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1972 DIGILAW 418 (ALL)

Jangi Lal v. Ram Raj

1972-09-29

N.D.OJHA, SATISH CHANDRA

body1972
JUDGMENT N.D. Ojha, J. - This special appeal is directed against the judgment of a learned Single Judge whereby a writ petition filed by Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 was allowed. The land which is the subject matter of dispute was the occupancy tenancy of Raghunath father of Respondents Nos. 9 and 10. He deposited ten times rent of this land on May 30, 1951 and obtained a declaration u/s 6 of the U.P. Agricultural Tenants (Acquisition of Privileges) Act, 1949, hereinafter referred to as the Acquisition of Privileges Act. Raghunath usufructuarily mortgaged the land in dispute in favour of the Appellants on May 31, 1951. Subsequently Raghunath died and his sons, namely Respondents Nos. 9 and 10 sold the land in dispute to the Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 on May 19, 1959. The village in which the land in dispute is situated was brought under consolidation operation and a dispute between the Appellants on the one hand and Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 on the other arose in regard to the title of the said land, both claiming to be bhumidhars. Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 claimed bhumidhari rights on the basis of the sale deed executed in their favour by Respondents Nos. 9 and 10, whereas Appellants' case was that oh a declaration being granted to Raghunath u/s 6 of the Acquisition of Privileges Act he became a bhumidhar and the usufructuary mortgage executed by him on May 31, 1951 had the effect of a sale as contemplated by Section 164 of the UP ZA and LR Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). On this basis the Appellants pleaded that the sale deed subsequently executed by Respondents Nos. 9 and 10 in favour of Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 was invaild and confers no rights upon the vendees. The Consolidation Officer accepted the claim of Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 and held them to be bhumidhars on the basis of the sale deed executed in their favour. He accordingly directed the names of Respondents Nos. 9 and 10 to be expunged and the names of Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 to be recorded as bhumidhars. He further ordered the Appellants to be recorded as asamis in class 3 of the Khatauni. This order was upheld by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) on appeal. The Appellants took the matter up in second appeal and the Dy. 9 and 10 to be expunged and the names of Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 to be recorded as bhumidhars. He further ordered the Appellants to be recorded as asamis in class 3 of the Khatauni. This order was upheld by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) on appeal. The Appellants took the matter up in second appeal and the Dy. Director of Consolidation giving the Appellants the benefit of Section 164 of the Act allowed their appeal directing them to be recorded as bhumidhars. The revision filed by Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 failed; whereupon they instituted a writ petition in this Court which as already observed above was allowed giving rise to the present special appeal. 2. The learned Counsel for the Appellants has reiterated his submission that the Appellants being usufructuary mortgagees from a bhumidhar were entitled to the land in dispute as bhumidhars inasmuch as the mortgage in their favour amounted to a sale as contemplated by Section 164 of the Act. In support of this submission it was urged that the Act came into force on January 26, 1951 and consequently Sections 18 Sub-section (2) and 164 became operative with effect from the said date. Relying upon Section 340 of the Act and Schedule IV thereto it was urged that the amendments referred to in Schedule IV are to be read and construed as if they had been made in the Acquisition of Privileges Act and were enforced from the commencement of the said Act. So construed. Raghunath father of Respondents Nos. 9 and 10 became bhumidhar u/s 18 Sub-section (2) of the Act on January 26, 1951 and he having executed a usufructuary mortgage in favour of the Appellants on May 30, 1951 the said mortgage has to be treated as a sale and on its basis the Appellants became bhumidhars. 3. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties we are unable to accept the Argument advanced on behalf of the Appellants. The preamble of the Act reads: Whereas it is expedient to provide for the abolition of the zamindari systems which involves intermediaries between the tiller of tie soil and the State in Uttar Pradesh and for the acquisition of their rights, title and interest and to reform the law relating to land tenure consequent on such abolition and acquisition and to make provision for other matters connected therewith. It is hereby enacted as follows: It would thus appear that the purpose of fee ZA Act was to abolish the zamindari system; to acquire rights, title and interest of the intermediaries and to reform the law relating to land tenure consequent on such abolition and acquisition. The Appellants would be entitled to the benefit of Section 164 of the Act only if their mortgagor Raghunath had become a bhumidhar on January 26, 1951. The only provision as already pointed out above under which Raghunath has claimed to have become a bhumidhar on the said date is Section 18(2) of the Act, The skid section occurs in Ch. II of the Act which deals with acquisition of interest of intermediaries and its consequences. Sub-section (1) of Section 18 is specific on the point that the settlement of land as bhumidhars with the persons mentioned therein takes place after vesting. The provisions of Sub-section (2), however, are not specific and the learned Counsel for the Appellant on this basis urged that even though the persons mentioned in Sub-section (1) of Section 18 became bhumidhars on July 1, 1952 those covered by Sub-section (2) became bhumidhars on January 26, 1951. 