JUDGMENT M.N. Shukla, J. - These connected appeals are directed against the order of the learned Sessions Judge, Varanasi dated 21-12-1968 whereby the four accused namely Jittu, Mittu, Jiyan and Nando alias Nand Lal were acquitted of the charge u/s 302 read with Section 34 IPC framed against them and accused Jittu alone was convicted u/s 323 IPC simpliciter and was sentenced to six months' rigorous imprisonment. The State has challenged the acquittal of the accused persons of the charge u/s 302 read with Section 34 IPC. Jittu has challenged his conviction and sentence u/s 313 IPC. 2. Jittu, Mittu and Jiyan accused are brothers and Nandu accused is the son of Jittu. According to the prosecution the incident occurred on the 9th September, 1967 at 7 a.m. The person who lost his life was one Ram Behari alias Bilgu. The accused as well as the deceased resided in village Phulwaria, police station Gantt. Varanasi. The accused had a well to the north of which stood the field of the deceased. Formerly the paudar of this well was to the west but about three years ago the accused persons changed the direction of this paudar to the south. While doing so they opened a urani (drainage) to the north towards the field of Ram Behari. This is said to be the cause of quarrel between the accused on the one hand and the deceased on the other. 3. On the 9th September, 1967 in the morning Ram Behari who was a nai by caste was proceeding towards Varuna river for taking water which was to be offered on the ghant which had been erected in connection with the death of one Bhola Singh of the village. While Ram Behari was crossing the paudar of the well aforesaid, he was accosted by the accused persons out of whom Nandu had a spear whereas the rest were armed with lathis. All the four accused fell upon him with their respective weapons. The deceased to save himself ran to the south, but: chased by the accused. He fell down on the ground and he was still beaten. The marpit was witnessed by a number of persons on whose arrival the assailants made good their escape. 4. All the four accused fell upon him with their respective weapons. The deceased to save himself ran to the south, but: chased by the accused. He fell down on the ground and he was still beaten. The marpit was witnessed by a number of persons on whose arrival the assailants made good their escape. 4. The first information report of the incident was dictated by Ram Behari himself to Saraswati Prasad Singh (PW 6) but lodged by the deceased at police station, Varanasi Cantt. On the same date i.e. the 9th September, 1967 at 8-10 a.m. the victim was sent to S.P. Gupta Hospital for his medical examination and treatment where he died the same day at 2-10 p.m. 5. The post mortem examination on the dead body of Ram Behari was conducted by Dr. B.S. Lal (PW 5) Medical Officer S.P. Gupta Hospital, Varanasi on the 10th September, 1967 at 3 p.m. The following ante mortem injuries were found on the dead body: * * * 6. The internal examination of the dead body revealed fracture of 7th and 8th ribs of the left outer axillary line and of 4th rib near the vertebrae end. The pleura was also torn under the ribs on left side. The stomach contained 4 ozs. of watery fluid with large chunks of curded milk. In the opinion of the doctor the victim had died due to shock caused by injuries. 7. It may also be noted at this stage that on the 9th September, 1967 at 9-10 a.m. Jittu accused also lodged a report at the same police station stating therein that there had been some quarrel between Ram Behari on the one hand and himself and others on the other. The time of the incident at the foot note of the report was mentioned as 7-30 a.m. on 9-9-1967. The report is Ex. Ka 13. 8. The usual investigation followed and after completion of the same a charge-sheet was submitted against the accused. 9. All the accused pleaded not guilty and denied their participation in the crime. Jittu accused deposed that about three months prior to the incident Ram Behari (deceased) had cut away the crop of Jittu's field and included the same in his own field which had given rise to some quarrel between them. 9. All the accused pleaded not guilty and denied their participation in the crime. Jittu accused deposed that about three months prior to the incident Ram Behari (deceased) had cut away the crop of Jittu's field and included the same in his own field which had given rise to some quarrel between them. Jiyan accused pleaded alibi and stated that he was working on his duty at N.R. Diesel Loco Shed, Mughal Sarai from O hours to 8 hours on the 9th September, 1967. Nandu accused also pleaded alibi and stated that on the date of occurrence he attended his class in cutting Memorial School at 6-45 a.m. and that he used to leave his house for the school at 6-15 a.m. 10. The accused led evidence in defence to prove their alibi. Four witnesses were examined in this connection namely Ram Deo Lal (DW 1), Narendra Mohan Malhotra (DW 2), Dhukkhi Nath (DW 3) and Prem Shanker (DW 4). 