Judgement This judgment will cover two appeals, namely. S. A. Nos. 16 and 17 of 1970, arising out of Civil Appeals Nos. 19 and 27 of 1969, respectively, in the Court of the District Judge, Manipur, which were disposed of by a common judgment and which arose out of the same suit namely, T. S. No. 173/62/8 of 1965 in the Court of Munsiff (II), Manipur, filed by the present respondents. 2. The plaintiffs case, in brief, was that the suit land as described in the plaint, originally belonged to Kamal-ud-din, who is the younger brother of plaintiff No. 2. Kamal-ud-din sold the land to Obedulla the father of the defendant, under a registered sale deed, which was purported to be executed in Savour of the defendant who was then a minor. Sometime after this purchase, Obedullah sold the land allegedly on behalf of the defendant to one Ali Mia by a registered sale deed dated 2-9-1952 for due consideration and for legal necessity, that is, to meet the educational expenses of the defendant, who was then reading in School and delivered possession. Ali Mia, in his turn, sold the land to the plaintiffs on 26-8-54 under a registered sale deed accompanied by delivery of possession, and after this purchase the plaintiffs put their agent Kamal-ud-din (brother of plaintiff No. 2) in possession of the land. Kamal-ud-din was in peaceful possession of the land till 13-10-1958 when he was dispossessed by Obedullah in collusion with the defendant, whereupon Kamal-ud-din filed a criminal case against Obedullah, in which he was convicted by the trial Court, but subsequently acquitted by the Judicial Commissioner in revision. Obedullah died in the meantime on 5-8-1962. and the defendant is now in occupation of the suit land. Under the circumstances, the plaintiffs filed the suit for declaration of their title and for recovery of possession over the suit land. 3. The defendant filed the written statement and contested the suit. He denied his knowledge about the sale of the land by his father in favour of Ali Mia, and he also denied that there was any delivery of possession to the said Ali Mia. It was contended by him that even if his father sold the land to Ali Mia he had no authority or legal necessity to sell the same and as such the sale was not binding on him. It was contended by him that even if his father sold the land to Ali Mia he had no authority or legal necessity to sell the same and as such the sale was not binding on him. The subsequent sale of the land by Ali Mia to the plaintiffs and the possession and dispossession of the latter as alleged in the plaint were also denied. 4. Upon the pleadings, as many as 8 issues were framed including the following two issues, which were issue Nos. 3 and 8 respectively : "3. Did the father of the defendant sell the suit land to Ali Mia with the delivery of possession in consideration of the legal necessity of the defendant during the latters minority ? X X X X X X 8. Is the plaintiff entitled to the reliefs as claimed?" 5. It may be mentioned here that in the original plaint it was stated that the suit land originally belonged to the defendant, and that during his minority it was held by his father Obedullah, but at the stage of hearing, the plaint was amended to the effect that "the suit land originally belonged to Kamal-ud-din, the attorney of the plaintiffs as inherited from his father Nawab-ud-din, and that the suit land was sold to Obedullah by the said Kamal-ud-din, the deed of transfer being drawn up in the name of the defendant, and that after the said sale transaction the suit land was held in possession by the said Obedullah." Except for this amendment, the original plaint remained as it was. 6. After the above amendment, an additional issue was framed as follows, which was issue No. 3 (a) : "3 (a) Whether suit land was sold to Obedullah by Kamal-ud-din, deed of transfer being drawn in the name of defendant ?" 7. In deciding the above issues the learned Munsiff, on a consideration of the evidence adduced in the case, held that late Obedullah was the real owner of the property, having purchased the same with his own money, and that the defendant was simply an ostensible owner. He however held that even if the property belonged to the defendant, his father being his legal guardian had the authority to sell the land for legal necessity, and that meeting the educational expenses of the defendant, for which the land was sold, was a sufficient legal necessity. He however held that even if the property belonged to the defendant, his father being his legal guardian had the authority to sell the land for legal necessity, and that meeting the educational expenses of the defendant, for which the land was sold, was a sufficient legal necessity. In deciding issue No. 8 the learned Munsiff however held that although according to the plaintiffs the defendant dispossessed them from the suit land and the defendant also claimed to be in possession of the land, the evidence showed that the defendant was not in possession of the land and so the plaintiffs were not entitled to get a decree for possession. In the result, the learned Munsiff decreed the suit of the plaintiffs simply with a declaration of their title, and their prayer for possession was refused. 