JUDGMENT 1. THE short point involved in this appeal is whether the appeal preferred by the appellant against the order of discharge from service was lawfully heard by the Secretary, Panchayat Department, Government of West Bengal, and whether the order made by the Secretary in disposing of the appeal was validly made. 2. THE appellant was employed as a driver by the District Board of 24-Parganas and continued in such employment under the Zilla Parishad, 24-Parganas constituted by the West Bengal Zilla Parishad Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the Act. He was called upon to show cause by a notice dated January 8, 1964, in respect of certain allegations made against him. But the enquiry, however, was kept in abeyance by the Administrator. Thereafter, further complaints were received against the appellant and a second show cause notice dated December 2, 1964, was served upon him. Pursuant to this second show cause notice, an enquiry proceeding was started against the appellant. In course of the enquiry proceeding following the two show cause notices, further complaints were received and a third show cause notice dated February 19, 1965, was served upon the appellant. The Executive Officer of the first respondent conducted an enquiry into the charges, witnesses were examined and by a report dated March 31, 1965, the Executive Officer reported that one out of the six of the charges in the first charge-sheet, and all the charges in the two subsequent charge-sheets were proved. The Executive Officer recommended the dismissal of the appellant from the service of the first respondent. Thereafter the first respondent served a notice upon the appellant to show cause why he should not be discharged from service. The appellant showed cause in writing. By a unanimous resolution dated May 5, 1965, the first respondent discharged the appellant from service. Against this order of discharge, the appellant preferred an appeal to the Commissioner, presidency Division, through the Chairman, 24-Parganas Zilla Parishad. The petition of appeal was forwarded by the Commissioner to the Secretary, Panchayat Department. It is not in dispute that the procedure prescribed by section 31 (2) of the Act for dismissal of an employee was duly followed. Against this order of discharge, the appellant preferred an appeal to the Commissioner, presidency Division, through the Chairman, 24-Parganas Zilla Parishad. The petition of appeal was forwarded by the Commissioner to the Secretary, Panchayat Department. It is not in dispute that the procedure prescribed by section 31 (2) of the Act for dismissal of an employee was duly followed. Under S. 31 (2) of the Act, an appeal lies to the State Government against an order of punishment awarded by the Zilla Parishad under subsections (3), and (4) of section 30, within one month from the date of that order. Under S. 105 of the Act, the Slate Government may, by notification, delegate subject to such conditions as it may specify, all or any of its powers under the Act except certain powers specified in certain sections. It is not in dispute that the State Government had the power to delegate its functions under S. 31 (2) of the Act. In exercise of this power, by a notification dated June 15, 1964, the Governor delegated the powers under sub-section (2) of S. 31 of the Act against orders of punishment awarded by Zilla Parishad to the Divisional Commissioner. Prior to this notification, however, there was another notification dated February 5, 1959, by which the Governor, in exercise of the powers conferred by Article 166 (2) of the Constitution, prescribed the following Rule : "orders and other instruments made and executed in the name of the Governor shall be authenticated by the signature of the Secretary or an officer of the Government of West Bengal specially empowered in this behalf by the Governor". 3. THE Secretary, Panchayat Department, in disposing of the appeal directed that the order of dismissal passed against the appellant be set aside, and three separate enquiries be held afresh in connection with the three separate proceedings drawn up against the appellant. It was also ordered that the fresh enquiries should be held as expeditiously as possible and the Zilla Parishad would be at liberty to pass such orders as it thought fit on the basis of the records of the fresh enquiries, on the merits of each case. 4. AGGRIEVED by this order, the first respondent moved this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and obtained a Rule Nisi which was made absolute by the judgment and order of the trial court dated December 23, 1969. 4. AGGRIEVED by this order, the first respondent moved this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and obtained a Rule Nisi which was made absolute by the judgment and order of the trial court dated December 23, 1969. This appeal is directed against this order. Appearing for the appellant, Mr. Bankim Chandra Roy contended that although there was delegation of the power of the State Government to hear appeals under S. 105 of the Act by virtue of the notification which I have mentioned earlier in this judgment, the state Government still had the power to deal with the appeal preferred by the appellant. He argued that by virtue of the notification mentioned above, the State Government did not denude itself of its powers to hear appeals under S. 105 of the Act. He also submitted that the Secretary, Panchayat Department, was competent to deal with the appeal to be heard by the State Government and, therefore, the order made by the Secretary was a valid order and ought not to have been quashed by the trial Court. In support of this contention, Mr. Roy relied on a decision of the Supreme Court (1) Godavari S. Parulekar v. The State of Maharashtra, A. I. R. 1966 S. C. 1404. In that case the question was that whether the State Government having delegated its powers under Rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules, stood denuded of its powers to make an order of detention. It was held that by the notification delegating its powers, the State Government did not denude itself of its powers to act under Rule 30. But in that case it was also noticed that quite apart from Rule 30 of the Rules, the Governor could still have made the order under Rule 26 of the Defence of India Rules. Therefore, quite apart from the powers of the Governor under Rule 30 which were delegated, the Governor still retained powers under Rule 26 of the Rules to make an order of detention. It was in these facts that it was held that the State Government had not denuded itself of its powers to act under Rule 30. This decision is, therefore, of no assistance to the appellant in this case. 5. IT was next contended by Mr. It was in these facts that it was held that the State Government had not denuded itself of its powers to act under Rule 30. This decision is, therefore, of no assistance to the appellant in this case. 5. IT was next contended by Mr. Roy that the provisions in Clause (2) of Article 166 of the Constitution requiring that orders and other instruments made and executed in the name of the Governor shall be authenticated in such manner as may be specified in rules made by the Governor are directory and not mandatory and, in support of this contention, reliance was placed on a decision of the Supreme Court (2) M/s. Bijoya Lakshmi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. State of West Bengal and other A. I. R. 1967 S. C. 1145. He argued that although in this case the order was the order of the Secretary, Panchayat Department, it should be regarded as an order made by the Governor and the default or omission in specifying that the order was an order of the Governor was a mere irregularity and such irregularity did not affect the legality or validity of the order, as the provisions in Article 166 (2) of the Constitution are merely directory and not mandatory. In support of this contention, reliance was also placed by Mr. Roy on another decision of the Supreme Court : (3) P. Joseph John v. State of Travancore-Cochin, A. I. R. 1955 S. C. 160. 