JUDGMENT : Raina J. ( 1. ) This is a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. ( 2. ) The petitioner was appointed as excise Sub-Inspector on probation for a period of two years vide orders dated 26-6-1962 and 9-11-1962 annexures 1 and 2. Although he was due for confirmation on 16-7-1964 no order of confirmation was passed, but he continued to serve on this post till December 1967. His services were terminated by giving him one months notice by order dated 20th November 1967 vide annexure A. ( 3. ) The contention of the petitioner is that he had passed the prescribed departmental examinations and had successfully completed the course of training, and should, therefore, be deemed to be confirmed with effect from 16-7-1964 under sub-rule (2) of rule 8 of the M. P. Civil Services (General Conditions of Service) Rules, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules). Being a confirmed employee, his services could not be terminated in the aforesaid manner and his removal from service is in contravention of the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution. He filed a review petition, which was rejected by the Excise Commissioner by order dated 6-11-1968 vide annexure D. The revision petition filed on 15-1-1969 was also dismissed by order dated 17-12-1969 vide annexure F and a petition for reviewing the order in revision met the same fate vide order dated 25-5-1970 annexure G. Thereupon, the petitioner filed this petition against the State Government praying that the order terminating his service may be quashed and it may be declared that he is still in service and is entitled to the benefits arising therefrom. ( 4. ) The case of the State Government as set out the return is that the petitioner could not complete the prescribed training, which he should have completed within two years, even in five years, and, therefore, his period of probation was extended to 30th June 1967. As he was a probationer, his service was rightly terminated under rule 8 of the said Rules. ( 5. As he was a probationer, his service was rightly terminated under rule 8 of the said Rules. ( 5. ) Since the principal contention of the petitioner is that he should be deemed to have been confirmed by implication under rule 8 of the said Rules on the expiry of the period of his probation, which was two years, it is necessary to examine the rival contentions of both the parties in this connection with reference to the said Rule which is reproduced below :- "8. Probation.-(1) A person appointed to a service or post by direct recruitment shall ordinarily be placed on probation for such period as may be prescribed. (2) The appointing authority may, for sufficient reasons, extend the period of probation by a further period not exceeding one year. Note:-A probationer whose period of probation is not extended under this sub-rule but who has neither been confirmed nor discharged from service at the end of the period of probation shall be deemed to have been continued in service, subject to the condition of his service being terminable on the expiry of a notice of one calendar month given in writing by either side. (3) A probationer shall undergo such training and pass such departmental examinations during the period of his probation as may be prescribed. (4) The services of a probationer may be terminated during the period of probation if in the opinion of the appointing authority he is not likely to shape into a suitable Government servant. (5) The services of a probationer who has not passed the departmental examinations or who is found unsuitable for the service or post may be terminated at the end of the period of his probation. (6) On the successful completion of probation and the passing of the prescribed departmental examinations, the probationer shall be confirmed in the service or post to which he bas been appointed." ( 6. ) According to Shri P. L. Dube, learned Government Advocate, the services of the petitioner could be terminated by one months notice under the note below sub-rule (2) of the aforesaid Rule. The note provides that services of a probationer, whose period of probation is not extended under sub-rule (2), but who has neither been confirmed nor discharged from service at the end of the period of probation may be terminated by one months notice given by either side. The note provides that services of a probationer, whose period of probation is not extended under sub-rule (2), but who has neither been confirmed nor discharged from service at the end of the period of probation may be terminated by one months notice given by either side. Although the order dated 22nd March 1967 (annexure 12 to the return) states that the probationary period of the petitioner was extended till 30th June 1967, Shri Dube was unable to place before us any prior order extending the period of probation. The probationary period admittedly expired on 16-7-1964. If the Government wanted to extend the period of probation we would expect some order extending the period of probation before or atleast immediately after expiry of the period of probation. But no such order is forthcoming and it appears that the question of extension of the period of probation of the petitioner was taken up for the first time in March 1967. In any case, there is no order extending the period of probation beyond 30th June 1967 and thus it is clear that the services of the petitioner were terminated several months after the extended period of probation had expired. ( 7. ) Thus, the main point for consideration in this case is whether in the circumstances of this case, it was