Pratap Narain Agarwal v. Union of India — 1972 DIGILAW 367 (ALL)

JUDGMENT H.N. Seth, J. - Pratap Narain Agarwal and his mother Smt. Vidya Bai partners of Messrs. Agra Roller Flour Mills, Belanganj, Agra have filed the present writ petition. The residential-cum-business premises belonging to the petitioners was searched by the officials of Customs and Central Excise Department, Agra on 3/4th June, 1969. They seized certain articles and prepared a Panchanama. According to the Panchanama, the seized articles consisted of 13 pieces of gold bullion in the form the crude Lachcha (coil shape) Hansuli and one piece of gold bullion in the shape of a bar. These fourteen pieces of gold were recovered from a safe lying in a room which was jointly used by Sri Pratap Narain Agarwal and his mother. Out of these items, 13 items were of 24 carats purity, whereas the bar was of 20 carats purity. The total weight of these articles was 5593-5 grammes. The petitioners failed to produce any evidence with regard to the lawful purchase acquisition of the said gold. They also failed to produce any permit granted by the Reserve Bank of India for possession of the said gold. They did not produce any evidence to disclose that the said gold had been declared under the provisions of the Gold Control Act. Customs Officials, accordingly, seized the said gold under Sec. 110 of the Customs Act, 1962 as they believed that it had been smuggled in India in contravention of the restrictions imposed on its import under Sec. 8(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 read with Sec. 11 of the Customs Act, 1962. They also seized it under the provisions of the Gold Control Act, 1968 as the same had not been declared in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Apart from the said gold certain articles of foreign origin, like record changer, air cooler, transistor, radio, tape recorder etc., were also recovered. Sri Pratap Narain failed to produce any evidence for the lawful purchase or acquisition of those articles hence they also seized under Sec. 110 of the Customs Act, under a belief that they had been smuggled into India in contravention of import restrictions. 2. On 29th of May, 1970, the Collector of Customs and Central Excise, Kanpur issued two notices to the petitioners for showing cause against the confiscation of the seized goods and imposition of penalty upon them. 2. On 29th of May, 1970, the Collector of Customs and Central Excise, Kanpur issued two notices to the petitioners for showing cause against the confiscation of the seized goods and imposition of penalty upon them. The first notice (annexure VII to the writ petition) stated that the petitioners appear to have contravened the provisions of Secs. 8 and 16 (1) of the Gold (Control) Act, 1968 as they were found in possession of 14 items of primary gold weighing 5,593.6 grammes. The gold had been seized under Sec. 66 (1) (a) of the Gold Control Act, under a reasonable belief that the same was being possessed in contravention of the provisions of Sec. 16 (1) of the Gold (Control) Act. The second notice (Annexure VIII to the writ petition) was for taking proceedings for the confiscation of these very items of gold as well as that of other articles of foreign origin like record changer etc. found in petitioners possession, under Sec. 111 of the Customs Act. 3. The two petitioners have now moved this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. They pray that the respondents be directed to return the gold ornaments and other articles seized by them on 3/4th June, 1969 and to drop the proceedings initiated by them by issuing the two show cause notices dated May 29, 1970. 4. It is admitted by learned counsel for the parties that various items of gold have been seized both under the provisions of the Gold Control Act and the Customs Act. So far as the remaining items alleged to be of foreign origin are concerned they have been seized only under the provisions of the Customs Act. 5. Sri S. N. Kacker appearing for the petitioners, contended that the proceeding; for confiscation of the articles mentioned in the two notices have not been initiated within a period of six months from the date of their seizure. Extension of period of six months for retention of goods under the provisions of the Customs Act and Central Excise Act, granted by the Collector of Customs and Central Excise, without hearing the petitioners is illegal. Accordingly respondents are under a statutory obligation to return the seized goods to the petitioners forthwith. 6. Sec. 110 of the Customs Act, which finds place in Chapter VIII dealing with searches, seizure and arrests provides for seizure of goods. Under sub sec. Accordingly respondents are under a statutory obligation to return the seized goods to the petitioners forthwith. 6. Sec. 110 of the Customs Act, which finds place in Chapter VIII dealing with searches, seizure and arrests provides for seizure of goods. Under sub sec. (1) it the appropriate officer has reason to believe that any goods are liable to confiscation under the Act he may seize such goods. Sub-sec. (2) runs : "Where any goods are seized under sub-sec. (1) and no notice in respect thereof is given under clause (a) of Sec. 124 within six months of seizure of the goods the goods shall be returned to the person front whose possession they were seized : Provided that the aforesaid period of six months may, on sufficient cause having shown be extended by the Collector of Customs for a period not exceeding six months." 