( 1 ) THIS appeal is preferred by the petitioner (referred to as the appellant) against a judgment and order of dismissal of the Writ petition in the circumstances substantially as follows: ( 2 ) THE appellant South Eastern Railway Employees Co-operative Urban Bank Ltd. was registered as a Co-operative Society under the Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1940 with the object of carrying on banking business mainly in lending its funds to its members and providing facilities for mutual aids among members. By a resolution on February 23, 1957 the rules of the South Eastern Railway regarding the working hours among other things of the employees of the Society which were at the material time from 10. 30 a. m. to 5 p. m. on all week days and from 10. 30 a. m. to 2 p. m. on Saturdays were adopted. Subsequently this working hour of employees of the Bank was increased to extra half an hour with the proclamation of the Emergency some time in 1962 in conformity with railway working hours. Thereafter on or about July 29, 1963 the Bank declared second Saturdays of each month as holidays and full working day on the remaining Saturdays in keeping with the Government of India's decision applicable to Government offices including the railways. Although the employees in obedience to these directions continued to work for extra half an hour and also on each of the Saturdays excepting second Saturday each month for full days, the matter was referred by the employees through their Union to the Labour Commissioner evidently for a conciliation under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Labour Commissioner asked the management of the Bank by its letter dated July 31, 1963 to maintain the status quo. But in reply by a letter dated August 9, 1963 the Bank pointed out that decision to enhance the working hour was inter alia to fall in line with the railway offices as the service conditions applicable to railway staff were followed for the bank staff. Eventually, this dispute between the Co-operative Bank and its employees was taken up by the Government of West Bengal and by its order dated January 10, 1964 the dispute was referred to for adjudication by the First Industrial Tribunal on the issue as to:"whether the management was justified in enhancing the working hours of the employees with effect from 30. 11. 62? 11. 62? To what relief, if any, are the workmen entitled?"2. Before the Industrial Tribunal both parties filed their written statement and in course of the proceedings a preliminary issue was raised before the Industrial Tribunal, namely, as to whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to enter into and decide the dispute under reference as one of the objections raised by the Co-operative Bank was that in view of sec. 86 read with Sec.2 (j) of the Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to decide the dispute as it touched the business of the Bank. ( 3 ) THE Tribunal upon this issue held that it had jurisdiction to decide the dispute as an industrial dispute on the view, firstly, that it did not touch the business of the Bank and secondly in any case under the provisions of the bye-laws no question of exclusive jurisdiction of the Registrar could arise. The petitioner then came against this order before this Court in Writ jurisdiction and obtained a rule Nisi. The learned Judge who took up this rule for disposal came to the same conclusion as that of the Tribunal but on different reasons. He held that the dispute under reference was a dispute touching the business of a Co-operative Society within the meaning of Sec. 86 of the Act but even then the matter could not be decided by the Registrar as he could not in substance enforce the contract between the parties and impose any new obligations as the Industrial Tribunal could. The correctness of this decision is now challenged before us in the present appeal. ( 4 ) THE principal question that arises for consideration in this case is whether the dispute under reference by the State Government for adjudication before the Tribunal is a dispute touching the business of the Society within the meaning of Sec. 86 of the Bengal Co-operative Societies Act. Before we come directly to the point it would be useful to look to definition of Dispute and two other sections relevant for our present purpose. Section 2 (j) defines the Dispute as follows:"2 (J) "dispute" means any matter capable of being the subject of civil litigation, and includes a claim in respect of any sum payable to or by a co-operative society (whether such claim be admitted or not ). "then, the relevant part of section 86 runs thus: "86. Section 2 (j) defines the Dispute as follows:"2 (J) "dispute" means any matter capable of being the subject of civil litigation, and includes a claim in respect of any sum payable to or by a co-operative society (whether such claim be admitted or not ). "then, the relevant part of section 86 runs thus: "86. Any dispute touching the business of a co-operative society (other than a dispute regarding disciplinary action taken by a society or its managing committee against a paid servant of the society) or of the liquidator of a society shall be referred to the Registrar if the parties thereto are among the following namely: (a) the society, its managing committee, any past or present officer, agent or servant or the liquidator of the society; or"section 87 which confers power upon the Registrar is in these terms: "87. (1)on receipt of a reference under section 86 the Registrar shall, subject to the rules - (a) decide the dispute himself; or (b) transfer it for disposal to any person authorized by the State Government to exercise the powers of the Registrar in this behalf; or (c) refer it