Ramamurti, J.-The four appellants, I to 4 in this appeal, are accused 1 to 4 respectively in Sessions Case No. 106 of 1971 on the file of the Sessions Court, Tirunelveli, The Sessions case arose out of the murder of one Anthonipandian of Tuticorin at about 9-15 a.m. on 29th March, 1971 in the Clinic (Manohar Clinic) of one Dr. Krishnamurthi. In the course of the same transaction, one Karuppuswami Thevar (examined as P.W.1 in the case) was stabbed on his back. The four accused, along with one Thavidan alias Sudalalimani (a juvenile), were charged for the offence of rioting armed with deadly weapons, punishable under section 148, Indian Penal Code. Accused 1 to 4 were also charged for the offence of murder under section 302 read with section 149, Indian Penal Code and the first accused was charged for attempt to murder Karuppuswami Thevar (P.W.1) punishable under section 307, Indian Penal Code. All the accused pleaded not guilty to all the charges ; but the Sessions Judge found them guilty in respect of all the three charges, and convicted them. Accused 1 to 4 were each sentenced to imprisonment for life for the conviction under section 302 read with section 149, Indian Penal Code and to rigorous imprisonment for two years for the conviction under section 148, Indian Penal Code and the first accused was also sentenced to five years’ rigorous imprisonment for the conviction under section 307, Indian Penal Code. All the sentences of imprisonment imposed were directed to run concurrently. 2. The facts of the case may be briefly, stated: The deceased, Anthonipandian, was keeping a jutka for his use, whenever he went out, since his left leg had been cut long ago. On the day of the occurrence, he had some work (some prohibition case) with his Advocate at Tuticorin, Thiru Mariappaswami (P.W.7). The deceased along with P.W.1, went to the lawyer’s place at about 8-15 a.m. on 29th March, 1961 and, after finishing his work, the deceased and P.W.1 were returning back in the jutka from east towards west along the North Car Street. When they were coming near the brass vessels shop, (at about 9-15 a.m.) which is situate about 30 feet east of Manohar Clinic in that street, accused 1 to 4 suddenly appeared at the scene along with the juvenile accused, Thavidan, and they obstructed the jutka. When they were coming near the brass vessels shop, (at about 9-15 a.m.) which is situate about 30 feet east of Manohar Clinic in that street, accused 1 to 4 suddenly appeared at the scene along with the juvenile accused, Thavidan, and they obstructed the jutka. It is said that the juvenile was armed with a velstick and the first accused was having a bichuva while accused 2 to 4 each had an aruval. At that time, the fourth accused shouted saying, Outoffear,the deceased jumped Out from the front portion of the jutka while P.W.1 jumped out from the back portion of the same. Both the deceased and P.W.1 ran towards Manohar Clinic, Accused 1 to 4 and the juvenile accused chased them inside the Clinic. P.W.1 reached the verandah of the Clinic first and subsequently the deceased also followed P.W.1 and entered into the western room of the verandah. When P.W.1 reached the verandah, the first accused stabbed him on his back with the bichuva (M.O. 4). At that time, the deceased peeped out from the doorway of the dressing-room in the Clinic, The juvenile accused at once cut on the forehead of the deceased with the knife attached to the vel-stick, the fourth accused cut on the reck of the deceased with aruval, the third accused cut on the left hand of the deceased with aruval, the second accused cut on the chest of the deceased with aruval and the first accused cut the deceased repeatedly with the bichuva knife. P.W.1, out of fear and panic, came out of the Clinic and ran towards east, after having received the stab injury from the first accused. The deceased, who sustained several injuries, died on the spot and after thus murdering the deceased by inflicting numerous injuries, accused 1 to 4 and the juvenile accused came Out of the Clinic and disappeared. P.W.1, who came out of the Clinic after sustaining the stab injury, engaged a rickshaw and drove towards the hospital. On the way to the hospital, P.W.1 saw his brother, P.W.10 Lakshmanan, and conveyed to him the news of the occurrence. P.W.10 asked P.W.1 to rush to the hospital, and after conveying to the Police on the phone the news of the occurrence received from P.W.1, P.W.10 joined P.W.1 in the hospital. On the way to the hospital, P.W.1 saw his brother, P.W.10 Lakshmanan, and conveyed to him the news of the occurrence. P.W.10 asked P.W.1 to rush to the hospital, and after conveying to the Police on the phone the news of the occurrence received from P.W.1, P.W.10 joined P.W.1 in the hospital. The case for the prosecution is that P.W.2 Francis, P.W.3 Ponpandi and P.W.4 Subbiah Thevar are the eye-witnesses who were present at the scene at the time of the occurrence and they actually witnessed the stabbing of P.W.1 by the first accused with the bichuva and the murderous assault on the deceased by all the accused along with the juvenile, inflicting numerous injuries P.W.16, the Sub-Inspector of Police, who received the news of the occurrence on the phone from P.W.10, went to the hospital at about 10 a.m. and Exhibit P-1, the first information report, was given by P.W.1. It was also attested by P.W.10, the brother of P.W.1. The Inspector of Police (P.W.17) was at once informed about the occurrence and the Inspector reached the scene of occurrence at 11 A.M. and conducted the inquest from 11-30 A.m. to 1-30. p.m. At the inquest, the Inspector of Police examined P.W.8 the Doctor of Manohar Clinic, P.W.9 the Nurse, P.W.11 the wife of the deceased and the son of the deceased. After completion of the inquest, the dead body was sent to the hospital. P.W.6, the Civil Assistant Surgeon, conducted the postmortem examination on the dead body of Anthonipandian at 3-50 p.m. on the same day, viz., 29th March, 1971 and Exhibit P-3, the post-mortem certificate, contains the details of all the injuries and the opinion of the Doctor. The Doctor was clearly of the opinion that the deceased died of shock and haemorrhage due to multiple injuries, with special reference to the fatal injuries Nos. 8 and 10 found on the neck. The Doctor was of the view that each of the injuries Nos. 8 and 10 was necessarily fatal and that the death was due to all the injuries inflicted. He was also of opinion that all the incised injuries could have been caused by cuts with aruval or a knife like M.O. 4. (It is unnecessary to refer, at this stage, to the other steps taken by P.W.17 in the course of the investigation). He was also of opinion that all the incised injuries could have been caused by cuts with aruval or a knife like M.O. 4. (It is unnecessary to refer, at this stage, to the other steps taken by P.W.17 in the course of the investigation). The Inspector of Police, P.W.17 thereafter, examined P.W.1 at the hospital, recovered from him, his blood-stained dhoti, the blood-stained shirt and the blood-stained underwear. P.W.5, the Woman Assistant Surgeon, examined P.W.1 and gave the wound certificate (Exhibit P-2) to the effect that P.W.1 had sustained an incised wound, 1" X 1/2" X 1 1/2", in the back. In the wound certificate, the Doctor has stated that the injury was grievous in nature and the same could have been caused with a weapon like M.O. 4. P.Ws. 2, 7 and 10 were examined by P.W.17 on the same day, 29th March, 1971, but later. The other two eye-witnesses, P.Ws. 3 and 4, though they belonged to Tuticorin, and known persons were examined a long interval after the inquest, P.W.4 was examined on 31st March, 1971 and P.W.3 was examined much later, on 6th April, 1971. 