JUDGMENT N.D. Ojha, J. - The appellants own a factory for the manufacture of straw-board and pulp-board. The First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 prescribes rates of duty leviable on excisable goods and Section 3 of the said Act empowers the levy and collection of the prescribed duty. Item No. 17 of the First Schedule makes paper including straw-board etc. liable to excise duty provided in or in relation to the manufacture of such paper any process is ordinarily carried on with the aid of power. There is no dispute that the straw-board etc. manufactured by the appellants fall within the item No. 17 of the First Schedule and are liable to excise duty. Rule 8 of the Excise Rides framed under the power conferred by Section 37 of the aforesaid Act empowers the Central Government to exempt any excisable goods for the whole or any part of duty leviable on such goods by issuing a notification in the official Gazette. 2. The Central Government issued notification No. 37/63 dated March 1, 1963 by which it exempted straw-board other than corrugated board upto the quantity prescribed in column 1 of the table annexed to the said notification cleared by any manufacturer for home consumption on or after the 1st day of April in any financial year from so much of the duty leviable thereon as was in excess of the amount specified in the corresponding entry in column 2 of the said table. The exemption so granted was not to apply to any factory which produced more than 5,000 Tons of paper and pulp board excluding straw-board in any of the immediately proceeding three complete financial years subject to a proviso contained in the said notification. On November 9, 1963 another notification was issued whereby certain amendments were made in the notification No. 37 of 1963 aforesaid. By this notification a proviso was added to the parent notification to the effect that where a manufacturer applied for license on or after November 9, 1963 the rates applicable to him would be as contained in that notification unless he satisfied the Collector of Central Excise, inter alia, that the factory for which the license was applied for was owned on the 9th day of the November, 1963 by the applicant. The effect of this amendment was that the rate of exemption in case of new manufacturers covered by the amending notification was lesser than those who owned the factory for which the licence was applied for on November 9, 1963. Subsequently, two other notifications were issued under Rule 8 being Nos. 34 of 1964 and 35 of 1964 both dated March 1, 1964. Notification No. 34 granted exemption in respect of paper falling under item No. 17 of the First Schedule referred to above produced in any factory which commenced manufacture for the first time on or after March 1, 1964 or in certain contingencies produced in a factory existing immediately before March 1, 1964. By notification No. 35 of 1964 on the other hand notification No. 37 of 1963 referred to above was superseded and a different rate of exemption was provided. Sub-clause (3) of the proviso to the said notification, however, specified that nothing contained shall apply to a manufacturer who applied or applies for a license on or after the 9th day of November, 1963 unless he satisfies the Collector of Central Excise. (a) that the factory for which the license was or is applied for was owned on the 9th day of November, 1963 by the applicant, and (b) ..................................... 3. The appellants apprehending that clause (a) of the third proviso to the notification No. 35 of 1964 may be made applicable to them made a representation to the Central Government. They were, however, informed that they were not eligible to the exemption under Notification No. 35 of 1964 aforesaid. The appellants thereupon filed a writ petition in this Court claiming various reliefs. Before the learned Single Judge a twofold contention was made : (1) that the appellants owned a factory on November 9, 1963 and, therefore, clause 3 (a) of the proviso to the notification No. 35 of 1964 was not applicable to them and they were entitled to exemption; (2) that in the alternative the said clause 3 (a) was ultra vires being hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. The learned Single Judge found that the appellants had failed to establish that they owned a factory on November 9, 1963. The learned Single Judge found that the appellants had failed to establish that they owned a factory on November 9, 1963. In regard to the alternative submission he held that since the petitioners had commenced manufacture for the first time after March 1, 1964 they were governed by notification No. 34 of 1964 and not by notification No. 35 of 1964. On this ground he held that the appellants not being entitled to the benefit of notification No. 35 of 1964 it was immaterial whether the third clause of the proviso to that notification was or was not ultra vires. On these findings the writ petition was dismissed by the judgment under appeal. 4. Learned counsel for the appellants has not challenged before us the finding of the learned Single Judge that the appellant did not own a factory on November 9, 1963. He restricted his arguments to the alternative plea raised by the appellants, namely that clause 3 (a) of the proviso to the notification No. 35 of 1964 was obnoxious being hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. In this regard it was urged that the fixation of the date of November 9, 1963 was arbitrary inasmuch as the classification had no nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the notification granting exemption. The precise point which was sought to be argued before us did not appear to have been urged before the learned Single Judge but since it involved a pure question of law we felt inclined to permit the point to be raised and granted the parties an opportunity to file supplementary affidavits. The parties have availed of the said opportunity. In paragraph 10 of the affidavit of Sukh Dev Verma dated September 20, 1972 filed before us on behalf of the Union of India it has been stated that November 9, 1963 was taken to be the crucial date as the notification dated November 9, 1963 came in force on that day and the impugned provision was necessary in order to prevent fragmentation and thereby causing loss to federal revenue. 5. 