for disposal to one or more arbitrators to be appointed by the Registrar. (2) Subject to the rules, the Registrar may withdraw any reference transferred or referred under sub-section (1) and may deal with it himself in the manner provided in such rules. " ( 5 ) NOW, the learned Trial Judge while considering the scope and effect of these provisions, besides several cases of the Bombay High Court as also of the Madras High Court, noticed four decisions of this Court. First decision, it appears, is not, strictly speaking, relevant for it was a dispute regarding disciplinary action taken against one of Society's employees. In the next decision Banerjee J. held that claim for ascertained sum as arrear of pay by an employee of a Society was a dispute touching the business although it was observed that scale of pay and wages of the workman "may not be a dispute touching the business and capable of civil litigation". Third one is a contrary decision of P. B. Mukharji J. (as his Lordship then was) reported in (1) M/s. Co-operative Milk Societies Union Ltd. v. State of West Bengal and ors. 62 C. W. N. 405. Third one is a contrary decision of P. B. Mukharji J. (as his Lordship then was) reported in (1) M/s. Co-operative Milk Societies Union Ltd. v. State of West Bengal and ors. 62 C. W. N. 405. In this case the similar objection was raised, namely that Industrial Tribunal had no jurisdiction to try a dispute between a Co-operative Society registered under the Co-operative Societies Act and its workmen. On a construction of secs. 86 and 87 read with sec. 2 (j) of the Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, it has been held that the Industrial Tribunal has jurisdiction to try a dispute between a Co-operative Society under the Bengal Co-operative Societies Act and its workmen when it has been referred to under the Industrial Disputes Act. The last one is a Bench decision of this Court reported in (2) Workmen's Co-operative Industrial Home Ltd. v. The Presiding Officer, First Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal and Ors. 72 C. W. N. 669. This was a case where termination of service of one of its employees by the Society was referred to by the State Government for adjudication by the Industrial Tribunal. Sinha C. J. considering this aspect of the matter while not entirely disagreeing with the view taken in Co-operative Milk Society's case (supra) inter alia observed as follows:"as regards the somewhat wide proposition which found acceptance by the learned Judge, namely that no disputes between a Co-operative Society and its workmen could touch the business of a Co-operative Society, we think that the finding is too wide, and not supported by the consensus of authority. There are decisions directly in conflict with the same. " ( 6 ) THEN, on reviewing several decisions of the Bombay High Court including the Full Bench decision in A. I. R. 1962 Bombay 162 it was further observed that:"the word 'touches' is very wide and would include any matter which relates to, concerns or affects the business of the society. Every society must necessarily employ some servants for the purpose of carrying on its business. The payment of wages or any sum due to them under the law is, therefore part of the business of the society. In any case there was no doubt that such payment would 'touch' the business of the society. Every society must necessarily employ some servants for the purpose of carrying on its business. The payment of wages or any sum due to them under the law is, therefore part of the business of the society. In any case there was no doubt that such payment would 'touch' the business of the society. " ( 7 ) THIS judgment should have assumed great importance for our consideration on the question whether dispute in the instant case between the Co-operative Bank and its employees touch the business of the society but for the two decisions of the Supreme Court now cited before us we are unable to support the proposition laid down in this case. ( 8 ) THE first decision of the Supreme Court is reported in (3) D. M. Co-opposite parties. Bank v. M/s. Dalichand Jugraj Jain and ors. A. I. R. 1969 S. C. page 1320. In this case the dispute was between the Co-operative Bank and one of its tenants occupying a part of the Bank's building. While considering the question whether a dispute between the Bank and its tenant is a dispute touching the business of a society on a construction of Section 91 (1) of Maharastra Co-operative Societies Act, which was somewhat wider than the provisions of Section 86 of the Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, it was held that the word 'business' in that context did not mean the affairs of a society but it was used in a narrower sense and it meant actual trading or commercial or other similar business activity of the society which the societies were authorized to enter into under the Act and the Rules and its bye-laws. We need not for the purpose of the present case go to the specific question which was decided by the Supreme Court in this case for it was a dispute between the landlord and tenant and regard being had to the nature of the dispute it was held that such letting out in the facts of that case would not be deemed to be a business touching the society. In the next decision of the Supreme Court reported in (4) Co-operative Central Bank v. Industrial Tribunal, Hyderabad A. I. R. 1970, S. C. 245 almost identical question as in the instant case, came up for consideration. In the next decision of the Supreme Court reported in (4) Co-operative Central Bank v. Industrial Tribunal, Hyderabad A. I. R. 1970, S. C. 245 almost identical question as in the instant case, came up for consideration. In this case, an