Research › Browse › Judgment

Karnataka High Court · body

1972 DIGILAW 39 (KAR)

MOHIDDINSAB GAFFARSAB KUNDGOL v. ROHIDAS HARI KINDALKAR

1972-02-16

HONNAIH, M.S.NESARGI

body1972
NESARGI, J. ( 1 ) THE Claimant in Misc. Case No. 52 of 1968 on the file of the Motor accidents Claims Tribunal and District Judge, North Kanara, Karwar, has filed this appeal against the Award, dismissing his claim for Rs. 21,711 as compensation in. view of injuries sustained by him in a motor accident. ( 2 ) THE facts of the case are as follows: The appellant is a fruit and vegetable vendor. He had, on 17-10-1968, purchased vegetables and fruits at Huoli and intended to go back to Karwar by a State Transport bus leaving Hubli by about 4 or 4-30 p. m. He missed the bus. A lorry belonging to Respondent 1 and insured with Respondent 2 was beijig driven by one Ramappa the driver of Respondent 1. That lorry was loaded with manganese ore and was to proceed frorn Hubli to Karwar. Ramappa saw the appellant and offered to convey him to Karwar in the lorry. The appellant put his luggage in the body of the lorry and sat alongside the driver in the cabin of the lorry. After the lorry was driven to some distance, ramappa told the appellant that he was feeling sleepy. He asked the appellant to keep talking with him so that he would be able to keep awake. When Ramappa was dozing, the lorry dashed against another lorry which was stationed on its proper part of the road. The left side mudguard of the lorry in question crashed into the cabin and caused injury to the leg of the appellant. The appellant became unconscious and when he regained consciousness, he found that he was m a hospital and his leg had been amputated. ( 3 ) THE appellant did not make the driver Ramappa a party to the claims petition. ( 4 ) THE contentions of the respondents were that Ramappa had not been authorised to carry any passenger and, therefore, even if Ramappa had conveyed the appellant iji the lorry and the rash and negligent driving of ramappa had resulted in injuries to 'the appellant, neither of the respondents was liable to pay compensation or damages to the appellant. ( 5 ) THE Tribunal below dismissed the claims petition mainly on the above mentioned contention. ( 5 ) THE Tribunal below dismissed the claims petition mainly on the above mentioned contention. ( 6 ) SRI K. I. Bhatta, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant contended in the first instance that the respondents had not produced any evidence to establish that Respondent 1 the owner had prohibited ramappa from conveying passengers in the lorry and therefore, it will have to be presumed that Ramappa conveyed the appellant in the course of his employment as driver of the lorry and and in view of this presumption, respondent 1 would be vicariously liable to pay compensation or damages to tht appellant. ( 7 ) SRI K. I. Bhatta was not able to support this proposition by citing any authority. It is undisputed that the vehicle in question was a 'goods Vehicle'. 'goods Vehicle' is defined in Section 2 (8) of the Motor vehicles Act as follows :"2 (8 ). 'goods Vehicle' means any motor vehicle constructed or adapted for use for the carriage of goods, or any motor vehicle not so constructed or adapted when used for the carriage of goods solely or in addition to passengers. "the above definition shows that the law docs not permit carrying of passengers in a 'goods vehicle'. If the vehicle in question was a passenger vehicle, then the contention of Sri K. I. Bhatta that a presumption that the appellant was being conveyed in such a vehicle in the course of employment of the driver of that vehicle would be sustainable. But his contention that even when the vehicle is a goods vehicle, such a presumption is 1o be drawn is, in our opinion, not sustainable. ( 8 ) SRI K. I. Bhatta nextly argued that the appellant had luggage with him and he put the luggage also in 'the lorry and then travelled in thy lorry and, 'therefore, it should be construed that the appellant had hired the lorry and was travelling in the lorry as a hirer and, therefore, respondent 1 also became liable to pay. We are not inclined to agree with this contention because it is not the case of the appellant that he had hired the lorry. All that he has sworn is that driver Ramappa asked him to travel in the lorry to Karwar and, therefore, he (the appellant) put his luggage in the lorry and sat in the cabin. We are not inclined to agree with this contention because it is not the case of the appellant that he had hired the lorry. All that he has sworn is that driver Ramappa asked him to travel in the lorry to Karwar and, therefore, he (the appellant) put his luggage in the lorry and sat in the cabin. In cross-examination, he made it further clear that he had not paid any charge for the luggage to ramappa. ( 9 ) IN regard to the proposition of Sri K. I. Bhatta that, a presumption thalt the appellant was taken as a passenger by driver Ramappa in the course of his employment should be drawn and that would go to show that the burden was on the dther side to establish that Respondent 1 the owner had prohibited the driver Ramappa from picking up passengers and such a