JUDGMENT SHIV DAYAL, J. This second appeal arises from a suit for eviction on the ground contained in section 12(1)(e) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The suit was dismissed by the trial Court on the ground that the plaintiffs could not establish that their requirement is bona fide or that they have no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation of their own in the city. The first appellate Court dismissed their appeal. The plaintiffs are related as follows: Munnilal Gopilal Laxmichand 1. Motital 1. Babulal 2. Ramswaroop (Plaintiff No.1) 2. Bhagwandas (Plaintiff No. 2) 3. Hariram 3. Radheylal 4. Chhotelal 4. Bux Chand. The suit accommodation is residential. It forms part of a big building situated in Danaoli, Lashkar. In the same vicinity is a big building in which the plaintiff Ramswaroop and Bhagwandas reside along with Gopilal and Laxmichand. In the plaint they say that it is not "convenient" for them to stay with their families in that house. It has been found by the Courts below that the house in which the plaintiffs reside at present is their joint family property. Besides this, two other houses have been purchased in another locality, namely--Jayendra Ganj, Lashkar (vide sale-deeds Exs. D9 and D10). The house purchased under Ex. D10 has been purchased in the name of Motilal's wife and Ramswarup's wife and the house under Ex D9 has been purchased in the name of Babulal's wife and Bhagwandas's wife. The Courts below have found that the plaintiffs have no bona fide requirement, and further more, they have suitable alternative accommodation in which they can live (properties purchased by their wives). The Courts below have reached the conclusion that the eviction was really aimed at enhancement of rent. Ramswarup and his wife have a separate living room; so also Bhagwandas and his wife have a separate living room in the house. Shri Gupta, learned counsel for the appellants vehemently argued that the entire family consists of ten couples and about 20 or 22 children. For about 42 members these 20 rooms are not sufficient and as regards the house purchased in Jayendra Ganj, he states that one of them is not yet vacant and the other is not suitable. Moreover, they are not in the same locality. For about 42 members these 20 rooms are not sufficient and as regards the house purchased in Jayendra Ganj, he states that one of them is not yet vacant and the other is not suitable. Moreover, they are not in the same locality. If the plaintiffs want to shift to their own house, which is in the same locality, so that they may live in the neighbourhood of their father and uncle and brothers, they should not be compelled to shift to another locality. In my opinion, there is no substance in this contention. Section 12(1)(e) of the Act reads as follows: that the accommodation let for residential purposes is required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned; When the scheme of M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 is closely examined three things emerge quite clear: (i) That this Act is enacted primarily for the protection of the tenant from eviction; (ii) That a tenant who commits default in payment of rent or otherwise unscrupulously behaves and does not fulfil his obligations should forfeit the protection, and (iii) That in case the accommodation is required bona fide by the landlord, for instance, for his own occupation or for his business or for building or rebuilding etc. possession of the accommodation should be restored to the landlord. Thus, there are provisions in the Act for the fulfilment of the third object so as to ensure that the landlord has his bona fide requirement fulfilled. But in this case the legislature has in its wisdom put checks so that the provision may not be misused. If I may say so, there are two ingredients in clause 12 (1) (e) and each one of them contains a controlling word, "bona fide" in the first and "reasonably" in the second. These words furnish checks and arc, therefore, crucial in the application of this clause. The landlord has to satisfy the Court objectively that his requirement is bona fide. It is not merely his word which will be decisive. He is not the sole arbiter. These words furnish checks and arc, therefore, crucial in the application of this clause. The landlord has to satisfy the Court objectively that his requirement is bona fide. It is not merely his word which will be decisive. He is not the sole arbiter. So also where he is in occupation of another's premises two considerations are vital: (a) If the accommodation in his occupation is not his own, nothing else is to be seen and he will be entitled to eviction, because the policy of the law is not to deny the landlord the use of his own property for his occupation, or for his business and it is no answer that he is residing or carrying on business comfortably in rented premises. (b) But where he is in occupation of a residential accommodation of his own, then he has further to satisfy the Court that it is not reasonably suitable for his purposes. The word "reasonably" is indicative of an objective test. Here again, it is not the whim of the landlord that the accommodation in his occupation does not suit him. If it were not so, nothing would have been easier than to make this ground a pretext and throw out a tenant. That would defeat the whole purpose of the law. In Netaram v. Jiwanlal AIR 1963 SC 499 their Lordships of the Supreme Court considered an analogous provision in the Patiala and East Punjab Urban Rent Restraint Ordinance. Mr. Justice Hidayatullah (as his Lordship then was) speaking for the Court, said: The Controller has to be satisfied about the genuineness of the claim. To reach this conclusion, obviously the Controller must be satisfied about the reality of the claim made by the landlord, and this can only be established by looking at all the surrounding circumstances, such as the condition of the building, its situation, the possibility of its being put to a more profitable use after construction, the means of the landlord and so on. Thus it is not the bona fides of the landlord, but the bona fides of the claim which must be established. Thus it is not the bona fides of the landlord, but the bona fides of the claim which must be established. Again in Sarwate T.B. v. Nemichand 1966 MPLJ 26 (SC) : 1966 JLJ 973 their Lordships while dealing with an analogous provision contained in the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1955, laid down: It is not correct statement of law that under section 4(h) of the Act genuineness of the alleged requirements of the landlord must be determined in the light of the assertions made by him and the case of requirement of the landlord may be negatived only if there be evidence to prove that the assertion was demonstrably false or mala fide. Mere assertion by the landland that he requires for his use the premises in the occupation of his tenant raises no presumption that he genuinely requires the premises for his use. The Legislature has imposed a restriction upon the jurisdiction of the Court to pass a decree against the tenant in a suit in ejectment by the landlord; and the onus of proving the conditions on proof