Judgment 1. This revision application is directed against an order dated the 10th November, 1971 passed by the Munsif Magistrate. Sitamarhi allowing the petition filed by the Public Prosecutor for withdrawal of the prosecution and discharge of the accused-opposite party in the case pending before him. 2. The facts necessary for the disposal of the present application are as follows: On the 27th July, 1970 a first information report was lodged by petitioner Shital Singh at Sitamarhi Police Station against the accused-opposite party, for offences under Sections 307 and 380 of the Indian Penal Code. The case lodged by the informant in short was that a woman raised some cry that Mithua Nonias son had been killed by the son of the first informant. On this alarm, a big mob consisting of the accused persons and others variously armed came to the Darwaja of the informant and began to damage the tiles of the house with lathis. The allegation further is that the accused Baldeo Nonia gave orders to loot away the shop of the informant and Nawal Kishore gave orders to kill the informant. Thereupon some of the accused persons assaulted the informant with Lathi and he was pressed against the wall. The accused also pointed a Bhala towards his chest and his nephew was also assaulted. The accused thereafter looted away articles from the shop and the Dalan of the informant. They also looted articles from the Dalan and house of the other two petitioners, Kapildeo Singh and Rajmangal Singh. The police after investigation submitted charge-sheet and after cognizance the case was transferred to the file of the Munsif Magistrate for disposal. Before him on the 24th September 1971 a petition was filed by the Public Prosecutor under Sec. 494 of the Code of Criminal Procedure withdrawing the prosecution. An objection petition was filed by the petitioners on the same date opposing the withdrawal on a number of grounds raised in the petition. They also alleged that the withdrawal was mala fide and not supported by reasons of the State and public policy and that it was calculated or intended to interfere with the due course of justice. An objection petition was filed by the petitioners on the same date opposing the withdrawal on a number of grounds raised in the petition. They also alleged that the withdrawal was mala fide and not supported by reasons of the State and public policy and that it was calculated or intended to interfere with the due course of justice. Thereafter a supplementary petition was filed by the Public Prosecutor on the 27th October, 1971 the relevant portion of which may be quoted : "That I have also looked into the case diary and the papers of the case and I am satisfied that the case is fit to be withdrawn." The petitioners thereafter filed another objection petition on the 30th October, 1971 alleging that no reason of State or public policy had been disclosed so as to justify the petition for withdrawal of the prosecution. Thereafter the learned Munsif Magistrate passed the impugned order. 3. Mr. Kailash Roy learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, has urged that the learned Magistrate has acted illegally in allowing the withdrawal petition even when no material was placed before him to satisfy that the withdrawal was for reasons of the State and in the interest of the public policy. He has also urged that the impugned order suffers from the fact that the order proceeds on the footing that once a petition under Sec. 494 of the Code for withdrawal of the prosecution is filed the Court has to allow it as a matter of course. 4. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the State on the other hand, has contended that the learned Magistrate, in the last paragraph of his order, has stated that he was satisfied that the withdrawal of the prosecution was in the interest of public policy for reasons of the State and therefore he was not in error in allowing withdrawal. 5. The facts of the case as discussed above prima facie do not bring out any material from which an inference may necessarily follow that the withdrawal was in the interest of the State or on the ground of public policy. The petitioners prayed before the Court for directing that the Public Prosecutor should indicate to the Court as to what was the matter of State Policy in a case of the present nature between the petitioners and the opposite party-accused. The petitioners prayed before the Court for directing that the Public Prosecutor should indicate to the Court as to what was the matter of State Policy in a case of the present nature between the petitioners and the opposite party-accused. In the petition for withdrawal filed on the 24th September, 1971 what is stated is as follows:- "(1) That the prosecution now does not want to proceed with the case on ground of State and public policy. (2) That State Government too has decided not to proceed with the case taking into consideration inexpediency of prosecution for reasons of State and public policy." In the supplementary petition filed by the Public Prosecutor on behalf of the State, a portion of which I have already quoted, nothing is stated from which an inkling may be had as to in what manner and on what ground that withdrawal of the prosecution could have any relation or connection with the reasons of the State policy. It is also not the contention on behalf of the State that the reasons were such as could not be disclosed in the interest of the State. It also appears from the police charges-sheet that a large number of eye-witnesses are there in the instant case. In that view of the matter simply the fact that the learned Magistrate has mentioned that the withdrawal of the prosecution is reasonable and bona fide for the reasons of the State cannot be sufficient to sustain this order. Legal position in this regard has also finally been settled by a recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of M. N. S Nair V/s. P. V. Bala Krishnan. AIR 1972 SC 496 : (1972 Cri LJ 301) a portion of which may usefully be quoted :- "A reading of Sec. 494 would show that it is the Public Prosecutor who is in charge of the case that must ask for permission of the Court to withdraw from the prosecution of any person either generally or in respect of one or more of the offences for which he is tried. This permission can be sought by him at any stage either during the enquiry or after committal or even before the judgment is pronounced. This permission can be sought by him at any stage either during the enquiry or after committal or even before the judgment is pronounced. The section does not however indicate the reasons which should weigh with the Public Prosecutor to move the Court for permission nor the grounds on which the Court will grant or refuse permission. Though the section is in general terms and does not circumscribe the powers of the Public Prosecutor to seek permission to withdraw from the prosecution the essential consideration which is implicit in the grant of the power is that it should be in the interest of administration of justice which may be either that it will not be able to produce sufficient evidence to sustain the charge or that subsequent information before prosecuting agency would falsify the prosecution evidence or any other similar circumstances which it is difficult to predicate as they are dependent entirely on the facts and circumstances of each case. Nonetheless it is the duty of the Court also to see in furtherance of justice that the permission is not sought on grounds extraneous to the interest of justice or that offences which are offences against the State go unpunished merely because the Government as a matter of general policy or expediency unconnected with its duty to prosecute offenders under the law directs the public prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecution and the Public Prosecutor merely does so at its behest. A large number of cases have been referred to but it is unnecessary to consider them except for a few as typifying the approach in cases where permission to withdraw from the prosecution was sought on grounds extraneous to and not germane to the maintenance and enforcement of the law and which permission though given by the trial Court, was quashed by the High Court." Their Lordships further observed: - "It appears to us that the wide and general powers which are conferred under Sec. 494 on the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecution though they are subject to the permission of the Court have to be exercised by him in relation to the facts and circumstances of that case in furtherance of rather than as a hindrance to the object of the law and justified on the material in the case which substantiate the grounds alleged not necessarily from those gathered by the judicial method but on other materials which may not be strictly on legal or admissible evidence. The Court also while considering the request to grant permission under the said Section should not do so as a necessary formality - the grant of it for the mere asking. It may do so only if it is satisfied on the materials placed (before it that the grant of it subserves the administration of justice and that permission was not being sought covertly with an ulterior purpose unconnected with the vindication of the law which the executive organs are in duty bound to further and maintain." 6. From the discussions above it is apparent that the order of the learned Magistrate does not fulfil the test laid down by the Supreme Court for allowing withdrawal from the prosecution and the impugned order therefore has got to be quashed. I accordingly allow this application and quash the order of the learned Magistrate dated the 10th November, 1971. The result of my order is that the prosecution against the accused opposite party must proceed. I further feel that the case should better proceed in the court of a competent Magistrate at the station, other than Shree Rajaram Singh who has expressed some kind of opinion in this case.