open to the State Government to terminate the services of the petitioner by one months notice under note below sub-rule (2) of rule 8. Incidentally it may be mentioned here that under sub- rule (4) of rule 8, it is open to the State Government to terminate the services of a probationer during the period of probation without assigning any reasons, if in its opinion, he is not likely to shape into a suitable Government servant. This power can strictly be exercised during the period of probation and not thereafter. Under sub-rule (2) of rule 8, the period of probation can be extended for a period not exceeding one year. Since the petitioner was initially appointed on probation for a period of two years as is clear from annexure A as well as annexure II and this period expired on 16-7-1964, the probationary period could be extended at the most till 16-7-1965 and not beyond that. Since the petitioner was initially appointed on probation for a period of two years as is clear from annexure A as well as annexure II and this period expired on 16-7-1964, the probationary period could be extended at the most till 16-7-1965 and not beyond that. Thus, the extension of the period of probation of the petitioner till 30-6-1967 (vide annexure 12 to the return) was in contravention of sub-rule (2) and must, therefore, be treated as illegal. ( 8. ) Shri Dube contended that under sub-rule (1) a person may be appointed on probation for such period as may be prescribed and since the Government have not prescribed any period of probation so far by any statutory rules, it was open to the Government to extend the period of probation to any extent it pleased. We are, however, not impressed by this argument. The word "prescribed" as defined in clause (f) of rule 2 of the said Rules means prescribed by rules or by general or special executive instructions issued by the Government in this behalf. From the instructions of Government which are referred to in annexure VII to the return as well as from annexure III it appears that the Government has prescribed a probationary period of two years and the petitioner was, therefore, appointed for such period in accordance with these instructions. Moreover, sub rule (1) merely deals with the initial appointment on probation while sub-rule (2) deals with the question of extension. Even assuming that the Government have not prescribed any period of probation for the purposes of sub-rule (1) it would be open to the Government to make the initial appointment on probation for such period as it thinks fit. But whatever the initial period of probation may be, the question of extension will be governed strictly by sub-rule (2) and in view of the said rule the probationary period cannot be extended for a period cannot be extended for a period exceeding one year. Since in the instant case, the probationary period of the petitioner was two years, which expired on 16-7-1964 his extension beyond 16-7-1965 was in contravention of sub-rule (2) and as such illegal. ( 9. Since in the instant case, the probationary period of the petitioner was two years, which expired on 16-7-1964 his extension beyond 16-7-1965 was in contravention of sub-rule (2) and as such illegal. ( 9. ) We may now proceed to consider the next contention of Shri Dube that even if the petitioner is not to be treated on probation after 16-7-1965, it should be deemed that his services were continued in terms of note below sub- rule (2) and as such could be terminated by one months notice. We are unable to accept this contention for the following reasons. The note cannot be construed as empowering the Government to keep a probationer in suspense for an indefinite period at its sweet will, particularly in view of the express prohibition contained in sub-rule (2) that the period of probation cannot be extended for more than one year. For the proper construction of the note it must be read along with sub-rule (2) to which it is appended. ( 10. ) In our view, the note relates to a period during which an appointee can be lawfully continued on probation. The expression "whose period of probation is not extended under this sub-rule" in the said note clearly signifies that the note relates to the period during which the appointee could be lawfully continued on probation under sub-rule (2) in a case where no order for extension has been passed. In other words, it means that where the initial period of probation of an appointee has expired, but no order of extension as contemplated by sub-rule (2) has been passed, the services of the appointee would be terminable by one months notice on either side. It is thus clear that the situation contemplated by this note can last at the most for one year during which the period of probation could be lawfully extended under sub-rule (2), but not beyond that. ( 11. ) The object of placing a person on probation for a specified period is to watch his work and conduct during the said period so that he may either be confirmed on the expiry of the said period, in case he gives a good account of himself and passes the prescribed departmental examinations. In case the training is not complete, the period of probation may be extended for a period not exceeding one year under sub-rule (2). In case the training is not complete, the period of probation may be extended for a period not exceeding one year under sub-rule (2). This is the maximum period during which the Government should make up its mind whether he is fit for confirmation. If he is not found fit during the said period, his services may be terminated under sub-rule (4). From sub rule (2) it