3. While in the hospital, a statement (Exhibit D-1) was recorded by the Sub-Magistrate, Tuticorin, from P.W.1 at about 1-30 p.m. on’29th March, 1971, evidently as a dying declaration. It is necessary, even at this stage, to mention that there are several vital discrepancies in the version given by P.W.1 about the occurrence, in the First Information Report and in the statement, Exhibit D-1. In Exhibit P-1, it was stated that the first accused stabbed P.W.1 on the back and accused 1, 2, 3 and 4, along with the juvenile, murdered the deceased by inflicting several injuries, the first accused using a knife and accused 2 to 4 using aruvals and the juvenile using a vel-stick. In Exhibit D-1, P.W.1 has stated that the fourth accused, the second accused, the first accused, one Selvaraj, Mariappan and Jeeva and the juvenile accused attacked the deceased and that the first accused stabbed P.W.1. In more places than one, it is repeated in Exhibit D-1 that all the aforesaid seven persons participated in the murderous assault upon the deceased. So far as the third accused is concerned, it is merely stated that the third accused was merely one in that crowd. In more places than one, it is repeated in Exhibit D-1 that all the aforesaid seven persons participated in the murderous assault upon the deceased. So far as the third accused is concerned, it is merely stated that the third accused was merely one in that crowd. It is not stated that the third accused actually participated in the assault (no overt act was ascribed to A-3.). 4. Even though several witnesses were examined on the side of the prosecution, the evidence which calls for scrutiny touching the occurrence lies in a narrow compass, because the place of occurrence and the setting in which it took place has been clearly established. The evidence establishes that P.W.1 and the deceased travelled in the jutka, that the jutka was obstructed in front of Manohar Clinic, that P.W.1 and the deceased went inside the Clinic and the assault took place there and that, whoever may be the assailants, they ran away from the scene immediately after the occurrence. P.W.8, the Doctor, admittedly did not witness the occurrence because, at that time, he was in the midst of an operation in the operation room upstairs. It is only after the operation, he came downstairs and noticed the dead body of the deceased with bleeding injuries and the assailants had already ran away. The evidence of P.W.9, the Nurse, again, does not throw any light about the occurrence. As soon as P.W.1 and the deceased entered the Clinic, she bolted the door out of fear and she opened it only when P.W.8, the Doctor, came down and tapped at the door when the culprits had disappeared from the scene. P.Ws.1, 2, 3 and 4 claim to be eye-witnesses to the occurrence. P.W.10, the brother of P.W.1, has played an important part after the event, he conveyed to the police by phone the news of the occurrence as conveyed to him by P.W.1. The oral evidence of P.W.10 calls for scrutiny in the light of the evidence of P.W.1, the statement (Exhibit P-1) given by P.W.1, to the police at 10 o’clock and the later statement of P.W.1 (Exhibit D-1) given at 1-30 p.m. P.W.10 admittedly did not witness any portion of the occurrence and therefore, he throws no light on it as such. His evidence becomes relevant on other points, the motive for the crime, the party faction and the enmity between the parties. His evidence becomes relevant on other points, the motive for the crime, the party faction and the enmity between the parties. P.W.11 is the wife of the deceased and she herself got the news of the murder long after the occurrence and therefore, her evidence is not useful concerning the actual occurrence. The evidence of P.W.17, the Inspector of Police, becomes relevant only with regard to the investigation made by him. The result is that the proof of the case of the prosecution would mainly rest upon the evidence of P.W.1 and the eve-witnesses P.Ws.2, 3 and 4. P.W.2 turned hostile and he goes out of the picture, and the learned Sessions Judge, naturally, has not placed any reliance whatever on his evidence. The result is that the proof of the case for the prosecution ultimately rests upon the evidence of P.Ws.1, 3 and 4. In the course of the cross-examination of P.Ws.3 and 4, the defence has made out ample grounds that P.Ws.3 and 4, who admittedly are chance witnesses, are unscrupulous persons and have given false evidence without any scruples. It is admitted that P.W.1 knew P.Ws.3 and 4 very well; he knew them by their names, and if they were present at the scene at the time of the occurrence, P.W.1 would have surely mentioned their names, in P-1 especially when the First Information Report is recorded by the Sub-Inspector. Even though (P.W.3 and P.W.4) belong to Tuticorin, they were not examined at the inquest and they were examined several days later. P.Ws.3 and 4 know P.W.11, the wife of the deceased, very well, yet they did not convey the news of the murder to P.W.11. Even though the police station is very near, they did not inform the police about the occurrence. When reference is made to the evidence of P.Ws.3 and 4 a little later, the infirmities and the artificialities and the falsehood revealed in their evidence will be considered. Indeed, in paragraph 19 of the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge, he has appreciated the serious infirmities and defects in the evidence of P.Ws.3 and 4 and how it will be unsafe to act upon their evidence. Indeed, in paragraph 19 of the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge, he has appreciated the serious infirmities and defects in the evidence of P.Ws.3 and 4 and how it will be unsafe to act upon their evidence. for reasons which we will discuss a little later, we have not the slightest hesitation in rejecting the evidence of P.Ws.3 and 4 as totally false and worthless, with the net result, that the truth of the case for the prosecution ultimately rests upon the sole testimony of P.W.1 which has to be judged in the light of the discrepancy in Exhibit P-1 and Exhibit D-1 and in the light of the numerous discrepancies and infirmities and prevarications elicited in his cross-examination. It is a matter for regret that the learned Sessions Judge has not appreciated that, on the ultimate analysis, the case for the prosecution rests solely