Order.- In this revision an important point of law is involved. There are in all 92 accused persons in P.R.C. No. 1 of 1971 having been charged under sections 302, 120-B, 121-A, 395 etc., Indian Penal Code. During the enquiry the prosecution filed a petition Crl. M.P. No. 187 of 1972 before the learned Special Magistrate, who is enquiring into P.R.C. No. 1 of 1971, with a prayer to split up the case of six of the accused viz., A-82, A-95, A-97, A-102, A-109, and A-118 on the ground that they have caused obstruction to the proceedings of the Court by making noise, raising slogans, singing songs and even causing threats to a witness, followed by intermittent interruption, as a result of Which the proceedings could not be conducted in a peaceful atmosphere and the decorum of the Court could not be maintained and the whole atmosphere was not in keeping with the dignity of the Court. The learned Magistrate dismissed the petition on two grounds viz., that he had no power to pass such order splitting up the case of the six accused from the rest. The Magistrate also found that most of the allegations of the prosecution have not been established. Aggrieved by the said order, the prosecution has preferred this revision. 2. Sri Jayachandra Reddy, the learned Public Prosecutor contends that although there is no provision in the Criminal Procedure Code to split up the case nevertheless the Magistrate erred in holding that he has no power to split up the case against the accused persons. In support of his contention, the learned Public Prosecutor has relied on several rulings. The learned Public Prosecutor further submits that it is true that no similar provisions as that of section 561-A, Criminal Procedure Code, are to be found in the Criminal Procedure Code giving inherent powers to the lower Court. A perusal of several authorities would show that the lower Court is clothed with inherent powers to pass orders which are necessary for effective dispensing of justice. In view of the importance of the question of law involved, I consider it necessary that it should be disposed of by a Division Bench of this Court because it will affect a number of cases for all times to come. Hence the case is referred to the Bench. In view of the importance of the question of law involved, I consider it necessary that it should be disposed of by a Division Bench of this Court because it will affect a number of cases for all times to come. Hence the case is referred to the Bench. The papers may be placed before My Lord the Chief Justice for necessary orders. 3. In view of the urgency of the case and the fact that most of the accused are in jail for a very long time it is desirable that this revision may be posted before a Bench during the next week. In pursuance of the above order of the High Court dated 17th August, 1972 this case came on before the Bench. (Kondiah and Sriramulu, JJ.) The Public Presecutor, for Petitioner. P. Venkateswarlu, for 2nd Respondent. The following Judgments were delivered.- Sriramulu, J.-This Criminal Revision Petition has been filed by the Public Prcsecutor, with a prayer that the order of the Special Magistrate, Visakhapatnam, dated 29th June, 1972 in Crl. M. P. No. 187 of 1972 in P.R.C. No. 1 of 1971, be revised. 5. 92 persons in all were charge-sheeted before the Special Magistrate in P.R.C. No. 1 of 1971 for various offences alleged to have been committed by them. During the enquiry, the prosecution filed Crl. M.P. No. 187 of 1972 before the Special Magistrate, with a prayer to split up the case of six of the accused persons viz., A-82, A-95, A-97, A-102, A-109 and A-118 on the ground that they have caused obstruction in the proceedings of the Court by making noise, raising slogans, singing songs, and even causing threats to a witness, followed by intermittent interruption, as a result of which the proceedings could not be conducted in a peaceful atmosphere and the decorum of the Court not be maintained and the whole atmosphere was not in keeping with the dignity of the Court. By his order dated 29th June, 1972, the Special Magistrate dismissed the petition, mainly on the ground that he has no power to split up the case of some of the accused persons from the case of the rest of the accused. The Special Magistrate also discussed the merits, and found that the prosecution had failed to establish most of the allegations made by it. 6. The Special Magistrate also discussed the merits, and found that the prosecution had failed to establish most of the allegations made by it. 6. Aggrieved by the above order, the learned Public Prosecutor filed this criminal revision case in this Court. The petition came up for hearing before our learned brother, Muktadar, J. In view of the importance of the question of law involved, our learned brother considered it necessary that this revision petition should be disposed of by a Division Bench, because it would affect a large number of cases for all times to come. This is how the petition has come up before us. 7. The learned Public Prosecutor contended that every subordinate criminal Court has, by its very constitution inherent powers to do all such acts as are necessary for a fair and smooth trial of the accused persons. There may be several cases where the cases of some of the accused may have to be split up from the case of others, for various valid reasons. The High Court, by rule 18 of the Criminal Rules of Practice, has provided that every subordinate criminal Court has got inherent powers to split up the case of an absconding accused, from the case of the rest of the accused. If the subordinate Courts have no such inherent power, it would be impossible for the subordinate Courts to have a fair and smooth trial. In support of his argument, the learned Public Prosecutor relied upon a large number of cases. 