8. Being aggrieved by the decree of the learned Munsiff both the parties came in appeal to the District Judge, Manipur - the defendant with C. A. No. 19 of 1969, and plaintiffs with C. A. No. 27 of 1969, by way of cross appeal. Both the appeals were heard together and disposed of by a common judgment. 9. In deciding the appeals, the learned District Judge held that Obedullah purchased the land for the benefit and interest of his minor son Ahmadullah, and that the latter was the owner of the land. He also held that Obedullah, the father of the defendant transferred the suit land to All Mia for legal necessity, that is, for maintenance of his minor son. On a consideration of the entire evidence on record, the learned District Judge also held that the plaintiffs had acquired good title to the suit land by their purchase from Ali Mia, and they are entitled to recover possession over the same. With these findings, the learned District Judge modified the decree of the Munsiff and decreed the plaintiffs suit for title as well as for possession, having dismissed the appeal filed by the defendants and allowed the appeal filed by the plaintiff. 10. With these findings, the learned District Judge modified the decree of the Munsiff and decreed the plaintiffs suit for title as well as for possession, having dismissed the appeal filed by the defendants and allowed the appeal filed by the plaintiff. 10. The first contention of the learned counsel for the appellant was that the learned District Judge having held that the defendant was the true owner of the land prior to its alleged sale to Ali Mia, he should have at once dismissed the plaintiffs suit, as it was their case, as put forward in the amended plaint, that Obedullah was the real owner. According to him, there was no alternative plea of the plaintiffs that even if the land belonged to the defendant, Obedullah sold it for legal necessity. In the absence of such an alternative case, it was contended, the District Judge committed an error in law by making out an alternative case, simply because there was an averment about the legal necessity in the plaint. 11. I am unable to agree with the learned counsel for the appellant in this regard. Though the drafting of the plaint is not happy, it will be seen, if the plaint is read as a whole, that the plaintiffs took an alternative plea that even if the property actually belonged to the defendant, it was sold by the father of the defendant, for legal necessity. As already pointed out, after the amendment of the plaint, an alternative issue was also framed in that regard, and the party fought on that issue as well as on the original Issue No. 3, in both the Courts below. At no time the defendant took any exception to the continuance of issue No. 3 after the amendment of the plaint. That being the position, the appellant cannot urge now that the learned District Judge committed an error in law by going to decide the issue No. 3 after having held that the property belonged to the minor. There was nothing wrong in the approach of the learned District Judge. 12. The second contention of the learned counsel for the appellant was that the learned District Judge erred in law in his finding that late Obedullah sold the land for legal necessity, that is, for maintenance of the defendant. There was nothing wrong in the approach of the learned District Judge. 12. The second contention of the learned counsel for the appellant was that the learned District Judge erred in law in his finding that late Obedullah sold the land for legal necessity, that is, for maintenance of the defendant. In elaborating this contention it was submitted by him that under the Mohammedan Law, a legal guardian of the property of the minor can sell the immovable property of the minor, when the sale is necessary for his maintenance and when the minor has no other property. Maintenance, according to him, means only food, raiment, and lodging and not ,the expenses of education. In this connection he drew my attention to the definition of the word "Maintenance, as given in Section 369 of Mullas Mohamedan Law, 16th Edition, which provides that "Maintenance" includes food, raiment and lodging. It was further urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that the District Judge has given no finding that the defendant had no other property at the relevant time. 13. The definition of the word "Maintenance" as quoted above, which was relied on by the appellant is not exhaustive, in my opinion. The word "include" is generally used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases, occurring in the body of the Statute; and when it is so used those words or phrases must be construed as comprehending, not only such things as they signify according to their natural import, but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include. It is a phrase of extension and not restrictive definition and it is not equivalent to "means". In this view of the definition of the word "Maintenance" as given above, I feel constrained to hold that it does not exclude other necessary expenses for mental and physical well-being of a minor, according to the status in society of the family. 