JUDGMENT : A. Misra, J. - Defendant No. 1 in a suit for grant of letters of administration in favour of Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 is the Appellant. 2. Plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 are the Bons, Defendant Nos. 3 to 5 are daughters and Defendant No. 1 is the widow of Narasingh, the predecased son of one. Hari Sahu. Defendant. No. 2 is the widow of Hari. Hari along with his sons constituted a joint family. He executed and registered a will on 6-10-1963 devising his interest in the joint family property in favour of his two surviving sons (Plaintiffs). On these allegations, the Plaintiffs prayed for grant of letters of administration in their favour. 3. Defendant Nos. 2 to 5 did not enter contest. Defendant No. 1 resisted the suit on the following grounds: (1) The will purporting to convey the undivided interest of Hari in the joint family property is invalid; (2) Hari was not in a sound disposing state of mind at the date of execution of the Will, and as such, it was not executed with his free consent; (3) prior to the date of execution of the alleged Will, she had filed a partition suit in which Hari was a party and during the pendency of the suit had no right to convey his interest by Will; (4) the execution of the Will was fraudulently brought about by the Plaintiffs taking advantage of their relationship with deceased Hari and (5) the Will has not been properly executed and attested. 4. The trial Court decreed the Plaintiffs' suit on the following findings: (1) Hari executed and registered the Will (Ext. 1) in a sound disposing state of body and mind out of his free will; (2) Ex. 1 was duly executed and attested and (3) Hari had the right to dispose of his interest in the joint family properties. 5. Learned Counsel for Appellant assails the judgment and decree of the trial Court on the following grounds: (1) Hari having no power of testamentary disposition in respect of his undivided interest in the joint family property, Ext. 1 is invalid; (2) the propounders having taken active interest in execution of Ex. 1 whereby substantial benefits were conferred on them and in view of the other suspicious circumstances relating to execution of Ext. 1 is invalid; (2) the propounders having taken active interest in execution of Ex. 1 whereby substantial benefits were conferred on them and in view of the other suspicious circumstances relating to execution of Ext. 1, the trial Court should have refused to grant letters of administration and (3) the trial Court should have rejected Ext. 1 on the ground of failure of proof of due and valid attestation. 6. Point No. 1: It is contended by learned Counsel for Appellant that Hari as a member of the joint family consisting of himself, his two sons and his predeceased son's widow possessed no definable interest in the joint family properties, and as such, Ext. 1 conveying such undefinable interest in the joint family property is invalid in law. In support of this contention, reliance is placed on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in Addagada Raghavamma and Another Vs. Addagada Chenchamma and Another, where in paragraph 25 of the judgment, it has been observed: A member of an undivided coparcenary has the legal capacity to execute a will; but he cannot validly bequeath his undivided interest in the joint family property. If he died as an undivided member of the family his interest survives to the other members of the family and therefore the will cannot operate on the interest of the joint family property. But if he was separated from the family before his death the bequest would take effect. This contention is met by learned Counsel for Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 on two grounds. Firstly, it is argued by him that when admittedly Defendant No. 1 had filed the partition suit T.S. No. 57 of 1963 in which summons had been served on an the other members of the family before execution of Ext. 1, there was disruption of the family, and as such, Hari had at the time of execution of Ext. 1 a definable interest. Secondly, it is urged that even if the family is held to have been joint at the time of execution of Ext. 1, in view of the provision contained in Section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 Hari was competent to bequeath his interest in the joint family assets. Both these contentions urged by learned Counsel for Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 must prevail. 7. There is no dispute that prior to the date of execution of Ext. 1, in view of the provision contained in Section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 Hari was competent to bequeath his interest in the joint family assets. Both these contentions urged by learned Counsel for Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 must prevail. 7. There is no dispute that prior to the date of execution of Ext. 1 Defendant No. 1 had filed a partition suit in which summons had been served on all the members of the family including the deceased Hari. It is when settled that institution of a suit for partition by a member of a joint family is an enquivocal intimation of his intention to separate and consequently there is a severance of his joint status from the date when it is instituted. A decree may be necessary for working out the results of the severance and for allotting definite shares, but the status of the party as separate in estate is brought about by the assertion of his right to separate communicated to the other members of the family. The contention of Mr. A. Mohanty that by institution of the partition suit, only the Defendant No. 1 will be deemed to have separated and the rest continued as members of the joint family, is not sustainable. Therefore, by the date of execution of Ext. 1, the partition suit having been fileds prima facie, there had been disruption of the family and the bequest by one of the members of his interest cannot be invalid. 