Moidu, J.-The sole question argued in this Criminal Revision Petition is that rules 3. 6, 11 and 13 in the Vaccination in rural areas transferred from former Madras State to the Kerala State Rules, 1964 made under sections 81 and 129(i) of the Madras Public Health Act, 1939 (III of 1939) are invalid, inoperative and unconstitutional as violative of Article 25 of the Constitution of India. The facts which led to the filing of this Criminal Revision Petition may be stated first. 2. The petitioner is a homeopathic practitioner and a staunch believer in the efficacy of that system of medicine. By a notice dated 8th July, 1969, of the first respondent, Health Inspector, Koduvayoor Health Centre, the petitioner was informed that his daughter, one Jayasree aged 5½ shall be produced for inspection and vaccination as a protection against small-pox, on 15th July, 1969, at the time and place specified in that notice. The notice was issued under rule 3(iii) read with rule 11(ii)(d) of the above Rules. The petitioner did not produce the child, though he acknowledged the notice. So the petitioner was prosecuted before the Sub-Magistrate, Chittur, for an offence under rule 13(a) of the Rules, which reads: “13. Whoever commits a breach of any of the above rules shall be liable on conviction-(a) to a fine which may extend to twenty rupees”. The petitioner contended before the Magistrate that the Rules under which he was prosecuted are violative of the protection guaranteed under Articles 14, 19, 21 and 25 of the Constitution and therefore the rules are invalid, inoperative and unconstitutional. He stated further that he is not liable to be convicted. But he had no other contention on merits. That the petitioner did not comply with the notice dated 8th July, 1969, was also not disputed. Evidence had also been adduced to prove the prosecution case against the petitioner. The Magistrate accepted the prosecution case and entered a conviction and sentenced the petitioner to pay a fine of Rs. 10 and in default to simple imprisonment for two days under rules 3(iii) and 11(ii)(d) read with rule 13(a) of the above rules. 3. Evidence had also been adduced to prove the prosecution case against the petitioner. The Magistrate accepted the prosecution case and entered a conviction and sentenced the petitioner to pay a fine of Rs. 10 and in default to simple imprisonment for two days under rules 3(iii) and 11(ii)(d) read with rule 13(a) of the above rules. 3. It is relevant at this stage to point out that during the pendency of the prosecution before the Sub-Magistrate the petitioner moved that Court to refer the matter to the High Court under section 432 of the Criminal Procedure Code for determination as to whether any substantial question of law as to the interpretation of Constitution of India involved in the case. The Magistrate rejected that petition. While so, the petitioner filed O.P. No. 1216 of 1970 in this Court to determine the question as to whether the case involved a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution, as according to him, it is necessary for the disposal of the case pending before the Magistrate to decide whether rules 3, 6, 11 and 13 of the aforesaid rules are unconstitutional or not. A single Judge of this Court dismissed that petition. The petitioner filed Writ Appeal No. 74 of 1970 to this Court which came before a Division Bench. The learned Judges of the Division Bench passed the following order dismissing the writ appeal: "At this stage for the purpose of Article 228 of the Constitution no substantial question of law arises in this case. The appeal is dismissed. No costs." 4. It is after the dismissal of the writ appeal that the Magistrate tried the case and entered the conviction against the petitioner and sentenced him. It is against that conviction and sentence the present Criminal Revision Petition is filed. The petition first came before a Single Judge of this Court. The learned single Judge was of the opinion that the question involved a substantial question of law which required a comprehensive adjudication by a Division Bench. It is accordingly that this criminal revision petition has come up before us. 5. The revision petitioner inter alia stated in his petition that the homeopathic system of medicine is effective and superior to allopathic system of medicine to cure small-pox and for its complete eradication. That contention by itself is no answer to the charge. It is accordingly that this criminal revision petition has come up before us. 5. The revision petitioner inter alia stated in his petition that the homeopathic system of medicine is effective and superior to allopathic system of medicine to cure small-pox and for its complete eradication. That contention by itself is no answer to the charge. If a notice in form No. 1 under rule 3(iii) and rule 11(ii)(d) is issued by Health Inspector acting under rule 4 and acknowledged by a guardian and if he refuses to produce the child within the time specified in the notice or unless Such guardian produces a certificate from a vaccinator to the effect that the child has either been successfully vaccinated or is unfit for vaccination, the guardian can be prosecuted under rule 13(a) of the Rules. If such a guardian feels that the homeopathic method of treatment for immunity against attack of small-pox is on a par with the Allopathic method of vaccination it is open to him to move the appropriate authority and get a suitable exemption clause inserted in the rules, But in the absence of such an exemption clause he must be held to have contravened the provisions of the said rules by reason of the rule 13(a). In that way the conviction and sentence of the petitioner are correct. 