ORDER R.L. Gulati, J. - This is a petition Under Article 226 of the-Constitution. 2. The Petitioner instituted four suits against the Respondents 4 to 8 u/s 209 of the UP ZA and LR Act on the allegation that she was the sirdar tenant of the land in suit and that the Respondents had trespassed in the year 1367 F. The Respondents contested the suits on the plea that the land in suit was part of their holding and they themselves were sirdar-tenants. The trial court dismissed the suit on two grounds: (1) that the lease in favour of the Plaintiff had not been proved and (2) that the land in suit was not identifiable. On appeal the Addl. Commr., Allahabad held that the lease had properly been proved but he dismissed the appeals on the ground that the land was not identifiable. The Petitioner then appealed to the Board of Revenue. The Board of Revenue endorsed the finding of the lower appellate court that the lease had properly been proved but it has also dismissed the appeals on the ground that the land in suit was not identifiable. It has directed the Petitioner to take proceedings of demarcation and thereafter to file a suit u/s 209 of the UP ZA and LR Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act,) in case a trespass is found after demarcation. 3. The Petitioner had already taken proceedings for the demarcation of the land u/s 41 of the Land Revenue Act. These proceedings were dismissed on the ground that as the Applicant was not in possession of the entire area in dispute she wanted to be demarcated, as such, no demarcation could be carried out. This order was passed by the S.D.O., Kanpur and is dt. 31-6-1961. She then filed an appeal against that order in the court of the Addl. Commr., Allahabad. The Addl. Commr. held that the Petitioner had not disclosed any dispute regarding demarcation of land and unless there was a dispute about the demarcation, no application u/s 41 of the Land Revenue Act was maintainable. He dismissed the appeal on 31-5-1962. It is thereafter that the Petitioner filed the suit u/s 209 of the Act. In these circumstances, it was futile for the Board to have directed the Petitioner to institute proceedings for demarcation and thereafter to file a fresh suit. He dismissed the appeal on 31-5-1962. It is thereafter that the Petitioner filed the suit u/s 209 of the Act. In these circumstances, it was futile for the Board to have directed the Petitioner to institute proceedings for demarcation and thereafter to file a fresh suit. Such proceedings were bound to fail and the Petitioner's second suit for ejectment was likely to become time-barred. Moreover, proceedings u/s 41 of the Land Revenue Act are only summary proceedings and they are meant only to facilitate the work of the Revenue Courts. They are not condition precedent for the maintainability of a suit u/s 209. The Petitioner had done all that lay in her power before coming to the Court but the proceedings u/s 41 of the Land Revenue Act proved abortive. In these circumstances it was the duty of the courts to proceed with the case. 4. Now the Petitioner's allegation is that she was granted a lease of certain area in one plot. The land of the Respondents surrounds her land. They have encroached upon portions of her land. Such a suit cannot be thrown out merely on the ground that the boundaries of her land are not recited in the lease-deed. The area of the land being known, and she being in possession of a part of it, the boundaries of the entire land covered by the lease could easily be fixed. Surely the law is not so helpless to deny relief to a litigant like the Petitioner, merely because the lease-deed does not specify the boundaries. The Court should have called upon the Plaintiff to supply a map of the land claimed by her and thereafter a survey of the land could have been carried out. It is not necessary to force the Petitioner to take recourse to proceedings u/s 41 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, when such proceedings had already been taken and had proved abortive. The maintainability of the suit does not depend upon proceedings u/s 41 of the said Act. I am convinced that the view taken by the Board of Revenue leads to manifest injustice and cannot be sustained. 5. The learned Counsel for the Respondents has raised an objection to the maintainability of the writ petition. It is urged that since there were four separate suits, the Petitioner should have filed four separate writ petitions. There is no force in this contention. 5. The learned Counsel for the Respondents has raised an objection to the maintainability of the writ petition. It is urged that since there were four separate suits, the Petitioner should have filed four separate writ petitions. There is no force in this contention. The Petitioner is aggrieved with the order of the Board of Revenue which is a consolidated order disposing of all the four appeals filed by her. It is not necessary to quash the said order four times. 6. The petition is allowed. The order of the Board of Revenue dated 9-6-1970 is quashed. The appeals of the Petitioner are restored to their original numbers and the Board is directed to decide them afresh in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above. It will, of course, be open to the Board to set aside the orders of the lower appellate court as well as of the trial court and, to remand the case for a fresh trial, if necessary. The Petitioner is entitled to her costs.