A. A. DAVE, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal has been preferred against the judgment and decree of the learned Extra Assistant Judge Baroda dismissing civil appeal No. 49 of 1965 and confirming the judgment and decree passed by the learned 6th Joint Civil Judge Junior Division Baroda in regular civil suit No. 1379 of 1962. ( 2 ) THE facts giving rise to this appeal briefly stated are as under:-THE suit property bearing survey number 445/3 admeasuring 7238 1/2 sq. ft. situated in Baroda Sayaji Gunj ward belonged to one Pathan Sidukhan Pirkhan who is the father of the plaintiff and defendant No. 3. In part of this property admeasuring about 1568 sq. ft there were two houses with Orda Parshal kitchen etc. and were described as city survey numbers 45/12 and 45/13. Sidukhan died on 25-11-1950 leaving behind him his widow Bai Nurbibi and one minor daughter named Dhabu alias Memudabibi and one minor son named Kalu alias Imam khan. Under the Muhammadan Law the share of the plaintiff was 4 2/3 annas in a rupee and the share of the defendant was 9 1/3 annas in a rupee while Nurbibi had 2 annas share in a rupee. All of them thus held the property as tenants in common as the heirs of the said Sidukhan. It transpires that defendants Nos. 1 and 2 had obtained a decree for Rs. 4600/with running interest at 4% on the principal amount of Rs. 4022/on 1-7-1952 against Bai Nurbibi and also against the minors wherein Nurbibi was appointed as guardianad-litem by the court. After this decree was obtained by defendants Nos. 1 and 2 Nurbibi executed a sale deed Ex. 40 dated 11-2-1953 in their favour under which the suit property admeasuring 1968 sq. ft. containing a house was sold to them. Pursuant to the said transaction defendants Nos. 1 and 2 entered into possession of the suit property. Nurbibi died on 21-2-1959. Subsequently Bai Dhabu alias Memudabibi on attaining the majority filed a suit against defendant Nos. and 2 for a declaration that Nurbibi had no right to sell their share in the immovable property inherited by them from their father and that the said sale was not binding on them. The plaintiff therefore claimed partition of the suit property and for physical possession of her share. and 2 for a declaration that Nurbibi had no right to sell their share in the immovable property inherited by them from their father and that the said sale was not binding on them. The plaintiff therefore claimed partition of the suit property and for physical possession of her share. Defendant No. 3 Kalu alias Imamkhan was added in that suit who was represented by his guardian ad litem Ibrahim. During the pendency of the suit defendants Nos. 1 and 2 sold the property to one Gangaben and Madbuben and hence they were also joined as defendants Nos. 4 and 5. Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 by their written statement Ex. 12 raised several contentions. According to them the suit was beyond limitation. They contended that the decree in regular civil suit No. 306/61 was passed against both the minors and their mother for Rs. 4600/with costs and interest which came to Rs. 5400/and in consideration of the said amount and in consideration of Rs. 4599/which were paid in cash the sale transaction Ex. 40 was effected; that as the debt for which the decree was obtained was incurred by the deceased Sidukhan it was binding on the estate of the deceased and hence the sale transaction which was effected by Nurbibi for satisfying the said decretal amount was binding not only on Nurbibi but on the minors. They contended that Nurbibi was the administratrix of the property of the deceased and in such a capacity she had executed the sale deed to satisfy the debt of the deceased and hence it would be binding on the minors. In the alternative they contended that Nurbibi had a right to sell 1/8th interest in the estate of the deceased and the property covered by the sale deed being less than 1/8th of the value of the total property of the deceased the transaction was valid and was binding on the minors. It was contended that they had effected improvement to the tune of several thousands of rupees and therefore the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover possession of the property unless the said amount was paid. Defendant No. 3 accepted the averments made by the plaintiff by his written statement Ex. 17 and prayed for possession of his share equal to 9 1/2 annas in a rupee in the suit property on partition. Defendants Nos. Defendant No. 3 accepted the averments made by the plaintiff by his written statement Ex. 17 and prayed for possession of his share equal to 9 1/2 annas in a rupee in the suit property on partition. Defendants Nos. 4 and 5 by their written statement Ex. 26 adopted the written statement by defendants Nos. 1 and 2. From the pleadings of the parties the learned trial Judge framed the issues at Ex. 18. The learned trial Judge held that the suit was maintainable; that it was not barred by limitation; that the sale was not binding on the minors and therefore he passed a decree for partition of the suit property and for separate possession by plaintiff and defendant No. 3 on payment of Rs. 2916-37 paise with 6% interest from the date of judgment by the plaintiff and Rs. 5832-75 paise with 6% interest by defendant No. 3 to defedants Nos. 1 and 2. The court also held that plaintiff