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1972 DIGILAW 352 (ALL)

Manager, Shanta Nand Swatantra Bharat Inter College v. Kamla Rai

1972-09-04

N.D.OJHA, SATISH CHANDRA

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JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, J. - The Managing Committee of Shanta Nand Swatantra Bharat Inter College, Azamgarh, has come up in appeal against the judgment of a learned Single Judge allowing a writ petition and quashing the order of the Deputy Director of Education passed in an appeal. 2. The appellant had engaged the respondent No. 1 as a head clerk. He was charge-sheeted for misconduct. An enquiry committee was appointed to investigate into the charges. Its report was considered by the Managing Committee which then passed a resolution that the charges had been proved and that the respondent be dismissed.This decision was forwarded to the District Inspector of Schools for his approval. The Inspector, however, refused to accord his approval. The Managing Committee thereafter went up in appeal. The Deputy Director of Education by a reasoned order held that the Inspector was in error in refusing to accord approval. Considering the merits of the matter, the proposal to dismiss the respondent was approved with the modification that he be removed from service. 3. Aggrieved, the respondent, head clerk came to this court in a writ petition. The learned Single Judge held that the Managing Committee had no right of appeal against the order of the Inspector declining to accord approval. On this ground the petition was allowed and the order of the Deputy Director was quashed. 4. The question whether there was a right of appeal against the Inspector's order refusing to grant approval is covered by Rule 143 (i) of the Educational Code of Uttar Pradesh, 1958 edition. That rule reads : " (i) No Headmaster/Principal/teacher/clerk with whom the agreement in the prescribed form has not been executed may be dismissed, removed suspended or discharged from service, without the prior approval of the Inspector/Inspectress. Any order of punishment made by a Managing Committee or on its behalf against a Headmaster/Principal/teacher/clerk etc., appeal for which is not provided in the rules or in any form of agreement prescribed to be executed between the management and such Headmaster/Principal/teacher/clerk, etc. shall be appealable to the Inspector/Inspectress in the case of Principal/Headmaster/teacher/clerk librarian, a second appeal shall be from the order of the Inspector/Inspectress to the Regional Deputy Director/Incharge Kumaun Region in the case of boys institutions and to the Deputy Director (Women) in the case of girls institutions. shall be appealable to the Inspector/Inspectress in the case of Principal/Headmaster/teacher/clerk librarian, a second appeal shall be from the order of the Inspector/Inspectress to the Regional Deputy Director/Incharge Kumaun Region in the case of boys institutions and to the Deputy Director (Women) in the case of girls institutions. The decision of the Deputy Director of the Region/Incharge Kumaun Region or the Deputy Director (Women) shall be final." 5. This rule provides for three matters. By the first clause it provides that no order of dismissal, removal, suspension or discharge shall be passed without the prior approval of the Inspector. By the second clause, an order of punishment passed by the Managing Committee is made appealable to the Inspector. By the last clause, a second appeal is provided against the order of the Inspector. 6. The underlying scheme and the clear object of this rule is to provide an appeal to the Inspector against orders of punishment passed by the Managing Committee and then a second appeal to the Deputy Director against orders passed by the Inspector in such proceedings. It is true that the use of the words "second appeal" in the said clause would normally refer to an appeal against an order passed in an appeal. It is also true that the second clause specifically speaks of an appeal to the Inspector against an order of punishment made by a Managing Committee. Under the second clause an appeal lies against an order of punishment. It cannot be denied or disputed that an order, of dismissal or removal or suspension or discharge from service for misconduct is an order of punishment. Such orders of punishment can be passed by adopting a different procedure than may be available for orders of lesser punishment like censure or withholding of increments etc. For the major punishments mentioned in the first part of the rule, prior approval of the Inspector is necessary. Without that no decision of dismissal or removal etc., will be effective i.e., no operative order of such punishment can be passed without the prior approval of the Inspector. 7. In our opinion, the proceedings for prior approval of the decision of the Managing Committee to impose the above mentioned punishments would be in tho nature of an appeal before the Inspector against the decision of the Managing Committee. If the Inspector approves the proposal of the Managing Committee. 