JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS appeal arises out of proceedings in execution of a decree which was passed in accordance with the compromise arrived at between the parties in a suit for eviction under the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. ( 2. ) DHANRAJ (respondent) brought the suit for eviction against Munshiram (appellant) on the ground that he required the suit premises bona fide for starting his business. While the trial was pending, there was a compromise between the parties on April 8, 1968 on the following terms:- " (1) That the defendant will vacate the honse No. 11 of Ward No. 21 of Chhindwara town (suit house) on 31-3-1971 and will deliver vacant possession of the accommodation to the plaintiff without fail. (2) That in case the defendant fails to vacate and deliver possession of the suit accommodation to the plaintiff on 81-3-1971, the plaintiff shall be entitled to take possession of the suit house by executing the decree through process of Court. The defendant shall be liable to pay damages at Rs. 5 (Rupees Five) per day for such use and occupation of the suit accommodation from 1-4-1971 till the plaintiff gets possession of the same from the defendant. (3) That this dispute regarding rent has been settled mutually and it is agreed that the defendant is not in arrears of rent upto 31-3-1968. The plaintiff acknowledges receipt of rent upto 31-3-1968 of the suit house. Now the defendant will pay rent regularly every month from 1-4-1968 till 31-3-1971. Now the defendant is not entitled to recover anything in respect of goods from the plaintiff. (4) That the parties will bear their own costs. " The compromise was recorded by the trial Court. A decree was accordingly passed. ( 3. ) AS the judgment-debtor did not deliver possession to the decree-holder, the latter, on April 9, 1971, made an application for execution of the decree. He claimed possession of the disputed accommodation and also damages Rs. 40, from April 1, 1971, to April 8, 1971, that is, 8 days, at Rs. 5 per day. Thus, the decree-holder sought enforcement of the terms of the compromise decree. He claimed possession of the disputed accommodation and also damages Rs. 40, from April 1, 1971, to April 8, 1971, that is, 8 days, at Rs. 5 per day. Thus, the decree-holder sought enforcement of the terms of the compromise decree. The judgment-debtor raised an objection that the decree was a nullity inasmuch as, there was no finding that the accommodation was required bona fide by the decree-holder for starting his business within the meaning of section 12 (1) (f) of the Act. Further, damages could not be recovered from him at Rs. 5 per day. The first objection found favour with the trial Court but not the second. It held that possession could not be delivered to the decree-holder but the judgment-debtor was liable to pay damages at Rs. 5 per day. 3. By the order of the executing Court both the parties were aggrieved. They both filed cross-appeals in the Court of the Additional District Judge, chhindwara. The decree-holders contention was that the compromise decree was not a nullity so that he was entitled to get possession of the accommodation. The judgment-debtors grievance was that once the decree was held to be a nullity, he could not be obliged to pay Rs. 5 per day as damages. The learned Additional District Judge dismissed both the appeals. While dismissing the decree-holders appeal, he relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in Smt. Kaushalya Devi v. K L. Bansal ( AIR 1970 SC 838 ) and a decision of a learned single Judge of this Court in Balgovind v. Mahavir Prasad (1970 MPLJ Note 83 ). He, however, held that the judgment-debtor was liable to pay Rs. 5 per day as damages. In the result, both the appeals were dismissed. ( 4. ) IN this Court, the decree-holder has not preferred an appeal from that part of the judgment of the first appellate Court, whereby his appeal before that Court was dismissed, However, the judgment-debtor has preferred this second appeal. Shri Khirwadkar, learned counsel for the appellant, contends that since the judgment-debtor cannot be compelled to vacate and the first condition of the compromise decree is unenforceable, the second automatically falls through. It is further contended that the decree for eviction being a nullity, the appellant became a statutory tenant so that he became entitled to the protection of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, particularly section 6. It is further contended that the decree for eviction being a nullity, the appellant became a statutory tenant so that he became entitled to the protection of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, particularly section 6. All these contentions must be dealt together and, in my opinion, must be rejected. ( 5. ) THE judgment of the first appellate Court consists of two parts: (1) The compromise decree is a nullity and, therefore, the decree-holder is not entitled to possession of