industrial dispute arose between twenty-five Co-operative Central Banks in the State of Andhra Pradesh and their workmen represented by Andhra Pradesh Bank Employes' Federation Hyderabad which was referred to by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the Industrial Tribunal, Hyderabad under Section 10 (1) (d) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The subject-matter of the reference amongst various other items included the working hours and overtime allowance. Under Section 61 of the Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act which provides inter alia that if any dispute touching the business of a society other than a dispute regarding disciplinary action taken by the society or any difference against the paid employees of the society arises between the society, its committee or any officer or any agent or employees of the society, the Registrar may on receipt of the reference of the dispute under Section 61 elect to decide the dispute himself or transfer it for disposal to any person who has been invested with powers in that behalf or refer it for disposal to an arbitrator. It appears, in this case, the Supreme Court noticed, the decision of this Court in (1) Co-operative Milk Society v. State of West Bengal (supra) and on a construction of Section 61 Bhargava, J. who delivered the judgment of the Court expressed himself as follows:"since the word 'business' is equated with the actual trading or commercial or other similar business activity of the society and since it has been held that it would be difficult to subscribe to the proposition that whatever the society does or is necessarily required to do for the purpose of carrying out its object such as laying down the conditions of the service of its business, it would appear to be a dispute relating to the business of the society and cannot be held to be dispute touching the business of the society". ( 9 ) APPLYING the principles indicated in the above decisions of the Supreme Court, we do no think, it is possible to construe Section 86 read with section 2 (j) of the Bengal Co-operative Societies Act in any other manner. ( 9 ) APPLYING the principles indicated in the above decisions of the Supreme Court, we do no think, it is possible to construe Section 86 read with section 2 (j) of the Bengal Co-operative Societies Act in any other manner. Although the Supreme Court was considering the question in the background of two different enactments of two other States there is no material difference between the wordings as regards disputes touching the business of society of these two sections of the two different Acts and section 85 of the Bengal Co-operative Societies Act. It seems to us clear that the word 'business' occurring in Section 86 must be understood as limited to the actual trading or commercial or other similar business activities consistent with the object of the society. In our opinion the dispute between the Bank and its employees under reference cannot be held to be a dispute touching the business of the Bank. ( 10 ) IT is, however, contended by Mr. Gupta that the dispute referred to for adjudication of the Industrial Tribunal in the present case is in the nature of civil litigation as defined under section 2 (j) of the Act and, therefore, the Registrar and not the Industrial Tribunal is competent to decide the dispute. We cannot accept this contention as correct. For, there are two-fold limitation on the jurisdiction of Registrar or his nominee to decide a dispute. First, the dispute must be one touching the business. Secondly, such a dispute must also fulfill the meaning of 'dispute' as given in sec. 2 (j) of the Act. Since the instant dispute is not one touching the business of the Bank further question whether such a dispute is capable of being enforced by civil litigation does not really arise. Even if we would have entered into this question we are doubtful whether we could have taken any view different from the learned Trial Judge. For, the dispute under reference, it is quite possible, may involve laying down certain conditions of terms of service of the employees of the Bank either in reducing or increasing the hours of work which could not be done in court of law in adjudicating a civil litigation. For, the dispute under reference, it is quite possible, may involve laying down certain conditions of terms of service of the employees of the Bank either in reducing or increasing the hours of work which could not be done in court of law in adjudicating a civil litigation. It is fairly settled by now that the Tribunal has powers wider than the civil court in the sense that it is competent to lay down the terms and conditions in an industrial dispute relating to services of the employees. The other words, it has power to modify or armed the contract of employment which the civil court has not. However, in the view we have already taken we need not decide this question finally. ( 11 ) THE other contention raised by Mr. Gupta is that in view of section 31 of the Industrial Disputes Act (Amendment of Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1956 the dispute referred to in the present case cannot be decided by the Industrial Tribunal. This contention also fails obviously because the Registrar has no power under the Co-operative Societies Act to decide the dispute of the kind referred to for adjudication by the Tribunal in the present case. We therefore come to the same conclusion reached by the learned trial judge though on different reasons. The result is, the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed. But considering the facts and circumstances of this case there will be no order as to costs. B. C. Mitra, J. : I agree. Appeal dismissed.