is clear that the appointee cannot be kept in the precarious position of a probationer indefinitely. We, therefore, hold that the note below rule 2 is not attracted in this case and it was not open to the Government to terminate the services of the petitioner under the note in 1967 long after the period of probation had expired. ( 12. ) Shri Dube, however, urged that in no case can the petitioner be deemed to have been confirmed under sub-rule (6) of rule 8 because there can be no automatic confirmation under the said sub-rule on the expiry of the period of probation. He further urged that the petitioner had failed to undergo a part of the prescribed training successfully as he remained on leave too often for long periods and, therefore, he was not qualified for confirmation under sub-rule (6) of rule 8. ( 13. ) Before proceeding to consider the question of automatic confirmation or confirmation by implication, in the absence of any express order of confirmation, in the circumstances of this case we propose to deal with the contention of the State Government that the petitioner had not completed his probation successfully. The petitioner has averred in paragraph (1) of his petition, which is supported by an affidavit that he had satisfactorily completed his training course and obtained success in the departmental examination. It is significant that in the order of termination dated 20th November 1967 (annexure A) it has not been stated that the petitioner had failed to complete the course of training. Shri Dube referred to annexure 10 to the return in this connection. This is a letter dated 28-6-1966 addressed to the Excise Commissioner by the District Excise Officer. In this letter it is stated that the training relating to office charge was yet to be completed by the petitioner. Shri Dube referred to annexure 10 to the return in this connection. This is a letter dated 28-6-1966 addressed to the Excise Commissioner by the District Excise Officer. In this letter it is stated that the training relating to office charge was yet to be completed by the petitioner. The petitioner in his affidavit filed on 6-9-1971 has stated in paragraph 4 that he carried out the executive charge successfully and was awarded a certificate in this connection by the District Excise Officer dated 14-12-1967 vide annexure B. The certificate supports the contention of the petitioner. Shri Dube questioned the bona fides of the officer, who granted this certificate on the ground that it was granted after the notice terminating the services been issued to the petitioner by the Excise Commissioner. But in the absence of anything to show that there was any adverse remark by any superior officer against the petitioner regarding his training, we are not prepared to reject this certificate merely because it was granted at a late stage. The certificate merely goes to show that the District Excise Officer was satisfied with the work and conduct of the petitioner while holding the charge in question and we must accept this certificate in the absence of anything to the contrary. ( 14. ) Shri Dube was at pains to point out that the petitioner remained on leave for various periods from time to time as indicated in annexure N and annexure VI to the return. It is true that we do not expect a probationer to remain on leave so often and that the record of the petitioner is somewhat unusual in this connection But the fact remains that the leave was granted from time to time, apparently because the competent authority considered that the reasons for leave were genuine. If the authority considered that the leave was being asked for on frivolous grounds, it could have been refused and necessary action taken against the petitioner, if he still remained absent from duty. We do not think, it would be proper to link the question of leave with the question whether the petitioner successfully completed his course of training. Learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the petitioner did hold an independent charge for nearly seven months and his work was found to be satisfactory. We do not think, it would be proper to link the question of leave with the question whether the petitioner successfully completed his course of training. Learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the petitioner did hold an independent charge for nearly seven months and his work was found to be satisfactory. Shri Dube contended that the question whether the petitioner had successfully completed his training is a question of fact and it cannot properly be decided in these proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. We do not, however, find any difficulty in deciding this question on the basis of the material on record. It is not disputed that the petitioner has passed the required departmental examinations and in the absence of any adverse report against him, it is clear that he also completed the prescribed training successfully. We, therefore, hold that he was duly qualified for confirmation under sub-rule (6) of rule 8. ( 15. ) The next point for consideration is whether the petitioner should be deemed to be confirmed by implication in the circumstances of this case. In State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh ( AIR 1968 SC 1210 ) their Lordships while considering the question of confirmation by implication under Punjab Educational Service Rules made the following observations in paragraph 5, which are pertinent to this case:- "In the present case, rule 6 (3) forbids extension of the period of probation beyond three years. Where, as in the present