4. From the heading of Section 18 which reads "Settlement of certain lands with intermediaries or cultivators as bhumidhars." It appears that the settlement as bhumidhars under this Act was to take place under both the sub-clauses of the section simultaneously, namely on the date of vesting. Ch. VIII of the Act deals with the classes of tenure to be recognised under the Act. Section 130 occurring in the said Chapter deals with Bhumidhar and reads as follows: Every person Belonging to any of the following classes shall be called a bhumidhars and shall have all the rights and be subject to all the liabilities conferred or imposed upon bhumidhar by or under this Act, namely-- (a) every person who as a consequence of the acquisition of estates becomes a bhumidhar u/s 18, (b) every person who acquires the rights of a bhumidhar under or in accordance with the provisions of this Act. It would thus appear that Sub-section (a) of Section 130 makes no distinction between Clauses (1) and (2) of Section 18 and deals with them similarly. This sub-section contemplates a person who has become bhumidhar u/s 18 as a consequence of acquisition of the estates. It would thus appear that Sub-section (a) of Section 130 makes no distinction between Clauses (1) and (2) of Section 18 and deals with them similarly. This sub-section contemplates a person who has become bhumidhar u/s 18 as a consequence of acquisition of the estates. It follows that a person becomes a bhumidhar not only Under Sub-section (1) but also Under Sub-section (2) of Section 8 only as a consequence of the acquisition of estates. The reason of the rule is not far to seek. The U.P. Tenancy Act was repealed by Section 539 of the Act with effect from the date of vesting. The classes of tenure under the U.P. Tenancy Act, therefore, continued to be in existence till the date of vesting. The classes of tenures under the U.P. Tenancy Act and the rights and liabilities of such tenure-holders are different than those of Bhumidhars under the Act. 5. Before the Act came into force there were intermediaries between the State and the actual tiller of the soil known as Zamindars. They were owners of every inch of the land and various classes of tenants used to hold the land under them. The Act does not recognise Zamindar as a class of tenure. If the interpretation sought to be put upon Section 18(2) of the Act by the learned Counsel for the Appellants is accepted it would lead to an anomalous result, namely that between January 26, 1951 and July 1, 1952 the same person would be tenant under the Tenancy Act as well as bhumidhar with a Zamindar over his head. 6. The argument that a person having obtained a declaration u/s 6 of the Acquisition of Privileges Act became a bhumidhar with effect from January 26, 1951 is not acceptable for another reason. A scrutiny of the various provisions of the Acquisition of Privileges Act would indicate that the said Act does no where speak of a bhumidhar. u/s 7 of the said Act, a person having obtained a declaration u/s 6 thereof gets certain privileges including those which have been retrospectively added to Section 7 by Schedule IV of the Act, but he does not become a bhumidhar by the mere grant of a declaration. u/s 7 of the said Act, a person having obtained a declaration u/s 6 thereof gets certain privileges including those which have been retrospectively added to Section 7 by Schedule IV of the Act, but he does not become a bhumidhar by the mere grant of a declaration. None of the privileges referred to in Section 7 of the said Act including those added by Schedule IV of the Act confers the status of a bhumidhar upon the person who has obtained a declaration u/s 5 thereof. Even though the U.P. Tenancy Act was repealed by Section 339 of the Act, the Acquisition of Privileges Act has not been so repealed. The result was that a person even though he had obtained a declaration u/s 6 of the Acquisition of Privileges Act continued to be a tenant till the date of vesting and acquired a status as bhumidhar only on the date of vesting u/s 18(2) read with Section 130 of the Act as a consequence of the acquisition of estates. In Data Din v. Deputy Director of Consolidation 1961 AWR 449 a Division Bench of this Court interpreting the provision of Sub-section (2) of Section 18 of the Act held that in order to be entitled to bhumidhari rights under the said sub-section a person must belong to the class of persons mentioned in Section 3, namely persons holding certain tenancy rights on the date of vesting. The emphasis on the words "on the date of vesting" indicates that the person who becomes entitled to bhumidhari rights Under Sub-section (2) of Section 18 continues to be a tenant till the date of vesting. 7. As is clear from the scheme of the Act as also from what was held in Rana Sheo Ambar Singh v. Allahabad Bank 1961 AWR 546 SC a bhumidhari right created by Section 18 of the Act is a new right altogether. The Act does not recognise payment of any rent by a bhumidhar to a Zamindar. 7. As is clear from the scheme of the Act as also from what was held in Rana Sheo Ambar Singh v. Allahabad Bank 1961 AWR 546 SC a bhumidhari right created by Section 18 of the Act is a new right altogether. The Act does not recognise payment of any rent by a bhumidhar to a Zamindar. Notwithstanding the fact that a person may have obtained a declaration u/s 6 of the Acquisition of Privileges Act his liability to pay rent as reduced by Section 7 of the said Act to the Zamindar continued till the date of vesting and if this argument is accepted that such person became bhumidhar u/s 18(2) of the Act on January 26, 1951, it would amount to holding that a bhumidhar was liable to pay rent to the zamindar. Such a situation is wholly inconsistent with the entire structure of the Act and we, therefore, find it difficult to accept the submission made by the learned Counsel for the Appellants in this behalf. 8. It was then argued that the Appellants were at all events entitled to be recorded as asamis of the land in dispute. As observed above the Consolidation Officer has already passed an order to this effect. That order has been restored by the learned Single Judge. In fact the learned Single Judge has himself held that the Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 were bhumidhars of the plots in dispute and the Appellants were asamis thereof. No further order in this behalf, therefore, appears to be necessary. No other point has been pressed before us. 9. The appeal has no force and is accordingly dismissed with costs.