and defendant No. 3 would be entitled to mesne profits for their share in the suit property from the date of the judgment till recovery of possession. Against the said judgment and decree an appeal was preferred in the district court Baroda which was heard by the learned Extra Assistant Judge Baroda who dismissed the same and confirmed the judgment and decree of the trial court. Against the sad judgment and decree of the leaned Extra Assistant Judge baroda defendants Nos. 1 2 4 and 5 have preferred the present appeal to this court. ( 3 ) MISS V. P. Shah appearing for Mr. N. R. Oza learned Advocate for the appellants raised the following points1 That Nurbibi having sold 1/8th of survey number 445/3 which could be treated as sale of her share the suit for possession and partition of the property sold was not maintainable;2 That the plaintiff and defendant No. 3 having taken benefit out of the sale consideration and having earned the rent from the new construction were estopped from challenging the sale;3 The estate of the deceased could not be partitioned before the debt of the deceased is paid off. 4 The sale being effected for payment of debt under a decree was binding upon the minors and it cannot be challenged as being void or unauthorised;5 The defendants were entitled to the sum spent towards the improvement of the property. 4 The sale being effected for payment of debt under a decree was binding upon the minors and it cannot be challenged as being void or unauthorised;5 The defendants were entitled to the sum spent towards the improvement of the property. ( 4 ) IN order to appreciate the submissions made by the learned Advocate the appellants it would be worthwhile to consider the provisions of the Muhammadan Law with regard to the sale of immovable property of the minor by a person other than a guardian of the minor. It may be noted that the heirs of the deceased Muhammadan held the property left by the deceased as tenants in common in specific share. Thus one of the several co-owners has no right to alienate the share of the other coowners even for the purpose of discharging the debts of the deceased. Mulla in his Principles of Muhammadan Law 16 Edition at page 40 has made the following observations :-ONE of several heirs of a deceased Muhammadan though he may be in possession of the whole estate of the deceased has no power to alienate the shares of his coheirs not even for the purpose of discharging the debts of the deceased. If he sells or mortgages any property in his possession forming part of the estate of the deceased though it may be for payment of the debts of the deceased such sale or mortgage operates as a transfer only of his interest in the property. It is not binding on the other heirs or the other creditors of the deceased. The transferor of course is in his turn entitled to obtain contribution from his co-heirs. IN the instant case admittedly the present plaintiff and defendant No. 3 were minors at the time of the death of Sidukhan. Under the Muhammadan Law Nurbibi was not the guardian of the property of the minors. Nurbibi therefore had no authority to alienate the interest of the minors in the property left by the deceased. As observed by the learned author referred to earlier Nurbibi had no power to alienate the share of the minors even for the purpose of discharging the debts of the deceased. Thus the present sale transaction Ex. 40 entered into by her for the purpose of making payment of dues under the decree obtained by defendants Nos. As observed by the learned author referred to earlier Nurbibi had no power to alienate the share of the minors even for the purpose of discharging the debts of the deceased. Thus the present sale transaction Ex. 40 entered into by her for the purpose of making payment of dues under the decree obtained by defendants Nos. 1 and 2 against Bai Nurbibi and the minors for the debt of the deceased was clearly unauthorised and she could not alienate the interest of the minors in the immovable property and any such alienation would be valid only to the extent of Nurbibis share in the property alienated and the sale transaction would not be binding on the minors. Miss Shah however urged that the transaction would not be invalid or void and at the most it would be voidable. She submitted that if Nurbibi for a lawful purpose executed the sale transaction not on behalf of herself only but on behalf of the minors the sale transaction would be binding on the minors for the simple reason that they had benefited by the act of Nurbibi. I am unable to agree with her. It is immaterial whether the minors have benefited or not. The question is whether Nurbibi had any authority to alienate the share of the minors in the immovable property inherited by them from their father. In my opinion. Nurbibi cannot do so and her act being unauthorised would be illegal and invalid. In the case of Pathummabi and another v. Vittil Ummachabi and others I. L. R. 26 Madras 734 it was observed by the division bench thataccording to the Muhammadan Law the widowed mother is not the legal guardian of the property of her minor children and cannot do any act relating to their property so as to hind them and a sale or mortgage by her cannot as such bind the minor children. Though she may be a co-heir with her minor children in respect of the property dealt with by her the