8. This aspect however, loses its importance in view of the provision contained in Section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act. The explanation to that section runs as follows: The interest of a male Hindu in a Mitakbara coparcenary property...shall, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force, be deemed to be property 'capable of being disposed of by him or by her within the meaning of this sub-section. According to Mitakhara law, no coparcener not even a father could dispose of by Will his undivided coparcenary interest the reason being that a t the time of death the right of survivorship came in conflict with the right by devise. According to Mitakhara law, no coparcener not even a father could dispose of by Will his undivided coparcenary interest the reason being that a t the time of death the right of survivorship came in conflict with the right by devise. This rule of Mitakhara law is now abrogated by the Explanation to Section 30 which lays down in explicit terms that such interest is deemed to be properly capable of being disposed of by Will notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force. The decision of the Supreme Court sought to be relied upon by the Appellant related to a will executed in the year 1915 prior to the enactment of the Hindu Succession Act, and therefore, has no application to the question in issue here. From any point of view, this contention of the Appellant has no force and the testamentary disposition created by Hari cannot be invalid on this ground. 9. Point No. 2 :-The next contention on behalf of the Appellant relates to certain alleged suspicious in connection with Ext. I on account of which it is argued that the trial Court should have rejected it and declined to grant letters of administration. Before dealing with the circumstances which are relied upon as suspicious, it is necessary to refer to the wen set out principles which govern proving of a Will. The Supreme Court in the two decisions reported in H. Venkatachala Iyengar Vs. B.N. Thimmajamma and Others, and Rani Purnima Devi and Another Vs. Kumar Khagendra Narayan Dev and Another, while dealing with these principles have observed as follows: The mode of proving a Will did not ordinarily differ from that of proving any other document except as to the special requirement of attestation prescribed in the case of a Will by Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act. The onus of proving the Will was on the propounder and in the absence of suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will, proof of testamentary capacity and signature of the testator as required by law was sufficient to discharge the onus. Where, however, there were suspicious circumstances, the onus would be on the propounder to explain them to the satisfaction of the Court before the Will could be accepted as genuine. If the caveator alleged undue influence, fraud or coercion, the onus would be on him to prove the same. Where, however, there were suspicious circumstances, the onus would be on the propounder to explain them to the satisfaction of the Court before the Will could be accepted as genuine. If the caveator alleged undue influence, fraud or coercion, the onus would be on him to prove the same. Even where, there were no such pleas but the circumstances gave rise to doubts, it was for the propounder to satisfy the conscience of the Court. 10. In the present case, the initial onus lying on the propounder was Bought to be discharged by examining p.w. 1, one of the attestors and p.w. 3, the scribe of Ext. 1 besides the testimony of one of the propounders. Defendant No. 1, in short, pleaded absence of Bound disposing state of mind on the part of Hari and alleged that it was fraudulently brought about by taking advantage of the relationship between the propounders and the testator. Defendant No. 1 has totally failed to prove any fraud in bringing 8 bout execution of Ext. 1. The evidence of p.ws. that Hari was physically and mentally sound at the time of execution of Ext. 1 finds substantial corroboration from the statements made by some of the d.ws. Though in his examination-in-chief d.w. 1 stated that Hari was unable to see and hear sience some years prior his death, in his cross-examination, he however admitted that Hari was a reputed Mamalatkar and was managing his Makadami during his life time. He also admitted that on the date of execution of Ex. 1 he had come to Puri and saw Hari taking to the scribe of the Will. D.W. 2, one of the attestors of Ext. 1, also has admitted in his cross examination that Hari was a big Mamatkar and about two years prior to the date he was examined, Hari had been called by some Bhois of the village to settle their disputes. D.w. 2 was examined in November, 1965. This would indicate that though Hari's sight was defective, he was in a sound state of mind by the date of execution of Ex. 1 as otherwise his services would not have been requisitioned by others to settle their disputes. 11. Learned Counsel for Appellant has referred to certain circumstances which raise considerable suspicion in connection with execution of Ext. 1. 1 as otherwise his services would not have been requisitioned by others to settle their disputes. 11. Learned Counsel for Appellant has referred to certain circumstances which raise considerable suspicion in connection with execution of Ext. 1. These circumstances, according to him, are firstly the Will was executed shortly after institution of the partition suit by Defendant No. 1; secondly, Defendant No. 1 admittedly had refused the request of Hari to take the son of Baban in adoption; thirdly, no provision was made by Had for his widow (Defendant No. 2; and his daughters (Defendant Nos. 3 to 5); fourthly, though the Will was executed on 6-10-1963. there was a delay in its registration till 4-11-1963 and lastly, the admitted fact Baban was present and took in active interest in bringing about execution of Ex. 1. In addition, it is also stated that no other member of the family has been examined to speak about the voluntary nature of the disposition. In support of this contention, he bag relied on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in H. Venkatachala Iyengar Vs. B.N. Thimmajamma and Others, and Rama Chandra Rambux v. Champabai and Ors. 1965 S.C.D. 362. None of these circumstances, in my opinion, individually or cumulatively is sufficient to justify an inference that Ext. 1 was not executed out of free will or the propounders taking advantage of their relationship prevailed upon the testator to execute the same. One important distinguishing