upon the evidence of P.W.1. If I may say so, in several portions of the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge, he has given reasons for acquittal, but, curiously enough, in the ultimate conclusion, he has found all the accused-guilty of all the charges. If the learned Judge has made a proper effort to sift and analyse the evidence of P.W.1, he would have at once seen that P.W.1 is a thoroughly unreliable person and on his evidence it will be very unsafe and dangerous to find four persons guilty of the grave offence of murder especially when there is party faction and bitter enmity on the side of the prosecution witnesses and on the side of he accused. Further, the evidence also shows that party-men supporting the case of the prosecution had taken control of the prosecution and had introduced false witnesses with a view to deliberately implicate certain specified persons belonging to the opposite group. If there is any defect or omission in the investigation, it is all because the police did not get any co-operation from disinterested persons who are residents in the locality and who could have given useful evidence. With these preliminary observations, we shall now consider the evidence. 5. Mr. If there is any defect or omission in the investigation, it is all because the police did not get any co-operation from disinterested persons who are residents in the locality and who could have given useful evidence. With these preliminary observations, we shall now consider the evidence. 5. Mr. Vanamamalai, learned Counsel for the appellants urged that P.W.1 ran away from the scene out of panic and fear the moment he received the stab injury in his back and he either could not or did not see any portion of the rest of the occurrence, and whatever P.W.1 has said as to the persons who actually participated in the occurrence, how the injuries were inflicted, the particular weapons used by the particular accused, is false, and right from the beginning, he is not a free agent and is merely a tool in the hands of his scheming brother, P.W.10. Learned Counsel further urged that, on his own case, when P.W.1 ran into the Clinic by instinct of self-preservation, the assailants chased him behind his back and he sustained a stab injury; in that context, P.W.1 would not have observed who, amongst the assailants, inflicted the stab injury. Learned Counsel stressed the extreme improbability of P.W.1, while running away, noticing the other portions of the occurrence. Indeed, learned Counsel stresses that, the moment he received the stab injury, P.W.1 would have simply fled away out of panic from the scene. He further contended that from stage to stage, there have been distinct developments and P.W.1 has been giving discrepant and prevaricating versions. It would be highly unsafe and dangerous to base a conviction upon the sole evidence of such a witness, especially when there is abundant background to show the motive for the party of the prosecution to foist a false case against the accused. The duty of the prosecution in proving the guilt of the accused in grave offences like murder and the responsibility of the Court in assessing and arriving at the truth is very onerous, much more so, when a number of persons are implicated. The evidence will have to be carefully sifted and, if the circumstances raise a reasonable doubt as to whether all the accused participated or some alone participated in the occurrence and who among them participated, all the accused will have to be acquitted, being given the benefit o~ doubt. The evidence will have to be carefully sifted and, if the circumstances raise a reasonable doubt as to whether all the accused participated or some alone participated in the occurrence and who among them participated, all the accused will have to be acquitted, being given the benefit o~ doubt. Where several persons are implicated, the question is, not one of mere arithmetic, acquitting some and convicting the rest, but whether the evidence, which has been rejected as false or insufficient as against the accused who had been acquitted, is sufficient and convincing to make out the guilt of the other accused; as against the latter, the Court should have no doubt whatever. As often said, motive operates as a powerful influence for the commission of the crime; equally, motive operates as a powerful force to falsely implicate the hostile group. The fact that the parties and the witnesses belong to rival factions and are on terms of pronounced enmity and hostility is a circumstance in favour of the accused, in a case where several persons are implicated. The legal position is well settled that, as an abstract rule of law, the Court is not precluded from basing its conviction upon the evidence of a single witness; what is important is the quality of the evidence, and not the quantity of the evidence. It is sufficient to refer to the recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras1, in which the Supreme Court, after referring to section 134 of the Evidence Act, which lays down that no particular number of witnesses shall, in any case, be required to prove any fact (as different from the law in England which requires plurality of witnesses in certain cases), has held that the conviction can be based upon the evidence of a single witness if the testimony of that witness is true and reliable. In that case, Sinha, J. (as he then was) delivering the judgment, classified the oral testimony into three categories: (1) where the testimony is wholly reliable, (2) where it is wholly unreliable and (3) where it is neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. It was pointed out that in the third category of cases, the Court has to be circumspect and to look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial. It was pointed out that in the third category of cases, the Court has to be circumspect and to look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial. This view that where the evidence of a sole witness suffers under a serious infirmity of its being partly reliable and partly unrealiable, there should be corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony has been followed in the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court, with a particular note of caution that the Court must look for corroboration, more so, in cases where several persons have been implicated and the sole witness gives varying and discrepant versions as to the details of the occurrence. We shall first dispose of the evidence of P.Ws.3 and 4. 