Judgment :- 1. Very shortly stated, the question that arises in this petition is about the scope and the ambit of the powers vested in the Government under S.33C(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). While there is no dearth of authority on the scope of S.33C(2), the only decision specifically under S.33C(1) brought to my notice is that in Sawatram Ramprasad Mills Company Ltd., Akola v. Baliram Ukandaji and another (1966 I.L.L.J 41). I shall advert to this decision in due course, but shall start by dealing with the latest pronouncement of the Supreme Court which is in R. B. Bansilal Abirchand Mills Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. The Labour Court, Nagpur & others etc. (AIR 1972 SC. 451) The specific question that arose for decision therein was about the power of the Labour Court under S.33C(2) of the Act. The main contention that was raised was, that the employer having taken up the stand that there was a closure of the factory and the question in substance according to the employer being whether there was such a closure or not, that the Labour Court had no, jurisdiction to deal . with the question as to whether lay-off compensation could be paid to the employees on the contention of the employees that there was in fact only a layoff and not a closure being accepted by the Labour Court. Reference was made by Mr. Gupta who argued the case to various sections of the Act, particularly to Schedule Three, item 10, giving power to the Industrial Tribunal to deal with retrenchment and closure and to the powers vested with the Labour Court by virtue of S.7 of the Act read with Schedule Two to the Act. It was urged that the closure being a matter exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal, a matter apparently to be dealt with by the Tribunal, on a reference to it under S.10(1) of the Act, the Labour Court could not be deemed to have the same power when the powers of the two authorities are limited and delineated by the sections and the schedules to the Act. This contention was negatived by the Supreme Court. This contention was negatived by the Supreme Court. It was held that the question was whether there was a lay-off or not and it was further held that though lay-off is not one of the specific subjects mentioned in Schedule Two to the Act, S.7 conferred on the Labour Court not only powers enumerated in Schedule Two but also such other functions as may be assigned to them under the Act. It was taken that by the wording of S.33C any question of any benefits arising from the provisions under Chapter V-A in which S.25C dealing with compensation occurred, could be dealt with under S.33C(2). A mere assertion by the employer that there was no lay-off and that there was really a closure was not sufficient to oust the jurisdiction of the Labour Court. If the Labour Court on investigation came to the conclusion that what happened was merely a lay-off and not a closure it had jurisdiction to act under S.33C(2) and determine the monetary benefit due to the employees. This was the main point that was decided in the case. But I consider the case also an authority regarding the scope of the enquiry in proceedings initiated by workmen under S.33C(2) of the Act. Though as early as in 1964 a Bench of five judges of the Supreme Court in The Central Bank of India Ltd. v. P. S. Rajagopalan etc. (AIR. 1964 SC 743) decided that (he Labour Court acting under S.33C(2) had the power not only to compute the money equivalent of a benefit admittedly due to a workman, but had also the power to decide whether, in fact, such a benefit existed, some doubts were cast because of certain observations in certain subsequent cases. In U. P. Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. R. K. Shukla and others (AIR. 1970 SC 237) the Supreme Court expressed the view that where the real dispute was whether workmen had been retrenched or not and the computation of the amount was only a subsidiary or incidental matter the Labour Court had no authority to trespass upon the powers of the Tribunal and decide the question as to whether there was retrenchment or not. This decision was distinguished by the Supreme Court in Ramakrishna Ramnath v. The Presiding Officer, Nagpur and another ((1970) 2 LLJ. 306) by observing that the observations made in U. P. Electric Supply Co. This decision was distinguished by the Supreme Court in Ramakrishna Ramnath v. The Presiding Officer, Nagpur and another ((1970) 2 LLJ. 306) by observing that the observations made in U. P. Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. R. K. Shukla and others (AIR. 1970 SC. 237) "cannot be considered dissociated from the setting in which they were made. In a later pronouncement of the Supreme Court in R. B. Bansilal Abirchand' Mills Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. The Labour Court, Nagpur and others (AIR 1972 SC 451) already referred to, it was said that the observation in U. P. Electric Supply Co-Ltd. v. R. K. Shukla and others (AIR 1970 SC 237) "cannot be considered binding on us as all the aspects were not placed before the Court then". 2. In view of these decisions there can be little doubt that the question as regards the existence of a right can also be dealt with under S.33C(2) of the Act by the Labour Court on appropriate applications being made before that court. The principles are summarised in the decision in East India Coal Company, Ltd., Bararee Colliery, Dhanbad v. Rameshwar and others ((1968) 1 LLJ. 6) under eight different heads. This decision has been noticed by the Supreme Court and approved in Ramakrishna Ramnath v. The Presiding Officer, Nagpur and another ((1970) 2 LLJ. 306) as well as in R. B. Bansilal Abirchand Mills Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. The Labour Court, Nagpur and others etc. (AIR. 1972 SC 451). It is useful to read at this stage the principles,1 and 2 as enunciated in East India Coal Company, Ltd. Bararee Colliery, Dhanbad v. Rameshwar and others ((1968) 1 LLJ. 6): "(1) The legislative history Indicates that the legislature, after providing broadly for the investigation and settlement of disputes on the basis of collective bargaining, recognized the need of individual workmen of a speedy remedy to enforce their existing individual rights and therefore inserted S.33A in 1950 and S.33C in 1956. These two sections illustrate cases in which individual workmen can enforce their rights without having to take recourse to S.10(1) and without