Judgement JUDGMENT:- This appeal is by the defendant and is directed against the judgment and decree passed by the Assistant District Judge No.2, Gauhati, in Title Appeal No.26/68. The plaintiffs case is as follows- 2. The plaintiff let out on 25-10-56 a room at Lakhtokia in the town of Gauhati to the defendant for the purpose of business at Rs.30/- as rent per month. As he needed the room for his own use, on 14-3-62, he served a notice on the defendant to vacate it. On 28-4-62, the defendant executed an agreement (proved as Ext.1 in the case) whereby he undertook to vacate the room within one year from the date of execution of Ext.1. He undertook by that deed to pay a compensation at the rate of Rs.3/- per day to the plaintiff and to be evicted without notice, on his failure to vacate the room as promised. The defendant failed to comply with the terms of Ext.1. The plaintiff then issued a notice of ejectment, Ext.2, dated 11-1-66 asking the defendant to vacate the room by the end of January 31, 1966 and demanded payment of compensation of Rs.2970-/. As the defendant did not comply, the plaintiff instituted the instant suit. The defendant filed a written statement and contested the suit. His defence, material for the purpose of this appeal is that the agreement dated 28-4-62 did not ipso facto determine the tenancy and that he was entitled to a valid notice and that the notice dated 11-1-66 issued by the plaintiff was not valid in law. 3. The learned Munsif framed a number of issues and after trial dismissed the plaintiffs suit holding that there had been no valid termination of the tenancy. On appeal by the plaintiff, the learned Assistant District Judge decreed the suit. Hence this second appeal. 4. Mr. J. Majumdar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the defendant-appellant, admits that Ext.1 is not a valid deed of lease; but his contention is that a new tenancy from month to month has been created by it and that it can be looked into for the purpose of determining the commencement of that tenancy. Hence this second appeal. 4. Mr. J. Majumdar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the defendant-appellant, admits that Ext.1 is not a valid deed of lease; but his contention is that a new tenancy from month to month has been created by it and that it can be looked into for the purpose of determining the commencement of that tenancy. According to him, a new tenancy created under Ext.1 commenced on 28-4-62 and the tenant is entitled to a 15 days notice terminating the tenancy on the 27th of a month, but as by Ext.2 the plaintiff asked the defendant to quit by the end of 31st of January, 1966, the notice was invalid. 5. The first point to be decided in this case is whether Ext.1 has created a new tenancy. Secondly, if it has, whether the plaintiff served on the defendant a valid notice terminating the tenancy. It is admitted by Mr. Majumdar that Ext.1 is not operative as a lease as it is not in accordance with Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. Mr. Majumdars submission that this document can be looked into for the purpose of determining the commencement of the tenancy is fallacious. His submission pre-supposes that Ext.1 has created a tenancy. A document which is inoperative under Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, and cannot create a tenancy, cannot create the inception of any tenancy and cannot be looked in to find out the origin of any tenancy. In fact, by the notice dated 11-1-66, the plaintiff had terminated the tenancy subsisting between the parties and the defendant accepted that position. But at his request, the plaintiff agreed to allow the defendant to stay in the room for one more year on the defendants undertaking given by Ext.1 to vacate the room within one year from the date of its execution and on his further undertaking that in case he fails to vacate the room within one year, he would be treated as a trespasser and liable for eviction without notice and to pay compensation at the rate of Rs.3/- per day for use and occupation of the room. It is therefore clear that Ext.1 is a mere undertaking given by the tenant for the aforesaid purposes. It is therefore clear that Ext.1 is a mere undertaking given by the tenant for the aforesaid purposes. Ext.1 clearly indicates that the intention of the parties was not to create a fresh lease; and that the tenancy subsisting between the parties had been terminated by the notice dated 11-1-66 and that the further intention of the parties was to permit the defendant to stay in the room for not more than one year. The learned Assistant District Judge, in my opinion, was right in holding that Ext.1 was an agreement and that the defendant was bound by it. 6. As Ext.1 has not created any new lease between the parties and as the tenancy subsisting between the parties had already been determined by the notice dated 11-1-66 the defendant is not entitled to any notice before the filing of this suit. 7. The second submission of Mr. Majumdar that the notice Ext.2 is invalid and that he is entitled to a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act does not arise. 8. Mr. Majumdar relies on a decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1952 SC 23 . In that case by a kabuliyat a settlement for building purposes for 10 years at annual rent was taken. It was contended that the tenancy was from year to year. The Supreme Court held that as the purpose of the lease was not manufacturing or agricultural, under Section 107, T.P. Act, the tenancy created by implication of law should be held to be from month to month. In this case there was no doubt that the parties intended to create a tenancy but the nature of the tenancy, whether monthly or yearly, was the question. In the instant case, the parties did not intend to create a tenancy. Next Mr. Majumdar relies on a decision reported in AIR 1969 All 333 (FB). In that case the original lease was for 11 months. It was stipulated in the lease that on the expiry of the period of lease, the lessee would vacate the shop without notice, and also would be liable to be ejected in case of default in payment of a months rent. There was no provision for extension. But after the stipulated period, the lessee continued in possession and after him, his son for several years, and that subsequently rate of rent was increased. There was no provision for extension. But after the stipulated period, the lessee continued in possession and after him, his son for several years, and that subsequently rate of rent was increased. The Court held that either a renewed lease was created or the lessee was a tenant by holding over, and that in either case he was a tenant from month to month. Mr. Majumdar also relies on AIR 1970 Ker 40 . This was a case of tenancy by holding over and the court held that the tenancy had to be terminated by a notice under Section 106, T.P. Act. These cases are not applicable to the Case in hand. 9. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. The judgment and decree of the Assistant District Judge are upheld. Appeal dismissed.