Surendra Chandra Biswas v. Ananga Kishore Bhattacharjee
1972-07-10
B.N.SARMA, D.M.SEN
body1972
DigiLaw.ai
Judgement SARMA, J. :- This is an appeal by the defendant, who lost in both the Courts below, and it arises out of a suit for declaring the plaintiffs jote right and title over the suit land and for recovery of possession. 2. The plaintiffs case, in brief, was that he along with pro forma defendant No. 4 Shyama Charan Bagchi took jote settlement of 2 drones of land appertaining to touji No. 17 of taluk No. 24 standing in the name of Dwarikanath Chakraborty from the superior landlords at an yearly rental of Rs. 29.75 including road cess. Thereafter the jote land was partitioned between the plaintiff and proforma defendant No. 4 and in that partition the plaintiff got 1 drone and 9 kanis of land, for which a separate touji No. 31 was created and he had been all along in possession of the land since the settlement paying rent to his landlord. About 3/4 years before the institution of the suit one Kirton Tanti who was pro forma defendant No. 3 and who is since dead, was permitted to occupy about 10 gandas of land within the plaintiffs share by constructing a house thereon. Said Kiron Tanti resided there for some years and then surrendered the house and the land in favour of the plaintiff. After this the principal defendant, it is alleged, trespassed into the said land on 4-3-64 B. S. denying the title of the plaintiff. Under the circumstances, the plaintiff filed the suit for the reliefs, as mentioned above. 3. The suit was contested by the appellant by filing a written statement. It was not denied by him in his written statement that the plaintiff and pro forma defendant No. 4 took settlement of 2½ drones of land in taluk No. 24 standing in the name of Dwarikanath Chakraborty from the superior landlords and that subsequently the jote was partitioned between the plaintiff and pro forma defendant No. 4 as alleged in the plaint. According to the defendant, he took korfa settlement of the suit land from one Suradhani Devi and he purchased the house from one Jatindra Nag to whom it Was sold by Kirton Tanti after he had relinquished the land to Suradhani Devi. It may be mentioned that according to the defendant, Kirton Tanti occupied the land as licensee under the said Suradhani Devi. 4.
It may be mentioned that according to the defendant, Kirton Tanti occupied the land as licensee under the said Suradhani Devi. 4. Upon the pleadings, several issues were framed including two issues, namely, whether the plaintiff had the right, title and interest over the suit land and whether he is entitled to khas possession over the same, which were issues (4) and (3) respectively. 5. The learned Munsiff issued a survey commission to ascertain whether the suit land is attracted by the plaintiffs jote or by that of the defendant. The Commissioner after local investigation submitted a report that the suit land is included in the plaintiffs jote. On a consideration of the evidence adduced by the parties including the report of the Commissioner, the learned Munsiff answered all the issues in favour of the plaintiff and accordingly he decreed the suit on 27-9-1959. Against that decree, the defendant took an appeal before the District Judge and the latter, having found that the investigation by the Survey Commissioner was not satisfactory, remanded the suit with a direction to issue a fresh commission which was duly complied with. On the second occasion also the Survey Commissoner, after local investigation, reported that the suit land is attracted by the plaintiffs jote, though he found that there was some discrepancy between the area and boundary and accordingly the suit was again decreed by the learned Munsiff with costs. In the first appeal the learned District Judge having affirmed this decree, the defendant has come up with the present second appeal. 6. The only contention of Mr. M. R. Choudhury, the learned counsel for the appellant, before us was that the learned Courts below acted illegally in admitting and relying on the unregistered Amalnama (Ext. P-4). which is legally not admissible in evidence. In elaborating this contention, it was submitted by him that at the time of alleged execution of the Amalnama (Ext. P-4) Tripura Registration Act was in force and not the Indian Registration Act and that in view of the provisions of Section 12 of the Tripura Registration Act, such a document, if not registered, is of no consequence and it cannot be used for any purpose in accordance with law.
P-4) Tripura Registration Act was in force and not the Indian Registration Act and that in view of the provisions of Section 12 of the Tripura Registration Act, such a document, if not registered, is of no consequence and it cannot be used for any purpose in accordance with law. It was further submitted that there being no provision in the Tripura Registration Act, analogous to those of the proviso to Section 49 of the Indian Registration Act, such a document cannot be used even for a collateral purpose. 7. Mr. Ghosh, the learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submitted that an Amalnama is neither a kabuliyat nor a patta, but only an authority to possess the land on the understanding that kabuliyat would be executed in future and as such, the provisions of Clauses (Na) and (Ta) of Section 12 of the Tripura Registration Act are not attracted. In support of this contention, Mr. Ghosh relied on the decision in Lakshan Chandra Mandal v. Takim Dhali, (1924) 28 Cal WN 1033 : (AIR 1924 Cal 558) where it was held that "an amalnama, which in essence only authorises the grantee to take possession and is intended to be followed by a formal kabuliyat, is neither a lease nor an agreement to lease within the meaning of Section 3 of the Indian Registration Act and is consequently admissible in evidence without registration". 8. To appreciate the respective contentions of the counsel for the parties, as mentioned above, it will be helpful to reproduce the relevant provisions of Section 12 of the Tripura Registration Act. This Act is in Bengali language. The English translation of the relevant provisions of Section 12 will be as follows : S. 12. No action whatsoever in accordance with law can be taken on the following documents, if they are not registered. (Ka) Instruments of gift of immoveable property : (Kha) Except will, all instruments relating to immoveable property, which purport or operate to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest worth more than Rs. 20/-; (Na) Kabuliyat or Patta for a period of more than one year : (Ta) Kabuliyat or Patta for a period of less than one year if the rent is worth Rs. 100/- or more. 9. In our opinion, although the Amalnama (Ext.
