Order.- This is a petition under section 561-A, Criminal Procedure Code, to quash the proceedings in P.R.C. No. 19 of 1971 on the file of the Judicial First Glass Magistrate, Ananthapur. The relevant facts for purposes of the disposal of this petition are as follows: The petitioner is a member of Indian Police Service. He is at present the Assistant Superintendent of Police., Nagarkurnool, Mahaboobnagar District. He was placed in charge of Anantapur Rural Circle during the period from 1st August, 1971 to 14th October, 1971. One Venkata Ranga Reddy filed a complaint before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Ananthapur alleging that at midnight on 10th October, 1971, the petitioner along with three others who were police officers and about 15 Constables came in a jeep and a police van, and woke up the complainant. The complainant suspected that they might be Naxalites and did not open the door immediately. On being told by A-2 that the Assistant Superintendent of Police, Ananthapur came and wanted to see the complainant, the complainant came down and met the police party. Then A-1, who is the petitioner herein, told him that he wanted to search his house because he was informed that some of the accused concerned in Kothapalli murder case were suspected to have been harboured in his louse. The complainant denied that he had any connection with them but it appears that the accused and the constables entered the house of the complainant and searched the house without any search warrant. When the police party did not find any of the absconding accused in Kothapalli murder case, A-1 asked the complainant to get into the jeep and compelled him to do so by force. After the complainant got into the jeep, it was driven towards the road leading to Thimmanayanipalem and stopped near a thanda. The complainant was asked to get clown from the jeep. Then the entire party walked to Thimmanayanipalem village where the house of Chinnabali was searched for the alleged absconding accused. There also no one was found. It was in this village that one Peddanna protested that the complainant was being unnecessarily taken by the police in the jeep whereupon Peddanna also Was put into the police van by A-2 to A-4 and brought to Ananthapur. The entire party reached Ananthapur by 6-30 A.M. or 7A.M. on 11th October, 1971. There also no one was found. It was in this village that one Peddanna protested that the complainant was being unnecessarily taken by the police in the jeep whereupon Peddanna also Was put into the police van by A-2 to A-4 and brought to Ananthapur. The entire party reached Ananthapur by 6-30 A.M. or 7A.M. on 11th October, 1971. When they entered the police station, Peddanna was pushed into a room after which A-1 abused the complainant in filthy and vulgar language and insulted him. A-1 threatened the complainant and asked him to confess that the absconding accused were harboured by him and to give a statement to that effect to which the complainant refused. Thereupon A-1 asked for a stick which was handed over to him. A-1 then beat the complainant with the stick on his face and the blow fell on his left cheek causing a bleeding injury. The complainant protested and raised his left hand to ward off the second blow about to be dealt by A-1 and consequently it fell on his left palm. The clothes of the complainant became blood-stained and he had to sit down due to the blows. Peddanna also Was beaten by A-2. A-1 left the police station saying that he would return in half an hour’s time. After his return, A-1 asked the complainant to remove his shirt and towel which were blood-stained and asked one of the Constables to wash them causing the disappearance of evidence. The complainant produced the blood-stained clothes along with the complaint. Once again, A-1 compelled the complainant to sign a false statement to the effect that three of the accused involved in Kothapalli murder case were being harboured by him. The complainant refused to do so but on being threatened by the accused and having received beating at the hands of A-1, he had no other alternative but to sign the statement. Thus A-1 extorted a false confession from the complainant by causing hurt to him. A-1 again left the police station leaving the complainant behind closed doors. Thus the complainant could not communicate with anybody, but a nephew of his by name G.V. Ramana Reddy filed a petition before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Ananthapur under section 100. Criminal Procedure Code. Thus A-1 extorted a false confession from the complainant by causing hurt to him. A-1 again left the police station leaving the complainant behind closed doors. Thus the complainant could not communicate with anybody, but a nephew of his by name G.V. Ramana Reddy filed a petition before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Ananthapur under section 100. Criminal Procedure Code. The Judicial First Class Magistrate, Ananthapur came to the police station at 12-40 P.M. and recorded a statement from the complainant and as well took a statement from the sentry. While the statement of the complainant was being recorded, A-4 came into the police station. The learned Magistrate directed A-4 to produce the complainant before the