5. The Central Government seems to have apprehended that in order to avail of the benefit of the exemption granted from 1-3-1963 the factories already in existence may take recource to fragmentation and as a result of this apprehension I notification No. 37 of 1963 was amended by the notification dated November 9, 1963 whereby the rate of exemption in respect of those persons who did not own a factory on November 9, 1963 was reduced; and when by the subsequent notification No. 35 of 1964 the notification No. 37 of 1963 was superseded and different rates were prescribed the exemption granted in respect of those persons who did not own a factory on November 9, 1963 was completely withdrawn. 6. November 9, 1963 seems to have been fixed to serve the purpose of a dividing line between existing or old factories and new factories which were to be dis entitled from the exemption. It is true that the notification No. 35 of 1964 does not speak of any old factory or a new factory but taking into consideration the apprehension which led the Central Government in withdrawing the exemption in respect of those persons who did not own a factory on November 9, 1963 it is apparent that the classification by the Central Government with reference to the date of November 9, 1963 was made from the aforesaid point of view. The object of withdrawing the exemption with effect from November 9, 1963 was to avoid fragmentation of existing factories and in pursuance of that object exemption in respect of all those factories which came into being after the said date was withdrawn as it seems to have been considered impracticable to detect fragmentation. 7. In V. J. Ferreira v. Bombay Municipality, AIR 1972 S.C. 845 it was held that a legislature did not have to tax everything in order to tax something. It could pick and choose districts, objects, persons, methods and even rates of taxation as long as it does so reasonably. 7. In V. J. Ferreira v. Bombay Municipality, AIR 1972 S.C. 845 it was held that a legislature did not have to tax everything in order to tax something. It could pick and choose districts, objects, persons, methods and even rates of taxation as long as it does so reasonably. It was further held that when a statute divided the objects of tax into groups or categories, so long as there was equality and uniformity within each group, the tax could not be attacked on the ground of its being discriminatory, although due to fortuitous circumstances or a particular situation some included in a class or group may get some advantage over others, provided of course they were not sought out for special treatment. 8. In Khandige Sham Bhat v. Agricultural Income-tax Officer, AIR 1963 S.C. 591 it was pointed out that the advantages or disadvantages to individual assessees are accidental and inevitable and are inherent in every taxing statute as it has to draw a line somewhere and some cases necessarily fall on the other side of the line. 9. In Shanker I. and S. R. Mills v. Union of India, AIR 1969 Pun. 50 a bench of the Punjab High Court took the view that no body can claim exemption from liability to pay a tax or an excise duty as a matter of right. It is for the State to grant exemption in suitable cases to any particular class for cogent reasons. It was further held that a classification may be in point of time and that the validity of such a classification would depend on whether the date fixed for the impugned piece of legislation which acts as the dividing line between two sets of persons is or is not related to the objects of the legislation. 10. In United States v. Mary Land S. S. Insurance Corporation, AIR 1971 U.S., S.C. 61 it was held that "just as a State may provide that after a specified date newly established common carriers must obtain State approval before entering into business so as to prevent proliferation of such carriers and excessive use of the State's highways similarly Congress does not exceed its power to tax nor does it violate the Fifth Amendment when it refuses to exempt from tax newly formed corporations, the multiplication of which might burden otherwise valid federal programmes." 11. It is thus clear that placing persons in two groups with reference to a particular date would be a reasonable classification and would not be obnoxious provided such classification has a nexus with the object sought to be achieved and persons placed in one group are not put to discrimination inter se. If the aforesaid ingredients are established it would not be for the courts to go into the correctness or otherwise of the policy of the Government in granting exemption to one class of persons or withholding it from others. 12. In Jaipur Hosiery Mills v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1971 S.C 1330 it was held : "It is not for the court to decide whether the policy of exempting articles made from woven cloth was justified or that hosiery articles should have been given exemption in the same way as other garments. It is entirely for the taxing authorities to take a decision as to the goods which will be subjected to taxation and those which would be exempted from it." 13. As already pointed out above the purpose of issuing the notification No. 35 of 1964 was obviously to continue the exemption in respect of old factories and to withhold it in respect of new factories, and in order to determine which factory would come under one category and which under the other some date had to be fixed and if the Government chose November 9, 1963 to be the said date on the basis that that was the date on which the notification of 1963 granting exemption was issued, it cannot be said that the classification is unreasonable. We are further of opinion that withholding of the exemption as contemplated in clause 3 (a) of the proviso to the notification No. 35 of 1964 has a clear nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the said notification. The object sought to be achieved was to prevent fragmentation of the existing factories which was likely to result in causing loss to the federal revenue and since it appears to have been found impracticable to detect fragmentation it was decided to withhold the exemption in regard to all those persons who did not own a factory on November 9, 1963. It is only a fortuitous circumstance that new manufacturers who form new companies or units without fragmentation of any old one are also deprived of the exemption. But this happened because of the impractability of defecting fragmentation. As seen above, such exceptioned cases are inevitable and inherent in taxing provisions. In this view of the matter we find nothing obnoxious in clause 3 (a) of the proviso to the notification No. 35 of 1964. 14. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.