JUDGMENT J.S. Trivedi, J. - This is a plaintiff's appeal against the judgment and decree of District Judge, Ghazipur allowing the appeal and dismissing the plaintiff's suit. The plaintiff appellant was appointed a Tracer in the Consolidation Department on 19-11-56 From 13-12-56 he worked as a Draftsman. On 22 8-57 he was retrenched. On 12-11-57 he was again re-appointed as a Draftsman. On 3-7-64 he was reverted as a Tracer but the order was never communicated to the appellant and he continued to work as a Draftsman On 9-7-64 the Consolidation Officer made a report that the plaintiff was not a capable Draftsman. By order dated 16-7-64 the plaintiff appellant was then reverted as a Tracer. Exhibit 5 on record is the order of reversion The plaintiff appellant then made a representation and on 10-8-64 his representation was rejected. He thereafter filed an appeal. While forwarding the appeal Consolidation Officer reported that the appellant was thoroughly incompetent and was not fit to be kept in service. On 1-10 64 the appellant's services were terminated by S O, C. Sri S, K. Srivastava. 2. The suit out of which this appeal arises was then filed challenging the order of termination on the ground that the order in effect was an order of dismissal. The learned Munsif decreed the plaintiff's suit quashing the order of termination. In appeal the lower appellate Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the plaintiff's suit. According to the finding of the lower appellate Court the order was an order of termination only and not of dismissal. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant's contention is that the lower appellate Court committed an error of law in holding that the order was a mere order of termination and not of dismissal. His contention is that the whole order passed by the S. O. C. amounts to an order of dismissal. His further contention is that while considering whether the order amounts to an order of termination or dismissal the background in which the order was passed was relevant for determining whether the order of termination was an order by way of punishment and was a mere camouflage or cloak for dismissing an employee by way of punishment. On the other hand learned counsel appearing for the State has contended that if the order ex facie is a simple order of termination the motive for termination is immaterial. On the other hand learned counsel appearing for the State has contended that if the order ex facie is a simple order of termination the motive for termination is immaterial. Reliance his been placed by him on : - (1) Mahant Akhey Dass v. Gurdial Singh and others ( AIR 1971 SC 834 ); (2) Ram Gopal Chaturvedi v. State of Modhya Pradesh (MR 1970 SC 158); (3) R. S Raizada v. State of U. P. and others (AIR 1971 Allahabad 271). In the State of Punjab and another v. Sukh Raj Bahadur ( AIR 1968 S.C. 1089 at page 1094) their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down the following five propositions for determining the nature of the order: "(I) The services of a temporary servant or a probationer can be terminated under the runs of his employment and such termination without anything more would not attract the operation of Article 311 of the Constitution. (2) The circumstances preceding or attendant on the order of termination of service have to be examined in each case, the motive behind it being immaterial. (3) If the order visits the public servant with any evil consequences or casts an aspersion against his character or integrity, it must be considered to be one by way of punishment, no matter whether he was a mere probationer or a temporary servant. (4) An order of termination of service in unexceptionable form preceded by an enquiry launched by the superior authorities only to ascertain whether the public servant should be retained in service, does not attract the operation of Article 311 of the Constitution. (5) If there be a full scale departmental enquiry envisaged by Article 311 i.e an Enquiry Officer is appointed, a charge-sheet submitted, explanation called for and considered, any order of termination of service made thereafter will attract the operation of the said Article." 4. The question for determination in the present case, therefore, is whether the order of termination did cast an aspersion against the integrity of the employee and whether the order in effect was passed because the appellant was not fit to be retained in service. The order of termination which is alleged to have been communicated to the appellant is Ext. A-l on record and reads as under : - Order "Services of Sriyut Mohd. Bashir and Anish Ahmad Tracers are terminated with immediate effect. Sd/- S.K. Srivastava. The order of termination which is alleged to have been communicated to the appellant is Ext. A-l on record and reads as under : - Order "Services of Sriyut Mohd. Bashir and Anish Ahmad Tracers are terminated with immediate effect. Sd/- S.K. Srivastava. S.O.C. 1-10-64." 5. As stated earlier this order was passed when the appellant was protesting against his reversion. Ext. A-8, the report of the C. O., on which the order was passed, is on record and shows that the full order passed by S. O. C. on the report of C. O. was not communicated. Only one portion of the order which is a termination order was communicated. Ext. A-8 is relevant to determine the extent of the order that was passed by S.O.C. and the nature of the termination order. The relevant portion of the report of C. O. dated 1-10-64 read as under:- "S.O C. Kindly refer to your order dated 16-9 64 on my report regarding loss of tracing cloth. I am to say that I made detailed enquiries and fixed the responsibility on Sri Mohd. Bashir and Sri Anish Ahmad Tracers who have deposited 13 yards cloth. These two officials are not able to deposit three yards cloth as yet. It is therefore requested that pay of these two officials may kindly be withheld until they deposit three yards cloth. Moreover the enquiry and circumstances of the case reveal that Sri Bashir Ahmad. Anish Ahmad Tracers have stolen the cloth from the place where it was kept.................the cloth was so skilfully cut that only experienced hand can do that work and except these two Tracers none of the other have any experience for the cutting of cloth. In the circumstances mentioned above I am fully convinced that these two aforesaid Tracers have committed the theft and their conduct is not clear and therefore, suitable action may kindly be taken against them. Submitted for favour of order. Sd/- Illegible Consolidation Officer II Ghazipur, 1-10-64." 6. Below that is the order of S. O. C. and is being reproduced : - Order (1) Services of Snyut Mohd. Bashir and Anish Ahmad, Tracers are terminated with immediate effect. (2) Their pay shall be withheld till the remaining three yds. of tracing cloth is also (not legible). Sd/- Illegible Consolidation Officer II Ghazipur, 1-10-64." 6. Below that is the order of S. O. C. and is being reproduced : - Order (1) Services of Snyut Mohd. Bashir and Anish Ahmad, Tracers are terminated with immediate effect. (2) Their pay shall be withheld till the remaining three yds. of tracing cloth is also (not legible). (3) C.O. II shall immediately report this theft to P. S. Kotwali and send me a copy of the F. I. R." Sd/- Illegible S. O. C. 7. The full order which was in three paras clearly goes to show that the order terminating the services was by way of punishment and is the result of a finding of guilt of theft committed by the appellant, Annexure 'A' to the plaint is the order dated 16-7-64 passed by Sri S. K. Srivastava, Settlement Officer Consolidation reverting the appellant to the post of a Tracer. That order shows that the appellant was reverted to the post of a Tracer because he was not found fit to the post of a Drafttman. The order terminating his services, therefore, could not be passed on the basis that the appellant was incompetent as a Tracer because the order of termination was passed shortly after the order of reversion and during the representation of the appellant against the order of reversion. Simply because some portion of the order is communicated to the appellant the Department cannot be permitted to say that the portion only is the full order and other portion of the order is not relevant for determining the nature of the order In my opinion the order dated 1-10-64 if read as a whole can be nothing but an order of dismissal and the lower appellate Court in the circumstances was wrong in holding that the order did not amount to an order of dismissal. 8. The result, therefore, is that this appeal is allowed and the suit of the plaintiff appellant shall stand decreed with costs.