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1972 DIGILAW 392 (ALL)

Darbari v. State

1972-09-22

P.N.BAKSHI

body1972
ORDER P.N. Bakshi, J. - A complaint was filed in the court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate Hata by the Chairman of the Town Area Committee against Darbari and Ramjit on the allegations that they had constructed a house adjacent to the public road without previous notice and sanction as required u/s 178/181 of the U.P. Municipalities Act (Act No. 2 of 1916). A notice was given to them to remove the construction but they did not give any reply. It was alleged that a failure on the part of the accused to remove the unsanctioned construction despite due notice under the provisions of the Act amounted to an offence punishable u/s 185 of the said Act. The defence of the accused was that the house in question belonged to one Mahatam and that it had been constructed much before the Town Area same into existence. The prosecution in support of its case examined Ram Naresh Lal, Buxi of the Town Area and Rajneti. The accused examined Guptar in defence. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate after considering the evidence on record came to the conclusion that the prosecution had succeeded in proving its case. On this finding he convicted the accused u/s 185 of the U.P. Municipalities Act and sentenced them to a fine of Rs. 250/- each. A further fine of Rs. 5/- per day was imposed upon the accused till they had removed the construction in question. The Magistrate also directed the accused to remove the construction. Aggrieved by this decision the accused filed an appeal before the first Additional Sessions Judge, Deoria. The Sessions Judge, confirmed the findings of the trial court. He held that the accused had made new construction within the limits of the Town Area without prior notice and sanction and therefore, they had committed an offence u/s 185 of the Municipalities Act. He, however, set aside the sentence of fine of Rs. 5/- per day imposed upon the accused and ordered removal of the construction within 15 days from the date of the order. Aggrieved thereby the Applicants have filed a revision in this Court. 2. The findings of fact have not been challenged before me by the counsel for the Applicants. His sole contention is that the courts below had no jurisdiction to order removal of the construction while convicting the accused u/s 185 of the Municipalities Act. Aggrieved thereby the Applicants have filed a revision in this Court. 2. The findings of fact have not been challenged before me by the counsel for the Applicants. His sole contention is that the courts below had no jurisdiction to order removal of the construction while convicting the accused u/s 185 of the Municipalities Act. He contends that this power vests exclusively in the Board (Town Area) and cannot be exercised by the Magistrate. I shall now examine the force of this argument. 3. From a perusal of Ch. VII of the U.P. Municipalities Act, it appears that the relevant sections in this connection to be considered are Sections 178 to 186. They relate to the erection of buildings within the limits of Municipality. The relevant portion of Section 178 reads thus: 178(1) Before beginning, within the limits of Municipality-- (a) to erect a new building or new part of a building, or (b) to re-erect, or make a material alteration in a building..... a person shall give notice of his intention to the Board. (2) The notice referred to in Sub-section (1) as required in the case of a building shall only be necessary where the building abuts on, or is adjacent to, a public street or property vested in Government or in the Board, unless, by a bye-law applicable to the area in which the building is situated, the necessity of giving notice is extended to all buildings. It is not denied that the accused-Applicants had constructed a house adjacent to the public street. As such in view of the aforesaid sections it was necessary for them to give notice of the proposed construction to the Board, in this case the Town Area Committee. Section 179 of the Municipalities Act lays down: 1. Where a bye-law has been made prescribing and requiring any information and plans in addition to a notice, no notice u/s 178 shall be considered to be valid until the information, if any, required by such bye-law has been furnished to the satisfaction of the Board. 2. Section 179 of the Municipalities Act lays down: 1. Where a bye-law has been made prescribing and requiring any information and plans in addition to a notice, no notice u/s 178 shall be considered to be valid until the information, if any, required by such bye-law has been furnished to the satisfaction of the Board. 2. In any other case, the board may within one week of the receipt of the notice required by Section 178, require a person who has given such notice to furnish a plan and specification of any existing or proposed building, or part of building, or well together with a site plan of the land, with such reasonable details as the board may prescribe in its requisition; and in such case, the notice shall not be considered to be valid until such plans and specification have been furnished to the board. 4. Section 180 of the Act authorises the Board (Town Area Committee) to either sanction or refuse to sanction the construction of the proposed building. Sub-section (5) of Section 180 runs thus: No person shall commence any work of which notice has been given u/s 178 until sanction has been given or deemed to have been given under this section. The fact that in the present case sanction was not accorded by the Town Area Committee has not been challenged before me. It is also clear from a perusal of the record that the Town Area had also given a notice to the accused to refrain from constructing the house in question. It is thus obvious that the construction in question was made in violation of Section 178/180 of the U.P. Municipalities Act. 5. Section 185 of the said Act penalises a person who contravenes Section 180(5) of the said Act. The relevant portion of Section 185 runs thus: Whoever begins, continues or completes the erection...of, for any material alteration in a building or part of a building...without giving the notice required by Section 178, or in contravention of Section 180, Sub-section (5)...shall be liable upon conviction to a fine which may extend to Rs. 1000/- but which, in the absence of special and adequate reasons to the contrary to be mentioned in the judgment of the court, shall not be less than two hundred and fifty rupees. 