11. The learned Sessions Judge accepted the evidence of alibi, and as we have already observed, he completely acquitted Jiyan and Nandu accused. The finding recorded by him was to the effect that their alibi having been established they could not have participated in this assault. In view of this finding he was of the view that the same witnesses who had falsely implicated the accused aforesaid could not be believed in respect of the remaining accused. He observed, "In view of this false implication of Jiyan and Nandu there can be no guarantee as to whether they are falsely implicating Jittu or Mittu or anyone of them." "The reliability of their testimony, therefore, unless corroborated by other evidence, is so far as Jittu and Mittu accused are concerned has been reduced to a great extent." The learned Sessions Judge proceeded to add that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses as against Jittu and Mittu was not corroborated by any other independent witness or circumstances and hence those accused were entitled to acquittal of the charge u/s 302 read with Section 34 IPC. Still it is significant that he convicted Jittu accused u/s 323 IPC simpliciter. In other words, he did rely on the testimony of some prosecution witnesses to some extent. 12. Still it is significant that he convicted Jittu accused u/s 323 IPC simpliciter. In other words, he did rely on the testimony of some prosecution witnesses to some extent. 12. So far as the accused who pleaded alibi are concerned, we are of the opinion that in every case where alibi is accepted it does not necessarily follow that the presence of the accused is totally ruled out. Even if the evidence relating to alibi is of such a nature that It raises a doubt in the mind of the court i.e. that the court is of the opinion that the accused may have been present or may not have been present at the time of time incident, the plea of alibi serves its purpose and the accused becomes entitled to the benefit of doubt. We have already referred to the definite finding in the instant case that from the evidence of alibi it could be inferred that those two accused persons had not participated in the assault. We are unable to endorse this finding in its entirety. In fact, the case of Nandu is distinguishable completely from that of the other accused. The weapon which was attributed to him was a spear and since no spear injuries were found on the person of the deceased, his presence is certainly rendered highly improbable and for that reason only he is entitled to the benefit of doubt. It is not necessary to probe into the evidence of alibi led by him because the one circumstance to which we have referred to above is sufficient to entitle him to the benefit of doubt. Coming to the evidence of alibi relating to Jiyan accused the same has been furnished by Ram Deo Lal (DW 1) and Narendra Mohan Malhotra (DW 2). Ram Deo Lal was Head Clerk in the Forman General Diesal Shed, Mughalsarai and he merely produced in court the notice diary for the period 7-9-1967 to 29-9-1967. The main testimony is that of Narendra Mohan Malhotra who was Electric Chargeman at the Loco Shed, Mughalsarai on September 9, 1967. He knew the accused Jiyan and stated that from 12 in the night between the 8th and 9th September. 1967 to 8 a.m. on the 9th September, 1967 the aforesaid accused had worked in his shed. The main testimony is that of Narendra Mohan Malhotra who was Electric Chargeman at the Loco Shed, Mughalsarai on September 9, 1967. He knew the accused Jiyan and stated that from 12 in the night between the 8th and 9th September. 1967 to 8 a.m. on the 9th September, 1967 the aforesaid accused had worked in his shed. This statement about the aforesaid accused the witness based both on the entry in his register and his own memory. The entry in the register in our opinion cannot conclusively prove the consistent presence of the accused throughout the hours of duty at that place. The witness admitted that after the conclusion of the duty hours there was no checking made of the staff at the gate. The reason stated by the witness was that the entire staff was called by him before departure on completion of duty. This does not sound a feasible and true practice. The witness added that if any member of the staff went out of the shed for some time and returned, then he used to make an entry to that effect. The witness was, however, unable to lay his finger on a single such entry in the diary. We have already referred to the fact that he also relied on his own memory in order to prove the presence of the said accused in the Shed. We are unable to believe that the witness could possibly remember as to which member of the staff was actually present on duty on a particular date. He was referred to certain fitters and cleaners who were sitting in front of his room and he had to admit that he could not tell from memory their names or as to the number of such fitters and cleaners. We are, therefore, not inclined on the basis of such testimony to come to a categorical finding that the accused Jiyan's presence on duty at the Loco Shed is consistently proved for the whole of the time in question. Still the evidence in our opinion is sufficient to raise a doubt about his presence in the Shed. He may have been present and he may not have been presents Even in this State of evidence relating to the alibi the accused Jiyan is entitled to the benefit of doubt. Beyond this we cannot endorse the categorioal finding recorded by the learned Sessions Judge. He may have been present and he may not have been presents Even in this State of evidence relating to the alibi the accused Jiyan is entitled to the benefit of doubt. Beyond this we cannot endorse the categorioal finding recorded by the learned Sessions Judge. 