case, the service rules fix a certain period of time beyond which the probationary period cannot be extended, and an employee appointed or promoted to a post on probation is allowed to continue in that post alter completion of the maximum period of probation without an express order of confirmation, he cannot be deemed to continue in that post as a probationer by implication. The reason is that such on implication is negatived by the service rule forbidding extension of the probationary period beyond the maximum period fixed by it. In such a case, it is permissible to draw the inference that the employee allowed to continue in the post on completion of the maximum period of probation has been confirmed in the post by implication." ( 16. In such a case, it is permissible to draw the inference that the employee allowed to continue in the post on completion of the maximum period of probation has been confirmed in the post by implication." ( 16. ) In the instant case too, sub-rule (2) of rule 8 forbids extension of the period of probation for more than one year and, therefore, since the petitioner was allowed to continue in service for more than two years after 16-7-1965, beyond which his period of probation could not be extended, he should be deemed to have been confirmed by implication according to the principle laid down by their Lordships. Shri Dube tried to distinguish the aforesaid case on the ground that in the Punjab Services Rules there was no provision similar to note below sub rule (2) of rule 8. We have already dealt with this note above and pointed out that it is limited to the period during which the probation can be lawfully continued and it is not applicable to the period thereafter. Thus, the note is not attracted in this case and once we reach that conclusion it is obvious that the petitioner should be deemed to have been confirmed by implication, particularly because it appears that he had passed the departmental examinations and successfully completed the course of his training. ( 17. ) We may also here refer to the decision of this Court in Narain Singh Thakur v. Excise Commissioner and others ( 1971 MPLJ 496 = 1971 3 JLJ 464) in which the appointee who was also governed by the said Rules was deemed to have been confirmed on his post in the absence of any express order of confirmation in somewhat similar circumstances. ( 18. ) Shri Dube urged that there can be no automatic confirmation and in this connection he relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Sukhbans Singh v. State of Punjab (A I R 1962 S C 1711), It was held in that case that a probationer cannot, after the expiry of the probationary period automatically acquire the status of a permanent member of the service unless the Rules expressly provide for such a result. This decision was followed by this Court in D. K Rai v. Excise Commissioner ( 1966 MPLJ 41 = 1966 J LJ 132) Although the petitioner in that case appears to be governed by the said Rules, it appears that the implications of sub-rule (2) which prohibit extention beyond one year as well as of the note below the said Rule were not fully examined and the decision rested mainly on the ground that even as a probationer he was entitled to the protection of rule 55 (b) of the Civil Services (Classification Control and Appeal) Rules and on that ground the order of this termination was quashed. ( 19. ) As pointed out by their Lordships in Sukhbans Singh v. State of Punjab (supra) the question of automatic confirmation has to be considered in the light of the Rules and since the rules which their Lordships had to consider in the State of Punjab v. Dharamsingh (supra) are similar to the Rules in question, the said decision is directly applicable to this case. We, therefore, hold that the petitioner must be deemed to have been confirmed by implication on the post of Excise Sub-Inspector. ( 20. ) It appears to us that the services of the petitioner were terminated on the ground of misconduct to which reference has been made in the return filed on !2th July 1972. The conduct was apparently taken serious notice of as the petitioner had repeatedly proceeded on leave previously. But if the Government wanted to take action against the petitioner for misconduct, the proper course was to hold a departmental inquiry against him and give him an Opportunity to show cause against the action proposed to be taken against him as required by Article 311 of the Constitution. Since the petitioner had acquired the status of a confirmed employee by implication, his removal from service was clearly in contravention of Article 311 and it is, therefore liable to be quashed. ( 21. ) We, therefore, all w the petition and quash the order of termination of petisioners service dated 20th November 1967 vide annexure A with the consequence that the petitioner will be regarded as continuing in service. But this will not preclude the State Government from taking such action against the petitioner as may be considered necessary for any service deliquency. ) We, therefore, all w the petition and quash the order of termination of petisioners service dated 20th November 1967 vide annexure A with the consequence that the petitioner will be regarded as continuing in service. But this will not preclude the State Government from taking such action against the petitioner as may be considered necessary for any service deliquency. The non-petitioner (State Government) shall bear its own costs and pay the costs of the petitioner to whom the security amount shall be refunded. Counsels fee Rs. 100, if certified. Petition allowed.RAJESH