6. Next we have to consider the main argument of the petitioner’s learned Counsel, Sri T.P. Kelu Nambiar, that Rules 3,6, 11 and 13 are ultra vires because they contravene Article 25 of the Constitution. Before we consider he scope and effect of Article 25 it is necessary to consider the object and reasons for the Legislature in passing the Madras Public Health Act as well as allied rules thereunder. Rules 3, 6, 11 and 13 are passed under sections 81 and 129(1) of the Madras Public Health Act (III of 1939). Before we consider he scope and effect of Article 25 it is necessary to consider the object and reasons for the Legislature in passing the Madras Public Health Act as well as allied rules thereunder. Rules 3, 6, 11 and 13 are passed under sections 81 and 129(1) of the Madras Public Health Act (III of 1939). The definition of public health as set out in the preamble of the Act reads as follows: "Public health is the science and the art of preventing disease, prolonging life, and promoting physical health and efficiency through organized State effort by the sanitation of the environment, the control of infections, the education of the individual in principles of personal hygiene, the organization of medical and nursing service for the early diagnosis and preventive treatment of disease, and the development of the social machinery which will ensure to every individual a standard of living adequate for the maintenance of health: It is the organizing of these benefits in such a fashion as to enable every citizen to realize his birthright of health and longevity.“ 7. The importance of preserving public health has also been discussed in the preamble. The preservation of the public health is one of the duties devolving upon the State, as a sovereign power. In fact, among all the objects, sought to be secured by governmental laws, none is more important than the preservation of public health; and an imperative obligation rests upon the State, through its proper instrumentalities or agencies, to take all necessary steps to promote this object. This is a power which is inherent in the State, and which the latter cannot neglect, without great detriment to national welfare. It is as much for the interest of the State that the public health should be preserved as that life should be made secure. Several institutions have been set up for the good of the people to eradicate different forms of diseases. Every State has tacitly acknowledged that it is one of its primary duties to its citizens to pass and enforce quarantine, health and inspection laws and to prevent the introduction of disease, pestilence or unwholesome food. Several institutions have been set up for the good of the people to eradicate different forms of diseases. Every State has tacitly acknowledged that it is one of its primary duties to its citizens to pass and enforce quarantine, health and inspection laws and to prevent the introduction of disease, pestilence or unwholesome food. Health being the sine qua non of all personal enjoyment it is not only the right but the duty of the State or municipality to pass such laws or Ordinances as may be necessary for the preservation of the health of the people. Black-stone says; “The right to the enjoyment of health is a sub-division of the right of personal security-one of the absolute rights of persons.” (12 Corpus Juris 913; 1 Blackstone 129.) In 12 Rul. Cas. Law 1264; Talby, pp. 6, 31 it is stated: “This is a power inherent in every Government to enact such laws, as will promote the health, safety, morals, order, comfort and general welfare of society. It means to some extent the power of promoting the public welfare, by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property.” It was after consideration of the various aspects involved and the importance of preserving public health that the Madras Public Health Act was passed and the rules in question made thereunder. It is also necessary in this connection to refer to the relevant clauses of the 1964 Rules referred to above. ”3 (i) The parent or guardian of every unprotected child who is not less than six months old and who has resided for one month within the limits of local area shall take or cause the child to be taken to a vaccination depot for vaccination or revaccination as the case may be or shall procure such vaccination or re-vaccination by a vaccinator. (ii) Every unprotected person residing within the limits of a local area shall get himself vaccinated or re-vaccinated as the case may be at a vaccination depot or by any other vaccinator. (iii) Notice may be issued in Form No. 1 to unprotected person or guardian of such children to get them vaccinated. 4. (ii) Every unprotected person residing within the limits of a local area shall get himself vaccinated or re-vaccinated as the case may be at a vaccination depot or by any other vaccinator. (iii) Notice may be issued in Form No. 1 to unprotected person or guardian of such children to get them vaccinated. 