doctor immediately which direction was not complied with until 4-30 p.m. on that day. In the complaint, it is stated that the complainant never went to Singanamala Police Station voluntarily, and that the case registered at the said police station was fabricated by A-3 at the instance of A-1 and the other accused to the effect that the complainant assaulted A-3 when he was interrogating him in the police station and thereafter when the complainant tried to run away, he fell down and sustained the injuries. A-3 had thus fabricated a false case against the complainant to save A-1 and the other accused from legal punishment. The complainant was admitted into the Government Headquarters Hospital, Anantapur as in-patient after he was released on bail, and Was discharged on 14th October, 1971. Consequently, this complaint was filed on 15th October, 1971. The learned Judicial First Class Magistrate, Anantapur, recorded the statement of the complainant and took cognizance of the case under sections 365, 367, 324 and 330, Indian Penal Code, against A-1, and under sections 364, 367, 368, 324, 33a read with 114 and under section 202, Indian Penal Code, against A-2 to A-4, and issued process. The petitioner herein had filed W.P. No. 4241 of 1971 for the issue of a writ of prohibition but it was dismissed by this Court on 16th November, 1971. Against this order of the single Judge, W.A.No. 440 of 1971 was filed which was also dismissed with the direction. “It is open to the appellant to raise this question before the Magistrate when he appears before him and for the Magistrate to decide it when adequate material is placed before him.” Thereupon A-1 filed Crl. Against this order of the single Judge, W.A.No. 440 of 1971 was filed which was also dismissed with the direction. “It is open to the appellant to raise this question before the Magistrate when he appears before him and for the Magistrate to decide it when adequate material is placed before him.” Thereupon A-1 filed Crl. M.P. No. 480 of 1971 in P.R.C. No. 19 of 1971 before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Anantapur, questioning the jurisdiction of that Court to take cognizance of the said complaint. The learned Magistrate by his order dated 13th January, 1972, dismissed the said petition. In the petition before the learned Magistrate, A-1 had pleaded that the Court had no power or jurisdiction to decide the question whether sanction of the appropriate Government is necessary or not because the question of sanction is exclusively within the power of the State Government. In the above alternative, he also pleaded that the question of sanction must be first (determined) against the petitioner, after hearing him, and that taking cognizance of the case without hearing the petitioner is in violation of principles of natural justice. The learned Magistrate as stated above dismissed that petition justifying his action or the ground that the question of sanction will be determined from stage to stage on the basis of the evidence produced by the complainant. 2. In this petition, Mr. Lingayya Chowdary, the learned advocate for the petitioner raised the following contentions: (1) The learned Magistrate had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case without sanction because according to the allegations in the complaint, the raid offences were committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty. (2) The facts alleged in the complaint even if taken to be correct at their face value, do not make out the offences. (3) The jurisdiction of a Magistrate under the Code of Criminal Procedure is excluded because of the provisions of the Madras District Police Act. The first contention of the learned Advocate for the petitioner is with reference to section 197, Criminal Procedure Code. It is his contention that from the allegations made out in the complaint, it could be concluded that the petitioner was acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, and therefore, sanction to prosecute under section 197, Criminal Procedure Code was necessary. It is his contention that from the allegations made out in the complaint, it could be concluded that the petitioner was acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, and therefore, sanction to prosecute under section 197, Criminal Procedure Code was necessary. He submits that the learned Magistrate was incorrect in dismissing his objection stated above. 3. Two questions arise while determining this contention viz., (0 What interpretation has to be placed on the words ‘acting’ or “purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty” contained in section 197, Criminal Procedure Code, and (2) At what stage this sanction should be filed. So far as the interpretation of the words ‘acting’ or “purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty” is concerned, it is now well settled by a series of decisions of the Supreme Court and also of various other High Courts that in order to attract the provisions of section 197, Criminal Procedure Code, it is to be considered as to whether the act complained of was so inter-related to the official duty that one can reasonably postulate that it was done by the accused in the performance of his official duty. Several decisions have used