A.N.Grover, J. (1) THIS is an appeal by special leave from a judgment of the Allahabad High court arising out of a suit for a declaration that the plaintiff, now represented by his legal representatives, who are the appellants before us, was the Bhumidar of certain plots of land in village Sarkaripura in Varanasi District and that he was entitled to get possession of those plots as Bhumidar with which defendant No. 1 (respondent No. 1 herein) had no concern. The trial court dismissed the suit but the first appellate court decreed the same. The High court on appeal restored the decree of the trial court. (2) THE facts lie within a narrow compass. One Jhuru father of defendant No. 2 (respondent No. 2 herein) Smt. Sundariya was the original tenant of the plots in dispute. She died when Mst. Sundariya was still a child. She was brought up by Chhanoo respondent No. 1. During her minority he managed the property left by Jhuru including the plots in question. Mst. Sundariya was married when she came of age. It appears that Mst. Sundariya prior to December, 1965, obtained Bhumidari rights in the plots by depositing ten times the rent. On December 19, 1956, she sold these plots to the plaintiff for Rs. 1,500.00. It was alleged in the plaint that the plaintiff came into possession after the sale deed had been executed and registered. According to the revenue entries defendant No. 1 was shown as guardian of Mst. Sundariya. For that reason he kept on making attempts ro interfere with the possession of the plaintiff. There were proceedings under S. 145 of the Criminal Procedure court which ended against the plaintiff in September 1957. That led to the filing of the suit. (3) MST. Sundariya admitted the case of the plaintiff but the suit was contested by Chhanoo. According to him the rights of Mst. Sundariya got extinguished on her marriage and thereafter he continued to remain in possession as owner, his possession being adverse. It was pleaded that the entries in the revenue papers could not affect his rights. The trial court referred the is ue about Sirdari rights claimed by defendant No. 1 to the revenue court for a finding. The revenue court held that Chhanoo was the sirdar. On that finding the trial court dismissed the suit. It was pleaded that the entries in the revenue papers could not affect his rights. The trial court referred the is ue about Sirdari rights claimed by defendant No. 1 to the revenue court for a finding. The revenue court held that Chhanoo was the sirdar. On that finding the trial court dismissed the suit. (4) BEFORE the first appellate court only one point appears to have been the subject-matter of discussion and decision. That court was of the view that possession of Chhanoo over the plots in dispute commenced in his capacity as the de facto guardian of Mst. Sundariya. The revenue entries Were also to that effect. The marriage of Mst. Sundariya undoubtedly led to extinguishment of her rights but no heir entitled under the law came forward to claim or lake possession. Consequently Mst. Sundariya continued to be in possession through her de-facto guardian. Mst. Sundariya even after termination of her legal rights as heir of Jhuru thus continued to remain in possession and Chhanoo defendant No. 1 was shown at all times in the relevani revenue records as her representative. When Mst. Sundariya took proceedings to obtain Bhumidari certificate no objection was taken by Ghhanoo to that certificate being granted. In this view of the matter the first appellate court came to the conclusion that Ghhanoo did not have any rights and the plaintiff was entitled to a decree in his favour. (5) THE High court reversed the finding of the first appellate court on the short ground that when Mst. Sundariyas title got extinguished on her marriage the possession of Chhanoo could not be on her behalf in the eye of law. In the opinion of the High court the mere fact that Sundariya continued to be shown as a tenant could not make her a tenant and since she had lost all rights the plaintiff could not succeed in his suit. It has been urged on behalf of the appellants before us that the High court was in error in reversing the finding of fact given by the first appellate court that the possession of Chhanoo was only on behalf of Mst. Sundariya and not in his own right or in assertion of hostile title against her. It has been urged on behalf of the appellants before us that the High court was in error in reversing the finding of fact given by the first appellate court that the possession of Chhanoo was only on behalf of Mst. Sundariya and not in his own right or in assertion of hostile title against her. Our attention has been invited to S. 182(2) of the U. P. Tenancy Act, 1939 by which it is provided that if no suit is brought under this S. or if a deerse obtained is not executed the person in possession shall become heredirary tenant of such plut. According to Ss. (1) of S. 180 the person taking or retaining possession of a plot of land without the comment of the person entitled to admit him to occupy such plot shall be liable to ejectment on the suit of the penon so entitled. It