6. There are several circumstances brought out in the course of the cross-examination, demonstrating that these two witnesses, P.Ws.3 and 4, have absolutely no regard for truth, that they are most unreliable and have been uttering lies quite freely. P.W.3 claims to be a mason, P.W.4 is a watchman in a school in the locality and it is very easy to procure such evidence. Further P.W.3 is, admittedly, involved in a prohibition case at the time when he was contacted by the police. At the time of the occurrence, P.W.4 would have been in the school as a watchman and it is absurd to say that he was waiting at the scene of occurrence to meet P.W.3 to secure a painting job for the latter. The version given by P.Ws.3 and 4 as to when and how they met at the scene of occurrence bristles with artificialities and falsehood. They are chance witnesses and their evidence cannot be accepted unless their Version as to why they happened to be at the scene is natural, convincing and acceptable. The infirmities and artificialities in their version as to how they came to be at the scene of occurrence are sufficient to hold that they never witnessed the occurrence and that their version is introduced as an afterthought. There is the further fact that both of them belong to the same Thevar community as the party of the prosecution and it has been suggested to P.W.3 that, in the local election, he was working for the party ranged against the accused. There is the further fact that both of them belong to the same Thevar community as the party of the prosecution and it has been suggested to P.W.3 that, in the local election, he was working for the party ranged against the accused. P.W.3 has admitted that he was standing outside and that he could not observe anything that took place inside the clinic is concerned, he is involved in some criminal cases along with the deceased. 7. It is in the background of these serious infirmities and unsavoury features in the evidence of P.Ws.3 and 4, the great significance of the absence of any reference to their names in the First Information Report calls for scrutiny. P.W.1 has clearly admitted in his evidence (page 5 of the typed papers) that P.Ws, 3 and 4 are very well known to P.W.1 and were present at the time of the occurrence. It is obvious that, if P.W.1 knew P.Ws.3 and 4 and if they were eye-witnesses witnessing the occurrence, P.W.1 would certainly have referred to their names in Exhibit P-1. It must be borne in mind that the First Information Report was recorded by P.W.16, the Sub-Inspector, and the first thing a Sub-Inspector of Police would have asked while recording a First Information Report in a grave offence like murder is about the eye-witnesses. The bald and vague statement at the end of Exhibit P-1 that the occurrence is known to the people in the street, in general, without referring to P.Ws.3 and 4 betrays that the statement is so made, to later on introduce convenient, obliging eye-witnesses. The matter does not stop there. The inquest took place immediately after the occurrence, between 11-30 A.M. and 1-30 p.m. and P.Ws.3 and 4 are residents of Tuticorin. P.W.4 is a watchman in a school and there cannot possibly be any difficulty in tracing him and examining him. P.W.3’s address is also known to the police officer and he resides in Tuticorin. The Inspector of Police examined P.Ws.8, 9 and 11 at the in quest and P.Ws.2, 7 and 10 on the same day later; how does it happen that P.Ws.3 and 4, the most important eye-witnesses, are not examined at the inquest? P.W.3’s address is also known to the police officer and he resides in Tuticorin. The Inspector of Police examined P.Ws.8, 9 and 11 at the in quest and P.Ws.2, 7 and 10 on the same day later; how does it happen that P.Ws.3 and 4, the most important eye-witnesses, are not examined at the inquest? The question naturally arises, that the police would certainly have asked P.W.1 as to who the eyewitnesses were that were referred to in Exhibit P-1, and in the course of the cross-examination, when P.W.1 was confronted with respect to that situation, he gave the false answer that he had told the police that P.Ws.3 and 4 had witnessed the occurrence. The utter falsity of this answer of P.W.1 is exposed by the evidence of P.W.17, the Inspector, of Police, who says that P.W.1 never mentioned to him the names of P.Ws.3 and 4 as eye-witnesses. 8. The prosecution has miserably failed to explain the delay in the examination these crucial witnesses. P.W.4, a watchman in a school, who can easily be traced, was examined only 31st March, 1971 and P.W.3 was examined a week later. The prosecution gave a furtile explanation that, for over a week, P.W.3 was absent and could not be examined. Except a bare statement, P.W.does not say why he was absent, for what purpose and to which place he had gone. Again, the Sub-Inspector of Police has given no evidence as to what step they took in examining P.W.3 as early as possible. Even though, admittedly, the police station is very near, P.Ws.3 and 4 admittedly evinced no interest in reporting the matter to the police. P.W.3 has admitted that he was in the hospital when the First Information Report was given. If so, it passes one’s comprehension how his name was not mentioned in the First Information Report and how he was not examined at the inquest. The story of P.W.3 suddenly disappearing from the scene, i.e., hospital immediately after the occurrence for about a week is worse than a fairy tale, even to narrate. When pressed in cross-examination, he gave the false answer that immediately after the occurrence he went and informed P.W.11, the wife of the deceased, about the occurrence. The story of P.W.3 suddenly disappearing from the scene, i.e., hospital immediately after the occurrence for about a week is worse than a fairy tale, even to narrate. When pressed in cross-examination, he gave the false answer that immediately after the occurrence he went and informed P.W.11, the wife of the deceased, about the occurrence. This answer is demonstrated to be false because P.W.11, the wife of the deceased, does not corroborate P.W.3; further, if P.W.11 had been told by P.W.3 about the occurrence, P.W.11 would at least have informed the Inspector at the inquest that the news of the murder of her husband was conveyed to her by P.W.3, a witness alleged to have witnessed the occurrence. P.Ws.3 and 4 have admitted that after the occurrence they never met and discussed, which would not have been the normal conduct if they had both witnessed the occurrence and they had known P.W.1 very well. The conduct of P.Ws.3 and 4 again is unnatural that they never made enquiries as to what happened after the occurrence. P.W.4 could not withstand the cross-examination and he admitted that he did not tell the Inspector of Police that the fourth accused instigated the other three accused to cut the deceased, which is the crux of the case of the prosecution. From the evidence of P.W.1, P.W.10 and P.W.11, ample material has been brought out to show that P.Ws.3 and 4 are obliging partisan witnesses and they have been tutored to give this evidence at the instance of the leader of the party of the prosecution ranged against the party of the accused. The evidence of the Inspector shows that there is party faction on account of municipal elections and the party of one Mariappan on the side of the accused is ranged against the party of Ayyasamy on the side of the prosecution. The prosecution evidence also shows that P.W.10 is a staunch supporter of the party of Ayyasamy. The several answers elicited in the course