13. The question, however, remains as to the value to be attached to the same evidence qua the other accused namely Jittu and Mittu. It is facile to adopt a mechanical formula and give a general amnesty to all the remaining accused on the basis that the prosecution witnesses chose to falsely implicate some accused and therefore, their testimony must be discarded in toto. This approach to evidence has not been judicially approved. In several decisions of the Supreme Court it has been emphasised that the mere fact that some witnesses exaggerated the incident and roped in some innocent persons does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that their evidence was unreliable with regard to the remaining accused. It is a well-settled principle that evidence may be accepted piecemeal and while the same witness may be disbelieved against one accused, they may be believed wholly or in part with regard to other accused persons. In Nisar Ali v. State of U.P. 1957 AWR 461 SC all the eye-witnesses tried to implicate the accused who was acquitted while the other accused was convicted on the evidence of the same eye-witnesses. It was held by Kapur, J. as under: the maxim "falsus in in falsus in omnibus" has not received general acceptance in different jurisdictions in India; nor has this maxim come to occupy the status of a rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts to is that in such cases the testimony may be discarded and not that it must be disregarded. The doctrine merely involves the question of weight of evidence which a Court may apply in a given set of circumstances but it is not what may be called "a mandatory rule of evidence." In a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Raghubir Singh Vs. State of U.P., AIR 1971 SC 2156 the same argument was raised and repelled. Tejpal and Kundan Singh accused had not been convicted on the evidence of the same prosecution witnesses on whose evidence the other accused namely Raghubir Singh had been convicted. State of U.P., AIR 1971 SC 2156 the same argument was raised and repelled. Tejpal and Kundan Singh accused had not been convicted on the evidence of the same prosecution witnesses on whose evidence the other accused namely Raghubir Singh had been convicted. Hence, it was argued that Raghubir Singh was also entitled to the acquittal. Dua, J. observed that this argument "runs against the rule which has long since been accepted without demur that in cases where there is enmity between two factions then there is a tendency on the part of the aggrieved victim to give an exaggerated version and to rope in even innocent members of the opposite faction in a criminal case and that, therefore, the court has in all such cases to sift the evidence with care and convict only those persons against whom the prosecution witness can be safely relied upon without raising any element of doubt....the argument founded solely on the basis of acquittal of Tej Pal and Kupdan Singh would be wholly misconceived....It may in this connection be pointed out that enmity may tempt a witness to rope in more persons belonging to the opposite faction, but it seldom if ever serves as an inducement to completely exclude the real guilty party." 14. Thus, the rule seems to be that even where the court comes to a finding that some prosecution witnesses have falsely implicated an accused or more than one accused the court is not absolved of the duty of sifting the evidence and separating the grain from the chaff. In Ugar Ahir v. State of Bihar 1935 AWR 90 SC Subba Rao, J. observed: The maxim falsus in uno falsus in omnibus (false in one thing, false in every thing) is neither a sound rule of law nor a rule of practice. Hardly one comes across a witness whose evidence does not contain a grain of untruth or at any rate exaggerations, embroideries or embellishments. It is, therefore, the duty of the court to scrutinise the evidence carefully and in terms of the falicious metaphor, separate the grain from the chaff. But, it cannot obviously disbelieve the substratum of the prosecution case or the material parts of the evidence and reconstruct a story of its own out of the rest. 15. It is, therefore, the duty of the court to scrutinise the evidence carefully and in terms of the falicious metaphor, separate the grain from the chaff. But, it cannot obviously disbelieve the substratum of the prosecution case or the material parts of the evidence and reconstruct a story of its own out of the rest. 15. It was contended on behalf of the accused and that it will be illogical to rely on identical evidence for convicting and acquitting the accused and hence it was necessary that for relying on the same evidence with respect to some accused and convicting them corroboration must be sought from other independent evidence, oral or circumstantial. In support of that submission reliance was placed on a division Bench decision of this Court in Guchun Misir v. State 1957 AWR 48 . The learned Counsel also referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in Vadivelu Thevar Vs. The State of Madras, AIR 1957 SC 614 wherein B.P. Sinha, J. pointed out the three broad categories into which the witnesses may be divided namely (1) wholly reliable, (2) wholly unreliable and (3) Neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. With regard to the third category it was observed that the court had to be circumspect and had to look for corroboration in material particulars by other reliable evidence, direct or circumstantial. This principle was followed and explained in a decision of this Court in State v. Tula Ram AIR I960 All 585. It was observed: Where the witness is neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable the court seeks corroboration from some independent evidence or from circumstances. There can be no corroboration of a false or doubtful witness by another witness of the same character. And where independent corroboration was lacking, as in the present case, the State cannot urge that that the three eye-witnesses although not worthy of belief in the case of Yogvir Singh whose alibi was proved to the hilt should be believed in the case of the other five accused despite the witnesses having implicated all the six accused equally in the prime. 16. Thus, the consensus of judicial decisions on the above point seems to be that there is no bar to placing reliance on the testimony of witnesses who falsely implicate the other accused persons. 16. Thus, the consensus of judicial decisions on the above point seems to be that there is no bar to placing reliance on the testimony of witnesses who falsely implicate the other accused persons. As the Supreme Court pointed out, the false implication may be motivated by factionalism or other causes of animosity but the mere exaggeration of an occurrence or roping in of some innocent persons does not lead to the inevitable conclusion that the evidence stands completely condemned and not fit to be relied upon at all in so far as it relates to the other accused, It is precisely a situation like this which calls for the exercise of the critical scrutiny of the court in the matter of evaluation of evidence, the supreme task of what has been aptly described as 'separating the grain from the chaff. Judicial experience has evolved two important critaria for accomplishing this difficult task. Firstly, the court should look for corroboration in material particulars by other evidence, direct or circumstantial. Secondly, the court should concentrate on the basic question whether in the circumstances of the case the presence of the witnesses on the spot at the time of the occurrence appears doubtful or not. 17. In the instant case we are satisfied about the presence of the witnesses on the scene of occurrence. The testimony of the three eye-witnesses, viz. Ram Lal (P.W. 1), Trilochan (PW 2) and Daya Shanker (PW 3) is reliable. Even corroboration from other sources and circumstances is not wanting in the present case. So far as Jittu accused is concerned, we have already referred to the report lodged by him with the police which appears to relate to the same incident as alleged by the prosecution. His participation, therefore, in the incident and his presence at the time of the occurrence cannot be doubted. We can safely rely on the evidence of the prosecution witnesses. The testimony of those witnesses does not suffer from any discrepancy and nothing substantial has been elicited in the cross-examination which may cast doubt on their veracity. So far as the other accused namely Mittu is concerned, those very witnesses consistently implicated him assigned a role to him. There is also another important circumstance viz., that as many as 17 injuries were found on the dead body of Ram Bihari. So far as the other accused namely Mittu is concerned, those very witnesses consistently implicated him assigned a role to him. There is also another important circumstance viz., that as many as 17 injuries were found on the dead body of Ram Bihari. That could not obviously be the result of assault by a single individual. Therefore, the circumstances of the case also corroborate the oral evidence which implicates Mittu accused. Hence, we are inclined to believe the prosecution witnesses with regard to Jittu and Mittu accused. 18. The question, however, still remains as to the offence committed by them. It is clear from the evidence that they were acting in a concerted manner. There is evidence of previous bad blood between the parties. Both these accused started belabouring the deceased simultaneously with the weapons in their hands. A look at the injuries of the deceased reveals that they were caused with lathis. There was a fracture of the 7th and 8th ribs of the victim and also of the 4th rib near the end of the vertebrae. The pleura was also turn under the ribs on the left side. There was contusion of the entire outer surface of left forearm with fracture of both bones about its middle. Thus, it appears to us that the common intention of the assailants was to cause grievous hurt to the deceased. 19. In the result we partly allow the State appeal and convict the accused Respondents Jittu and Mittu u/s 325 read with Section 34 IPC and sentence them to five years' rigorous imprisonment each. The appeal is, however, dismissed against the other accused Respondents namely Jiyan and Nandu. Since we have convicted Jittu u/s 325 read with Section 34 IPC the appeal preferred by him i.e. Cr. A. No. 356 of 1959 has no merit and is dismissed. Jittu and Mittu shall be taken into custody forthwith to serve out the sentence now imposed on them.