has been submitted that it was open to the person who was entitled to evict Mst. Sundariya on the extinction of her rights on her marriage in the tenancy but since no action was taken by him and she continued to. remain in possession through Ghhanoo she became the hereditary tenant of those plots and it was wholly immaterial whether she had lost her rights by reason of her marriage. In this connection reference may also be made to S. 36 of the Tenancy Act, which provided inter alia that if a female tenant who is the daughter of the last male holder gets married the holding shall devolve in accordance with the order of succession laid down in S. 35 on the heir of the last rnale tenant. It was never tin case of Chhanoo that he was the heir of the last male tenant who was entitled to succeed under S. 35 on the extinction of rights of the female tenant Mat. Sundariya on her marriage. It has next been contended that even assuming that Chhanoo was a Sirdar he made no attempt at any stage to get the entries in the revenue records corrected nor did he raise any objection to the Bhumidar Sanad being grantrd to Mst. Sundariya which could be done only on her having satisfied the authorities with regard to her right, to obtain the Bhuimidari Sanad. Sundariya which could be done only on her having satisfied the authorities with regard to her right, to obtain the Bhuimidari Sanad. The acquisition of Bhumidari rights is dealt with by S. 134 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. The certificate is granted under S. 137 on the satisfaction of the Assistant Collector that the applicant is entitled to. a declaration with regards to Bhumdari rights. Such a declaration was admittedly obtained by Mst. Sundariya and no attempt was made to get that certificate cancelled which could be done under S. 137-A of the aforesaid Act, by Chhanoo if he wanted to estphlish that he had the rights of a Sirdar and that the certificate had been obtained either fraudulantly or by concealment of true facts from the Assistant Collector. The purchase of the plots was made by the plaintiff after the certificate had been granted in favour of Mst. Sundariya. It was sought to be established by the counsel for the appellants from all the above facts and circumstances as also the legal provisions that Chhanoo had no. lights whatsoever and the High court was wholly in error in interfering with the finding given by the first appellate court. (6) MR. J. P. Goyal who appears for respondent No. 1 Chhanoo, has not been able to effectively meet the above submission of the counsel for the appellants. He has tried to emphasise mainly the position which was canvassed and was accepted by the High court that on the extinction of the rights of Mst. Sundariya, Chhanoo took into possession all the plots in dispute and by virtue of his possession he became entitled to all the rights under the law of a Sirdar etc. In our judgment the entire material on the record including the revenue entries showed that Chhanoo was never in passession in his own right and even if he was in actual physical possession that possession was only as an agent or representative of Mst. Sundariya who after her marriage was living in a different village and was only expected to manage the properties of which she was in possession through someone, that being Ghhanoo. Neither the necessary facts nor the material evidence on the question of acquisition of any title by Chhanoo by way of adverse possession was relied on in the courts below or before us. Neither the necessary facts nor the material evidence on the question of acquisition of any title by Chhanoo by way of adverse possession was relied on in the courts below or before us. The conduct of Ghhanoo throughout showed that he never, claimed or asserted before the present litigation that he took possession even as a trespasser after the marriage of Mst. Sundariya. He made no attempt at any stage to have the revenue entries corrected. According to those entries he was shown in possession on behalf of Mst. Sundariya. If he bad taken possession as a tresspasser the entries would have been of a different nature and would not have continued to show Mst. Sundariya in possession through her quondam de facto guardian. It is difficult to accept that Chhanoo remained totally ignorant about the steps taken by Mst. Sundariya for obtaining Bhumidari rights. Even after she had obtained a certificate under S. 137 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, with regard to her Bhumidari rights Chhanoo did not take any action to get the certificate cancelled which he could have got done if his case was true under the provisions of S. 137-A of that Act. All these facts and circumstances support the conclusion arrived at by the firat appellate court that the possession of Ghhanoo was always as a representative or de facto guardian of Mst. Sundariya. We see no reason or justification on the part of the High court for reversing that finding. (7) THIS appeal, therefore, must succeed. The order of the High court is hereby set aside and that of the first appellate court restored with rests.