4. The Health Officer or Executive Authority or any person duly authorised by any of them may if any portion of the local area is threatened or infected with small-pox, direct every person or child in the said area who has no visible mark of small-pox or is unable to produce satisfactory evidence of successful vaccination or re-vaccination carried out within four years to be vaccinated forthwith. * * * * * (i) If a vaccinator finds that an unprotected person or child is not in a fit state of health to vaccinate, he shall deliver to such person or the parent or guardian or such child as the case may be, a certificate in Form No. II to the effect that the person or child is not in a fit state for vaccination. Such certificate shall remain in force for the period specified therein not exceeding three months but may be renewed if necessary. The reason for the unfitness shall be specified in the certificate. (ii) If a vaccinator finds that an unprotected person or child is in a state of health fit for vaccination he shall forthwith vaccinate such person or child and deliver to such person or the parent or guardian of such child as the case may be a memorandum stating the date on which the vaccination was performed and specifying the date on which and the time and place at which the person or child should be present or be produced, as the case may be, for inspection. * * * * * 11(ii)(d) If he is acting in pursuance of the powers vested in him under rule 4 deliver to such person or the parent or guardian of such child or cause to be affixed to the house of such person or such parent or guardian a notice in Form I requiring the person or child as the case may be to be vaccinated within 72 hours at a time and place to be specified in the said notice. The person, or the parent or guardian to whom such notice is delivered or at whose house it is affixed shall be bound to comply with it unless a certificate is produced from a vaccinator to the effect that such person or child has either been successfully vaccinated already or is unfit for vaccination. * * * * * 13. Whoever commits a breach of any of the above rules shall be liable on conviction- (a) to a fine which may extend to twenty rupees, * * * * * These rules are said to be violative of the Article 25 of the Constitution. Article 25 of the Constitution reads: “25. (i) Subject to public order morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion. (2) Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the State from making any law: (a) regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other activity which may be associated with religious practice; (b) providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus. Explanation I.-The wearing and carrying of Kirpans shall be deemed to be included in the profession of the Sikh religion. Explanation II.-In sub-clause (b) of clause 2, the reference to Hindus shall be construed as including a reference to persons professing the Sikh, Jaina or Buddhist religion, and the reference to Hindu religious institutions shall be construed accordingly.” 8. What is guaranteed under Article 25 of the Constitution is freedom of conscience and unhindered right to profess, practise and propagate religion by every citizen of India and every other person who lives in India. This right is no doubt subject in every case to public order, health and morality. Two explanations are added to these rights under clause 2 of the Article. Sub-clause (a) of clause 2 enjoins upon the State to make laws and rules regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular activity which may be associated with religious practice; and Sub-clause (b) gives the State unrestricted power to make laws providing for social welfare and reform, even if such social welfare and reform run counter to religious practices. Notwithstanding there State interferences in religious practices, it is the fundamental right of every person in this country under the Constitution to stick to his religious faith and belief according to his conscience or judgment and he would be within his right to accept or propagate his faith, belief and ideas in such manner as his religious tenets sanctioned it. There is absolutely no prohibition of any kind in the Constitution for any person in India to follow any religion he chooses to adopt. But he should be on guard that he in his free exercise of religion by bringing its tenets into practice as ordained in the religious commandments to be bound by the powers of the State to secure order, public health and morals of the people. The State however cannot make rules and regulations under Sub-clause (a) of clause 2 of Article 25 regulating, modifying or restricting the religious practice of a person in this country as such practices are protected under clause 1 of Article 25 unless they run counter to public health or morality. There can be no restrict on in the State power to make laws in respect of activities which are merely of an economic commercial or political character, though they are associated with religious practices. 9. The scope and effect of Article 25 were considered in State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa1, upholding constitutional validity of the Bombay Prevention of Hindu Bigamous Marriages Act (XXV of 1946) and Gajendragadkar, J. as he then was, who wrote the concurrent judgment with Chagla C.J., stated as follows: Article 25 of the Constitution guarantees freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion to all the citizens of the Union of India. But this article itself makes it perfectly clear that the freedom guaranteed by it is subject to some exceptions. First and foremost, this freedom is subject to public order, morality and health, as well as to the other provisions of Part III. Then it is also subject to the provisions of Article 25(2) by which the State is given full power to make laws providing for social welfare and reform. First and foremost, this freedom is subject to public