ORDER 1. This petition is directed against the order dated May 28, 1971 passed by the Magistrate 1st Class, Nahan, granting bail to the respondents Nos. 1 to 32 and a subsequent order dated June 3, 1971 by the same Magistrate reviewing the case and granting bail afresh to the said respondents. 2. The petition purports to have been made under Sections 435 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and also under Article 227 of the Constitution. 3. At the outset, learned counsel for the respondents Nos. 1 to 32 has raised an objection that this revision application should not be entertained as the petitioner should apply in the first instance to the learned Sessions Judge. 4. It appears that on April 27, 1971, the respondents Nos. 1 to 32 were arrested for different offences upon a complaint filed by the petitioner. On May 28, 1971, an application for bail was made before the Magistrate and bail was granted. But before the respondents were actually released, the petitioner pointed out that one of the offences for which the respondents had been arrested was an offence under S.307. I.P.C which was non-bailable. The Magistrate considered the matter and held that the case properly fell under Section 325, I.P.C. and not under Section 307, I.P.C. Accordingly, he made an order on June 3, 1971 granting bail afresh to the respondents. 5. Now, while the bail application was pending before the Magistrate, a jail application was also moved before the earned Sessions Judge, Simla. It is alleged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the learned Sessions Judge was not informed that a similar bail application was already pending before the Magistrate, for was the Magistrate informed that a bail application had been made before the learned Sessions Judge. Learned counsel or the respondents, however, states that he bail application was moved before the earned Sessions Judge on May 31, 1971 and in view of the granting of bail by the Magistrate on June 3, 1971, the application was rejected as not maintainable by the learned Sessions Judge on June 11, 1971. 6. It seems to me that, in, the circumstances, the petitioner should apply to the learned Sessions Judge in the first instance. That course will be in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Gulam Ali v. The State, 1972 Him LR 8. 6. It seems to me that, in, the circumstances, the petitioner should apply to the learned Sessions Judge in the first instance. That course will be in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Gulam Ali v. The State, 1972 Him LR 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn my attention to S. Narayanan v. Kannamma Bhargavi, AIR 1969 Ker 126 (FB) where a Full Bench of the Kerala High Court has observed that there is no legal bar to a party approaching the High Court without first moving the Sessions Judge or the District Magistrate. Reference was made to the practice prevailing in that High Court. There is no doubt that a party is entitled to apply to the High Court even as he is entitled to do so before the learned Sessions Judge. But whenever concurrent jurisdiction is vested by the statute simultaneously in two courts, one superior to the other. I consider it appropriate that the party should apply to the inferior court first. There are a number of reasons persuading me to that conclusion. Firstly, if a party is required to go to the inferior court in the first instance, the superior court has the advantage of the opinion of the inferior court when the occasion arises for the exercise by it of its jurisdiction in the matter. Secondly, the inferior court is generally situated in the same, or very near the place where the authority is situate from whose order the revision application is made, and it is more convenient and saves time for the record to be sent from that authority to the inferior court when the revision application is filed, and upon disposal of the revision application for the record to be returned to the authority for disposal of the case. Thirdly, it provides against the superior court being flooded with cases which can be more appropriately disposed of by the inferior court. These are reasons which have generally prevailed with the High Courts in holding that where it is a case of concurrent jurisdiction a party should ordinarily apply to the inferior court in the first instance. The rule is not an absolute rule, it is to be applied ex debito justitiae. These are reasons which have generally prevailed with the High Courts in holding that where it is a case of concurrent jurisdiction a party should ordinarily apply to the inferior court in the first instance. The rule is not an absolute rule, it is to be applied ex debito justitiae. There may be a case where the interests of justice may be defeated if a party is required to apply to the inferior court first before approaching the High Court. The rule must then give way to the interests of justice. 7. The other reason which prevailed with the Kerala High Court is that Article 131 of the Limitation Act prescribes a period of 90 days for entertaining a revision application and as that period runs from the date of the order sought to be revised, the party applying to the High Court would be out of time inasmuch as the disposal of a revision application by the Sessions Judge first could extend beyond 90 days. With great respect to the learned Judges. I am unable to endorse the view taken by them. In the first place, if the order of the Magistrate is on the merits it can be said to merge in the order of the Sessions Judge, and in the strict view of the law a revision application made to the High Court would be an application against the order of the learned Sessions Judge. At the same time, inasmuch as the entire record is before the High Court, it would be open to the High Court to examine the correctness of the order of the Magistrate and make an order accordingly. In the next place, even if a revision application before the High Court falls to be treated as directed solely against the order of the Magistrate, the benefit of Section 5 of the Limitation Act can be extended and the delay occasioned by filing the revision application before the Sessions Judge can, in appropriate cases, be condoned. 8. In my opinion, as the learned Sessions Judge has dismissed the bail application without considering the case on its merits there is no reason why the petitioner should not apply to him in the first instance. 8. In my opinion, as the learned Sessions Judge has dismissed the bail application without considering the case on its merits there is no reason why the petitioner should not apply to him in the first instance. In case there is any objection as to limitation, the learned Sessions Judge will consider the circumstances in which the revision application was filed in this Court and proceed to dispose of the question of limitation accordingly. 9. It is pointed out by learned counsel for the petitioner that this petition has been filed under Art.227 of the Constitution also and, therefore, this Court should interfere. It seems to me that the objection which has been raised to the petition treated as on under Sections 435 and 439 is equally valid if it is treated as a petition under Article 227. 10. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed. Application dismissed