Judgement JUDGMENT:- The short question that arises for determination, in this appeal filed by Mahabir Prasad Agarwalla under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, hereinafter called the Act, is whether the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Dibrugarh, was justified in its conclusion, recorded in its award dated 10-1-1970, that the Commonwealth Assurance Company Ltd.. Calcutta, was not liable to pay any part of the compensation, adjudged at Rs.4,000/-, made payable to Jiban Chandra Hazarika in respect of the death of the latters son Girish Chandra Hazarika who died on 25-1-1967 in a truck accident. 2. According to the findings reached by the Tribunal the truck No.ASE-2239 belonging to Mahabir Prasad, the appellant herein, was hired by about 52 students, both boys and girls, for a picnic party. The truck was driven by a driver of Mahabir Prasad when on its return journey from Dillighat, where the picnic was enjoyed, to Moranhat, from where the truck was engaged, it turned turtle while negotiating a bend on account of rash and negligent driving. A number of students were thrown out of truck but the unlucky Girish Chandra Hazarika was buried under the truck and crushed to death at the spot. The claimant Jiban Chandra Hazarika impleaded Mahabir Prasad, the owner of the truck, as also the Insurance Company in the claim petition. The total claim made was for Rs.25,000/-. 3. The claim was resisted both by Mahabir Prasad and the Insurance Company on the score, inter alia, that it was deceased and not the driver of the truck who was responsible for the ugly mishap. The company pleaded, in addition, that the motor vehicle being a goods truck the third party risk in respect of a passenger in the truck was not covered by the policy issued by it in favour of the owner of the truck, and as such the company was not obliged in law to share any part of the compensation awarded to the father of the deceased. 4. The Presiding Officer of the Tribunal fixed the total compensation at Rs.4,000/- but made it payable exclusively by Mahabir Prasad. 4. The Presiding Officer of the Tribunal fixed the total compensation at Rs.4,000/- but made it payable exclusively by Mahabir Prasad. In his opinion the Company was not liable since the truck was permitted to be used, in terms of the Insurance Policy, under a Private Carrier Permit within the meaning of the Act, and the policy did not cover use of the truck on hire and that the deceased was carried as a passenger in the truck against the payment of hire. 5. Mahabir Prasad having felt aggrieved with the finding of the Tribunal that the company was immune from any liability arising out of the accident, filed the instant appeal. His counsel, Sri S.K. Sen, urged that since the truck had been insured with the Company and the Tribunal has adjudged that the insurer is liable to pay compensation in the sum of Rs.4,000/- to the legal representative of the deceased student, the Tribunal went completely wrong in exonerating the Company from the liability to indemnify the insured. Sri P.G. Barua, representing the Company, submitted on the other hand that the Company is not liable to pay any part of the compensation either under the relevant provisions of the Act or in terms of the Insurance Policy. He cited a number of authorities to support his contention. 6. Chapter VIII of the Act is a complete code bearing on the insurance of motor vehicles against third party risk, and the parties counsel were agreed that answer to the controversy raised will have to be found from within the four corners of this Chapter and the insurance policy issued by the company respecting the truck involved in the accident. Section 94 of the Act sternly prescribes that no person shall use, except as a passenger, or cause or allow any other person to use a motor vehicle in a public place, unless there is in force in relation to the use of the vehicle by that person or that other person, as the case may be, a policy of insurance complying with the requirements of Chapter VIII. The requirements of the policy are set out in Section 95. The requirements of the policy are set out in Section 95. Sub-section (1) of that section states that in order to comply with the requirements of Chapter VIII, a policy of insurance must be a policy which is issued by an authorised insurer and "insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-section (2) against any liability which may be incurred by him or them in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place". This part of sub-section (1) is subject to three exceptions one of which, and with which alone we are concerned in the present case, states that a policy of insurance shall not be required "except where the vehicle is a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment, to Cover liability in respect of the death of or bodily injury to persons being carried in or upon or entering or mounting or alighting from the vehicle at the time of the occurrence of the event out of which a claim arises". Sub-section (2) of S.95 relates to the maximum extent of liability which the company shall cover while issuing the policy in respect of the various varieties of vehicles mentioned therein. Sub-section (5) of S.95 enjoins that notwithstanding anything elsewhere contained in any law, a person issuing a policy of insurance under Section 95 shall be liable to indemnify the person or classes of persons specified in the policy in respect of any liability which the policy purports to cover in the case of that person or those classes of persons. 7. 7. Sub-section (1) of S.96 states that if, after a certificate of insurance has been issued under sub-section (4) of S.95 in favour of the person by whom a policy has been effected, judgment in respect of any such liability as is required to be covered by a policy under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of S.95 (being a liability covered by the terms of the policy) is obtained against any person insured by the policy, then, notwithstanding that the insurer may be entitled to avoid or cancel or may have avoided or cancelled the policy, the insurer shall, subject to the provisions of Section 96, pay to the person entitled to the benefit of the decree any sum not exceeding the sum assured payable thereunder, as if he were the judgment-debtor, in respect of the liability, together with any amount payable in respect of costs. Sub-section (2) of the same section enacts that in order to make the insurer liable in respect of any judgment, a notice must be served on him through the Court respecting a proceeding in which the judgment is given, and it also prescribes what grounds of defence shall be open to the insurer in such proceeding. 