1000/- but which, in the absence of special and adequate reasons to the contrary to be mentioned in the judgment of the court, shall not be less than two hundred and fifty rupees. The next relevant section which may be usefully quoted in this connection is 186 of the Act which runs thus: The Board may at any time by written notice direct the owner or occupier of any land to stop erection or alteration of a building or part of a building...where the Board considers that such erection, re-erection, alteration, construction...is an offence u/s 185 and may, in like manner, direct the alteration or demolition as it deems necessary of the building...as the case may be. It is obvious that u/s 185 of the U.P. Municipalities Act a person who contravenes the provisions of Section 178/180 of the Act is liable on conviction to a fine which may run up to Rs. 1,000/-. The power to remove or demolish the unauthorised construction vests only in the Board (Town Area) under the provisions of Section 186 of the Act and that power can be exercised only by the Town Area after giving a written notice to the owner or the occupier of the land to stop erection or alteration of the building. There is nothing in the aforesaid provision to indicate that the criminal court while convicting the accused for an offence u/s 185 of the Act is also empowered under the same section to direct a removal or demolition of the construction. From a perusal of Section 265 of the U.P. Municipalities Act it is also clear that when any person wilfully obstructs or causes obstruction of the free passage of any street, the Board (Town Area) has got the power Under Sub-section (2) of Section 265 to remove any obstruction and the expense of any such removal is recoverable from the offender in the manner prescribed by Ch. VI of the Act. It is thus obvious that the power to stop the erection of a building constructed adjacent to a public street, as well as to prevent an obstruction created on a public street vests in the Board (Town Area). The Board (Town Area) is also authorised to effect a demolition or removal of the construction or the obstruction which has been caused by the offender. 6. The Board (Town Area) is also authorised to effect a demolition or removal of the construction or the obstruction which has been caused by the offender. 6. If it was intended to invest the Magistrate with the powers to order a demolition or removal of the construction while convicting the accused for an offence u/s 185 of the Municipalities Act, the legislature would have used some such words in Section 185 authorising removal of the construction, but from a plain reading of the section, I do not find the Magistrate having been invested with any such powers. It has been urged on behalf of the State that the power of removal should be deemed to be inherent in the court which passes an order convicting the accused u/s 185 of the said Act, otherwise it will lead to disastrous consequences. I am not inclined to accept this submission. A cardinal rule of interpretation of statute is to construe them according to their plain and literal meaning. It is not permissible to add words to statute or to read words within it which are not there. If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and its meaning is plain, the consequences are to be desregarded. 7. In the present case, as discussed above, the Board (Town Area) had been invested with the powers to effect the removal of unauthorised construction. For the non-exercise of those powers in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the Board (Town Area) itself is to blame. It may still be open to the Town Area to seek a proper remedy in the Civil Court but with that we are not concerned in these proceedings. In my opinion on a consideration of the various provisions of the Municipalities Act, it must be held in this case that the Courts below had no jurisdiction u/s 185 of the Act to direct removal of the house constructed by the accused-Applicant while recording their convictions under the aforesaid section. I am supported in my conclusion by two old decisions of N.W.P. High Court reported in C.H.A. Twidale v. The Municipal Board of Mussorie 1900 WN 8 and Queen Empress v. Nanhu 199 WN 81. I am supported in my conclusion by two old decisions of N.W.P. High Court reported in C.H.A. Twidale v. The Municipal Board of Mussorie 1900 WN 8 and Queen Empress v. Nanhu 199 WN 81. In both these cases it has been held that while convicting the accused under Act XV of 1883 N.W.P. and Oudh Municipalities Act, the court has no power to order the demolition of the building erected in contravention of the Rules. It was further held therein that Section 517 Code of Criminal Procedure has no application to a case of this kind. 8. It has lastly submitted on behalf of the State that Section 517 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would apply to the facts of the present case and the Magistrate would be entitled to order the removal of the construction in question while convicting the accused. I am not inclined to agree with this submission. A perusal of Section 517 Code of Criminal Procedure indicates that the word 'property' used in that section refers only to such property as can be produced before the court or is in its custody or regarding which an offence appears to have been committed, or which can be used for the commission of any offence. To my mind in order to apply this section, the word 'property' should be given a restricted meaning so as to include moveable property only. This restricted meaning becomes all the more necessary when we reconcile Section 517 Code of Criminal Procedure with Section 522 Code of Criminal Procedure which empowers the court to restore possession of immoveable property while convicting an accused in circumstances mentioned therein. I am supported in my view by a decision of a Calcutta High Court reported in Bisheshwar Singh v. Bhola Nath Pathak AIR 1914 Cal 629. In this case a Division Bench of Calcutta High Court has held that Section 517 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has no application to immovable property. A similar view has been expressed in a decision reported in A.B. Adepu Reddi v. K. Rammayya AIR 1920 Mad 652. In that case Justice Old-field has expressed the opinion that Section 517 is limited in its application to moveable property. I am in agreement with that view expressed by the Calcutta and Madras High Courts. 9. This application in revision is, therefore, partly allowed. In that case Justice Old-field has expressed the opinion that Section 517 is limited in its application to moveable property. I am in agreement with that view expressed by the Calcutta and Madras High Courts. 9. This application in revision is, therefore, partly allowed. While maintaining the conviction of the accused Applicants u/s 185, Municipalities Act and the sentence of fine of Rs. 250/-each awarded to them, I set aside the orders of the Courts below directing the removal of the construction raised by the Applicants. Revision partly allowed.