the accommodation ; and (2) the decree is a nullity and, therefore, the decree-holder cannot get Rs. 5 per day as damages from the judgment-debtor. These two parts are separable and, therefore, there is no substance in the appellants contention that just because the decree-holder did not prefer an appeal his liability to pay Rs. 5 per day as damages per se extinguished. It is one thing that because of the finality, which the first part of the first appellate Courts judgment has acquired, the judgment-debtor has been absolved of the liability to vacate under the compromise decree, but it is quite different whether the judgment-debtor is liable to pay Rs. 5 per day as damages under the compromise decree. The decree-holder may not succeed in getting possession of the accommodation ; he can still succeed in getting damages. ( 6. ) IN my opinion, the judgment-debtor was estopped from taking the plea that under the compromise decree he cannot be compelled to vacate because a ground under section 12 (1) of the M. P. Accommodation Control act, 1961, was not determined and made a rule of the Court. It was said by lord Herschell in In re South American and Mexican Company Ex parte Bank of England ( (1895) 1. ch. 37.) as follows:- "the truth is, a judgment by consent is intended to put a stop to litigation between the parties just as much as is a judgment which results from the decision of the Court after the matter has been fought out to the end. And i think it would be very mischievous if one were not to give a fair and reasonable interpretation to such judgments, and were to allow questions that were really involved in the action to be fought over again in a subsequent action. " These observations, in my opinion and I say with the utmost respect, are classic. And i think it would be very mischievous if one were not to give a fair and reasonable interpretation to such judgments, and were to allow questions that were really involved in the action to be fought over again in a subsequent action. " These observations, in my opinion and I say with the utmost respect, are classic. So also in Kinch v. Walcott (1929 AC 482.), it was laid down thus:-"first of all their Lordships are clear that in relation to this plea of estoppel it is of no advantage to the appellant that the order in the libel action which is said to raise it was a consent order. For such a purpose an order by consent, not discharged by mutual agreement)and remaining unreduced, is as effective as an order of the Court made otherwise than by consent and not discharged on appeal. In Secretary of State for India in Council v. Ateendranath Das (ILR 63cal. 550), it was similarly observed thus : "on this authority it becomes absolutely clear that the consent order is as effective as an order passed on contest, not only with reference to the conclusions arrived at in the previous suit but also with regard to every step in the process of reasoning on which the said conclusion is founded. " The above decisions were approved by the Supreme Court in Sailendra Narayan v. State of Orissa ( AIR 1956 SC 346 . ). The judgment of the Court was delivered by S. R. Das, c. J. In a word, it has been held that a consent decree operates as estoppel by judgment. Thus, if a decree had been a contested one and the judgment debtor cannot raise the objection in the executing Court that there was no determination of the bona fide requirement of the landlord, so also, he is estopped from raising that objection even where a compromise decree is sought to be enforced. ( 7. Thus, if a decree had been a contested one and the judgment debtor cannot raise the objection in the executing Court that there was no determination of the bona fide requirement of the landlord, so also, he is estopped from raising that objection even where a compromise decree is sought to be enforced. ( 7. ) BUT apart from these considerations, it has now been held by a division Bench in Chandan Bai v. Surjan (1973 MPLJ 216.) that after the suit is filed, the tenant can enter into a compromise promising to give up possession in future and as there is nothing per se illegal in such a promise, the Court would be bound to pass a decree in terms of the compromise under Order 23, rule 3, Civil procedure Code, the provisions of which were not excluded by the Accommodation Control Act. It was thus held that the compromise decree was not a nullity. In view of this decision, it must be said that if the decree is not a nullity, the decree-holder is entitled to recover damages under the compromise decree as agreed to between the parties. On that short ground also, this appeal must be dismissed. The dismissal of this appeal does not come in conflict with the finality which the first part of the judgment of the first appellate Court has attained because of the omission on the part of the decree-holder to file an appeal for the relief of eviction by enforcement of the compromise decree. ( 8. ) THE appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.