JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, J. - These companion appeals raise common questions and can be conveniently decided by a common judgment. 2. The dispute relates to Saharanpur-Muzaffarnagar via Deoband route. This route lay within the jurisdiction of the Regional Transport Authority, Meerut. 3. On 23rd March, 1959, the Meerut Authority raised the strength of this route from 16 to 25. On June 13, 1959, the Authority invited applications from Motor Operators for the grant of permits for the nine new vacancies. As many as 1095 applications were filed by a large number of persons, including the respondents. The applications were published in the Gazette of 2nd January, 1960, for inviting objections. During the pendency of these proceedings, the Meerut Authority granted some permits to displaced operators. 4. On 8th September, 1961, the State Government issued a Notification under Section 44 (1) of the Motor Vehicles Act. It created Regional Transport Authority at Dehra Dun. The districts of Dehra Dun and Saharanpur which till then lay within the jurisdiction of the Meerut Authority, were attached to the Dehra Dun Authority. The Saharanpur-Muzaffarnagar via Deoband route lay within the jurisdiction of Meerut as well as Dehra Dun Authority; but major portion of the route fell within the jurisdiction of the Dehra Dun Authority. 5. On 4th April, 1963, the Regional Transport Authority, Dehra Dun resolved to increase the strength of this route from 32 to 40. Thereafter the Dehra Dun Authority granted two permits to displaced Operators on this route. 6. Mohammad Rihan was an operator plying on the Saharanpur-Muzaffarnagar Via Deoband route. His permit was about to expire. He made an application for renewal. A number of other persons also similarly applied for grant of permits. All these applications were published by the Dehra Dun Authority and after consideration of the objections, at its meeting held on 26/27th July, 1963, it resolved to renew the permit of Mohammad Rihan. The other applications were postponed for consideration to a future meeting. At the meeting held on 18 to 20 February, 1964, Dehra Dun Authority renewed the permit of one Mohammad Irshad. Five other applications for grant of permits that had been instituted before the Dehra Dun Authority, were postponed for consideration on a future date. Against these orders renewing the permits of Mohammad Rihan, Mohammad Irshad and postponing consideration of other application, seven appeals were filed before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. Five other applications for grant of permits that had been instituted before the Dehra Dun Authority, were postponed for consideration on a future date. Against these orders renewing the permits of Mohammad Rihan, Mohammad Irshad and postponing consideration of other application, seven appeals were filed before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. By its order dated 10th August, 1964, the Appellate Tribunal allowed the appeals in part. It did not cancel the renewal of the two permits; but it remanded the matter to the Regional Transport Authority, Dehra Dun directing it to consider the remaining seven applications in relation to the vacancies still existing. It appears that by that time 1095 applications that had been initially filed before the Meerut Authority were transferred by it to the Dehra Dun Authority. The Appellate Tribunal in its order held that - "the large number of applications which had been filed before the Regional Transport Authority, Meerut, had become infructuous R. T. A., Dehra Dun." It directed the Dehra Dun Authority to fill up the remaining vacancies after considering the aplications which were filed before it alone. 7. Principally aggrieved at the direction to exclude the consideration of 1095 applications the respondents filed three writ petitions in this Court. 8. A learned single Judge held that since the Regional Transport Authority, Dehra Dun had merely postponed consideration of the applications, those applicants had no right of appeal. The appeals filed before the Appellate Tribunal were not competent. In relation to the observations made by the Tribunal relating to the 1095 applications filed initially at Meerut, the learned Single Judge held that those applications were rightly transferred to the Dehra Dun Authority and that the Dehra Dun Authority had in law jurisdiction to take them into consideration. Hence the persons, who had made applications initially at Meerut had locus standi to file a writ petition to challenge the validity of the observation made by the Appellate Tribunal that those applications were to be excluded from consideration by the Dehra Dun Authority. On these findings the writ petitions were allowed and the proceedings and the order of the Appellate Tribunal were quashed. 9. On these findings the writ petitions were allowed and the proceedings and the order of the Appellate Tribunal were quashed. 