Muhammadan law (unlike the hindu law) does not constitute the senior co-heir the managing coparcener entitled to administer and manage the estate until partition. Alienations by such a widow cannot therefore be upheld by extending to Muhammadans the principle of Hindu law applicable to the acts of a guardian or managing member of a family. Alienations by such a widow cannot therefore be upheld by extending to Muhammadans the principle of Hindu law applicable to the acts of a guardian or managing member of a family. THE same view was taken by the Bombay High Court in the case of Bhikaji Ramchandra Shimpi v. Ajagarally Sarafally Bohori 47 B. L. R. 803 wherein the division bench made the following observations :-WHERE a Muhammadan widow after obtaining the leave of the executing court under Order XXXII rule 7 of the Civil Procedure Code 1908 executes a sale deed in favour of the mortgagee who had obtained a decree for the sale of the land which was mortgaged by her deceased husband on behalf of herself and as guardian ad litem of her minor daughter the sale deed is void in so far as it affects the share of the minor daughter in the land and the purchaser acquires no title to it. The leave granted by the executing court is not sufficient to clothe the widow with power to sell the lands in the absence of her appointment as the legal or certificated guardian of her minor daughter. THE decision of the Bombay High Court being prior to 1960 is binding on me and with respect I am in complete agreement. Miss Shah however tried to distinguish this ruling by saying that the Privy Council ruling on which reliance was placed by the division bench of the High Court had not given any opinion as to whether the transaction entered into by a co-heir on behalf the minor would be void or voidable. She therefore urged that the Bombay High Court had gone beyond the pronouncement of the Privy Council and therefore the ratio laid down by the High Court of Bombay required to be re-considered. She referred to the case of Mata Din v. Sheikh Ahmad Ali 14 B. L. R. 192 wherein the question whether according to the Muhammadan Law a sale by a de facto guardian if made of necessity or for the payment of an ancestral debt affecting the minors property and if beneficial to the minor is all together void or merely voidable was left open. I fail to understand as to how this question could in any way come into the picture in the instant case. I fail to understand as to how this question could in any way come into the picture in the instant case. In the instant ease there was no evidence that the sale transaction was effected by Nurbibi for any necessity or that it was beneficial to the minors. No doubt part of the consideration of the sale transaction ex. 40 was for payment of dues under a decree which was obtained against not only Bai Nurbibi but against the minors plaintiff and defendant No. 3. However merely because a decree was obtained against the minors that would not entitle another co-owner to enter into any transaction of sale or mortgage so as to alienate the share of the minor co-heirs in the property inherited by them. If fact in the subsequent case of Jan Mohammad and others v. R. B. Karam chand and others A. I. R. 1947 Privy Council 99 it was observed by the Privy Council at page 104 thatit follows that the sale by Babo Jan to Lorinda Mal is invalid except to the extent of her share which Is only one-eighth. THEREFORE if alienation made by Nurbibi is considered to be invalid so far as the share of the minors is concerned it is clear that the transaction would be void and not merely voidable. After Having considered all these decisions the Bombay High Court in the case of Bhikhaji Ramchandra (supra) had clearly laid down that such a sale transaction is void. It is not necessary for me to consider in the absence of any evidence whether the sale would be void or voidable if it was for necessity or for the benefit of the minors. As observed by the Bombay High Court Nurbibi could have been appointed as a guardian of the minors under the Guardians and Wards Act which was not done. Thus merely because she was appointed as guardian ad litem in the suit filed by defendant Nos. 1 and 2 for realising the dues of the deceased she cannot act as a guardian for the purpose of the sale of the said property. Her act therefore in alienating the share of the minors in the suit property was clearly unauthorised and invalid. Both the courts therefore were right in holding that such a transaction was not binding on the shares of the minors in the suit property. Her act therefore in alienating the share of the minors in the suit property was clearly unauthorised and invalid. Both the courts therefore were right in holding that such a transaction was not binding on the shares of the minors in the suit property. ( 5 ) MISS Shah next urged that before the property left by the deceased could be partitioned the debts due to the estate must be paid off and unless the debt is paid off no partition could be effected. In support of her say she relied on the observations made in the case of Pathummabi and another (supra) thatunder the Muhammadan Law the estate of a deceased person must be applied to the payment of his funeral expenses and debts before the heirs can make partition of it. In this respect it is analogous to and even stricter than the Hindu