the phrases as “reasonable connection between the act and the official duty”, “inseparably connected”, “there must be something in the nature of the act complained of that attaches it to the official character of the person doing it”, and “integrally connected so as to be inseparable”. These expressions would show that the act complained of must have some nexus with the duty so as to give rise to a reasonable conclusion that it was done by the accused in the performance of his official duty. These expressions would show that the act complained of must have some nexus with the duty so as to give rise to a reasonable conclusion that it was done by the accused in the performance of his official duty. In Matdjog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari1, it has been held by the Supreme Court as follows: “There must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty; the act must bear such relation to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable, but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty.” Applying this principle it is to be judged whether the acts of the petitioner herein complained of are so inter-related to his official duty that it could reasonably be postulated that they were done by the accused in the performance of his official duty though possibly in excess of the needs and requirements of the situation. I do not wish to express any opinion on the merits of this case at this stage because the petitioner had already appeared before the High Court in two separate proceedings. It is brought to my notice that when the complaint was filed on 15th October, 1971, the Magistrate recorded the statement of the complainant and one Vishnu Murthy who is stated to be the driver of the jeep which took the petitioner and the police party to the house of the complainant. The Magistrate felt some doubt regarding the issue of process without hearing on the question of sanction. However, it is found that on the strength of the authorities cited by the complainant’s advocate, the Magistrate ordered the issue of process. The petitioner herein filed W.P. No. 4241 of 1971 against the order of the Magistrate taking cognizance of the case without the necessary sanction. The main ground taken in the writ petition was that sanction Was essential and the 1. 1956 S.C.J. 110: (1955) 2 S.C.R. 925 : (1956) 1 M.L.J. (S.C.) 79: 28 I.T.F. 941: A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 44. Magistrate was not correct in taking cognizance of the case without sanction. The main ground taken in the writ petition was that sanction Was essential and the 1. 1956 S.C.J. 110: (1955) 2 S.C.R. 925 : (1956) 1 M.L.J. (S.C.) 79: 28 I.T.F. 941: A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 44. Magistrate was not correct in taking cognizance of the case without sanction. My learned brother, M. Krishna Rao, J., repelled this argument and on a reading of the complaint, the learned Judge observed: “---------I agree that it does not disclose any allegations to Warrant the sanction of the complaint that the injuries were caused in the discharge of the duty of the Police Officers. It is not a case where the Police Officers had to use force to prevent a person from escaping.” Finally the learned Judge relying upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Nagraj v. State of Mysore1, held that the view taken by the Magistrate viz., that it was not necessary at that stage to consider the question of sanction which could be considered later from stage to stage when there is material on record to show that sanction was necessary, was correct. Aggrieved by this order, the petitioner filed W.A. No. 440 of 1971. A Bench of this Court dismissed the appeal by holding that the view taken by the learned Judge was not erroneous. In compliance with the directions of the learned judge in the order in the writ petition (W.P. No. 4241 of 1971), the petitioner filed Crl. M.P. No. 480 of 1971 before the Magistrate raising an objection that sanction under section 197, Criminal Procedure Code was necessary and the Court was incorrect in taking cognizance of the case without the requisite sanction. That petition, however, Was dismissed by the learned Magistrate. Aggrieved by the order of the Magistrate, the petitioner filed Crl.R.C.No.58 of 1972 before the High Court. By his order, dated 12th July, 1972, my learned brother, A.D.V. Reddy, J., dismissed the revision on the ground that as the petitioner himself did not want to proceed with the petition and had filed a memo, through his Advocate withdrawing the petition, it was not necessary for the Court to exercise its discretion under section 435 or section 439,Criminal Procedure Code and enquire into the matter. Once again on the same set of facts the petitioner has moved this Court under section 561-A, Criminal Procedure Code, with a prayer to quash the proceedings in P.R.C. No. 19 of 1971 for want of sanction. Having regard to the decisions of this Court, I am not inclined now to pass any order as there is not enough material placed on record warranting the same. A decision on merits would be cause prejudice to the accused and he would be completely debarred from raising this plea in future. Therefore I am of the opinion that having regard to the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in Matajog Dobey v. H.G. Bhari2, Nagraj v. State of Mysore1and Bhagwan Prasad Srivastava v. N.P. Mishra3, it Would be better if the accused raises this plea in future at an appropriate stage in the course of the proceedings when there is enough material warranting sanction to prosecute the petitioner. 