feature between the facts of the present case And the cases covered by the aforementioned Supreme Court decisions is the naturalness of the bequest under the Will in the circumstances prevailing at that time. Admittedly, Defendant Nos. 3 to 5 are married, and out of the three eons, one is dead, Defendant No. 1 being his widow. It is in evidence that Hari wanted the Defendant No. 1 who is a childless widow to take a son of Baban in adoption, so that any apprehension of the property being lost to the family could be avoided. Defendant. No. 1 declined to make any adoption, and on the other hand, filed a partition suit claiming separation and allotment of her deceased husband's share to her. Defendant. No. 1 declined to make any adoption, and on the other hand, filed a partition suit claiming separation and allotment of her deceased husband's share to her. In those circumstances, it, is but natural that Hari who was interested in retaining as much of the property of the family as possible to his own children, would execute the will in favour of his two surviving sons instead of allowing any portion of it to be inherited by Defendant No. 1 who had already incurred his displeasure by filing the paortition suit. Absence of provision for Defendant No. 2 and Defendant Nos. 3 to 5 cannot be a suspicious circumstances as Defendant Nos. 3 to 5 are already married and living with their husbands and Defendant No. 2 is living and being maintained by her two eons (Plaintiffs). It is not disputed that if Hari had not executed Ext. 1, his share would have devolved on all his heirs including Defendant Nos. 2 to 5. The fact that Defendant Nos. 2 to 5 do not dispute the testamentary disposition is indicative that Ext. 1 was executed with their full knowledge which supports the voluntary nature of the document. It is true that Baban (Plaintiff No. 1) accompanied his old father to Puri on the date of scribing and execution of Ext. 1, but that cannot be a circumstance to justify an inference that he took an active interest in bringing about execution of the document. Hari was very old at that time and was suffering from defective sight. It is but natural that one of his sons should have accompanied him. There is evidence and even admitted by d.w. 1 that Hari on the date of execution of Ext. 1 contacted the scribe obviously to give him instructions. None of these circumstances can be considered as suspicious or militate against the same having been executed out of free will. On the other hand the very naturalness of the disposition in the circumstances by devising the property in favour of his two surviving sons when the pre-deceased son's widow was litigating for a share goes a long way to prove that Ex. 1 was executed voluntarily by Hari in a sound disposing state of mind. 12. Point No. 3 :-Lastly, it is contended on behalf of Appellant that due and valid attestation of Ext. 1 has not been proved. 1 was executed voluntarily by Hari in a sound disposing state of mind. 12. Point No. 3 :-Lastly, it is contended on behalf of Appellant that due and valid attestation of Ext. 1 has not been proved. The onus undoubtedly lies on the propounders to prove the valid attestation of Ext. 1. Section 63(c) of the Indian Succession Act runs as follows: 63(c) The Will shall be attested by two or more witnesses, each of whom has seen the testator sign or affix his mark to the Will or has seen some other person sign the Will, in the presence and by the direction of the testator, or has received from the testator a personal acknowledgment of his signature or mark, or of the signature of such other person and each of the witnesses shall sign the will in presence of the testator. In order to prove due attestation of Ex. 1, it is for the propounders to prove that the two attestors saw the deceased sign it and they themselves signed the same in the presence of the executant. 13. It is now to be seen how far the evidence adduced proves due execution of Ext. 1. p.w. 1 in his evidence stated: Hari put his L.T.I. In the Will in the presence of we attesting witnesses and we witnesses signed in the Will in the presence of Hari. P.w. 3 also has deposed as follows: Hari put his L.T.I. In the Will admitting the contents to be correct. Hari put his L.T.I. In the Will in the presence of witnesses and we witnesses signed in the presence of Hari. Nothing has been suggested to either of these witnesses challenging these statements. Reliance is, however, placed by Appellant on the statement of the other attesting witness examined as d. w. 2 to the effect: Probably Hari was not aware that I signed as be witness in the will because he was inside the cart. And a statement of p.w. 2 to the effect: My father had already put his L.T.I. when Ramesh came. It is argued that the execution by Hari was not in the presence of attesting witnesses and attestation by d.w. 2 was not in the presence of Hari. And a statement of p.w. 2 to the effect: My father had already put his L.T.I. when Ramesh came. It is argued that the execution by Hari was not in the presence of attesting witnesses and attestation by d.w. 2 was not in the presence of Hari. In my opinion, much importance cannot be given to such minor discrepancies in narrating the events that are said to have taken place more than two years prior to the date of examination of these witnesses. Evidence has to be taken &s a whole in surviving at a conclusion. It cannot be disputed that at the time of execution of Ex. 1, Hari as well as the attesting witnesses (p.w. 1 and d.w. 2) and the scribe p.w. 3 were all present at the Muharrir Khana and the execution by Hari and attestation by the witnesses took place at the same place and time D.w. 2 has admitted that be went through the Will near Hari's cart at the time he attested it. That the execution and attestation were in the presence of each other is admitted by d.w. 2 himself when he says: Hari Sahu put his L.T.I. In the Will in my presence and I signed in the Will in the presence of Hari just outside the Muharriar Khana. Considering the evidence, I agree with the trial Court that due execution and attestation of Ext. 1, as required under law, has been proved. Thus, I find no merit in any of the grounds urged. 14. In the result, the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs.