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Allahabad High Court · body

1972 DIGILAW 427 (ALL)

Punjab and Sind Bank Ltd. v. Mahendra Kumar

1972-10-05

J.S.TRIVEDI

body1972
ORDER J.S. Trivedi, J. - Defendent-Appellant in execution of a money decree purchased the property including the accommodation in suit. On the basis of a sale certificate Defendant-Appellant sought possession. Objections were filed by the sons of the judgment-debtors and during the pendency of the objections the delivery of possession remained stayed. Lastly an application Under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC was moved. When the Amin went to deliver possession on 4-4-63 Mahendra Kumar, Plaintiff-Respondent No. 1 obstructed the delivery of possession alleging that he was in possession under an allotment order dated 8-2-61. His objection before the executing Court was also dismissed. The suit out of which this appeal arises was then filed by Mahendra Kumar for a declaration that he was in possession of the accommodation in dispute on the basis of an allotment order. Permanent injunction restraining the Defendant-Appellant from evicting him in execution of the decree was also sought. The suit was contested. The trial Court dismissed the suit. In appeal the lower appellate Court allowed the appeal hence this Second Civil Appeal. 2. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has contended that the allotment order was the result of fraud perpetuated by the son of the judgment-debtor. He has also contended that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had no jurisdiction to allot the accommodation when the accommodation had neither fallen vacant nor was likely to have fallen vacant. Learned Counsel for the Respondent on the other hand has contended that after an order for delivery of possession was made the accommodation became liable o allotment on the ground of likely to lave fallen vacant. In support of his contention he has placed reliance on: Raman Das v. State of U.P. 1952 AWR 225 , Chhotey Lal v. District Magistrate 1952 AWR 506 , Smt. Ram Katpari v. RC and EO 1953 AWR 309 , (sic) Lal v. RC and EO 1953 AWR 540 , Gunda and Another Vs. State, AIR 1954 All 127 , Lachmi Narain v. RC and EO 1957 AWR 455 , Mohd. Ishaq v. State Government of U.P. 1966 AWR 520 , Mohd. Shuaul Islam v. RC and EO 1968 AWR 141 , Proprietor Agents v. Shamsher Bahadur 1964 ALJ 752, Shitma Shanker Sharma v. RC and EO 1967 AWR 229 ; Mahant Suryanand Giri v. Girdhari Lal 1967 AWR 193 and Puran Chandra v. Rex AIR 1951 All. 628 . 3. Ishaq v. State Government of U.P. 1966 AWR 520 , Mohd. Shuaul Islam v. RC and EO 1968 AWR 141 , Proprietor Agents v. Shamsher Bahadur 1964 ALJ 752, Shitma Shanker Sharma v. RC and EO 1967 AWR 229 ; Mahant Suryanand Giri v. Girdhari Lal 1967 AWR 193 and Puran Chandra v. Rex AIR 1951 All. 628 . 3. None of the cases referred and relied by the learned Counsel for the Respondent are to the point. The simple question for determination is whether where a landlord either voluntarily or in execution of a decree transfers an accommodation which is in his possession the accommodation shall be deemed to be vacant in the hands of the transferee. The purpose of the Rent Control and Eviction Act is to regulate the rent of the building and to protect the tenant from the harassment of the landlord. Where an accommodation in possession of a landlord is transferred to another person the other person enters into the accommodation as a landlord and the accommodation can on no account be deemed to be vacant. In the instant case so long as the decree is not executed the landlord cannot be deemed to have vacated the premises and the moment the decree is executed and the auction purchaser gets into possession the possession of the auctioner purchaser will be lawful and the accommodation would not be deemed to have fallen vacant. What is contemplated by the words "accommodation having fallen vacant" is that the accommodation is not intended to be used by the owner for his own purposes. It would be relevant to mention in this case that every obstacle was being placed by the judgment-debtors through their sons initially against the execution of the decree. After the judgment-debtors were unsuccessful, they through the Plaintiff who is no stranger than the son of one of the judgment-debtors applied for the allotment of the accommodation. The application which is paper No. 30-Ga-1 on record was not only incomplete but lacked in material particulars It is mentioned in the application that the Appellant Mahendra Kumar had been in possession of the accommodation since all his life. There is nothing in the application to show how the house had fallen vacant. 4. The application which is paper No. 30-Ga-1 on record was not only incomplete but lacked in material particulars It is mentioned in the application that the Appellant Mahendra Kumar had been in possession of the accommodation since all his life. There is nothing in the application to show how the house had fallen vacant. 