law. The creditors have the right to sue such of the heirs as have taken the estate but they are entitled to have recourse to a single heir only in a case where all the effects are in the hands of that heir. IT may be noted that these observations of the Madras High Court relied on by Miss Shah are no longer good law. In fact this Pathummabi case reported in I. L. R. 26 Madras 734 has been overruled by the full bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Abdul Majeeth Khan Sahib and nine others v. Krishnamachariar I. L. R. 40 Madras 243 so far as this proposition is concerned. At page 253 Abdul Rahim J. speaking for the Bench observed as under :-THE question referred to us is in these words When one of the co-heirs of a deceased Muhammadan in possession of the whole estate of the deceased or of any part of it sells property in his possession forming part of the estate for discharging the debts of the deceased is such sale binding on the other co-heirs or creditors of the deceased and if so to what extent ?. The answer must be in the negative. At page 255 it was observedthere cannot be the slightest doubt therefore upon the principles of Muhammadan Law and also upon the authorities that one heir has no right to deal with the shares of the other heirs. The answer must be in the negative. At page 255 it was observedthere cannot be the slightest doubt therefore upon the principles of Muhammadan Law and also upon the authorities that one heir has no right to deal with the shares of the other heirs. IN the light of the full bench decision of the Madras High Court it cannot be said that it would be necessary for the co-heirs to pay the dues due to the deceased before partitioning the property. That apart the question before me is whether even for the purpose of paying of the debt due to the deceased whether it is open to one co-heir to alienate the share of other co-heirs. In the instant case the plaintiff and defendant No. 3 were the minor and Nurbibi who was their mother cannot act as their guardian under the Muhammadan Law and therefore any act done by her with regard to the share of the minors in the immovable property would be invalid and would not be binding on the minors. In view of this position of law there is no substance in the submission made by Miss Shah that the sale transaction Ex. 40 would be binding on the minors as it was effected for the purpose of paying off the dues under the decree which was obtained not only against Nurbibi but against the minors. ( 6 ) MISS Shah however urged that in any case Nurbibi had an authority to alienate her 1/8th interest in the estate of the deceased and as the property alienated under the sale deed Ex. 40 did not exceed her 1 interest in the estate left by the deceased the sale transaction should be upheld. In my opinion the submission made by Miss Shah is devoid of any merit. First of all Miss Shah is not correct when she stated that the property conveyed by the sale deed Ex. 40 did not exceed the 1/8th interest in the property left by the deceased. The deceased left survey number 445/3 which admeasured 7200 sq. ft. and odd. Her share therein therefore cannot exceed 900 sq. ft. in all. The property conveyed by the sale deed Ex. 40 admeasures 1500 sq. ft. and odd including a house consisting of two rooms. 40 did not exceed the 1/8th interest in the property left by the deceased. The deceased left survey number 445/3 which admeasured 7200 sq. ft. and odd. Her share therein therefore cannot exceed 900 sq. ft. in all. The property conveyed by the sale deed Ex. 40 admeasures 1500 sq. ft. and odd including a house consisting of two rooms. Miss Shah however urged that in any case when partition is to be effected it should be so effected that the purchasers may not be put to any inconvenience and loss and the total interest of Bai Nurbibi in the whole estate left by the deceased should be taken into consideration before passing final orders. I fail to understand the submissions made by Miss Shah. First of all the purchasers would get interest only in the property conveyed under the sale deed and not in another property left by the deceased. The sale deed Ex. 40 consisted of 1500 sq. ft. and odd including a house situated thereon. Nurbibi who had 1/8th share in the estate of her deceased husband would therefore have 1/8th interest in this property. So far as the remaining property is concerned which had gone to the shares of the plaintiff and defendant No. 3 in fixed shares under the Muhammadan Law the interest therein cannot be transferred to the purchasers as the sale is not binding on the minors and it is clearly invalid so far as their share was concerned. ( 7 ) THE purchasers cannot be heard to say that merely because Nurbibi had sold the property wherein the minors had an interest the interest of Nurbibi in the property other than the property conveyed by the sale transaction should also be taken into consideration for the purpose of the suit. As observed earlier the purchasers did not get any interest in the other property of the deceased except the interest of Nurbibi in the property conveyed by the sale deed Ex. 40. Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 therefore would only get the interest of Nurbibi therein. The learned Judge while passing the decree for partition has already ordered that the plaintiff will be entitled to partition of the suit property and separate possession of the suit property and separate possession of 7/24th share in the suit property on payment of Rs. 40. Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 therefore would only get the interest of Nurbibi therein. The learned Judge while passing the decree for partition has already ordered that the plaintiff will be entitled to partition of the suit property and separate possession of the suit property and separate possession of 7/24th share in the suit property on payment of Rs. 2916-37 paise with 6% interest per annum and defendant No. 3 will be entitled to his 14/24 share therein on payment of Rs. 5832-76 paise with 6% interest thereon. The learned trial Judge has taken into consideration the dues which the plaintiff as well as defendant No. 3 were liable to pay under the decree obtained by defendants Nos. 1 and 3. In my opinion the order passed by the learned trial Judge is absolutely fair and equitable. Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 who did not get any interest save that of Bai Nurbibi in the property cannot insist that they should be allowed to remain in possession of the suit property and that the interest of Bai Nurbibi in the remainder of the property may be taken into consideration while partitioning the property among other co-heirs. ( 8 ) IT was next urged that the suit filed by the plaintiff was barred by limitation. Miss Shah urged that the suit should have been filed within three years from the date the plaintiff attained majority. She urged that the sale transaction being voidable the suit should have been filed for setting aside the sale within three years of the minor having attained the majority. In my opinion the submission made by Miss Shah has no merit. As already stated earlier the sale transaction is not merel voidable but is void and it was not necessary for the plaintiff to have filled the suit within three years from the date of his having attained the majority. The plaintiff could file a suit for obtaining possession within the period prescribed in the Limitation Act. The slit is in respect of immovable property and the usual period of limitation is 12 years. The plaintiff attained the majority in 1958 and the suit was filed in November 1962 It cannot therefore be said that the suit was not within limitation. The slit is in respect of immovable property and the usual period of limitation is 12 years. The plaintiff attained the majority in 1958 and the suit was filed in November 1962 It cannot therefore be said that the suit was not within limitation. Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act provided thatwhere a person entitled to institute a suit or make an application for the execution of a decree is at the time from which the prescribed period is to be reckoned a minor or insane or an idiot he may institute the suit or make the application within the same period after the disability has ceased as would otherwise have been allowed from the time specified therefor in the third column of the schedule. THUS it would be open to the plaintiff to institute a suit for possession of her share in the property within 12 years from the date she became a major. In my opinion therefore both the courts were right in negativing the contention raised by defendants Nos. 1 and 2 that the suit was barred by limitation. ( 9 ) IT was next urged by Miss Shah that the plaintiff and defendant No. 3 would be estopped from challenging the sale transaction as they had already taken benefit of the said transaction. In my opinion there is no merit in the submission. There cannot be any estoppel against minors. No act done by an unauthorised person could be binding on the minors and cannot operate as an estoppel. There is no evidence that the minors had taken any benefit because of the sale transaction. There is no evidence that Nurbibi had made construction of other rooms over the land bearing survey number 446/3 with the money she had received from defendants Nos. 1 and 2 as a result of the sale transaction Ex. 40. Even if the defendants were able to prove that that would not in any way come in the way of the plaintiff and defendant No. 3 to claim partition of their share in the suit property on the ground that the sale transaction being unauthorised was not binding on them. ( 10 ) LASTLY. it was urged that before passing the final order for partition the courts should have awarded defendants Nos. 1 and 2 the amounts which were spent by them towards the improvement of the property. ( 10 ) LASTLY. it was urged that before passing the final order for partition the courts should have awarded defendants Nos. 1 and 2 the amounts which were spent by them towards the improvement of the property. In this connection it may be noted that both the courts below have negatived the defendants contention that any improvement in the property was made by them. No evidence was led in court to show that they had spent any amount towards the improvement of the property. This being the finding of fact recorded by both the courts 1 need not consider it further in this second appeal. In my opinion both the courts below were right in holding that the defendants had failed to prove that they had spent any amount towards the improvement of the property. ( 11 ) IN the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. .