JUDGMENT -This petition under article 227 of the Constitution of India was filed by a tenant of agricultural lands, bearing Gat No.7 admeasuring 3 acres 8 gunthas situate at Maparwadi and 6 other pieces of lands situate at Sinnar, admeasuring totally 4 acres II gunthas belonging to the landlord respondent No.1. The landlord obtained an exemption certificate under section 88C of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, on July 29, 1960. He applied for possession of the lands for personal cultivation under section 33· B of the Act. An order for possession was passed in the proceedings and was ultimately confirmed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal on August 20, 1953. 2. The petitioner made an application on August 31, 1963 to the Commissioner, Bombay Division, for revocation of the certificate on the ground that the income of the landlord exceeded Rs, 1,500. After issuing show cause notice to the landlord, the Commissioner by his order dated July 6, 1964-, revoked the certificate in exercise of the powers delegated to him under section83-D, as he found that the income of the landlord exceeded Rs. 1,500. 3. In the meanwhile, the Commissioner had stayed the execution of the orders under section 33-B. The tenant continued in possession of the lands till the Commissioner revoked the certificate. The landlord never challenged the validity of the revocation of the certificate. 4. Proceedings were, thereafter, started by the Additional Mamlatdar and Agricultural Lands Tribunal, Sinnar, under section 33-C read with sections 32-G to 32-R of the Act. The tenant relied on the order of the Commissioner revoking the certificate and contended that he had become the purchaser of the lands under section 32 and that the price should be determined under section 32-G. The Additional Mamlatdar upheld this contention and fixed the price and installments payable by the tenant. The landlord carried an appeal against the said decision. The Assistant Collector, Niphad Division, Nasik No.2, who heard the said appeal, refused to interfere with the order passed by the Additional Mamlatdar relying on the order of the Commissioner revoking the certificate under section 88-C of the Act. In a revision application filed by the landlord, the Tribunal set aside the said orders and remanded the· case to the trial Court for further inquiry under section 8B·D (2) but only in respect of Maparwadi land. 5. In a revision application filed by the landlord, the Tribunal set aside the said orders and remanded the· case to the trial Court for further inquiry under section 8B·D (2) but only in respect of Maparwadi land. 5. The order passed by the Tribunal is patently illegal as it is difficult understand how section 88-D (2) is attracted to the case. Section 88-D (2) applies only where any land ceases to be exempted under section 88-D (1) and further when the tenancy subsists on the date specified in the order issued under section 88-D(1). Both the conditions must exist. There is no doubt that the exemption of the land under section 88-C in the present case ended when the certificate was revoked. There was however, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, no possibility of the tenancy subsisting on the date on which the Commissioner passed the order for revocation. Once a certificate under section 88-C was revoked tenancy did not subsist because, in the facts of this case, the tenant immediately and automatically became in law the statutory purchaser of the land under section 32. Again it is urged on behalf of the petitioners· tenants that the landlord, not having challenged the order of revocation of the certificate passed by the Commissioner On July 6, 1964, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to sit in judgment over that order. "It is also submitted that execution of the orders passed under section 33·B having been stayed by the Commissioner, the orders became in fructuous after the Commissioner revoked the certificate. 6. Mr. Limaye, who appears for the landlord-respondent No. 1, sought to support the order passed by the Revenue Tribunal on the ground that although the reference to section 88·D (2) and the order of remand passed by the Revenue Tribunal cannot be justified, the orders passed by the Assistant Collector and the Agricultural Lands Tribunal were not supportable because the Commissioner had no jurisdiction to revoke the certificate after the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal had finally decided the application under section 33-B on August 20, 1963. In support of his argument, he relied on the decision of Deshpande, J. in Atmaram Onkar v. Ananda1. Mr. Abhale who appears for the petitioners on the other hand relied on my unreported decisions in Shivnarayan Balasaheb Bhaulal Jakhete v. Ramdas Ramchandra Patil and in Vilas Dattatraya Joshi v. Ramdas Dagadu Choudhari3. Mr. In support of his argument, he relied on the decision of Deshpande, J. in Atmaram Onkar v. Ananda1. Mr. Abhale who appears for the petitioners on the other hand relied on my unreported decisions in Shivnarayan Balasaheb Bhaulal Jakhete v. Ramdas Ramchandra Patil and in Vilas Dattatraya Joshi v. Ramdas Dagadu Choudhari3. Mr. Pratap, learned Assistant Government Pleader, supported Mr. Limayes argument and submitted that the said two cases decided by me are distinguishable on facts. He also submitted that the Commissioner had no power to revoke the certificate after the proceeding under section 33·Bhad become final with the passing of the order of the Revenue Tribunal directing possession to be delivered to the. landlord. 