8. Sub-section (2) of the same section enacts that in order to make the insurer liable in respect of any judgment, a notice must be served on him through the Court respecting a proceeding in which the judgment is given, and it also prescribes what grounds of defence shall be open to the insurer in such proceeding. 8. A combined reading of Ss.94, 95 and 96 clearly yields the following propositions:- (1) No person can use or cause or allow any other person to use a motor vehicle in a public place (except as a passenger) unless a policy of insurance in compliance with the requirements of Chapter VIII of the Act has been secured and is in force; (2) The policy of Insurance must contain a provision, inter alia, insuring the persons mentioned therein to the extent specified in sub-section (2) of Section 95 against the liability which may be incurred by the insured in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place; (3) The proposition at No.(2) is subject to certain exceptions and one of them is to the effect that a policy shall not be required to cover liability in respect of the death of or bodily injury to persons being carried in or upon or entering or mounting or alighting from the vehicle at the time of the occurrence of the event out of which a claim arises, unless the vehicle involved in the occurrence is one in which passengers are carried "for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment"; (4) A person issuing a policy of insurance under Section 95 shall be liable, notwithstanding anything elsewhere contained in any law, to indemnify the person or classes of persons specified in the policy in respect of any liability; which the policy purports to cover in the case of that person or those classes of persons. Note: This provision for indemnification obviously will come into operation after the insured has incurred and discharged a liability arising out of involvement of the motor vehicle concerned in some occurrence. It is not quite obvious in what manner and in which forum this indemnity clause shall be enforced but apparently it shall be enforceable by an action under Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code. It is not quite obvious in what manner and in which forum this indemnity clause shall be enforced but apparently it shall be enforceable by an action under Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code. (5) If the claimant before the Tribunal is desirous of enforcing his judgment secured against the insured against the insurer then he must serve a notice: through Court upon the insurer respecting the proceedings proposed to be instituted or instituted by him; and (6) The insurer shall have to satisfy the judgment secured by the claimant only if the judgment is in respect of such liability as is required to be covered by a policy under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 95 and that too if the liability is actually covered by the terms of the policy. 9. It is the last proposition which was relied upon by Sri Barua in support of the contention that the company is not liable to share the compensation awarded against the insured. After a careful and deep consideration of the provisions of Sections 95 and 96 and weighing the arguments addressed at the bar I have reached the conclusion that the submission made by Sri Barua must prevail. The obligation cast upon the insurer to satisfy the judgment secured by a claimant against the insured in respect of third party risks has to be spelled gut from the provisions of Sections 95 and 96 inasmuch as this duty is statutory and not purely contractual, and the only provisions of the Act which Sri S.K. Sen could bring to the notice of this Court are those enacted in the two sections just mentioned. Sub-section (1) of Section 96 unequivocally states that the claimant shall be entitled to enforce a judgment against the insured only if the judgment is "in respect of any such liability as is required to be covered by a policy under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 95 (being a liability covered by the terms of the policy)". Sub-section (1) of Section 96 unequivocally states that the claimant shall be entitled to enforce a judgment against the insured only if the judgment is "in respect of any such liability as is required to be covered by a policy under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 95 (being a liability covered by the terms of the policy)". The liability which is required to be covered by a policy under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 95 is, to use She words of clause (b), "which may be incurred by him (the person insured) or them (the classes of persons insured) in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place". This clause (b), it has to be emphasized, has three provisions appended to it, the second of which has been reproduced above, it alone being relevant for our purposes. That proviso states that a policy of insurance issued under Chapter VIII shall not require to cover liability in respect of the death of or bodily injury to persons being carried in or upon or entering or mounting or alighting from the vehicle at the time of the occurrence of the event out of which a claim arises, unless, of course, the vehicle involved in the occurrence is one in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment. It has not been disputed by Sri S.K. Sen Chat the truck involved in the event culminating in this appeal could be plied in terms of the policy only under a Private Carrier Permit within the meaning of the Act and that the truck was not meant for the carriage of passengers for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment. Therefore the insurer very obviously incurred no liability for either indemnifying the insured or paying to the claimant the compensation adjudged by the Tribunal against the insured. The persons which have taken me to this conclusion may be re-stated. Therefore the insurer very obviously incurred no liability for either indemnifying the insured or paying to the claimant the compensation adjudged by the Tribunal against the insured. The persons which have taken me to this conclusion may be re-stated. They are that (the obligation of the insurer to satisfy the judgment obtained by a claimant from the Tribunal arises only if the judgment is in respect of a liability which is required to be covered by clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 95, and the facts of the present case make it absolutely clear that the liability incurred.) if at all by any one, does not answer that description. The truck was not meant, nor was licensed, for carriage of passengers against hire, and in terms of the policy itself the insured was not permitted to use the truck for hire of passengers. The expression "private carrier", according to clause (22) of Section 2 of the Act, means an owner of a transport vehicle other than a public carrier who uses that vehicle solely for the carriage of goods which are his property or the carriage of which is necessary for the purposes of his business not being a business of providing transport, or who uses the vehicle for any of the purposes specified in sub-section (2) of Section 42. It is, therefore, manifest that the insured did not have the sanction of law to use the truck ASE-2239 for the purpose of carrying passenger on hire as he is proved to have done. As such his contention that the liability incurred by him in the present case must be discharged by the insurer is without merit and so has to be negatived. 