6. WE do not think, however, that it can be said that the order made by the Secretary, Panchayat Department, was an order by the State Government as contemplated by the Act. Our attention was drawn to the text of the order itself in which it is said : "i am also constrained to hold that the report of enquiry into the charges does not disclose clearly how particular charges have been proved against the appellant". Our attention was also drawn to the opening words of the order in which the Secretary says : "I have gone through the papers. I find that the proceedings were drawn up against the appellant on three different occasions - the first time in January 1964,. It was argued by Mr. Our attention was also drawn to the opening words of the order in which the Secretary says : "I have gone through the papers. I find that the proceedings were drawn up against the appellant on three different occasions - the first time in January 1964,. It was argued by Mr. Mitra appearing on behalf of the first respondent that the text of the order itself disclosed that the order is that of the Secretary in his capacity as Secretary, and it is not the authentication of an order made by the Governor who alone, it was argued, would have been competent to hear and dispose of this appeal, if there was no delegation of power to hear such appeals to the Divisional Commissioner. It seems to us that this contention of the learned Advocate for the first respondent is well-founded. The order of the Secretary neither appears to be, nor purports to be an order of the State Government. Quite plainly ex facie the order is an order of the Secretary. If an appeal is to be heard by the State Government, in the absence of delegation or provision to the contrary it can be heard and disposed of by the Governor alone. Any order that the Governor might make in disposing of such an appeal no doubt has to be authenticated by a Secretary, as provided in Article 166 as also in the notification mentioned above. But in this case the order does not purport to be an order mode by the State Government and it is an order made by the Secretary qua Secretary, Panchayat Department. Secondly, in order to be able to hear and dispose of an appeal under S. 31 (2) of the Act, the Secretary must be authorised by the State Government under S. 105 of the Act, There is neither any such authorisation nor any delegation in favour of the Secretary. On the other hand, the only delegation made by the State Government in exercise of its powers under S. 105 of the Act, is a delegation in favour of the Divisional Commissioner. On the other hand, the only delegation made by the State Government in exercise of its powers under S. 105 of the Act, is a delegation in favour of the Divisional Commissioner. It is interesting to note that the appellant's appeal was addressed not to the Secretary, Panchayat Department, nor to the State Government but to the Divisional Commissioner; and although this appeal was addressed to the Divisional Commissioner, the Secretary assumed jurisdiction to deal with it, although at the time when this appeal was purported to be heard and disposed of by the Secretary, the Divisional Commissioner was the only competent authority, by reason of the notification, who could hear and dispose of the appeal. 7. MR. Das Gupta appearing for the respondent No. 2 frankly submitted, that he would not take sides in this appeal, because the State Government has in fact exercised powers under S. 105 of the Act, delegating the power to hear appeals by the Divisional Commissioner. He did not however concede that after the delegation by the State Government under S. 105 of the Act, the State Government stood denuded of its powers to deal with appeals. We are not called upon in this appeal to deal with the question whether the State Government stood denuded of its powers to deal with appeals under S. 31 (2) of the Act. In this case, we are satisfied that the order of the Secretary is not the order of the State Government and cannot be treated as such. If the order was an order made by the State Government, the question would have been whether such an order could be upheld having regard to the delegation made by the State Government under S. 105 of the Act. In this case, that being not the position, we do not think that we need go into the question whether any residuary powers or co-extensive powers remained with the State Government even after the delegation made by virtue of the notification to which I have referred earlier in this judgment. 8. MR. Das Gupta drew our attention to a decision of the Supreme Court (4) A Sanjeevi Naidu v. State of Madras and anr. 8. MR. Das Gupta drew our attention to a decision of the Supreme Court (4) A Sanjeevi Naidu v. State of Madras and anr. A. I. R. (1970) S. C. 1102 for the proposition that in certain cases the opinion of a Secretary of the State Government, who was a limb of the Government, could be treated to be the opinion of the State Government. In that case it was held that neither Council of Ministers nor an individual Minister could attend to all matters that came before the Government and that such matters had to be attended to and decisions taken at various levels by officials and that when such officials discharged the functions allotted to them they were doing so as limbs of the Government and not as persons to whom the power of the Government had been delegated. These observations, in our view, do not throw any light on the question with which we are concerned with this appeal. As I have noticed earlier the question in this case is whether a Secretary of the Government could, as such Secretary, hear and dispose of a statutory appeal, in the absence of any delegation or authorisation in his favour, and when the powers to hear the appeals had been expressly delegated to another officer in exercise of the statutory power of delegation by the State Government. This being the only question urged before us, we see no reason to interfere with the judgment and order of the trial court. This appeal is accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.