7. In view of these contentions, the first question which arises is as to whether the Commissioner could revoke the certificate granted to the landlord after the proceedings under section 33-B instituted by him concluded with an order for possession confirmed finally by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal on August 20, 1963. I find nothing in section 88·0 (1) (iv) which lays down any limitation on the powers of the Commissioner, exercising the powers of the State Government under that section to revoke the certificate. As a result of the revocation, all that happens is that certificated landlord ceases to be a (certificated landlord and becomes an ordinary landlord; and the excluded tenant becomes a tenant to whom sections 32 to 32·R will apply, in view of the definitions of these words contained in section 33-A. Once the certificate is revoked, section 32 would make the tenant the statutory purchaser with effect from the tillers day if the tenant was in possession of land on the tillers day. It is, therefore, difficult to appreciate the argument that merely because an order was passed under section 33-B by the Revenue Tribunal, the State Government or the Commissioner exercising powers of the State Government under section 88-D, were deprived of the powers to revoke the certificate. 8. In the two cases decided by me, I had to deal with a somewhat similar question and particularly the effect of the judgment of Deshpande, J, in Atmaram Onkar v. Ananda. 8. In the two cases decided by me, I had to deal with a somewhat similar question and particularly the effect of the judgment of Deshpande, J, in Atmaram Onkar v. Ananda. As observed by me in my judgment, in Shivnarayan Balasaheb Bhaulal Jakhete v. Ramdas Ramchandra Patil, "in Atmaram Onkar v. Ananda the order passed in exercise of the power of the Commissioner to revoke the certificate under section 88-D was challenged simultaneously with the order refusing possession under section 33B. before the High Court." In a case like the present one where the landlord never challenged the order of revocation of the certificate under section 88-C, passed by the Commissioner, the ratio of Atmarams case will not apply. 9. As stated above, there are no limitations on the powers of the Commissioner to revoke the certificate. If the argument of Mr. Limaye and Mr., Pratap is accepted, we would be adding words in section 88·D which do not exist in the Jaw. It would have been very easy for the Legislature to lay down that the powers of the Commissioner shall not be exercised if an order under section 33-B is passed. In the absence of such specific words in the section, it is not open to this Court to add words in that section. The foundation of an application under section 33-B is the right of the "certificated landlord" to terminate tenancy for pesonal cultivation. The application is liable to become in fructuous whenever a certificate is revoked by the Commissioner or the State Government under section 88-D. A somewhat similar view was taken by me in Vilas Dattatraya Joshi v. Ramdas Dagadu Choudhari, where also reliance was placed on Atmaram Onkar v. Ananda. 10. In making provisions for the exemption under section 88-C, the Legislature intended that only genuine small landholders whose income was less than Rs. 1,500 and the land leased by whom did not exceed the economic bolding, could claim that exemption. The Legislature, therefore, specifically laid down in section 88-D that any certificate granted under section 88·C could be revoked if, inter alia, the income or the economic holding exceeded the limits. 1,500 and the land leased by whom did not exceed the economic bolding, could claim that exemption. The Legislature, therefore, specifically laid down in section 88-D that any certificate granted under section 88·C could be revoked if, inter alia, the income or the economic holding exceeded the limits. The intention of the Legislature in making this provision was to confine the benefit only to real small holders falling within section 88-C. The intention of the Legislature was not to enable a landlord to deprive his tenant of the right to purchase by reveling in technicalities relating to the sources of his income or in falsehood and by getting wrong orders under section 88-C, which are liable to be revoked at any time by the Commissioner or the State Government. With very great respect to Deshpande, J. the somewhat different view expressed by him in Atmarams case cannot be applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case where the landlord did not challenge the revocation of the; certificate under section 88 C. Atmarams case must be confined to a case where a landlord successfully challenges the order of revocation in this Court on merits. 11. In the present case, the landlord has not challenged the order revoking the certificate passed by the Commissioner on any ground, at any time, before any authority. It is thus clear that he had accepted the verdict of the Commissioner. He is not a person entitled to the benefit of section 88-C. The provisions of sections 88-0 and 33-B were never intended to benefit such a, person. 12. For these reasons, the order passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal is quashed. The landlord has not challenged the price fixed by the, Agricultural Lands Tribunal before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. The; Assistant Collector had recorded a finding in his order observing: "As regards the price of the well and trees it is seen from the papers that there were panchas on behalf of the landlord and tenant at the time of panchanama. The panchas. after seeing the condition of the well arrived at a particular price of the well. The price of the well fixed by the panchas on behalf of the landlord is rather excessive. The panchas. after seeing the condition of the well arrived at a particular price of the well. The price of the well fixed by the panchas on behalf of the landlord is rather excessive. Further perusal of the lower Courts judgment shows that the Agricultural Lands Tribunal has correctly fixed .the price of the trees taking into consideration the produce therefrom." There is no error of law in the said finding. Hence the orders passed by the Agricultural Lands Tribunal and the Assistant Collector must be restored. Rule made absolute. No order as to costs. Rule made absolute.