7. In our opinion, the proceedings for prior approval of the decision of the Managing Committee to impose the above mentioned punishments would be in tho nature of an appeal before the Inspector against the decision of the Managing Committee. If the Inspector approves the proposal of the Managing Committee. such an order of approval would be tantamount to passing an order in an appeal against the teacher or clerk concerned and the teacher or clerk concerned shall have a right of second appeal before the Deputy Director. If the rule is not read in this manlier, several anomalous results will follow. Take a case where the Managing Committee proposes to dismiss a teacher or clerk. The matter is taken before the Inspector and the Inspector accords his approval. Thereafter the Management passes a formal order of punishment in the shape of dismissal from service. According to the literal sense of the second clause, the teacher or clerk will have a right of appeal against the order of punishment imposed, to the same person, namely the Inspector, who had passed the effective order at an earlier stage. That will be virtually providing an appeal from Caesar to Caesar. That could possibly not be the intention of framing this rule. The obvious idea is that if the Managing Committee passes an order of punishment, the punishment should be subject to review or reconsideration by two higher authorities, the Inspector and the Deputy Director, Read in this way, irrespective of the difference in procedure, both in a major and a minor punishment, the matter goes up to the Inspector by way of an appeal and to the Deputy Director by way of a second appeal. 8. The rule does not say that an appeal shall be at the instance of the clerk, teacher etc. It points out that in the case of a clerk etc. the order will be appealable or that a second appeal shall be from the order of the Inspector. This clearly shows that the aggrieved party has been conferred a right of appeal, no matter if it be the Managing Committee or the clerk, teacher etc. 9. The rule appears to have been drafted departmentally. That is why it as been so inartistically framed. For in stance the opening part of the rule speaks of "Headmaster/Principal/teacher/clerk". This clearly shows that the aggrieved party has been conferred a right of appeal, no matter if it be the Managing Committee or the clerk, teacher etc. 9. The rule appears to have been drafted departmentally. That is why it as been so inartistically framed. For in stance the opening part of the rule speaks of "Headmaster/Principal/teacher/clerk". The second part, however, says "Headmaster/Principal/teacher/clerk etc." The third clause introduces "librarian" in addition. These are obviously draftsman's mistakes. Since the scheme of the rule is clear, in our opinion, it should be given effect, especially when this construction is not violative of any express provisions of the rules. 10. So read, the management had a right of second appeal to the Deputy against the order of the Inspector. The appeal was competent. 11. For the respondent it was then urged that the Regional Deputy Director, Gorakhpur, had no jurisdiction to hear and decide this appeal. This argument is misconceived and is based upon a misreading of the rule. The second part refers to "Regional Deputy Director Incharge Kumaun Region." These are two distinct personalities. Here the institution is situate at Azamgarh and nobody has disputed that it is within the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Deputy Director, Gorakhpur. He rightly had the jurisdiction to decide the appeal. 12. It was also urged that the Deputy Director had himself held that the charge had not been proved and on that finding he was not justified in removing the respondent from service. We have read the order with care. The Deputy Director has not given such a finding. He has indicated that the Inspector based his order upon two grounds, firstly, the clerk was deprived of a portion of his wages during the period of suspension and, secondly, at the time of the passing of the order the Managing Committee did not apprise the clerk of the charges which in its opinion had been found established. The Deputy Director remarked that a perusal of the Inspector's order showed that he did not base his order upon a consideration of the truth or otherwise of the charges. Thereafter the Deputy Director dealt with both the points and held that they had no substance. There is nothing in his order to suggest.that he cattle to the conclusion that the charges had not been established. Thereafter the Deputy Director dealt with both the points and held that they had no substance. There is nothing in his order to suggest.that he cattle to the conclusion that the charges had not been established. On the other hand, he remarked that the clerk had appeared before him and said that he had nothing further to say. We are hence unable to agree that the Deputy Director had held that the charges had not been established. 13. No other point was pressed. 14. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment of the learned Single Judge is set aside. The writ petition is dismissed with costs.