VENKAIASWAMI, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against an order made by the Second Additional district Judge, Bangalore, in Misc. E. P. No. 14 of 1971, on 12th November 1971. By the said Order, the learned District Judge accepted the petition filed by the second respondent herein, whose nomination paper for election to the City of Bangalore Municipal Corporation has been rejected by the first respondent-Returning Officer, resulting in the election of the appellant being set aside. ( 2 ) DURING the scrutiny of the nomination papers, it was admitted by the second respondent that a demand for payment of compounding fee of rs. 1,500, on account of certain unauthorised constructions put up by him, had not been complied with, and that the legality of the demand had been questioned by him before the First Munsiff, Bangalore, in OS. No. 1820 of 1970. It was further admitted that on the relevant date of the nomination no stay order had been issued by that Court in regard to it. On this submission, the Returning Officer made the following Order:"it is a fact that a compounding fee of Rs. 1,500 is levied and has not been paid. His contention that he has gone to Court and so it cannot be said to be arrears due to Corporation cannot be accepted in the absence of a stay order from the Court. It is due according to the records of the Corporation. Therefore, the objection is upheld and the nomination is rejected. " ( 3 ) THE fact that such a demand had been made is also referred to in the plaint presented in the aforesaid suit by the second respondent himself. A copy of the demand has also been produced and marked as Ex. D-12 in the case. Thereupon, the second respondent presented the election petition before the learned District Judge, Bangalore, with the above mentioned result. Aggrieved by the said Order, the second respondent there has approached this Court in the present appeal. Before adverting to the contentions urged on behalf of the parties, it is relevant to refer to some of the provisions of the City of Bangalore municipal Corporation Act, 1949, hereinafter referred to as the Act. S. 55 of the Act prescribes qualifications of a candidate seeking election to the council of the Corporation. It also provides for certain disqualifications in regard to Government-servants. S. 55 of the Act prescribes qualifications of a candidate seeking election to the council of the Corporation. It also provides for certain disqualifications in regard to Government-servants. It is unnecessary for our present purpose to refer to them in any detail. S. 56 provides for disqualification of such candidates. The portion relevant for our present purpose runs thus:"56.-Disqualification of candidates : (1) * * * * (2) A person shall be disqualified for election or appointment as councillor if such person is at the date of nomination, election or appointment: * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * (ee) in arrears of any kind due by him to the Corporation otherwise than, as an agent, receiver, trustee or an executor; or. . . . "s. 69a specifies the grounds for declaring election to be void. The relevant portion of the said section reads thus:"69a. (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-sec. (2), if the Court is of opinion ****** (c) that any nomination has been improperly rejected; or ****** vhe Court shall declare the election of the returned candidate to be void. " ( 4 ) IT is clear irom the above provisions that a candidate for election to the Council of the Corporation, on the date of his nomination, election or appointment, should not be in arrears of any dues to the Corporation of whatever nature, and if a nomination paper of a candidate is rejected on that ground, the Court, pursuant to the provisions of S. 69a, could properly go into that question. On a fair reading of the above provisions of law, we are of opinion that the Court while holding an enquiry into a case of rejection of nomination paper, should concern itself only with the propriety of the exercise of jurisdiction by the Returning Officer. If the Returning Officer has exercised his jurisdiction properly, and rejected the nomination paper on the ground that the candidate in question was in arrears of any kind due to the Corpcration, it would not be open to such a Court to go further and investigate the legality or otherwise of the demand, which has given rise to such arrears. In the instant case, the learned District Judge has, in our opinion, misdirected himself on a question of fact. In the instant case, the learned District Judge has, in our opinion, misdirected himself on a question of fact. He has observed in para 10 of his order that "apart from the demand made, there is no bill presented as contemplated under S. 411 (of the Act)". This is clearly an erroneous view, in the context of the admissions made by the second respondent before the Returning Officer and the plaint presented before the Court, in os. No. 1820/70. That such a bill had been presented is also clear from the letter dt. 22-11-1970 issued by the Corporation Engineer and produced in the case as Ex. D-12. Further, the learned Disrict Judge has also proceeded to examine the nature and legality or otherwise of the demand relating to the compounding fee made by the Corporation. This, in our view was not within the purview of his jurisdiction. On behalf of the appellant Sri A. V. Albal, learned Counsel, submitted that the Court was not justified in law to go into the question of the legality of the demand made inasmuch as what the Court was primarily concerned with was the exercise of jurisdiction by the Returning Officer, and it would not be open to such Court to go behind the demand and investigate the question whether a candidate was in law liable to comply with such a demand. In support of this submission, he placed reliance on the decision of Ramachand Hirachand v. D. D. Collector, Baramati, AIR 1955 Bom. 154. On behalf of the contesting second respondent, Sri S. K. Venkataranga iyengar, learned Counsel, contended thus: A demand amounting to compounding fee cannot be unilaterally levied and such fee, in its very nature, is determined by a bilateral act of the parties concerned. Any unilateral levy, therefore, as in the instant case, would not result in foisting liability on a candidate. In an enquiry of the present nature, the Court is not precluded from going into the question whether a sum was, or was not, legally due. It is also urged that the function of the Returning Officer was 'judicial function' and he would be bound to hold a summary enquiry, on the question of