4. So far as the question as to the stage at which the sanction is necessary is concerned, it is to be noted that a perusal of the provisions of section 197, Criminal Procedure Code, would show that sanction is necessary before the Magistrate takes cognizance of the case. The Words used in the section are, “no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction”. It is now well-settled that these words mean that when from the facts alleged in the compliant a case is made out ipso facto that a police officer had acted or purported to act in the discharge of his official duty and in so doing had committed some offence complained of, the Court will not entertain the complaint unless it appears that the sanction to prosecute the said police officer has been obtained. If the allegations in the complaint do not indicate, such facts, the Court can have no ground for looking to the sanction of the government and in the absence of such a sanction for refusing to entertain the complaint, and it must proceed with the complaint as if it is a complaint against any other person. In such a case, an occasion might arise for the Court when at a later stage of the proceeding it appears that the officer acted or purported to act in the discharge of his official duty, to stop the proceedings for want of sanction. In such a case, an occasion might arise for the Court when at a later stage of the proceeding it appears that the officer acted or purported to act in the discharge of his official duty, to stop the proceedings for want of sanction. This Was so held by the Supreme Court in Nagraj v. State of Mysore1, and the other rulings referred to above. 5. The next point for consideration is as to whether the acts of the petitioner in beating the complainant with a ruler on his face causing a bleeding injury and extracting a confession from him by threats when the petitioner was in police custody would not amount to an offence committed by the petitioner while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty. The law on this point also is fairly settled. In State of Maharashtra v. Atma Ram2, the Supreme Court has held: “The provisions of sections 161 and 163 of the Criminal Procedure Code emphasize the fact that a police officer is prohibited from beating or confining persons with a view to induce them to make statements. In view of the statutory prohibition it cannot, possibly be said that the acts complained of, in this case, are acts done by the respondents under the colour of their duty or authority. In our opinion, there is no connection, in this case between the acts complained of and the office of the respondent and the duties and obligations imposed on them by law. On the other hand, the alleged acts fall completely outside the scope of the duties of the respondents and they are not entitled therefore, to the mantle of protection conferred by section 161 (1) of the Bombay Police Act. On the other hand, the alleged acts fall completely outside the scope of the duties of the respondents and they are not entitled therefore, to the mantle of protection conferred by section 161 (1) of the Bombay Police Act. This view is borne out by the decision of this Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. N. Venugopal3, in which the effect of section 53 of the Madras District Police Act was construed by this Court and it was held that the protection of that section cannot be extended to police officers accused of beating a person suspected of a crime or confining him in the course of investigation.” I, therefore, conclude that whatever way the matter is looked at, it is not possible to hold on the basis of the allegations contained in the complaint that the acts alleged against the petitioner are such as could be regarded to have been committed by the petitioner while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties. However, it will be open to the petitioner to establish during the course of further proceedings when there is sufficient material on record that the requisite sanction under section 197, Criminal Procedure Code, must be obtained. At this stage, I find that no such sanction is necessary. 