9. In the present appeals the point as to the maintainability of the appeal was not canvassed before us because the Appellate Tribunal had not cancelled the renewal of the two permits of Mohammad Rihan and Mohammad Irshad; and it appears that neither of the parties before us is interested in the cancellation of those permits. The only point upon which the present parties seriously argued the appeal related to the jurisdiction of Dehra Dun Authority to consider the applications that were initially filed before the Meerut Authority. 10. Sec. 44(1) Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 provides for Transport Authority. It states : - "44. Transport Authorities :- (1) The State Government shall, by notification in the official Gaztette, constitute for the state a Transport Authority to exercise and discharge the powers and functions specified in sub-Sec. (3) and shall in like manner constitute Regional Transport Authorities to exercise and discharge throughout such areas (in this Chapter referred to as regions) as may be specified in the notification, in respect of each Regional Transport Authority, the powers and functions conferred by or under this Chapter on such Authorities: Provided....................... Privided further .................." 11. This provision empowers the State Government to constitute Regional Transport Authorities for different regions. For its region, the Authority is to exercise and discharge the powers and functions conferred by or under Chapter IV. 12. Sec. 45(1) provides that every application for a permit shall be made to the Regional Transport Authority of the region in which it is proposed to use the vehicle or vehicles. The proviso says that if it is proposed to use the vehicle or vehicles in two or more regions lying within the same State, the application shall be made to the Regional Transport Authority of the region in which the major portion of the proposed route or area lies. Sec. 46 lays down the facts and matters upon which the application for a permit is to give the requisite particulars. Sec. 48 (1) provides that subject to the provisions of Section 47, a Regional Transport Authority may, on an application made to it under Section 46, grant a stage carriage permit. These provisions indicate that a Regional Transport Authority can exercise powers and functions in respect of areas falling within its region. Sec. 48 (1) provides that subject to the provisions of Section 47, a Regional Transport Authority may, on an application made to it under Section 46, grant a stage carriage permit. These provisions indicate that a Regional Transport Authority can exercise powers and functions in respect of areas falling within its region. It can grant permits on applications made to it. 13. Mr. Dhaon, learned counsel for the appellant, who presented the case for the appellants with care and clarity, submitted that when applications for grant of permits have been made to a particular Authority that Authority acquires power and jurisdiction to consider it and dispose it of. If during the pendency of such applications the route in relation to which the applications have been filed is transferred to another Regional Transport Authority, such Authority does not become a substitute or successor of the first one; and by the mere constitution of a new Authority in relation to that route the original Authority will not lose its power to deal with applications pending before it. 14. Sec. 44 (1) does not merely contemplate the creation of Regional Transport Authorities for different regions. It also confers powers upon them to exercise and discharge the functions conferred upon Regional Transport Authorities by Chapter IV. On the plain terms of Section 44 (1), when a Regional Transport Authority is created in respect of particular region only such Authority can exercise the powers and functions in relation to that region. Even if till such creation, the powers and functions were being exercised by some other Authority whose jurisdiction extended to that region, since with the creation of a new Authority the powers are exercisable by the new Authority, the old Authority must be held to have lost its power over the regions which has gone out of its jurisdiction. Sec. 44 (1) does not contemplate a vacuum in relation to any particular area or region. Under it if a region is within the jurisdiction of a particular authority, and that region is later attached to another authority, then from the date of this event, two consequences happen simimultaneously. The old Authority loses its jurisdiction and the new Authority acquired it at the same moment. There is no gap or interregnum in the exercise of the powers and functions conferred by Chapter IV. The old Authority loses its jurisdiction and the new Authority acquired it at the same moment. There is no gap or interregnum in the exercise of the powers and functions conferred by Chapter IV. In relation to such area or region there is always some Authority capable of exercising the powers and functions. 