legality or otherwise of the demand. In support of these submissions he relied on the following decisions: Hopkins and Williams (Travancore) Ltd. , v. Agricultural Income-tax and Rural Sales Tax Officer, 5 STC. In support of these submissions he relied on the following decisions: Hopkins and Williams (Travancore) Ltd. , v. Agricultural Income-tax and Rural Sales Tax Officer, 5 STC. 2 ; v. Narayanachari v. Commissioner and Returning Officer, Corporation of the City of Bangalore, (1971) 1 Mys. L. J. 225 and Tiruchirapalli Municipality v. S. Ramachandran, AIR 1972 Mad. 17 . We shall now proceed to consider the above contentions. In Ramachand hirachand's case (1), the Court was concerned with a case of rejection of nomination paper under the Bombay Village Panchayat Act, 1933. A bill for payment of tax under S. 91 (1) of that Act was presented to the petitioner on 17-9-1953. The petitioner did not pay the bill and filed a suit challenging the tax and on the day of the scrutiny of the nomination paper the sum claimed under the said bill was still due. It was contended therein that he did not admit that the tax was due to the Panchayat, and therefore, it was incumbent upon the Reutrning Officer to ascertain whether that tax was, in fact, due before he could be disqualified, and that a mere presentation of a bill by the local authority would not bring the case within the purview of the section relating to disqualification under the said Panchayat Act. Chagla, CJ. , speaking for the Bench has observed thus (at page 155 of the Report):". . . . . It is an established principle of election laws that all proceedings must be summary proceedings and there should be no delay in deciding points that arise in the course of elections. Now, if what mr. Tarkunde says were to be accepted, it would result in this extraordinary situation that every time a candidate for election has not paid the bill and challenges its validity, the Returning Officer must solemnly sit down and adjudicate upon the validity of the tax. That surely is not the function of the Returning Officer. All that S. 8 (i) means is that there must be a failure to pay a tax which is due not in law or legally but which is due under a bill which is presented by the Panchayat and which has not been paid by the candidate. . . . . . It is always open to a tax-payer to pay tax under protest and litigate his rights. . . . . . It is always open to a tax-payer to pay tax under protest and litigate his rights. But if he chooses not to pay tar in respect of which the local authority has presented a bill, it is but right that he should not aspire to become a member of that local authority. . . . . . . . . " (underlining (italics) is ours ). In that case, the learned Judges were construing Sec. 8 (i) of the Village panchayats, Act, which reads thus: "no, person may be a member of a panchayat or continue as such who (i) fails to pay any tax or fee due to the panchayat within three months from the date on or before which the amount of such tax or fee is required to be paid in the bill presented to the person under sub-section (1) of Section 91. " in our opinion, in substance, this provision is not very materially different from the provision of S. 56 (2) (ee) of the Act, in so far as it concerns the demand regarding arrears payable by a candidate. We are clearly of the view that the above enunciation of Chagla, CJ. , with which we are in respectful agreement, would be applicable to the present case. in the instant case, it is clear that a demand had been made by the corporation and the same was subsisting on the date of the nomination paper submitted on behalf ox the second respondent. The Returning Officer, has in fact, held a summary enquiry and examined the candidate, who has unequivocally admitted that a demand had been made and he had not complied with it as the same was being challenged in a Civil Suit. In this state of affairs, it is clear that the Returning officer has acted 'judicially' and the enquiry held by him satisfied the requirement of a summary enquiry. To enquire further into the legality or otherwise oi the demand made, would not fall within the scope and jurisdiction of his powers as a Returning Officer. The Order of the Returning officer, therefore, is clearly valid and has to be sustained. ( 5 ) WE have earlier observed that it is not the function of the Court enquiring into an election petition to go further and enquire into the legality of the demand made by the Corporation. The Order of the Returning officer, therefore, is clearly valid and has to be sustained. ( 5 ) WE have earlier observed that it is not the function of the Court enquiring into an election petition to go further and enquire into the legality of the demand made by the Corporation. Its jurisdiction is only co-existensive, so far as it concerns the case of rejection of nomination paper on the ground of non-payment of arrears claimed under a bill, with that of the Returning Officer. We are aware that the Court could declare an election as void on several other grounds specified in S. 69a of the Act. We are not concerned with any other ground in the present case. Turning now to the contentions of Sri S. K. Venkataranga Iyengar, it must be stated that some of the propositions formulated by him were not seriously questioned on behalf of the appellant, in our opinion, rightly, but, what is relevant to be examined is the question of jurisdiction within the four corners of the special Law governing such matters. We have also referred to the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction exercisable by a Court, in election petitions under S. 69a (1) (c) read with S. 56 (2) (ee) of the Act. In this view we consider it sufficient to refer only to the decision Thiruchirapalli municipality v. Ramachandran (4) relied on by the learned counsel. In our opinion, the said decision is clearly distinguishable. The decision in the said case clearly turned upon the effect on an Order of stay issued by a Court in regard to the demand made by the local authority by presentation of a bill. But, reliance was placed on certain observations made therein. In our view, the said observations even if it be assumed that they are in favour of the present petitioner, are clearly obiter and they were not relevant for the decision arrived at by the Court. As a result, this appeal succeeds and is allowed. The Order of the second Additional District Judge of Bangalore, in Misc. E. P. No. 14 of 1971 is, therefore set aside. The second respondent will pay the costs of the appellant in this appeal. Advocate's fee Rs. 100. --- *** --- .