having to depend on their union to espouse their case. (2) In view of this history two considerations are relevant while construing the scope of S.33C. These two sections illustrate cases in which individual workmen can enforce their rights without having to take recourse to S.10(1) and without having to depend on their union to espouse their case. (2) In view of this history two considerations are relevant while construing the scope of S.33C. Where industrial disputes arise between workmen acting collectively any their employers, such disputes must be adjudicated upon in the manner prescribed by the Act, as for instance, under S.10(1). But, having regard to the legislative policy to provide a speedy remedy to individual workmen for enforcing their existing rights, it would not be reasonable to exclude their existing rights sought to be implemented by individual workmen. Therefore, though in determining the scope of S.33C care should be taken not to exclude cases which legitimately fall within its purview, cases which fall for instance under S.10(1), cannot be brought under S.33C." It is unnecessary for me to examine in what circumstances a case can be said to fall under S.10(1) and when it can legitimately be brought under S.33C(2), for, in the case before me, there has been no application under S.33C(2); there have been only applications under S.33C(1). 4. Passing on to S.33C(1), there is an observation in Sawatram Rampra-sad Mills Company, Ltd., Akola v. Baliram Ukandaji and another (19661 LLJ. 41) that if the question as to whether there was lay-off or not arose before the authority functioning under S.33C(1), (the delegated authority in that case appears to have been the Labour Court) that question can be determined by that authority. But there is the categorical enunciation of the principle in East India Coal Company. Ltd., Bararee Colliery, Dhanbad v. Rameshwar and others ((1968) 1 LLJ. 6) that S.33C (1) is only an enabling provision for speedy recovery of amounts due to workmen under an award or settlement or under Chapter V-A of the Act the quantum of which are definitely known. I may revert to the decision in East India Coal Company Ltd, Bararee Colliery, Dhanbad v. Rameshwar and others ((1968) 1 LLJ 6) and extract principles 3 and 4 enunciated in that decision: "(3) S.33C which is in terms similar to those in S.20 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal; Act, 1950, is a provision in the nature of an executing provision. (4) S.33C(1) applies to cases where money is due to a workman under an award or settlement or under Chap. V-A of the Act already calculated and ascertained and therefore there is no dispute about its computation. But Sub-s. (2) applies both to non-monetary as well as monetary benefits. In the case of monetary benefit it applies where such benefit though due is not calculated and there is a dispute about its calculation. This decision, as I said earlier, has apparently been approved by the Supreme Court in its recent pronouncements in Ramakrishna Ramnath v. The Presiding Officer, Nagpur and another ((1970) 2 LLJ. 306) and in R. B. Bansilal Abirchand Mills Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. The Labour Court, Nagpur and others etc. (AIR 1972 SC 451). This must therefore be taken to be the scope and ambit of S.33C(1). In the light of the above, I have to examine whether the applications that have been, made by a large number of alleged workmen of the petitioner are sustainable under S.33C(1), It is necessary at this stage to refer to the industry in which the petitioner was engaged. The firm called Mangalore Ganesh Beedi Works was engaged in beedi manufacturing. It is their story that due to the additional amenities which the State Government felt must be afforded to the workmen in this industry they were compelled to cease operating in the Kerala State and shift their undertakings to other States. This attitude on the part of the petitioner, it is alleged in the affidavit, has been frowned upon by the Government and there are further averments made against the Minister for Labour and generally against the Government that they were bent upon persecuting the petitioner when the firm did not respond to suggestions from the authorities that it should continue to operate within the State. The applications that were said to have been made before the Labour Officer, it was alleged, were not actually made and that the notice Ext. P6 impugned in this case is said to be only a reflection of the attitude of the Government and it is further alleged that the Labour Court was merely carrying out the behest of the Government. P6 impugned in this case is said to be only a reflection of the attitude of the Government and it is further alleged that the Labour Court was merely carrying out the behest of the Government. All these allegations, T consider, are irrelevant for the purpose of this case and cannot be gone into on the merits for the simple reason that neither the Government nor the Minister who, it is said, threatened the petitioner, is made a party to this petition. I shall therefore ignore these allegations. The material allegation is only then that the applicants before the Labour Court were never the employees of the petitioner. In the petition in Para.2 and 3, it has been categorically stated that there has been no employer-employee relationship with any of the alleged applicants before the Labour Officer. Only two workmen have been made respondents to this petition and they are respondents 2 and 3. Though they are represented by counsel who ably assisted me on the case law on the subject they have not chosen to file any counter affidavit denying the averments in Para.2 and 3. They are the best judges of the situation as to whether they are workmen of this employer or not. The Labour Officer who has filed a counter has not advisedly, chosen to take any definite stand as to whether they were workmen or not. He. I think rightly, dealt with it as a matter to be investigated. It is in the light of these facts that the question as to whether in an application before the authority under S.33C(1) such matter can be decided, will have to be determined. From what I have been able to glean from the decisions on the subject, already referred to, it appears to me that S.33C(1) does not empower the authority under that section to investigate any such matters. The section, as was pointed out in the decision in East India Coal Company Ltd, Bararee Colliery, Dhanbad v. Rameshwar and others ((1968) 1 LLJ 6) is more in the nature of a section providing for execution. The section, as was pointed out in the decision in East India Coal Company Ltd, Bararee Colliery, Dhanbad v. Rameshwar and others ((1968) 1 LLJ 6) is more in the nature of a section providing for execution. If the analogy of execution can be carried on a little further there must be an admission of a liability or there must be a settlement or an award or there must be a clear indication, that the provisions in Chapter V-A of the Act would admittedly apply to a given case before a certificate can be issued by the Government under S.35C(1). I therefore consider that no proceedings can be continued by the first respondent pursuant to the notice Ext. P-6 that he had issued. 