order, morality and health, as well as to the other provisions of Part III. Then it is also subject to the provisions of Article 25(2) by which the State is given full power to make laws providing for social welfare and reform. In other words, if the State makes a law for social welfare and reform, it would not be a proper argument against the validity of such legislation to urge that the measure of social welfare and reform impinges upon the religious freedom of any section of the citizens of India. Religion in a modern democratic State is purely a matter of the individual and his God; with the religious beliefs of the citizen and his religious practices normally the State would not interfere. But if these religious beliefs or practices conflict with matters of social reform or welfare on which the State wants to legislate, such religious beliefs or practices must yield to the higher requirements of social welfare and reform. This, in my opinion, is the plain meaning of the provisions of Article 25(1) and Article 25(2) read together". More or less the same view was expressed as to the scope and applicability of Article 25 in another decision of the Bombay High Court reported in Ratilal v. State of Bombay2. Though the Supreme Court in Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. The State of Bombay and another3reversed the decision of the Bombay High Court in Ratilal v. State of Bombay2, in part on merits, the principle evolved in the Bombay case had not been interfered with. It is also now settled that there is no distinction between religious faith and belief on one side and religious practice on the other. But a contrary view was expressed by the Bombay High Court in Taker Saifuddin v. Tyebbhai Moosaji4where Chagla, C.J. stated as follows: "in considering Article 25 a sharp distinction must be drawn between religions faith and belief and religious pratices. What the State protects is religious faith and belief. But a contrary view was expressed by the Bombay High Court in Taker Saifuddin v. Tyebbhai Moosaji4where Chagla, C.J. stated as follows: "in considering Article 25 a sharp distinction must be drawn between religions faith and belief and religious pratices. What the State protects is religious faith and belief. If religious practices run counter to public order morality, health or a policy of social welfare upon which the State has embarked, then the religious practices must give way before the good of the people of the State as a whole." The Bombay view was also adopted in the Calcutta decision reported in Masud Alam v. Commissioner of Police5, wherein it is sated that: "a sharp distinction must be drawn between religious faith and belief and religious practices. What the State protects is religious faith and belief. If religious practices run counter to public order, morality or health, then the religious practices must give way before the good of the people of the State as a whole." But in the Supreme Court decision reported in T. Saifuddin v. State of Bombay1, which is a decision on an appeal from Taker Saifuddin v. Tyebbhai Mocsoji2. the Supreme Court did not accept the distinction which was sought to be made between the religious faith and belief on one side and religious practice on the other. According to the Supreme Court the religious practices also come within the term religious faith and belief. At page 225 of T. Saifuddin v. Stale of Bombay1, the observation of Ayyangar, J., who wrote the concurrent judgment reads as follows: "First as to Article 25, as regards clause 1 it was not in dispute that the guarantee under it protected not merely freedom to entertain religious beliefs but also acts done in pursuance of that religion, this being made clear by the use of the expression "practice of religion". No doubt, the right to freedom of conscience and the right to profess, practise and propagate religion are all subject to "public order, morality or health and to the other provisions of this Part" but it was not suggested that (subject to an argument about the matter being a measure of social reform) the practice of excommunication offended public order, morality or health or any other part of the Constitution." Taher Saifuddin v. Tyebbhai Moosaji2, was overruled only to the extent for holding that the order of ex-communication made by the head of the Bohra community on the basis of the Bombay Prevention of Excommunication Act, 1949 was quite in accordance with law as it was done under the religious practice in that community and therefore it was found that the Bombay Act offended Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. 10. The freedom of conscience is the minimum of religious liberty. It is intangible as it is subjective and is not capable of legal protection except that a person may not be compelled by law to abandon his belief, creed or opinion. A man may not only hold his religious opinions but may put them to practice and translate them into articulate force by profession, practice and propagation. Unless these are also protected, there is no meaning in protecting freedom of conscience. It is very difficult to separate religious belief and practice from politics or ethics. But in the interests of the State it cannot be contended, at any rate at the present day that such practices cannot legitimately be prohibited by legislation though such legislation might infringe religious liberty. (See Lakshmindra Theertha Swamiar v. The Commissioner, H.R.E. Board3. In Tejraj C. Gandhi v. State of M.B.4the same view was expressed. It is stated that the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 25(1) is the right to profess, practise and propagate religion. Religious practices or performances of acts in pursuance of religious beliefs which are guaranteed under Article 25(1) and Article 26(b) subject to the limitation of public order, morality and health and the limitations stated in Article 25(2) are religious practices and performances according to the doctrines of that religion. Religious practices are matters of religion within the meaning of Article 26(b). What constitutes the essential part of religion is primarily to be ascertained with reference to the doctrines of that religion itself. 