15. Mr. Dhaon relied upon Venugopala v. Krishnaswami, AIR 1943 F.C. 24. On the enforcement of the Government of India Act, 1935, Burma ceased to be part of India from 1st April, 1937. At that time a suit was pending in South Indian Court in relation to properties, some of which were situated in Burma. There was no specific provision for the transfer of jurisdiction of Indian courts in relation to property situated in Burma to any specified court in Burma. The Federal Court held that the right to continue an action, which has been commenced, was a vested right and it cannot be extinguished except by a clear indication of the intention of the Legislature to that effect. The Court held that there was no provision in the Constitution Act to have that effect. The case is not applicable because the proposition that there is a vested right to continue a suit, which has ben commenced, does not arise in the present case. No one says that the applications made before the Meerut Authority became totally in-fructuous after the creation of the Dehra Dun Authority. The respondent's case is that those applications could be dealt ; with only by the Dehra Dun Authority after the date of its creation. 16. Mr. Dhaon invited our attention to the decision of a Bench of this Court in Seth Champalal Ram Swarup Beawar v. Commissioner of Income-tax, 52 I.T.R. 201. By the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, Ajmer became a part of the State of Rajasthan in 1957. An application for a reference under the Income-tax Act was pending in the Allahabad High Court which at that time had jurisdiction to entertain it. The States Reorganisation Act, by Section 64, provided for transfer of proceedings to Rajasthan High Court from the High Courts of Bombay and Madhya Bharat. Sec. 125 provided for transfer of proceedings panting before a court other than a High Court Tribunal, authority or officer in any area which fell within the State of Rajasthan. The States Reorganisation Act, by Section 64, provided for transfer of proceedings to Rajasthan High Court from the High Courts of Bombay and Madhya Bharat. Sec. 125 provided for transfer of proceedings panting before a court other than a High Court Tribunal, authority or officer in any area which fell within the State of Rajasthan. Neither of these two provisions were held by the Division Bench to apply to an application for reference under the Income tax Act pending before the Allahabad High Court. In this context, it was held that if on the date of the filing of the suit or initiation of the proceedings a court had validly entertained the suit or proceedings it would continue to be seized of it even though later on the area from which the suit or proceedings arose has gone out of the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of that court. The case is inapplicable because the transitory provisions were construed as not taking away power of this Court to deal with a pending reference application, or to transfer jurisdiction in relation thereto any other court in the State of Rajasthan. In the present case, with effect from the date of the creation of the Dehra Dun Authority the power to exercise the functions conferred by Chapter IV vested in the Dehra Dun Authority. 17. In Dewaji v. Ganpatlal, AIR 1969 S.C. 560 , the Supreme Court interpreted Sec. 16-B of the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act, 1951. That section provided that no civil court shall entertain any suit instituted or application made, to obtain a decision or order on any matter which a revenue officer is empowered to determine, decide or dispose of. The Supreme Court held that it cannot be disputed that if the Legislature intends to oust the jurisdiction of civil courts, it must say so expressly or by necessary implications. The words "suit or proceelings" do not ordinarily include appellate proceeding : So the section was not applicable to pending appeals. The Court emphasised that the word used is "entertain" and not "entertain or try any suit" which phrase occurs in Section 15 (2) of the Act. In the context the intention was not to effect pending appeals. This case is distinguishable. Sec. 44 (1) does not deal with the entertainment of applications. It provides for exercising the powers and functions, inter alia, to grant permits. In the context the intention was not to effect pending appeals. This case is distinguishable. Sec. 44 (1) does not deal with the entertainment of applications. It provides for exercising the powers and functions, inter alia, to grant permits. These words are more akin to "trial" rather than to more "entertain". 18. The learned Advocate-General appearing for the respondents urged that the choice of forum is a matter relating to the law of procedure. Even if a litigant has a vested right to see that an action once commenced should be decided, yet he has no vested right in the choice of forum. He has no right to say that the court in which he institutes the proceeding alone has jurisdiction to try and decide it. From the decisions cited by learned counsel the proposition seems to have been accepted by all the principal courts in the court. 19. In Anant Gopal Sheorey v. State of Bombay, AIR 1958 S.C. 915 , the Supreme Court held that no person has a vested right in any course of procedure. He has only a right of prosecution or defence in the manner prescribed for the time being by or for the court in which the case is pending and if by an Act of Parliament the mode of procedure is altered he has no other right than to proceed to the altered mode. In other words, a change in the law of procedure operates retrospectively. 