of the cross-examination of the Inspector of Police show that the evidence given by P.Ws.3 and 4 is false from start to finish. The prosecution evidence also shows that P.W.10 is a staunch supporter of the party of Ayyasamy. The several answers elicited in the course of the cross-examination of the Inspector of Police show that the evidence given by P.Ws.3 and 4 is false from start to finish. At page 43 of the typed papers, the Inspector has admitted that P.W.3 did not tell the Inspector that he (P.W.3) saw P.W.1 running out of Manohar Clinic with bleading injury and again, he did not tell the Inspector that he went inside the Clinic and saw the deceased with bleeding injuries. Again, the Inspector has admitted that P.W.4 did not tell him about his (P.W.4’s) seeing P.W.1 running away from the Clinic with bleeding injury. These crucial admissions of the Inspector clearly show that P.Ws.3 and 4 never witnessed the occurrence, for, if they had witnessed, they would have stated these crucial things to the Inspector. From the foregoing it is demonstrably clear that it is impossible to place any reliance upon the evidence of P.Ws.3 and 4. It is difficult to understand how the learned Sessions Judge has so slightly slurred over the unjustifiable and unexplained long delay on the part of the investigating officer in recording the statements of material eye-witnesses during the investigation of a murder case like this. In paragraph 19 of the judgment, the learned Sessions Judge refers to these aspects, the infirmities in the evidence, and winds up by saying, because of the said facts, it will not be fair to disbelieve their evidence. I am sorry to say that this is not sifting or analysing the evidence, but betrays a pre-determination to accept their evidence, whatever may be the infirmities and falsehood which the defence had clearly and undoubtedly established. It is necessary to refer to the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Balakrishna v. State of Orissa1, in which the Supreme Court has observed that ‘unjustified and unexplained long delay on the part of the investigating officer in recording the statement of a material eye-witness during the investigation of a murder case will render the evidence of such witness unreliable’. In that case too, the Supreme Court commented upon the fact that the Inspector of Police was not able to explain the delay in the examination of the crucial eye-witnesses and the fact that these eye-witnesses gave prevaricating, unsatisfactory answers. 9. In that case too, the Supreme Court commented upon the fact that the Inspector of Police was not able to explain the delay in the examination of the crucial eye-witnesses and the fact that these eye-witnesses gave prevaricating, unsatisfactory answers. 9. Thus the defence has clearly made out that, under the aforesaid circumstances the truth or otherwise of the prosecution version has to be adjudged solely with reference to One single witness, i.e.. P.W.1. The learned Public Prosecutor submitted that the evidence of this witness is natural and rings true as he is an injured witness and there is no motive for him to leave out the real assailant and falsely implicate others and when the evidence of this witness is scrutinised with care and caution as indicated by the decision of the Supreme Court referred to above, there is no reason to reject his evidence. On the facts found and proved by the defence, it is impossible to accept this contention. In the first place, the incident is not a frontal attack in the sense, in front of P.W.1, when he could have witnessed the assailant. P.W.1 received a stab injury at the back and he at once ran away from the scene out of panic and fear. It is very doubtful whether he could have even noticed his own assailant. It is worse so far as his capacity and facility to notice the assailants of the deceased, because, immediately after the stab injury inflicted on him, P.W.1 ran away. Abundant material has been brought out in the course of the cross-examination, how the locality is faction-ridden and how motive and open hostility and enmity would act both ways. If P.W.1 had witnessed the occurrence, he would not have told his brother, P.W.10, on the way to the hospital, that the stabbing was by the fourth accused vagaiyara. It passes my comprehension that if P.W.1 had actually observed the occurrence and his assailant, he would not have so mentioned to P.W.10, but would have mentioned A-4 vagaiyara. This clearly proves two things: (i) P.W.1 had not witnessed the occurrence and (ii) not having witnessed the occurrence, who the assailants were, guess-work and speculation came in, and, naturally, the name of the fourth accused appeared uppermost in their minds, in view of the prior disputes and incidents concerning the fourth accused and his brother etc. This clearly proves two things: (i) P.W.1 had not witnessed the occurrence and (ii) not having witnessed the occurrence, who the assailants were, guess-work and speculation came in, and, naturally, the name of the fourth accused appeared uppermost in their minds, in view of the prior disputes and incidents concerning the fourth accused and his brother etc. on the one side and P.W.10 on the other. I find it impossible to ignore what P.W.1 conveyed to P.W.10 on his way to the hospital as inconsequential. In my view, it has a vital impact and I have not the slightest hesitation in holding that P.W.1 said ‘fourth accused vagaivara’ for the excellent reason that he never saw and could not have seen who his assailant was, which means that he never witnessed any portion of the occurrence, because he at once ran away from the scene. The next is the statement (Exhibit D-1) given by him in the hospital. Exhibit D-1 shows that P.W.1 is prepared to freely implicate others in a grave offence like murder. Here again, abundant material has been placed to show that these persons who are implicated are all persons belonging to the opposite party led by Councillor Mariappan. What better or further proof is necessary to show that P.W.1 is an unscrupulous person, has no regard for truth and is merely a tool in the hands of his party-men, besides his scheming brother, P.W.10? How does it happen that, when further persons are impleaded, they happen to be leaders of the party in the opposite side? In my opinion, the note of warning by the Supreme Court that the Court should be very circumspect in assessing P. W 1’s evidence and look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, clearly applies; Exhibit D-1 gives an entirely different version and, so far as the third accused is concerned , it is merely stated that the third accused was in the crowd Does it mean ‘outside the Clinic’ or does it mean ‘inside the Clinic?’ If inside the Clinic, how could P.W.1 make the statement because, according to Exihibit P-1, he also cut the deceased with aruval. Does it require any further elaboration is to show that P.W.1 did not witness the occurrence, but ran away in panic as soon as he received the stab injury in the back? Does it require any further elaboration is to show that P.W.1 did not witness the occurrence, but ran away in panic as soon as he received the stab injury in the back? At every stage of the discussion, we are emphasising that P.W.1 did not witness and could not have witnessed the occurrence, to show that the theory that an injured witness would not normally falsely implicate persons leaving out the real assailants has no application to the instant case. That argument would apply only in a case in which the prosecution has established beyond any reasonable doubt that the injured witness actually witnessed the occurrence and there is no controversy about his being able and having facility to observe the occurrence. The particular facts of this case ought not to be ignored and some general rule applied, in the abstract, in adjudging the truth of the case of the prosecution. Exhibit D-1 bears ample evidence that P.W.1 is not giving a natural or a true account of the episode. Not only has he falsely implicated other persons in Exhibit D-1, bat, even in his evidence in the trial he has been shown to be an unscrupulous person uttering lies quite freely. He had no scruples whatever in introducting two persons as eye-witnesses to the occurrence, which, as pointed out above is obvious falsehood. It is settled law that the evidence of such a witness who falsely introduces eye-witnesses to the occurrence, is not to be readily accepted, but the Court should be very cautious and look for corroboration. The next aspect is that, in Exhibit D-1, an attempt is made to shift the scene of occurrence (from inside the Clinic) to the street in front of Manohar Clinic. This is a deliberate, obvious falsehood and afterthought; the reason is obvious. Seeing that the murderous assault on the deceased took place inside the Clinic and also realising that neither he (P.W.1) nor other persons could have witnessed if everything happened inside the Clinic, this vital change is introduced in Exhibit D-1 to create a background that the occurrence took place in the road, so that in the course of the evidence, witnesses can be introduced to say that they witnessed the occurrence while standing on the road. The version in Exhibit D-1 is that the accused engulfed the jutka both in the front and in the rear and, as P.W.1 jumped out of the jutka, he was attacked on the road. Again, on an integral portion of the case it is seen that P.W.1 is uttering lies quite freely but in the trial, evidence was given in a discrepant and prevaricating manner, in a futile attempt to reconcile the version in Exhibit P-1 and that in Exhibit D-1. This again emphasises that P.W.1, is a thoroughly unreliable witness. He gave thoroughly useless and unsatisfactory answers. He said that he did not mention to the Inspector of Police that Mariappan and Jeeva etc, were in the group. Indeed be could not withstand any portion of the cross-examination about his falsely implicating three other people in Exhibit D-1. The Inspector in his evidence (at page 43 of the typed papers) has stated that P.W.1 told him that the party of the accused along with Mariappan and Jeeva, inflicted cut injuries indiscriminately upon the deceased. There is absolutely no scope for any theory that when Exhibit D-1, was recorded P.W.1 was not normal, in the sense that On account of some operation and treatment or on account of any sleeping pill that was given to him, P.W.1 was in a delirium and gave any such statement. There is no evidence whatever for that theory either in the evidence of P.W.1 or that of the Doctor or the Inspector of Police. Further the evidence does not admit of any such theory on the facts of the case. At the time of the investigation, which admittedly took place after Exhibit D-1, P.W.1 has persisted in slicking on to the statement when he told the Inspector in the course of investigation that Mariappan and Jeeva and others also participated in the murderous assault. At that stage, there is no question of any speculation of any delirium in the mental condition of P.W.1. What further proof is necessary to show that it: will be dangerous in the extreme to accept the evidence of P.W.1? There is one other serious impact flowing from this false and prevaricating version of P.W.1. At that stage, there is no question of any speculation of any delirium in the mental condition of P.W.1. What further proof is necessary to show that it: will be dangerous in the extreme to accept the evidence of P.W.1? There is one other serious impact flowing from this false and prevaricating version of P.W.1. If, in the investigation state, he told the police that seven people participated in the murderous assault and inflicted cut injuries with aruvals, on what basis can the Court hold that it is the four accused alone who are guilty of the Offence? How is it possible to hold that the other three people did nothing and that the four accused alone are the real assailants? How was P.W.1 able to identify and locate these four accused as the real assailants? It is not a case of simple arithmetic, 7 minus 3 equals 4. The argument that it frequently happens that more people are freely implicated in offences and that, for that reason the Court should not throw away the entire case for the prosecution, but can convict such persons as are proved to have committed the offence, has hardly any application to the instant case. The application of such a rule would result in gross miscarriage of justice unless the Court is satisfied that the evidence of the witness who falsely implicates other people has been corroborated by other convincing, satisfactory evidence with reference to those accused who are proved to have been the real offenders. In this connection, I may refer to the recent Bench decision of this Court in Narayanaswami, In re1, in which the note of warning given by the Supreme Court as to what weight should be attached to the case for the prosecution, where the prosecution relies upon three prevaricating dying declarations one after another and more persons are implicated in one than in the other, and where there is material discrepancy revealed in the dying declarations as to the number of persons who participated in the crime has been considered. The following headnote in that decision brings out the note of warning given by the Supreme Court in Pompiah v. State of Mysore2: "In a case in which there is a single dying declaration and also oral evidence one corroborating the other, the problem before the Court may not be very difficult of solution, though there may be some embellishments and discrepancies brought out in the oral evidence, because, due weight will have to be given to the statement of the deceased as to the real circumstances under which he met with his death, and in the light thereof, the oral evidence will have to be assessed making due allowance for discrepancies and inaccuracies. Complete and perfect harmony between the dying declaration and the oral evidence cannot always be secured. Problems would arise where the deceased had made two or more statements