objection against a part of the decree which the Respondent could have taken by way of appeal. Now entertaining and deciding of a cross-objection by the High Court is nothing but an exercise of its appellate jurisdiction or appellate power. Rule 22 of Order 41 of the CPC permits filing of a cross-objection against a part of the decree which the Respondent could have taken by way of appeal. Now entertaining and deciding of a cross-objection by the High Court is nothing but an exercise of its appellate jurisdiction or appellate power. Since I have held above that the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court u/s 381 of the Adhiniyam cannot be invoked unless the provisions of Sub-section (1) of that section are complied with, it follows that a cross objection will be ruled out and that seems to be the purport and effect of Sub-section (4) of Section 381 of the Adhiniyam. It deems an appeal from the decision of the Tribunal as an appeal from an original decree but at the same time always subject to the provisions of Sub-section (1). Further Sub-section (4) permits the applicability of the CPC only in so far as it may apply. I do not think I would be doing any violence to the language of that sub-Section if I were to hold that in an appeal u/s 381 of the Adhiniyam before the High Court which has come before it after complying with the provisions of Sub-section (1) a cross-objection as contemplated in the second part of Rule 22 of Order 41 of CPC is not maintainable. 11. The question whether the first part of Rule 22 of Order 41 of CPC will be attracted or not is not for me to consider and decide in this appeal. Likewise I need not express any opinion and what I have expressed above ought not to be construed as applying to a case where an aggrieved party complies with the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 381 of the Adhiniyam yet does not file a substantive appeal but within the time allowed files a cross-objection Under Rule 22 of Order 41 of the CPC in an appeal before the High Court by another aggrieved party which has come before it after complying with the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 381 of the Adhiniyam. 12. 12. From what I have discussed above, I find great tenability in the contention of the learned Standing Counsel and I have no hesitation in holding that he advocated a view which is consistent with the provisions of the statute and does not, to my mind, appear to be onerous on the Respondent as he had always an opportunity after complying with the provisions of Sub-section (1) to substantively file an appeal against that part of the decision of the Tribunal which went against him. 13. The learned Standing Counsel cited before me a large number of cases decided by our High Court and other High Courts where under other statutes on some what analogous provisions it has been held that a cross-objection contemplated by Rule 22 of Order 41 CPC will not be maintainable in appeals under the provisions of the particular statute. I need not encumber this judgment of mine by noticing those cases as I have confined my decision in this appeal to the particular provisions of the law under which the appeal was filed by the Collector of Varanasi before the High Court. 14. Sri Singh for the Respondent then raised an alternative contention. He relied on Rule 33 of Order 41 of the CPC and submitted that it was always open to this Court to grant a relief to the Respondent as was considered just and proper and what the Respondent was seeking through a written cross-objection be treated as a mere written submission. This contention of Sri Singh is as weak and as much without tenability as the first. For the very reasons which I have given above in holding that the second part of Rule 22 of Order 41, CPC relating to filing of cross-objections will not apply, the provisions of Rule 33 of Order 41 of the CPC cannot be resorted to for obtaining a relief by the Respondent in exercise of the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court. 15. For the reasons given above, I dismiss the appeal with costs, I also dismiss the cross-objection. Since the Respondent had a case on merits but he under wrong legal advice did not pursue the obtaining of certificate or special leave to appeal and filed the cross-objection, I would not saddle him with costs. There would be no order for costs in the cross objection.