20. In Hazari v. Mst. Maktula, AIR 1932 All. 30 a Division Bench of this Court held that the choice of forum is a matter of procedure and not a substantive right and the new Act would normally have a retrospective effect. So far as the choice of forum is concerned if the Legislature takes away the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain a suit of a particular nature and confers jurisdiction on the revenue court a plaintiff cannot compel the civil court to hear the suit after the date of the transfer. 21. The same view was taken by another Bench of this Court in D. K. Gupta v. Pilokhi Brick Kiln, 1971 A.L.J. 998. 22. The Calcutta High Court in Bireshwar v. Indu Bhushan, AIR 1943 Cal. 21. The same view was taken by another Bench of this Court in D. K. Gupta v. Pilokhi Brick Kiln, 1971 A.L.J. 998. 22. The Calcutta High Court in Bireshwar v. Indu Bhushan, AIR 1943 Cal. 573 held that the question whether a person has right to recover property is a substantial question of law but in what court he should institute proceedings is a procedure law and in the latter the litigant has no vested right. 23. The Bombay High Court in Shiv Bhagwan v. Onkarmal, AIR 1952 Bom. 365 held that no party has a vested right to a particular forum. All procedural laws are normally retrospective. A court is bound to take notice of the change in law and is bound to administer the law as it was when the suit came up for hearing. If the court has jurisdiction to try the suit when it came on for disposal it cannot refuse to assume jurisdiction even if it did not have it at the date when it was instituted. 24. Thus change of forum during the pendency of an action affects the power of the court or authority to continue to have seisin over it. 25. The Madras High Court has taken a similar view in V. C. K. Bus Service v. H. B. Sethna, AIR 1965 Mad. 149 . It has held that a litigant has no vested right in a particular forum. He cannot say, as a matter of right, that his suit or application should be tried by this or that forum which existed on the date his cause of action arose. Forum belongs to the realm of procedure and does not constitute substantial right of a party or a litigant. Any statutory law, which changes the forum, would affect a pending suit. 26. It is settled law that choice of forum does not inhere in a litigant. It depends upon the laws in force. If during the pendency of an action the forum is changed the action can be continued only before the new forum. The change of forum involves the transfer of pending actions. It does not affect the rights of the litigants. The choice of forum is referable to procedural laws. 27. It depends upon the laws in force. If during the pendency of an action the forum is changed the action can be continued only before the new forum. The change of forum involves the transfer of pending actions. It does not affect the rights of the litigants. The choice of forum is referable to procedural laws. 27. With the creation of the Dehra Dun Authority the jurisdiction to exercise the powers and functions conferred by Chapter IV in relation to the region attached to it stood transferred from Meerut to Dehra Dun Authority. From that date onwards the Meerut Authority could not deal with even pending applications in relation to that region. Only the Dehra Dun Authority could take them up. 28. Mr. Dhaon, however, argued that in view of Section 48 (1) the Regional Transport Authority, Dehra Dun could grant a stage carriage permit only "on an application made to it". The 1095 applications were made to the Meerut Authority. This presents no difficulty. When the Meerut Authority transferred the file of these applications to the Dehra Dun Authority those applications will be deemed to have been made to the Dehra Dun Authority on the date on which they were received by it. Sec. 48 (1) speaks of application made to it under Sec. 46. Sec. 46 lays down the contents of such an application. It is to be noticed that Section 48 (1) does not refer to an application made to it under Sec. 45. Hence it is not necessary that an application to be within Section 48 (1) it must invariably be personally made by the applicant for permit. Sec. 48 (1) cannot, in our opinion, be construed as debarring the Dehra Dun Authority from granting stage B carriage permits on applications received by it on transfer from Meerut. Since the fact of transfer by the Meerut Authority and the receipt of those applications by the Dehra Dun are admitted, it is, in our opinion, usnecessary to consider the correctness of the view expressed by the learned Single Judge that in the absence of any evidence, a presumption would arise that a competent authority must have passed an order of transfer. The only relevant thing is that the applications became made to the Dehra Dun Authority on their receipt by it. The Dehra Dun Authority alone had jurisdiction to consider and dispose of these applications. The only relevant thing is that the applications became made to the Dehra Dun Authority on their receipt by it. The Dehra Dun Authority alone had jurisdiction to consider and dispose of these applications. The f Meerut Authority lost its power over K them. 29. In the result, the appeals failed and are accordingly dismissed with costs.