constituting dying declarations as to the circumstances under which he met with his death. Here too, immaterial discrepancies and inconsequential inaccuracies between one statement and another will have to be ignored as of no consequence, if the main core of the case is found in the dying declaration of the deceased. . . . The crucial test in all cases of plurality of dying declarations is whether the deceased’s version is proved to be false in respect of an integral portion of the case and that the test whether the deceased has given a true version is not to be judged with refer’:nce to any one dying declaration, but it should be judged in the light of the several declarations made by him. It is only in extreme cases that the Court can safely convict relying upon the first dying declaration, provided there is convincing and adequate corroborative evidence". In the case before the Supreme Court in Pompiah v. State of Mysore2, the deceased, Eranna, whe was murdered, gave three dying declarations, marked as Exhibit P-2, Exhibit P-1(a) and Exhibit P-9 in that case. The point for decision turned upon the probative value of the two dying declarations, Exhibits P-2 and P-9. In the first dying declaration, Exhibit P-2, the deceased implicated one Pompiah and Hussaini as the real assailants, but in the second dying declaration, Exhibit P-9, which was given a few hours later, he implicated two more persons, Siddaiah and Rudramani. The point for decision turned upon the probative value of the two dying declarations, Exhibits P-2 and P-9. In the first dying declaration, Exhibit P-2, the deceased implicated one Pompiah and Hussaini as the real assailants, but in the second dying declaration, Exhibit P-9, which was given a few hours later, he implicated two more persons, Siddaiah and Rudramani. The High Court was not inclined to act upon the second dying declaration, Exhibit P-9, and therefore, found only the two accused, Pompiah and Hussaini, guilty of the offence charged on the basis of the earlier dying declaration. On appeal by these two persons, the Supreme Court acquitted them. The Supreme Court distinguished the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Khusal Rao v. State of Bombay3, in which case there was a plurality of dying declarations on the ground that no part of the dying declarations has been found to be false and the Court had no reason to doubt the truth of the dying declarations and their reliability. The Supreme Court observed as follows: "In the instant case, the declarations recorded in Exhibit P-2 and Exhibit P-1(a) were made almost simultaneously and the declaration recorded in Exhibit P-9 was made shortly thereafter. In Exhibit P-2 Erranna named Pompiah and Hussaini only as his assailants, whereas in Exhibit P-1 (a) and Exhibit P-9 he names not only Pompiah and Hussaini but also Siddaiah and Rudramani as his assailants. Now, his version that Siddaiah and Rudramani attacked him has been found to be an after-thought. We thus find that a material and integral portion of the deceased’s version of the entire occurrence is unreliable. The truthfulness of the dying declaration as a whole is not free from doubt. The prosecution case as a whole does not inspire confidence. The prosecution produced eye-witnesses, who have been found to be unreliable". In view of this decision, it is clear that it is not a simple arithmetic of addition or subtraction and no conviction can rest upon such versions, where a material, integral portion of the version is unreliable. The decision of the Supreme Court dealt with a dying declaration. The position applies a fortiori in the case of a party who appears in Court and gives evidence which is false from start to finish. The decision of the Supreme Court dealt with a dying declaration. The position applies a fortiori in the case of a party who appears in Court and gives evidence which is false from start to finish. The next integral portion of the occurrence, where P.W.1 gives unreliable evidence uttering lies freely, is as to the overt acts which he attributes to the various accused. In his evidence in Court he metioned specific overt acts referable to each of the four accused. He stated that the juvenile stabbed the deceased with vel stick on the face, the fourth accused cut the deceased with an aruval in the neck, the third accused cut the deceased with an aruval on the left hand, the second accused cut the deceased with an aruval in the chest and the first accused cut the deceased with M.O. 4 indiscriminately. He also gave evidence that these people inflicted injuries with aruvals indiscriminately. In cross-examination, he had to admit that it was only in the Sessions Court, for the first time, he was giving these particulars and he admitted that he never mentioned these particulars either in Exhibit P-1 or in Exhibit D-1 or to the Inspector, nor even in the committal Court. (Vide page 8 of his deposition). What further proof is necessary to demonstrate that this witness is an unreliable person? The learned Judge adverts to the false answers which P.W.1 gave in cross-examiation and, at the same time, the Judge makes the extraordinary statement, "because of these, we cannot brush aside the entire evidence of P.W.1." I have already made my comment that, in Exhibit P-1, the words "fourth accused vegaiarah" had been mentioned making the fourth accused as the leader of the party because of the hostility and enmity existing between the party of the prosecution and the party of the accused. The accused, in their statements under section 342, Criminal Procedure Code, have referred to the bitter enmity prevailing between P.W.10 and the accused’s party. The first accused has stated that he belongs to the Congress Party, and the Councillor Ayyasami and P.ws. 3, 4 and 10 belong to the D.M.K. Party. During the last General Elections, the first accused worked for the Congress Party candidate. Therefore, at the instigation of the said Ayyasami, he has been falsely implicated in this case. The first accused has stated that he belongs to the Congress Party, and the Councillor Ayyasami and P.ws. 3, 4 and 10 belong to the D.M.K. Party. During the last General Elections, the first accused worked for the Congress Party candidate. Therefore, at the instigation of the said Ayyasami, he has been falsely implicated in this case. The first accused filed along with his statement in the Sessions Court, the certified copy of the judgment in C.C. No. 87 of 1971 on the file of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Tuticorin. The second accused stated that he belongs to the Congress Party and worked for the Congress candidate in the last General Elections. Councillor Ayyaswami belongs to the D.M.K. Party and P.Ws. 1, 3, 4 and 10 belonging to the D.M.K. Party asked him not to work for the Congress candidate. He did not comply with their request and hence, at the instigation of Ayyaswami he has been falsely implicated. The third accused stated that, about five years prior to the occurrence, P.W.10 cut the fourth accused and in the criminal