7. Respondents do not deny that the Collector of Customs and Central Excise has extended the period of six months mentioned in Sec. 110 of the Customs Act, and Sec. 79 of the Gold Control Act, without issuing any notice to the petitioners or affording them an opportunity of being heard in this regard. In the case of Assistant Collector of Customs v. Charan Das Malhotra, AIR 1972 SC 689 , after considering the object underlying the provisions of Sec. 110 of the Act and use of the words "that the aforesaid period of six months may on sufficient cause being shown, be extended by the Collector . . . . . . . . . . ." the Supreme Court held that the power under the proviso to Sec. 110 (2) was quasi judicial and at any rate one which required a judicial approach, and the same could not be exercised without affording an opportunity of being heard being given to the person from whose possession the goods were seized. In this connection the following observations made in paragraph 16 of the judgment of Supreme Court are pertinent. "But in the present case also the right to restoration of the seized goods is a civil right which accrues on the expiry of the initial six months and which is defeated on an extension being granted even though such extension is possible within a year from the date of the seizure. "But in the present case also the right to restoration of the seized goods is a civil right which accrues on the expiry of the initial six months and which is defeated on an extension being granted even though such extension is possible within a year from the date of the seizure. Since the Collector has on facts to decide on the existence of a sufficient cause, although his decision as to sufficiency of materials before him may be within his exclusive jurisdiction, it is nonetheless difficult to comprehend how he can come to his determination unless as the Division Bench of the High Court has said he has before him the pros and cons of the question. An ex parte determination by the Collector would expose his decision to be one sided and perhaps one based on an incorrect statement of facts. How then can it be said that his determination that a sufficient cause exists is just and fair if he has before him a one sided picture without any means to check it, unless there is an opportunity to the other side to correct or controvert it. The difference in the language used in the first sub-section and the proviso to sub-sec. (2) lends support to the contention that the power in one case may be subjective and therefore not calling for an enquiry and the power in the other is one, the exercise of which necessitates an enquiry into the materials placed before the Collector for his determination. In our view, these considerations lead to the conclusion that the power under the proviso is not to be exercised without an opportunity of being heard given to the person from whom the goods are seized." 8. It is, therefore, clear that the Collector, Central Excise and Customs was not competent to extend the period of six months mentioned in Sec. 110 (2) of the Customs Act, without giving an opportunity of being heard, to the petitioner. The respondents are, therefore, bound to return the goods seized under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 110 to the person from whose possession they were seized. They are not entitled to retain the 14 items of gold and other articles of foreign origin for purposes of proceeding under Sec. 124 of the Customs Act. 9. The respondents are, therefore, bound to return the goods seized under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 110 to the person from whose possession they were seized. They are not entitled to retain the 14 items of gold and other articles of foreign origin for purposes of proceeding under Sec. 124 of the Customs Act. 9. So far as the claim of the petitioner for the return of the article seized under the provisions of the Gold Control Act, 1968 is concerned, Sri Kacker contends that for reasons similar to those given by the Supreme Court in the case of Assistant Collector of Customs v. Charan Das Malhotra, extension of period granted by the Collector of Customs for issuing notice under Sec. 79 (1) of the Gold Control Act, without affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner is invalid. The respondent are, therefore, bound to return those articles also after six months from the date of their seizure. Section 79 of the Gold (Control) Act runs thus : No order of adjudication of confiscation or penalty shall be made unless the owner of the gold, conveyance, or animal or other person concerned is given a notice in writing- (i) informing him of the grounds on which it is proposed to confiscate such gold, conveyance or animal or to impose a penalty; and (ii) giving him a reasonable opportunity of making a representation in writing within such reasonable time as may be specified in the notice against the confiscation or imposition of penalty mentioned therein and, if he so desires, of being heard in the matter : Provided that the notice and the representation referred to in this section may at the request of the owner or other person concerned be oral : Provided further that where no such notice is given within a period of six months from the date of the seizure of the gold, conveyance of animal or such further period as the Collector of Central Excise or of Customs may allow, such gold, conveyance or animal shall be returned after the expiry of that period to the person from whose possession it was seized. Explanation :-Where any fresh adjudication is ordered under this Act, the period of six months specified in the second proviso shall be computed from the date on which such order for fresh adjudication