10. The point at issue is not res integra. Identical question arose for decision in the case reported in AIR 1967 Punj 486 (FB), Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. v. Smt. Gurdev Kaur. The Punjab High Court held therein that "it is clear from the very terms of sub-section (1) of Section 96 that the liability of the insurer to pay to the person entitled to the benefit of any decree of the Tribunal is in regard to judgment in respect of such liability as is required to be covered by a policy under Cl.(b) of sub-section (1) of Section 95", and that the latter clause is subject to the provisos mentioned therein. "Apparently", the High Court observed further, "if the liability is not covered by clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 95, the question of any payment by the insurer pursuant to any judgment by the Tribunal does not arise". In the case before the Punjab High Court some owners of the goods carried in the truck and of which they were the passenger died as a result of the accident met by the truck and the Tribunal happened to conclude that the representatives of the deceased were entitled to get compensation from the insurers. On challenge by the insurer that finding of the Tribunal was set aside by the High Court on the basis that the judgment of the Tribunal was not "in respect of such liability as is required to be covered by a policy under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 95" read with the provisos appended thereto. The facts of the Punjab case are on all fours identical with those of the case in hand. The view of the Punjab High Court was endorsed by the Madras High Court in the case of South Indian Insurance Co. Ltd. v. P. Subramaniam, AIR 1972 Mad 49 . Sri Sen was unable to cite any authority to the contrary bearing on the interpretation of Sections 95 and 96. 11. Before concluding I would like to refer, in brief, to an argument raised by Sri Sen respecting the interpretation of S.110-B of the Act. That section reads: "On receipt of an application for compensation made under Section 110-A, the Claims Tribunal shall, after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, hold an enquiry into the claim and may make award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just and specifying the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid; and in making the award the Claims Tribunal shall specify the amount which shall be paid by the insurer". The point urged by Sri Sen was that in view of the legislative injunction issued to the Tribunal that it must specify in its award the amount which shall be paid by the insurer, it was the bounden duty of the Tribunal that it should apportion the compensation adjudged between the insured and insurer. The point urged by Sri Sen was that in view of the legislative injunction issued to the Tribunal that it must specify in its award the amount which shall be paid by the insurer, it was the bounden duty of the Tribunal that it should apportion the compensation adjudged between the insured and insurer. I think that the contention of Sri Sen is not borne out by the plain words of the relevant part of the Section. The Tribunal is required not to apportion the compensation between the insured and insurer but only to specify the amount, out of the total compensation fixed, which shall be paid by the insurer. Indeed the legislature could not have prescribed any such apportionment as has been pressed for by Sri Sen. The reason for it is that the liability of the insured arises directly out of the tort committed by him or vicariously for the tort committed by his employee who was at the wheel of the vehicle concerned at the time of occurrence giving rise to the claim, while liability of the insurer is primarily statutory, or, at the best, statutory-cum-contractual since the insurance policy issued by it has to be looked into for determining the extent of his liability. It looks obvious to me that the liability of tort-feaser is plenary and that of the insurer is limited by the statutory provisions read in the background of the terms of the policy issued by him. It follows that the claimant in the present case has the sanction of law to realise the entire amount of the compensation from the tort-feaser though the latter has been given right by sub-section (5) of Section 95 to claim indemnification from the insurer, to the extent admissible, if he has paid the amount to the claimant. Sub-section (1) of S.96 only gives an alternative remedy to the claimant to realise the compensation money from the insurer but only to the extent mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 95. Nothing said in Chapter VIII of the Act demands of the Tribunal that it must apportion the amount of compensation between the insured and the insurer; Section 110-B only requires him to specify the amount which shall be paid by the insurer out of the total compensation adjudged. Nothing said in Chapter VIII of the Act demands of the Tribunal that it must apportion the amount of compensation between the insured and the insurer; Section 110-B only requires him to specify the amount which shall be paid by the insurer out of the total compensation adjudged. The wording of Section 110-B does not warrant the conclusion that the Tribunal can pare down the liability of the insured, the tort-feaser. The objective behind the enactment of Chapter VIII was only to ensure that if the insured happens to be insolvent then the injured, or his legal representatives in the event of his decease, should not be thrown on the road, and that the injured or his legal representatives, as the case may be, should be guaranteed, realization of a part of the compensation if not the whole of it. 12. In the result this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.