case in that connection, he (the third accused) figured as a prosecution witness against P.W.10 who was sentenced to imprisonment. During the last General Elections, he worked for the Congress candidate and, on account of the enmity he has been falsely implicated. The fourth accused stated that P.W.10 cut his leg five years back. His younger brother Paramasivam, who belonged to the Congress Party, was murdered last year. During the last General Elections, this accused, along with the second and the third accused, worked for the Congress candidate. After the Elections, his elder brother Sudalaimuthu was murdered by one Komban and others. Municipal Councillor Ayyasami belongs to the D.M.K. Party and at his instigation, this accused has been implicated in this case. The evidence adduced on the side of the prosecution also refers to the aforesaid instances showing the enmity. To sum up, the net result is, the evidence of P.W.1 is false and unreliable and, in any event, it is impossible to act upon his sole evidence without sufficient, independent corroboration by reliable and acceptable testimony and otherwise. The evidence adduced on the side of the prosecution also refers to the aforesaid instances showing the enmity. To sum up, the net result is, the evidence of P.W.1 is false and unreliable and, in any event, it is impossible to act upon his sole evidence without sufficient, independent corroboration by reliable and acceptable testimony and otherwise. Far from there being any corroborative circumstance, everything tends to the inference that the evidence of P.W.1 should not be accepted: (a) Exhibit D-1 does not corroborate the evidence of P.W.1, but on the other hand, proceeds on a different line: (b) P.W.1 falsely introduced eye-witnesses, which shows that, on the integral portion of the case, he is uttering lies and this is not a circumstance which corroborates P.W.1’s evidence, (c) He utters lies freely in attributing overt acts to the several accused, which, again, does not constitute corroborative evidence; and (d) He falsely alleges that he told about the presence of P.Ws. 3 and 4 at the scene to the Inspector of Police. (e) He attempts to shift the scene of occurrence in Exhibit D-1. Thus, we find that in every integral portion or link of the case, P.W.1 has proved himself to be a liar. At this stage, reference may be made to the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Masalti v. State of Uttar Pradesh1, in which it was held that it will be a prudent test to apply, though it is mechanical, not to act upon a single witness, but to insist upon three or four witnesses giving a consistent account of the incident. Gajendragadkar, C.J., delivering the judgment, observed as follows: “That, no doubt, is true; but where a criminal Court has to deal with evidence pertaining to the commission of an offence involving a larger number of offenders and a larger number of victims, it is usual to adopt the test that the conviction could be sustained only if it is supported by two or three or more witnesses who gave a consistent account of the incident. In a sense, the test may be described as mechanical: but it is difficult to see how it can be treated as irrational or unreasonable. Therefore, we do not think that any grievance can be made by the appellants against the adoption of this test. In a sense, the test may be described as mechanical: but it is difficult to see how it can be treated as irrational or unreasonable. Therefore, we do not think that any grievance can be made by the appellants against the adoption of this test. If at all, the prosecution may be entitled to say that the seven accused persons were acquitted because their cases did not satisfy the mechanical test of four witnesses, and if the test had not been applied, they might as well have been convicted. It is, no doubt, the quality of the evidence that matters and not the number of witnesses who give such evidence.” The instant case is an a fortiori case; it is dangerous to act upon the sole testimony of such an unreliable witness as P.W.1 and sentence four persons to imprisonment for life. 10. There is yet one otter aspect emerging from the evidence of P.W.6, the Doctor who conducted the postmortem examination. He is of the opinion that all the injuries could have been caused with aruval or knife including a knife like M.O. 4. It is not the Doctor’s opinion that the injuries are such that they could have been caused only by using two weapons, a knife and an aruval. According to the evidence of the Doctor it may be that two weapons were used or it may be that only one weapon was used. The Doctor’s evidence does not decisively show that two weapons ought to have been used, i.e., two persons have participated in the occurrence. The prosecution has not established that aspect, namely, more than one assailant must have participated, beyond reasonable doubt. This assumes greater importance when we notice that the Inspector of Police (P.W.17) has stated that the charge-sheet was filed only as against accused 1 to 4 and the other three persons, Mariappan, Jeeva and Selvaraj, had been left out, because the so-called eye-witnesses, P. Ws. 3 and 4 did not mention to the Inspector that those persons also participated in the occurrence. 3 and 4 did not mention to the Inspector that those persons also participated in the occurrence. The Inspector is making an extraordinary statement that, as against the statement in Exhibit D-1 in which P.W.1 has unambiguously implicated seven people as the real assailants, all of them cutting with aruvals indiscriminately, the Inspector has taken the responsibility by confining the charge only in respect of accused 1 to 4, basing his judgment upon the evidence of P.Ws. 3 and 4. We have said enough to show that no reliance can be placed upon the evidence of P.Ws. 3 and 4. That again shows that the Inspector had not exercised any judgment in the matter and filed the charge-sheet against the four accused, leaving out the others. In such a situation, when seven people are alleged to have participated in the occurrence and all the injuries could have been inflicted by one individual, one or more of the rest facilitating the infliction of the injuries, serious doubts occur as to how the occurrence itself took place, again throwing serious doubts upon the truth of the evidence of P.W.1. In other words, a reasonable doubt as to who all participated and a reasonable doubt as to how exactly the occurrence took place, make it unsafe to act upon the sole testimony of P.W.1. In view of what has been mentioned above, we are not inclined to attach any value to the discovery evidence. For all these reasons, we have no hesitation whatever in holding that there are serious doubts about the truth of the prosecution version and the guilt of the accused has not been established beyond reasonable doubt in respect of any of the charges. All the four accused are acquitted of all the charges and the Criminal. Appeal is allowed. All the appellants are set at liberty. V.S. ----- Appeal allowed.