is made." 10. Explanation :-Where any fresh adjudication is ordered under this Act, the period of six months specified in the second proviso shall be computed from the date on which such order for fresh adjudication is made." 10. It will be seen that there is material difference between the provisions of Sec. 110 of the Customs Act and Sec. 79 of the Gold Control Act which specifically lays down that before making an order directing confiscation or imposing penalty a notice in writing has to be given, on the other hand there is nothing in this section which indicates that the Legislature entitled the Collector of Central Excise should hear the person concerned before extending the period mentioned in the proviso to that section. Moreover the words "that an extension can be granted on sufficient cause being shown" which finds place in Sec. 110 of the Customs Act are significantly absent in Sec. 79 of the Gold Control Act, 1968. In paragraph 13 of the judgment in the case of Assistant Collector v. Charan Das Malhotra the Supreme Court has made the following observations : The question therefore is as to the nature of such a function and power entrusted to and conferred on the collector by this proviso. It will be noticed that whereas sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 110 uses the expression "reason to believe for enabling the Customs Officer to seize goods, the proviso to sub-rule (2) was the expression sufficient cause being shown . . . . . . . . . .It would be seen that sub-sec. (1) does not contemplate an enquiry at the stage of seizure, the only requirement being the satisfaction of the officer that there are reasons to believe that the good are liable to confiscation by reasons of their illegal importation. . . .It is clear that the Legislature was not prepared to use the same language while giving power to the Collector to extend time and deliberately use the expression sufficient cause being shown. . . . . . .The words sufficient cause being shown must mean that the Collector must determine on materials placed before him that they warrant extension of time. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .The words sufficient cause being shown must mean that the Collector must determine on materials placed before him that they warrant extension of time. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .But there can be no doubt at the same time that the enquiry to be held by the Collector has to be on facts i.e. material placed before him. There is i no question in such cases of the subjective satisfaction of the Collector for what he is asked to do by the proviso is to determine that the cause shown before him warrants an extension of time." It is the use of the expression on sufficient cause being shown, in proviso to Sec. 110 of the Customs Act and absence of such an expression in Sec. 110 (1) that weighed with the Supreme Court in coming to the conclusion that the power to extend time given to the Collector of Customs under Sec. 110 of the Customs Act, was quasi judicial. In Sec. 79 of the Gold Control Act the position has been reversed. Whereas sub-sec. (1) specifically requires notice to the party concerned before adjudication, confiscation or penalty such requirement is absent in the proviso where even an expression similar to `on sufficient cause being shown appearing in Sec. 110 of the Customs Act, has not been used. This section as it stands does not require any adjudication or judicial determination of facts before the time mentioned in the proviso is to be extended. We are accordingly, of opinion that there is nothing in Sec. 79 which implies that the power given to the Collector, Central Excise for extending the period of six months for retention to goods seized under Sec. 79 of the Gold Control Act is to be exercised in a quasi-judicial manner. It is not necessary that the person from whose possession articles have been seized under Sec. 66 of the Act, should be given an opportunity for being heard before the Collector decides to extend the period of six months. As notice under Sec. 79 of the Gold Control Act has already been issued to the petitioners within the period as extended by the Collector, Central Excise they are not entitled to the return of the goods so long as proceedings under Sec, 79 are not concluded. 11. As notice under Sec. 79 of the Gold Control Act has already been issued to the petitioners within the period as extended by the Collector, Central Excise they are not entitled to the return of the goods so long as proceedings under Sec, 79 are not concluded. 11. So far as 14 items of gold seized from petitioners are concerned, they have been seized both under the provisions of Sec. 110 of the Customs Act and Sec. 66 of the Gold Control Act, 1968. Petitioner's right to get them back will depend on the ultimate adjudication that may be made in proceedings under Sec. 79 of the Gold Control Act. In the circumstances it cannot be said that retention of items of gold by the respondents is illegal merely because the period of six months has elapsed since their seizure. 