4. From the record it appears that on 13-1-61 Mahendra Kumar, Plaintiff Respondent who is the son of Jai Prakash judgment-debtor had moved an application for allotment of the accommodation to the District Magistrate and the District Magistrate made the following endorsement: The Applicant is said to have been living in this house all his life and is not vacating it even now. It has probably been represented that he is vacating or his portion is vacant. The portion in his occupation since his forefathers' time may be allotted to him, if it does not conflict with any injunction of any superior Court. 5. This order itself shows the manner in which the allotment order was procured. This endorsement clearly indicates that Mahendra Kumar represented that he was occupying the house not as a landlord but as a tenant and the authorities were informed that he was vacating that portion of the accommodation when in fact, he was not and he, therefore, sought that his possession should be legalised. 6. Learned Counsel for the Respondent has contended that an application for release of the accommodation moved by the Applicant was dismissed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and therefore, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was quite competent to allot the accommodation. Simply because the application for release was moved by the landlord it could not invest the Rent Control Officer with the jurisdiction of making an allotment when the accommodation as stated above was neither vacant and was not likely to have fallen vacant. The application for release goes to support the Appellant's contention that he needed the accommodation for his own use and there was no occasion for the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to presume that after the landlord or the transferee had obtained possession he would let out the accommodation on rent to some stranger. The application for release goes to support the Appellant's contention that he needed the accommodation for his own use and there was no occasion for the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to presume that after the landlord or the transferee had obtained possession he would let out the accommodation on rent to some stranger. Even where the landlord after obtaining possession had rented out the accommodation the jurisdiction of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer would have revived and he could in exercise of his powers under the Act not only allot the accommodation but eject any unauthorised occupant from the premises. The lower appellate Court has dealt with this case in a most unsatisfactory manner. He has tried to justify the allotment order in spite of the mis-statement of the Plaintiff-Respondent in his application wherein he had sought allotment on the basis that he had been in possession of the premises in suit. The remarks of the lower appellate Court that "the judgment of the learned Munsif shows that he was prejudiced against the Plaintiff on the ground that he was the son of one of the judgment-debtors and further on the grounds that it way in collusion between him and the judgment-debtors" were unjustified. On the other hand the lower appellate Court's approach and application of Laxmi Narain's case was erroneous. In case where an accommodation is in possession of a tenant and a decree for ejectment has been passed it can be said that the accommodation is likely to fall vacant, but where an accommodation is in actual occupation of a landlord and it is purchased by an auction purchaser the accommodation cannot be said to have fallen vacant simply because the warrant of delivery has been issued. In one case, i.e. in case where the accommodation is in possession of a tenant the landlord in view of the Rent Control and Eviction Act is not entitled to keep the accommodation in his actual possession without an order of release whereas in a case where a vendee or auction purchaser purchases the property he becomes entitled to obtain actual possession and retain the possession without any disturbance of his possession by the Rent Control and Eviction authorities. 7. 7. If the argument of the learned Counsel for the Respondent and the reasoning of the lower appellate Court is accepted the Rent Control and Eviction Officer will be entitled to pass an order of allotment the moment a deed of transfer is executed by the landlord and before the transferee gets actual possession of the accommodation. Similarly in cases where a property is sold in execution of a decree the issue of a sale certificate will invest the Rent Control and Eviction Officer with the jurisdiction of allotting the house to a tenant. This could not be the scope of the words "likely to have fallen vacant". The lower appellate Court, therefore was wrong in decreeing the Plaintiff's suit. 8. For the reasons given above this appeal is allowed and the suit of the Plaintiff shall stand dismissed with costs throughout. Stay order, if any, shall stand vacated. Appeal allowed.