6. So far as the next contention is concerned viz., that the facts alleged in the complaint even if taken to be correct at their face value do not mate out the offences, it is to be noted that this point was already raised in Crl.R.C. No. 58 of 1972 referred to above which Was withdrawn by the petitioner without pressing this point. That apart, from a perusal of the complaint, I find that three acts on the part of the petitioner stand out prominently in the complaint viz., (1) beating the complainant with a ruler while the complainant was in police custody which obviously Would attract the provisions of section 323 or section 324, Indian Penal Code, (2) extracting a false confession from the complainant which would attract the provisions of section 330, Indian Penal Code and (3) wrongfully confining the complainant in the police station which is covered by section 365 or 367, Indian Penal Code. The learned Magistrate has taken cognizance of the case under sections 365, 367, 324 and 330, Indian Penal Code. The learned Magistrate has taken cognizance of the case under sections 365, 367, 324 and 330, Indian Penal Code. At the time of the framing of the charge, if any of these sections, however, are not found to be applicable, then the Court is empowered to frame a charge under different sections. It is now well settled that under section 561-A, Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under the section can quash the proceedings (1) if is found that because of a question of law that is involved, as for example obtaining of sanction, the case cannot be proceeded with, (2) when the facts alleged even if taken to be correct at their face value do not make out an offence, and (2) when the evidence produced by the complainant docs not show that any offence has been committed by the accused. I find that none of these circumstances are obtaining in the instant case. The case is still at the initial stage and the accused is at liberty to move this Court later for quashing the proceedings on any of the grounds mentioned above when there is some material on record. Thus this contention of the learned Advocate also fails. 7. The learned Advocate for the petitioner finally argued that the jurisdiction of the Magistrate under the Criminal Procedure Code is excluded because of the provisions of the Madras District Police Act. It is his case that under section 44 of the said Act, penalties for neglect of duty etc., are provided, and section 50 of the Act provides for the enquiry into charges against certain police officers. He submits that in such circumstances the petitioner cannot be tried by the Magistrate because under section 50 of the said Act any charge against a police officer above the rank of a constable under the Act shall be enquired into and determined only by an officer exercising the powers of a Magistrate and that the facts alleged in the complaint would show that the petitioner had committed an offence under the Madras District Police Act. I cannot accede to this contention because section 51 of the said Act specifically provides: “Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to prevent any person from being prosecuted for any offence made punishable on conviction by this Act or to prevent any person from being liable under any other law, Regulation or Act to any other or higher penalty or punishment than is provided for such offence by this Act: Provided always that no person shall be punished twice for the same offence”. It would be thus be seen that the prohibition is only to the extent that no person shall be punished twice for the same offence but it does not prohibit a person from being tried for any offence made punishable under the Madras District Police Act or any other law. A perusal of section 36 of the General Clauses Act (Central) would show that the provisions contained therein are in pari, materia with the provisions of section 51 of the Madras District Police Act. In Baliah v. Rangachari1, it has been held by the Supreme Court as follows: “Section 26 of the General Clauses Act states: 26. Provision as to offences punishable under two or more enactments-Where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two or more enactments, then the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished under either or any of those enactments, but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence”. 8. A plain reading of the section shows that there is no bar to the trial or conviction of the offender under both enactments but there is only a bar to the punishment of the offender twice for the same offence. In other words, the section provides that where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two enactments, the offender may be prosecuted and punished under either or both the enactments but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence. 9. Applying the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the above rulings, I find that the contention of the learned Advocate is not at all tenable. 9. Applying the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the above rulings, I find that the contention of the learned Advocate is not at all tenable. That apart, in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Venugopal2, it has been held by the Supreme Court that it cannot be said that beating a person suspected of a crime or confining him or sending him away in an injured condition by the police at a time when they were engaged in investigation are acts done or intended to be done under the provisions of the Madras District Police Act or Criminal Procedure Code or any other law conferring powers on the police and that section 53 of the Madras District Police Act has, therefore, no application to such a case. Hence I hold that the provisions of the Madras District Police Act do not apply to the facts of the instant case, and the objection raised by the learned Advocate has no force. 10. There is no substance in this petition and it is accordingly dismissed. A.B.K. ----- Petition dismissed.