12. Sri S. N. Kacker then argued that the respondent could seize the various items of gold under Sec. 66 of the Gold Control Act, only if the concerned officers had reasons to believe that some provision of the Act in respect of that gold had been contravened by the petitioners. If at the time of seizure the officers concerned did not have reasons to believe that the petitioners had contravened some provision of the Gold Control Act, the seizure would be illegal and the petitioners will be entitled to the return of seized items of Gold. According to the respondents various items of gold were seized as the officers conducting the search had reasons to believe that the petitioners had contravened the provisions of Sec. 8 and Sec. 16 (1) of the Gold Control Act, 1968. Sec. 8 (1) prohibits owning or having in possession custody or control of any primary gold. Sec. 16 requires persons who own or have in their possession custody or control of any article of gold or ornament at the commencement of the Act, to make a declaration about those articles in the circumstances mentioned therein. According to the respondents the items of gold seized from petitioner's possession were primary gold, possession of which will amount to contravention of Sec. 8 of the Act. Even if those items are considered to be ornaments it was necessary for the petitioners to have made a declaration with regard to them as provided in Sec. 16 of the Act. According to the respondents the items of gold seized from petitioner's possession were primary gold, possession of which will amount to contravention of Sec. 8 of the Act. Even if those items are considered to be ornaments it was necessary for the petitioners to have made a declaration with regard to them as provided in Sec. 16 of the Act. The petitioners having not made the necessary declaration, they were in possession of those items in contravention of Sec. 16. 13. Sri S. N. Kacker learned counsel for the petitioners contended that in fact out of the 14 items of gold recovered from petitioners possession 13 of them were gold ornaments. The fourteenth item viz. a gold bar was also a piece from a broken ornament. These items being ornaments they could not be considered to be primary gold and as such the officers seizing those articles could not possibly have any reason to believe that the petitioners had contravened the provision of Sec. 8 of the Gold Control Act. 14. The expression `Primay gold' has been defined in Sec. 2 (r) of the Gold Control Act as meaning gold in any unfinished or semi finished form and as including ingots bars, blocks, slabs, billets, shots, pellets, rods, sheets, foils and wires. Similarly the expression `ornament' has been defined in Sec. 2 (p) of the Act as meaning a thing in a finished form meant for personal adornment or for the adornment of either deity or any other object of religious worship made of or manufactured from gold, whether or not set with stones or gems or pearls or with all or any of them and includes parts pendants or broken pieces of ornament. An explanation added to this section makes it clear that for purposes of this Act nothing made of gold comes resembles an ornament shall be deemed to be an ornament unless the thing having regard to its purity, size, weight, description or workmenship is such as it is commonly used as ornament in any State or Union Territory. It is true that if an item of gold comes within the definition of expression ornament, it cannot be considered to be primary gold and no question of contravention of the provisions of Sec. 8 of the Gold Control Act can arise. It is true that if an item of gold comes within the definition of expression ornament, it cannot be considered to be primary gold and no question of contravention of the provisions of Sec. 8 of the Gold Control Act can arise. However, the fact that the item of gold is in a shape which resembles an ornament it will not be deemed to be an ornament unless the thing having regard to its purity, size, weight etc. is such which is commonly used as an ornament in any State or Union territory. 15. Search memo prepared at the time of recovery of various items of gold copy of which has been filed as Annexure I to the petition, shows that 13 out of 14 items of gold were of 24 carats purity. The fourteenth items viz. gold bar which the petitioner claims to be a broken piece from an ornament was also from 20 carats purity. The search memo described these articles as gold bullion in the form of crude Lachhas and Hasuli. It follows that at the time of seizure, the officer concerned, after looking at these articles and having regard to their purity and appearance were of opinion that the seized gold could be regarded as gold bullion i.e. primary gold. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioner has filed certain annexures with the writ petition for showing that these very articles have been accepted to be ornaments by the Bank and the authorities under the Wealth Tax Act. He contends that in the circumstance it is not possible for the respondents to take up the stand that these items are not gold ornaments. So far as the Bank with whom these article were pledged and the Wealth Tax Authorities are concerned, they were not concerned with the question whether the articles in question were primary gold or gold ornaments as defined in Gold Control Act. They were concerned merely with their value; the Bank in order to Secure its interest and the Wealth Tax Officer in order to determine the tax payable. These authorities must have taken the description of these articles as ornaments from the petitioners themselves. They were concerned merely with their value; the Bank in order to Secure its interest and the Wealth Tax Officer in order to determine the tax payable. These authorities must have taken the description of these articles as ornaments from the petitioners themselves. We are, accordingly, of opinion that merely because these articles were described as ornaments by the Bank and the Wealth Tax Authorities, it does not necessarily mean that the officials of the Customs and Central Excise Department could not have reasons to believe that those items were in fact primary gold, possession of which has been prohibited by Sec. 8 of the Gold Control Act. As stated earlier, whether an article recovered is to be considered to be primary gold or ornaments will depend upon the shapes, size, weight, purity and workmenship of the item recovered. 