of which alone the protection may not be claimed, lies upon the landlord. The burden of proving that he genuinely requires non-residential accommodation within the meaning of section 4(h), therefore, lies upon the landlord. The law is as laid down by their Lordships in the above two cases If there are any observations in Motilal v. Badri 1954 MBLJ 274 or Damodar v. Nandram 1968 MPLJ 925 (FB) which run counter to the above dicta, they must be deemed to be no longer good law and overruled by the Supreme Court decision. It is to be seen whether the landlord has satisfied that the requirement is bona fide and that his existing residential accommodation is not reasonably suitable. On these questions issues 2 (a) and 2 (c) were framed in the trial Court. Both the plaintiffs examined themselves. They have not said in the witness box whether they have any children. They have not stated that the existing accommodation is not sufficient for them and their wives. All that they have stated in the plaint is that the present accommodation is not "convenient", but they had to satisfy the crucial tests deposited in the words "bona fide and reasonably". They have not stated that the existing accommodation is not sufficient for them and their wives. All that they have stated in the plaint is that the present accommodation is not "convenient", but they had to satisfy the crucial tests deposited in the words "bona fide and reasonably". Nothing has been pointed out to me for which I may be persuaded to disturb the concurrent finding of fact reached by the Courts below. Learned counsel for the respondent argued that plaintiffs are two members of a joint Hindu family, the wife of each of them has purchased a house along with the sister-in-law. In fact, the whole family is joint. They carry on joint business as found by the Court below and they are also joint in mess for which the first appeal Court has relied on the evidence of their neighbour, Shri Prithvi Nath Bhargava, Advocate. They purchased properties indifferent names instead of in the names of all the members of the family. For instance under Ex. D9 property has been purchased in the names of Babulal's wife and Bhagwandas's wife and that under Ex. D10 property has been purchased in the name of Motilal's wife and Ramswarup's wife. It is further pointed out that yet another house has been purchased in the name of Motilal and Babulal. It is further argued by the learned counsel for the respondent that in the absence of evidence that the plaintiffs have any children, their wives can shift to the two houses purchased by them along with their husbands. In my opinion, it is not necessary to go into all these details. Suffice it to say that what is to be seen in the suit is not the requirement for residential purpose for 42 members or for 10 couples ; all that is to be seen is whether the two plaintiffs have no reasonably suitable accommodation of their own in the city of Lashkar. Since the plaintiffs have not been able to prove this, it must be held that their suit has been rightly dismissed. It is strenuously urged by the learned counsel for the appellants that a house belonging to the joint family of the plaintiffs and other members cannot be said to be "of his own" within the meaning of the section. Reliance is placed on B.S. Shori v. Sitaram Singh 1962 JLJ 215. It is strenuously urged by the learned counsel for the appellants that a house belonging to the joint family of the plaintiffs and other members cannot be said to be "of his own" within the meaning of the section. Reliance is placed on B.S. Shori v. Sitaram Singh 1962 JLJ 215. In my opinion, this contention is not right. The law is that every co-parcener is the full proprietor of every part of co-parcenery property until there is severance of status. The expression "of his own" is used in section 12(1)(e) in contradistinction to a rented accommodation, so that it is not sufficient that the plaintiff has another reasonably suitable accommodation in his occupation which is rented. The words "of his own" do not connote exclusive ownership. This was also the view taken by Mr. Justice Krishnan in Radhika Prasad v. Gyasi Bai 1968 JLJ 67 (S.A. 81 of 1964 decided on 12-7-1967). The case relied on by Shri Gupta does not support him. There Mr. Justice Tare observed as follows: The fact that the landlord was occupying a joint family house along with other family members will not by itself disentitle him from applying for permission to evict the tenant of the newly purchased house. The question in such cases always arises as to whether the requirement or need of the landlord is objectively met by the accommodation under his occupation, or the alternative accommodation, that is available to him. If the alternative accommodation is sufficient to meet his requirement, he is not entitled to evict the tenant. On the other hand, if it is insufficient he cannot be deprived of the right to occupy his own house merely on the ground of the existence of an alternative accommodation however, insufficient it might be. If the learned Judge had held that a joint family house is not included in the expression "of his own" further considerations would have been irrelevant. Applying the tests laid down in that case and having regard to the above discussion, it must be said that the plaintiffs have not proved that the existing accommodation in their occupation is insufficient to meet their needs. But I go a step further. If the plaintiffs had established that their existing accommodation, though sufficient, was not reasonably suitable for their purposes, I would have decreed their claim. An accommodation may be sufficient but not reasonably suitable. But I go a step further. If the plaintiffs had established that their existing accommodation, though sufficient, was not reasonably suitable for their purposes, I would have decreed their claim. An accommodation may be sufficient but not reasonably suitable. However, in the present case, since the plaintiff has not at all proved even that their joint family house is not reasonably suitable, a decree of eviction against the tenant cannot be passed. Shri Gupta emphatically posed a question--Does the law compel a landlord to live in a joint family house throughout his life just on the ground of sufficiency and can he not purchase another house for a more comfortable or more luxurious living? The answer to this question is to be found in the second ingredient of the clause. The answer is, "Yes", he can purchase another house and shift to it if he has obtained vacant possession of it. But if that house is in occupation of a tenant, then the tenant will not be evicted merely on the ground that it is the landlord's whim to shift to that house from his existing residential accommodation. He will have to satisfy the test of reasonableness. In other words, he will have to satisfy the Court that the accommodation in which he is residing is not reasonably suitable for his purpose. If the Court finds that the accommodation in his occupation is reasonably suitable for his residential purposes, the protection given to the tenant prevails. If that was not so, the second ingredient would be otiose. The appeal is dismissed with costs.