11. Religious practices are matters of religion within the meaning of Article 26(b). What constitutes the essential part of religion is primarily to be ascertained with reference to the doctrines of that religion itself. 11. We have to consider these aspects when we take into account the complaint which the petitioner his put forward in giving effect to the aforesaid rules in the compulsory vaccination of his child. What the petitioner complained is that his religious conscience is a Hindu is shocked when the small pox vaccine made out of calf lymph, which is a product of cow-pox is injected into his child’s blood. Cow-pox is said to be a disease of teats of cows communicated to human being by vaccination. Lymph is the matter taken from cow-pox. The idea of vaccination itself was founded by one Edward Jenner in England in 1778. In a treatise "Why Vaccinate" by Harold W. Whiston a passage is quoted from the official report presented to the local Government by an eminent London M.D. He described the process of vaccine manufacture in the following words: "They take a calf, strap is down to a table, so that it is absolutely helpless. The next thing is to scrub the stomach well, and after having scrubbed it to shave off all the hair. After the calf has been scrubbed and shaved it is cut in 100-120 places upon the stomach with a lancet, and into these places is rubbed the so-called small-pox virus. After it has been well rubbed into these sores the poor creature is unstrapped and tied up in a stable with its head to the wall, so that it shall not lick itself, for eight days. Some of you know what you have suffered from a single postule on your arm. You know the irritation and the inflammation-fancy having 100-120 on your stomach with no opportunity of assuaging the torment. At the end of eight days the calf is brought back, and once more tied to the table and in order to get the dirty decomposing matter out. the pustules have to be squeezed. You cannot procure the contents as you can from a child’s arm, so the hard sores must be squeezed with iron clamps. At the end of eight days the calf is brought back, and once more tied to the table and in order to get the dirty decomposing matter out. the pustules have to be squeezed. You cannot procure the contents as you can from a child’s arm, so the hard sores must be squeezed with iron clamps. Often the tops are out off and the matter from the scabs scooped out; this filthy exudation is then mixed up with glycerine and used." There are very many authorities cited both in the above treatise as well as another book "Small-pox and vaccination" compiled by Dr. Dewan Jaichand and Dr. Chandra Prakash to show that the treatment of small-pox by vaccination is injurious to health and public morality. As against Jenner one Dr. Gifford made the following observation addressing the International Congress in Paris in 1889: "To Edward Jenner, a great monument in memory has been created, and upon its columns, in future, generations will inscribe; Accursed be the man by whose cunning device the blood of nations has been poisoned." 12. Barnad Shaw was reported to have said and pooh-poohed the idea of vaccination in the following words: "If the jewellers had thought of claiming that the possession of a gold watch and chain is an infalliable prophylactic against small-pox, their statistics would have been quite as convincing as those of the vaccinists". 13. These observations and comments bad been made particularly by those who were enthusiasts in the practice of Homeopathy or by those who were against Allopathic system of medicine. These observations and commentaries will not therefore bring down the efficacy of vaccination which the State introduced for the welfare of the people. 14. It is doubtful in the circumstances of this case whether the right claimed by the petitioner will in any way interfere with his religious belief and faith or any act done in furtherance of that belief and faith. The word "conscience" is described in [the Students English Dictionary as follows: "ordinary know ledge or judgment of right and wrong; the moral sense, or sense of right and wrong". In Oxford Dictionary the word is defined as "moral sense of right and wrong; good or clear, bad or guilty, consciousness that one’s actions are right or wrong". To have therefore a conscientious objection, there must be belief that the thing you object to is wrong. In Oxford Dictionary the word is defined as "moral sense of right and wrong; good or clear, bad or guilty, consciousness that one’s actions are right or wrong". To have therefore a conscientious objection, there must be belief that the thing you object to is wrong. So in the case of the petitioner it is contended that the petitioner has a conscientious objection to the use of vaccine which was made out of cow-calf lymph which he holds sacred and therefore the vaccine so made shall not be injected into his blood. It