17. Sri S. N. Kacker then invited our attention to the Panchanama, which according to him shows that the officer seizing the various items of gold were themselves not convicted that they were primary gold. He argued that the Panchnama shows that these heirs were seized for the contravention of Sec. 16 of the Act. This could be so only if they were considered to be ornaments, as the question of making a declaration under Sec. 16 arises only in respect of ornaments and not in respect of primary gold. Sometimes, in a case where gold has been put into a share resembling ornaments, there may be possibility of a genuine difference of opinion on the question whether the items recovered are primary gold or ornaments as defined by the Act. In such a case if the recovered items are found in such quantity that as ornaments it is necessary to declare them as provided in the Act, and if no such declaration has been made the officer concerned can have reasons to believe that either the provisions of Sec. 8 or those of Sec. 16 of the Act have been contravened and he has ample jurisdiction to seize the gold items. The officer seizing the item of gold is not required to finally decide whether the article seized constitutes primary gold or gold ornaments. It is ultimately for the adjudicating authority to determine the actual contravention of the provisions of the Act. The officer seizing the item of gold is not required to finally decide whether the article seized constitutes primary gold or gold ornaments. It is ultimately for the adjudicating authority to determine the actual contravention of the provisions of the Act. In the circumstances, merely because the officer seizing the articles has reasons to believe that there has been a contravention of Sec. 16 of the Act, it does not mean that he did not or could not, at the same time, have reasons to believe about the contravention of Sec. 8 of the Gold Control Act. 18. Our attention was also invited to the notice under Sec. 76 of the Act, issued by the Collector to the petitioner. In this notice, after describing the various articles said to have been recovered from the possession of the petitioners, it was specifically mentioned that the said items of primary gold were seized under Sec. 16 (a) of the Gold Control Act, 1968 under a reasonable belief that the same were possessed or acquired otherwise than as provided under Sec. 16 (1) of the Gold Control Act. He contends that the show cause notice makes it clear that the items of gold were seized under a belief that the provisions of Sec. 16 (1) of the Act and not those of Sec. 8 of the Act, have been contravened. These authorities did not seize these items under belief that they were primary gold, possession of which was in contravention of Sec. 8. Language used in the show cause notice is certainly not a happy one. At one place it is stated that what has been seized is primary gold whereas, while mentioning the belief, it is stated that they were seized under a reasonable belief that the same were acquired and possessed otherwise than as provided in Sec. 16 (1) of the Gold Control Act, 1968. Right to seize articles depends upon the belief entertained by the officers seizing the same at the time of search and not on the belief of the Collector who subsequently issued notice under Sec. 76 of the Act. It is quite possible that at the time of stating the reason for the seizure of the gold items, the Collector merely stated one out of several beliefs entertained by the officer seizing them. 19. It is quite possible that at the time of stating the reason for the seizure of the gold items, the Collector merely stated one out of several beliefs entertained by the officer seizing them. 19. We are, accordingly, of opinion that the petitioners have failed to make out a case that the person seizing the articles had no reason to believe that the provisions of Sec. 8 of the Gold Control Act had been contravened. 20. Sri S. N. Kacker then contended that in the instant case, as the gold items recovered from petitioner's possession were joint family ornaments which did not exceed 6,000 grammes in weight, no declaration as required by Sec. 16 (5) (b) was to be made. He argued that the expression family has been defined in Sec. 16 (6) as meaning (1) husband, wife and one or more minor children, or (2) any two or more of them but it is not deemed to include any other person. However, the respondents seized the various items under an impression that they belonged to a family consisting of the two petitioners, viz., mother and son who were obliged to make a declaration of the weight of ornaments in their possession as it exceeded 4,000 grammes. This he contends was a wholly erroneous assumption. In this case, the joint family to which the recovered gold items belonged, consisted of Pratap Narain and his wife (a family as defined in the Act) and his mother Smt. Vidya Bai (an individual). The family of Pratap Narain, consisting of himself and his wife, was entitled to hold ornaments weighing upto 4,000 grammes and his mother could possess ornaments weighing upto 2,000 grammes without making any declaration. Total ornaments, therefore, that could be possessed by the Joint family without making any declaration thus was 6,000 grammes. In the circumstances, it is obvious that there could be no contravention of the provisions