20/-; (Na) Kabuliyat or Patta for a period of more than one year : (Ta) Kabuliyat or Patta for a period of less than one year if the rent is worth Rs. 100/- or more. 9. In our opinion, although the Amalnama (Ext. P-4) is neither a kabuliyat nor a patta as mentioned in clauses (Na) and (Ta) of Section 12 of the Tripura Registration Act, it attracts the provisions of Clause (Kha) of the said section inasmuch as it purports to create some right, at least possessory right, in favour of the plaintiff and such interest is worth more than Rs. 20/-. In view of the provisions of Clause (Kha) as mentioned above, we have no hesitation to hold that such an Amalnama is compulsorily registrable. 10. We now come to the question whether the Courts below were justified in admitting in evidence the said Amalnama (Ext P-4). 11. Unlike Section 17 of the Indian Registration Act which simply enumerates the documents which are registrable along with some of their exceptions. Section 12 of the Tripura Registration Act, besides enumerating such documents contains a disabling clause that if such documents are not registered, no action whatsoever in accordance with law can stem out of the same or, in other words, such documents cannot be used for any purpose in accordance with law. It thus appears that the rigours placed by this clause are wider in scope and stringent in nature than those under Section 49 of the Indian Registration Act. On the other hand, there are no such provisions in the Tripura Registration Act, analogous to those of the proviso to Sec. 49 of the Indian Registration Act. That being the position, we feel constrained to hold that the Courts below committed an error in law in admitting the unregistered Amalnama in evidence and relying on the same. 12. It was submitted by Mr. Ghosh, the learned counsel for the respondent, that the Indian Registration Act which was in force at the time of institution of the suit will be applicable and not the Tripura Registration Act which was in force at the time of execution of the instrument. We are unable to accept this contention. 13. It has now got to be seen whether there is any other material on record to sustain the decree after Ext. P-4 is eliminated.
We are unable to accept this contention. 13. It has now got to be seen whether there is any other material on record to sustain the decree after Ext. P-4 is eliminated. Because, as provided in Section 167 of the Indian Evidence Act the improper admission of any evidence shall not be ground of itself for reversal of any decision, if. It shall appear to the Court that independently of the evidence improperly admitted, there is sufficient evidence to justify the decision. 14. We have already pointed out that the defendant did not traverse in his written statement the facts that the plaintiff and pro forma defendant No. 4 took settlement of 2½ drones of land appertaining to touji No. 17 of taluk No. 24 standing in the name of Dwarikanath Chakraborty from one of the superior landlords, namely. Devendra Prasad Chakraborty Choudhury and that after this there was a partition between the plaintiff and pro forma defendant No. 4 in respect of that land and a separate touji No. 31 was created as alleged in the plaint. As provided in Rule 5 of Order 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure every allegation of fact in the plaint, if not denied specifically or by necessary implication, or stated to be not admitted in the pleading of the defendant, shall be taken to be admitted except as against a person under disability. Again, as provided in Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act no fact need be proved in any proceeding which by any rule of pleading in force at the time is deemed to have been admitted by a party in his pleadings. 15. There was thus no obligation on the part of the plaintiff to prove the fact of the settlement in their favour as alleged in the plaint. Be that as it may. P. W. 2, Jogesh Chandra Roy, proved two rent receipts granted by the landlord which were marked Exts. P-l and P-2 and which go to show that the plaintiff paid rent for his jote to the superior landlord. He also proved a letter (Ext. P-3) written to the plaintiff by the constituted attorney of the co-sharer holding 12 annas share in the estate confirming the settlement in favour of the plaintiff and pro forma defendant No. 4 by the co-sharer having 4 annas share.
He also proved a letter (Ext. P-3) written to the plaintiff by the constituted attorney of the co-sharer holding 12 annas share in the estate confirming the settlement in favour of the plaintiff and pro forma defendant No. 4 by the co-sharer having 4 annas share. Besides, there is the oral evidence of P. W. 1 Ashutosh Bhattacharjee, son of the plaintiff and P. W. 2, Jogesh Chandra Roy, an employee of the superior landlord, which go to prove the tenancy of the plaintiff. 16. The main contention of the defendant, as already pointed out, was that the suit land was not attracted by the jote of the plaintiff. This contention has been repelled by the two successive reports submitted by the Survey Commissioners appointed by the Court. 17. In the above view of the matter we find that there is no substance in the appeal. The decree appealed against is accordingly affirmed and the appeal is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, we however, leave the parties to bear their own costs. 18. D. M. SEN, J. :- I agree. Appeal dismissed.