is in this regard that the petitioner has to be reminded that the State is permitted to restrain in the interests of public order, morality and health the right to freedom of conscience and the right to profess, practice and propagate religion. This is the power vested in the State under clause 1 of the Article 25. In the exercise of that power of the State it can make laws for social welfare and social reform as required in sub-clause (b) of clause 2. The law which is impugned has been enacted for the purpose of improving the public health which is an item of social welfare which the State has set on foot. Hence a law which is permitted for the purpose of introducing social Welfare cannot be impeached as violating the right freely to profess practise and propagate religion conferred under clause 1 of Article 25. The power of the State to punish a citizen for an act if the power is recognised by general consent by legislation as a proper matter for prohibiting it cannot be struck down on the ground that it runs counter to the tenets of a particular religious group, in Davis v. Beason1, Justice Field observed as follows: “It was never intended or supposed that the Amendment (the 1st Amendment of the American Constitution) could be invoked as a protection against legislation for the punishment of acts inimical to the peace, good order and morals of society. With man’s relations to his Maker and the obligations he may think they impose, and the manner in which an expression shall be made by him of his belief on those subjects, no interference can be permitted, provided always the laws of society, designed to secure its peace and prosperity and the morals of its people, are not interfered with. With man’s relations to his Maker and the obligations he may think they impose, and the manner in which an expression shall be made by him of his belief on those subjects, no interference can be permitted, provided always the laws of society, designed to secure its peace and prosperity and the morals of its people, are not interfered with. However free the exercise of religion may be, it must be subordinate to the criminal laws of the country, passed with reference to actions regarded by general consent as properly the subjects of punitive legislation.” 15. The people of a State are responsible for the welfare of the State. Rules impugned were passed by the Legislature in accordance with law. It is for the people of the State to lay down the policy that the State should pursue until and unless the existing rules are not abrogated. So long as they continue to be in force they shall be regarded as one passed for the good of the people. It is again for the people to decide what legislation shall be put upon the Statute in order to advance the welfare of the State. (See The State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa2and Ram Prasad v. State of U.P.3. In Ram Prasad v. State of U.P.3, the following observation was made: “It is well settled that in a democratic State the Legislature represents the will of the people and as such is responsible for the welfare of the State and it is for the Legislature to lay down the policy that the State should pursue. It cannot, therefore, be said that if the Legislature as the law-making authority regards a particular measure as a measure of social reform, the Courts should not say that it should not be regarded as a measure of social reform. The fact that according to Hindu Shastras the marriage is a sacrament and is regulated by the Shastras and that essential principle underlying a Hindu marriage is the perpetuation of family by birth of sons, nonetheless the marriage is a social institution and it may be for the welfare of the State to control such an institution and to bring about measures of reforms which the legislature’s wisdom thinks proper to do in the interest of the State”. 16. 16. The criticisms by some eminent men as revealed from the two treatise placed before us will not change the position as regards the ex sting law of vaccination which is questioned in the case. It is for the people of the State to agitate for the replacement of vaccination with any other system for the eradication of small-pox if they choose to do so. It is relevant at this stage to point out that no authoritative opinion is placed in our hands to come to the conclusion that the Homeopathic treatment of small-pox either as a cure or as a prevention is superior to or at any rate is on a par with the Allopathic system of medicine. It is sufficient to say that the system of vaccination even if it infringes the conscientious objection of the petitioner the State has authority to introduce legislation of this type in the interest of the people for the preservation of public health which is a part of the scheme of social welfare. The contention of the petitioner therefore that the impugned rules violated Article 25 of the Constitution cannot be accepted. There is therefore no merit in this petition. The petition is dismissed. Narayna Pillai, J.-The fundamental right to freedom of conscience and to the practice of religion guaranteed under Article 25(1) occurring in Part III of the Constitution is subject to several exceptions. It is subject to public order morality and health and the right of the State to make laws for social welfare and reform. It is also subject to the other provisions in Part III which deal with fundamental rights. The impugned Rules here are for social welfare. They are valid. I agree in dismissing the Revision Petition. M.C.M. ----- Revision Petition dismissed.