of Sec. 16 of the Gold Control Act. It appears that the officers seizing the ornaments did not apply their minds to this aspect and unless they did so, they could not have any reason to believe that the provisions of Sec. 16 had been contravened. It appears that the officers seizing the ornaments did not apply their minds to this aspect and unless they did so, they could not have any reason to believe that the provisions of Sec. 16 had been contravened. He also invited our attention to a number of documents which indicated that the ornaments in question had been held to be the family ornaments by the Wealth Tax Authorities and contended that considering the amount of ornaments recovered and the constitution of the joint family, the two petitioners were not obliged to make a declaration under Sec. 16 of the Act. 21. We may make it clear at this stage that we are not concerned with the merits of petitioners contention that the ornaments belonged to the family consisting of Pratap Narain, his wife and his mother Smt. Vidya Bai, and as such no declaration under Sec. 16 was required to be made unless they exceed 6,000 grammes in weight. We are merely concerned with the question whether at the time, when these articles, which could be ornaments, were seized, the officers seizing the same could have reasons to believe that the provisions of Sec. 16 appeared to have been contravened. 22. The Panchnama prepared in this case indicates that the premises belonging to the petitioners were searched in pursuance of a search warrant issued under the Customs Act. While the petitioners premises were being searched, the 14 items of gold were found. Total weight of these items was 5,593.50 Grammes. The room, from which these articles were recovered, was in joint use of the two petitioners. It is not disputed that under the law it is not possible for two individuals to have in their possession ornaments exceeding 2,000 grammes each, without making a declaration under Sec. 16 of the Act. When the two petitioners were asked to account for these items, they did not offer any explanation nor did they tell the officials effecting seizure that they were joint family ornaments. In absence of any explanation by the petitioners the respondents could have reason to believe that provisions of Sec. 16 of the Act have been contravened. When the two petitioners were asked to account for these items, they did not offer any explanation nor did they tell the officials effecting seizure that they were joint family ornaments. In absence of any explanation by the petitioners the respondents could have reason to believe that provisions of Sec. 16 of the Act have been contravened. From the copy of a letter dated 31st July, 1969, from the Superintendent Central Excise, addressed to the petitioner Sri Pratap Narain Agarwal, it appears that at the time of search Sri Pratap Narain produced a copy of a statement submitted by him to the Wealth Tax Officer. Learned counsel for the petitioners, claims that Annexure 2 to the writ petition is a copy of that statement. This copy shows that in Wealth Tax proceedings for the year 1960-61, Pratap Narain claimed that all these ornaments belonged to the wife of Sri Raj Narain Agrawal i.e. to the petitioner No. 2. This statement obviously has the effect of strengthening the belief of the officials that the provisions of Sec. 16 of the Act have been contravened. The assessment order or any other document to which reference has been made in the present writ petition, were not brought to the notice of the officers effecting seizure. In the circumstances they do not affect the question about the belief entertained by the officials at the time of search. 23. We are, accordingly, of opinion that the petitioner has failed to make out a case that the respondents seized various items of gold without having any reason to believe that the provisions of Gold (Control) Act have been contravened. 24. We have scrupulously avoided placing reliance on any material brought on the record of this writ petition, which was not before the officers who effected the seizure. It will be for the adjudicating authority to consider all that material and to come to its own conclusion on the question whether or not the provisions of Sec. 8 or those of Sec. 16 have been contravened in this case. We refrain from expressing any opinion on this aspect of the case. 25. In the result we hold that retention of the goods seized under Sec. 110 of the Customs Act, beyond the period of six months, is illegal but retention of the goods seized under the provisions of the Gold Control Act is valid. We refrain from expressing any opinion on this aspect of the case. 25. In the result we hold that retention of the goods seized under Sec. 110 of the Customs Act, beyond the period of six months, is illegal but retention of the goods seized under the provisions of the Gold Control Act is valid. The 14 items of gold were seized by the respondents both under the provisions of the Customs Act and the Gold (Control) Act. Their retention under the Customs Act cannot be justified, but they are being validly retained under the provisions of Gold (Control) Act. The petitioners are, therefore, not entitled to their return so long as the adjudication proceedings under the Gold (Control) Act are not completed. The petitioners are entitled to the return of the articles seized only under the Customs Act, mentioned in Annexure A to the Panchnama. We, accordingly direct the respondents to return those articles to the petitioners forthwith. Since the petition has succeeded in part, we direct the parties to hear their own costs.