14. In including the educational expenses in maintenance the learned District Judge relied on the decisions in Sm. Purnasashi Devi v. Nagendra Nath Bhattacharjvee, AIR 1950 Cal 465 , and Tekchand Partabrai Bhavani v. Kalavantibai Tekchand, AIR 1941 Sind 214. Both these cases were under Section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and were heard by the Division Bench. In the former case Das Gupta. Purnasashi Devi v. Nagendra Nath Bhattacharjvee, AIR 1950 Cal 465 , and Tekchand Partabrai Bhavani v. Kalavantibai Tekchand, AIR 1941 Sind 214. Both these cases were under Section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and were heard by the Division Bench. In the former case Das Gupta. J., who delivered the judgment observed : "But I do not see why the cost of ordinary education should not in the case of a middle class family be considered to form part of maintenance. It may be that when the case of a person of the cultivator class is being considered, any education more than primary education should not be considered to form part of maintenance, but the case of middle class families is different. I am unable to agree with the learned Judge that in no case can maintenance be thought to include anything more than food, clothing and lodging," In the latter case Davis, C. J., who delivered the judgment observed : "But it appears to me that if maintenance is to serve the purpose of the section, it must be something more than, as has been suggested by the learned Advocate, starvation maintenance, maintenance sufficient only to keep body and soul together. It must include board and lodging, but I should say myself boarding and lodging on such a scale as to enable a frugal and thrifty mother to save sufficient for a simple and necessary education of her child." 15. Although these observations were made in cases under Section 488, Criminal P. C. the interpretation of the word "Maintenance" equally holds good in a case like the instant one. In respectful agreement with the views taken in the above cases I hold that the expenses of ordinary and reasonable education of a child forms part of his maintenance. 16. It was then submitted on behalf of the appellant that for the appellant, who comes of an agricultural family any education more than primary education should not be considered to form part of maintenance, as observed by the learned Judge in the Calcutta case mentioned above. 16. It was then submitted on behalf of the appellant that for the appellant, who comes of an agricultural family any education more than primary education should not be considered to form part of maintenance, as observed by the learned Judge in the Calcutta case mentioned above. As the appellant was reading in Class IX, at the relevant time, having passed the stage of primary education long before, it was submitted, there was no justification to consider the expenses of his education at that stage, even if the alleged land was actually sold to meet the expenses for such education, as forming part of his maintenance. 17. As ideas of social needs and social justice alter, no such hard and fast rule can be laid down for all time, as to what should be the standard of education to form part of maintenance. In the present state of our society, which is rapidly advancing in all directions, education upto the Higher Secondary Stage cannot be said to be extravagant, so as to be excluded from maintenance. 18. As to whether or not the appellant had any other property at the relevant time, it was within his special knowledge. He did not state anywhere in his evidence that he had any other property. It is. therefore, of no consequence if the District Judge had not given any finding in this regard. 19. It was also contended on behalf of the appellant that except the recital in the sale deed, there is no other evidence on record to prove that there was actually any necessity to sell the land to meet the educational expenses of the appellant. The recital in the sale deed, it was urged, is no proof of such necessity and the learned Courts below committed an illegality in coming to their finding about the existence of such necessity, merely, on the basis of the sale deed. The appellant admitted that he was reading in Class IX of the High School at the relevant time. He passed his matriculation examination in 1954. He also stated that his father and sister bore the expenses of his education. It is, therefore, evident that his father alone was not in a position to bear the expenses of his education. The appellant admitted that he was reading in Class IX of the High School at the relevant time. He passed his matriculation examination in 1954. He also stated that his father and sister bore the expenses of his education. It is, therefore, evident that his father alone was not in a position to bear the expenses of his education. There is thus intrinsic evidence of such necessity and it cannot be said that the finding of the Courts below in this regard is based on no evidence. Be that as it may. it is finding of fact and this Court cannot interfere with such finding, even if it is erroneous. 20. From the foregoing discussions, it is seen that there is no substance in the appeal. The decree appealed against is affirmed. The appeals are dismissed with costs. Appeals dismissed.