5. I must refer to one other aspect, a point that has been taken in this petition. S.33C(1) mentions the Government as the authority empowering to issue the certificate. The Government purporting to act under S.39 of the Act issued a notification empowering the District Labour Officers to exercise the powers vested with the Government under S.33C(1) of the Act. It is contended that the satisfaction required by the Act before issuing the certificate is that of the Government and such a power conferred by the Act on the Government cannot be delegated under S.39 of the Act to anybody else. In the view that I have taken that even the Government have no power to decide the questions as to whether there has been an employer-employee relationship or not and whether there has been a retrenchment and therefore compensation was payable under S.25FFF of the Act, I need not deal with this aspect in this judgment. 6. Before closing, I must refer to the fact that the employment in this industry is of a peculiar nature. All the persons engaged at one stage or other in the manufacture of Beedi are not employees of the person who finances the operation and makes available tobacco and Beedi leaves out of which the Beedies are manufactured. This has been noticed by me in a recent judgment. A paragraph from the judgment in (1972 KLT 191) may be extracted, "6. The beedi industry is of a peculiar nature. This has been noticed by me in a recent judgment. A paragraph from the judgment in (1972 KLT 191) may be extracted, "6. The beedi industry is of a peculiar nature. Though there are certain premises which may be termed industrial premises which are registered under the Factories Act where the work of manufacturing of 'beedi' is carried on, a large percentage of the work in connection with the manufacturing process of this article is not carried on in factories registered under the Factories Act nor at specified places of business; but according to the convenience of those engaged in the manufacturing process in their own houses during leisure hours and as it suited them or at other places which are found convenient to them. Two bigger manufacturers merely supplied the material and engaged contractors; who, by and large, it appears, were truly independent contractors. There are two methods employed in so engaging con tractors. Some as in the case of the petitioner in O. P. No. 3307 of 1968 sold their raw material to the contractor and when the contractor produced the finished article purchased that article from the contractor. Very often this is merely a book adjustment, but the formality of a sale and repurchase were gone through. The majority however engaged independent contractors and entrusted them with the raw material and asked them to produce the finished products. The contractors so engaged very seldom did the work of manufacturing beedies themselves. Very few of them had industrial premises of their own and very few of them engaged labour in the sense of supervising and controlling their work, Almost invariably they entrusted the work to others who were most often home workers and occasionally the work was entrusted to workers other than home workers. These workers whether they were home workers or other workers had bo fixed hours of work. Their manner of doing the work was never controlled or supervised by the contractor, The agreement between the contractor and the labour employed was merely that the finished products must be produced by using the raw material given to them and the finished products must be of standard quality. They were at liberty to work as they pleased. At home very often many, if not all, the members of the family took part in the manufacturing process. They were at liberty to work as they pleased. At home very often many, if not all, the members of the family took part in the manufacturing process. This manufacturing process, in many States in India, is therefore in the nature of a cottage industry which from the very nature of things required an intermediary. There are of course a few very prosperous beedi manufacturers who controlled the business in different areas. But the way in which they carried out the manufacture is as indicated above. To make the picture complete I must also refer to one other method which is really in the nature of a camouflage to screen the true nature of the relationship between the manufacturer and his employees. That was by resort to engaging a manager or some other person who has been termed as a contractor by the manufacturer. Really he is an independent contractor. He is so called for the purpose of making it appear that the labour is employed by him. This is to avoid the liabilities that may accrue to the real employer who is the manufacturer towards wages and other amenities that are to be given to workers. This method of engaging labour, or perhaps it will be better to use the expression exploiting labour, has been frowned upon by the State and legislation has been brought in to avoid the evils of such a system." 7. In the complex nature of the industry as indicated above, the question posed in Para.2 and 3 of this petition raises fundamental issues which I conceive are not intended to be dealt with in a summary enquiry where a mere satisfaction on a prima facie basis as to whether any benefit that accrued to the workmen have been denied to them arises for determination. 8. I therefore set aside the notice Ext. P-6 and direct the first respondent not to proceed with applications said to have been received from the workmen. I need hardly say that this judgment will not prevent the workmen from seeking such remedies as may be available to them. There will be no order as to costs.