burden has not been discharged, we are of opinion that a presumption only to the extent that Ramappa was the driver of Respondent 1 the owner of the lorry and was driving that vehicle in that capacity, in the course of his employment as driver can be drawn. But in view of the definition of 'goods vehicle' as mentioned above, such presumption cannot extend to include thai picking up of passengers by Ramappa was also in the course of his employment. Tn Barnard v. Sully (1931) 47 TLR. 557 it has been held that proof of a person being the owner of a car would be prima facie evidence that the driver at the time of the accident was the servant or agent of the owner of the car and the said presumption would be a rebutable one and the owner would be within his rights to produce evidence and establish that the person driving the car was not his servant but was 'joy riding' or otherwise had no authority to drive the car. We, therefore, reject this contention of Sri Bhatta. ( 10 ) SRI K. I. Bhatta nextly argued that as driver Ramappa was driving the goods vehicle belonging to Respondent 1 in the course of his employment as driver and it was in discharge of such duties he acted rashly and negligently and caused injuries to the appellant, the owner is vicariously liable to pay damages or compensation to the appellant. The question that falls for consideration is whether Ramappa picked up the appellant as passenger, in the course of employment as driver of the lorry. That Ramappa was driving the lorry in the course of his employment as driver cannot at all be disputed. But what is disputed is that picking up of a passenger, viz. , the appellant by Ramappa the driver was in the course of his employment as driver. ( 11 ) WHAT is the scope of 'employment' has been succinctly summed up in Halsbury's Laws of England, Third Edn. Vol. 25 at pages 541, 542, and 545. The gist of these principles is that a master is not liable if the act which gave rise to the injury was an independent act not connected with the servants employment, if at the time when the injury took place the servant was engaged, not on his master's business, but on his own, though he was at that time using the master's property, the master would not be liable. It is also stated that where the servant whilst using his master's property in the course of his employment, embarks upon business of his own, then also the master is not liable. Wrongful acts of the servant if they fall wihin the scope of his employment as being reasonably ntcessary for the due discharge of his duties, or the preservation of the master's interests or of the master's property, or otherwise incidental to the purposes of his employment, the master has got to accept the responsibility. ( 12 ) IN the case on hand, there is no material to show that Ramappa had picked up the appellant as a passenger in order to preserve the interest of his master, viz. . Respondent 1. It is not shown that this picking up of the appellant as passenger by Ramappa was incidental to the purposes of his (Ramappa the driver's) employment as driver of the lorry. In view of this position, it is to be held thdt the contention of Sri K. I. Bhatta is not sound. In Twine v. Bean's Express Ltd. , 1946 (1) All. In view of this position, it is to be held thdt the contention of Sri K. I. Bhatta is not sound. In Twine v. Bean's Express Ltd. , 1946 (1) All. E. R. 202, Uthwatt, J. , has while dealing with almost a similar set of facts observed as follows:"it was outside the scope of the driver's employment for him to bring within the class of persons to whom a duty to take care was owed by the employer, a man to whom, contrary to his instructions he gave a lift. "these observations have been quoted with approval by the Court of appeal in Convey v. Wimpel and Co. Ldt,, 1951 (1) All. E. R. 363 when the case- Twine v. Bean's Express Ltd. , was taken up in appeal. His Lordship Sellers, J. , observed as follows:"if the question is asked: Was the driver, Harrison, in giving a lift io the deceased man acting within the scope of his employment? the answer is clearly 'no'. He was doing something that he had no right whatsoever to do, and qua the deceased man he was as much on a frolic of his own as if he had been driving somewhere on some amusement of his own quite unauthorised by his employers. . . He was in fact doing two things at once. He was driving his van from one place to another by a route that he was properly taking when he ran into the omnibus, and as he was driving the van he was acting within the scope of his employment. The other thing that he was doing simultaneously was something 'totally outside the scope of his employment, namely, giving a lift to a person who had no right whatsoever to be there. In my opinion, once the facts are understood the case is a perfectly simple one, and there is only one answer to it. "hence the contention of Shri K. I. Bhatta that the owner of the goods vehicle is vicariously liable to pay compensation or damages to the appellant is unsustainable. ( 13 ) IN view of the foregoing reasons, we deem it unnecessary [to go into other questions in this appeal and dismiss the appeal. No order as to costs. --- *** --- .