JUDGMENT : R.N. Misra, J. - The Plaintiffs are in appeal against the affirming decision of the learned Additional District Judge of Cuttack. Their suit for partition of the disputed property and allotment of 1/4th share therein was dismissed by the trial Court and has been upheld in appeal. 2. The Plaintiffs alleged that one Jagannath had four sons-Madhu, Bhagaban, Magu and Brundaban. The Plaintiffs claimed to belong to Brundaban's branch while the Defendants belong to the other three branches. The property in dispute was Deshahata jagir land and it is said that the same after abolition got settled with the Defendants. The Plaintiffs claimed that such settlement was invalid and they were entitled to partition of their 1/4th share in the property. 3. The Defendants contended that the suit was bad and without jurisdiction in as much as there was a settlement made under the provision of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act and Section 39 thereof would operate as a bar to the maintaining of the suit. They seriously refuted the genealogy by the Plaintiffs and contended that the Plaintiffs were not members of the family and had no relationship with them. 4. The Courts below have accepted both the defence contentions and have accordingly dismissed the suit. 5. Mr. Mohapatra for the Plaintiffs-Appellants contended that the view taken in the Courts below about the effect of the Estates Abolition Act in the present suit cannot be sustained. Admittedly the lands are Deshahata jagir and, therefore, Section 8(2) of the Estates Abolition Act applies. That provision is to the following effect: Any person holding land in a village for service as a Village servant by whatever name called, shall be deemed to hold it under the State Government subject to such terms and conditions as he was entitled or subject to immediately before the date of vesting, In respect of such jagir lands there would be no vesting and the jagir-holders continue to hold such lands on the self same terms as before vesting. It was, therefore, not competent for the estates abolition authorities or the revenue authorities of the State to settle the lands under the provisions of the statute with any of the parties. Such, settlement is contrary to the provisions of the statute and Mr. Mohanty for the Respondents concedes to the aforesaid conclusion. 6. It was, therefore, not competent for the estates abolition authorities or the revenue authorities of the State to settle the lands under the provisions of the statute with any of the parties. Such, settlement is contrary to the provisions of the statute and Mr. Mohanty for the Respondents concedes to the aforesaid conclusion. 6. The lower Appellate Court's finding to the contrary, even if vacated, does not bring about relief to the Plaintiffs. Since their relations hip with the Defendants is seriously disputed and since the Plaintiffs sue for partition on the basis of their status as members of the family, which fact is seriously denied, they are obliged to establish their title to the property which in this case is dependant upon their relationship. The genealogy is in dispute and the burden to establish the genealogy as correct and, therefore, the Plaintiffs' status to ask for partition is wholly on the Plaintiffs. It has been found in the Courts below that the Plaintiffs have failed to establish such status. Mr. Mohapatra took me through the evidence of the defence witnesses and wanted to rely upon certain statements therein as justifying the Plaintiffs' claim of relationship. The evidence led in this case falls short of the requirements of Section 50 of the Evidence Act. The oral evidence, therefore, cannot be acted upon. In Dolgobinda Paricha Vs. Nimai Charan Misra and Others, a matter going from this Court, their Lordships have clearly laid down that opinion evidence of relationship is not admissible. In this case the evidence is mostly of hearsay type. Therefore, the Courts below have rightly come to the conclusion that the Plaintiffs have failed to discharge the burden that lay upon them to show their relationship. Reliance was placed on the settlement records. As it appears the predecessors-in-interest, of the Plaintiffs for the first time came to be recorded to be in possession only in regard to a small portion of the disputed property in the remarks column in the P.S. By the time of the P.S. their names were not at all there. In the C.S. the ancestors were taken to the tenant's column obviously in regard to the small portion of which they were in possession. The learned Appellate Judge has properly considered the evidentiary value of these entries and has accepted the explanation given by the Defendants for the entries. In the C.S. the ancestors were taken to the tenant's column obviously in regard to the small portion of which they were in possession. The learned Appellate Judge has properly considered the evidentiary value of these entries and has accepted the explanation given by the Defendants for the entries. I do not think such conclusion can also be interfered with. 7. Besides, a finding on such matters is surety one of fact. The Courts below have discussed the evidence and come to such conclusion. In Second Appeal I do not think a different view can legitimately be taken. I would accordingly, while reversing the finding of the lower Appellate Court in regard to the impediment under the Estates Abolition Act, sustain the finding that the Plaintiffs have failed to establish their relationship with the Defendants as members of one family. The Second Appeal is bound to fail as there is no merit in it. It is accordingly dismissed. I do not propose to saddle the Plaintiffs with costs of this Court.