8. The learned Counsel Sri P. VenkatesWarulu, appearing for A-82, contended that, no doubt the subordinate Courts must have inherent powers to do all such acts which are necessary for ensuring a fair and smooth trial of accused persons, but the subordinate Courts have no inherent power to split up a case on the ground of obstruction, etc. If the accused persons intentionally insulted, or caused interruption to any public servant while such public servant is sitting in any stage of judicial proceedings, section 228 of the Indian Penal Code provides for punishing such offending accused. If the accused persons intentionally insulted, or caused interruption to any public servant while such public servant is sitting in any stage of judicial proceedings, section 228 of the Indian Penal Code provides for punishing such offending accused. Similarly, when any of the accused or an} person omits to produce a document to a public servant being legally bound to produce it, or refuses to take oath or affirmation when duly required by such public servant, or refuses to answer a public servant authorised to question, or refuses to sign his statement and commits offences under sections 175, 178, 179 and 180 or section 288 of the Indian Penal Code, the Magistrate has ample power, under section 480 of the Criminal Procedure Code, to take cognizance of the offence and sentence the offender. In view of the existence of these special provision in the Penal Code as well as in the Criminal Procedure Code, the subordinate Courts should be considered not to have any inherent power to split up a case on the ground of obstruction, etc. The learned Counsel, in support of his argument, incited our attention to the decision of this Court reported in Sri Eswaraswamy Temple represented by its Trustee v. Jangam Nagaiah and others1. Section 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code, saves the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code, or to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court, or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Some of the general principles governing the exercise of inherent powers by the High Court are: (1) Such powers would not be invoked in regard to matters covered by specific provisions of the Code, and (2) to review its own order passed in a criminal case. 9. The question that, therefore, arises before us is whether the subordinate criminal Courts have similar inherent powers to secure ends of justice. 10. This question came up for decision before various High Courts in connection with several matters involving the smooth and a fair trial of accused persons by subordinate Courts. 11. In Akhil Bandnu Ray and others v. Emperor1, certain persons were charged with conspiracy to commit criminal breach of trust and cheating. 10. This question came up for decision before various High Courts in connection with several matters involving the smooth and a fair trial of accused persons by subordinate Courts. 11. In Akhil Bandnu Ray and others v. Emperor1, certain persons were charged with conspiracy to commit criminal breach of trust and cheating. After the prosecution evidence was over, the Magistrate found at the stage of framing of the charges, that all the accused could not be tried together and the case should be split up in order to avoid misjoinder. The Magistrate, thereupon formed two groups of the accused persons and ordered de novo trial of one of them. Guha and Leth Widge, JJ. held that the Magistrate had acted rightly in the exercise of his inherent power in ordering de novo trial of a group. The learned Judges observed that: “.......Criminal Courts have an inherent power to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice. This inherent power is not capriciously or arbitrarily exercised; it is exercised ex debito justitiae to do that real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone Courts exist; but the Court, in the exercise of such inherent power, must be careful to see that its decision is based on sound general principles and is not in conflict with them, or with the intention of the Legislature as indicated in statutory provision......” 12. In holding that view, the learned Judges relied upon the decisions in Budhulal v. Chattu Gope2, Picot v. Ali Mahammad Mandal3and Rahim Shaikh v. Emperor4. 13. In Hansraj Harjiwan Bhate v. Emperor5 one of the objections that Was raised, was that section 173, Criminal Procedure Code, provided for the completion of police investigation without unnecessary delay and any subsequent investigation would be illegal and, therefore, the witnesses unearthed by such an investigation, should not be examined in Court. Section 540 of the Criminal Procedure Code was relied upon. But it was submitted by the other side that it related only to the examination of the Court witnesses but not to the prosecution witnesses. Overruling the contention that section 540, Criminal Procedure Code, was confined to Court witnesses only, Gruer, J. observed that: “......It is said that the Criminal Procedure Code is an exhaustive one. That is so only with regard to matters specifically dealt with by it. Overruling the contention that section 540, Criminal Procedure Code, was confined to Court witnesses only, Gruer, J. observed that: “......It is said that the Criminal Procedure Code is an exhaustive one. That is so only with regard to matters specifically dealt with by it. Absence of any provision on a particular matter does not mean that there is no such power, and the Court may act on the principle that every procedure should be understood as permissible till it is shown to be prohibited by law......” 13-A. In Emperor v. Rautmal Kanumal Marwadi6, one Magistrate released an accused on. bail. Another Magistrate, to whose Court the case was transferred, finding that the accused was tampering with the prosecution witnesses directed his re-arrest. The question was, whether the Magistrate, to whose Court the case was transferred, had inherent power to get the accused re-arrested. On a reference made by the Sessions Judge of Satara, Beaumont, C.J. and Sen, J. observed that: “......Every Judge or Magistrate trying a criminal case has inherent power to see that the trial is properly conducted and that the ends of justice are not defeated and if facts are brought to his attention which suggest that unless the person who is being tried is placed under arrest, the ends of justice will be defeated, the Court has inherent power to direct his rearrest........” 14. In Nalluswami Reddy v. Nallammal7, Horwill, J. held that no Court subordinate to the High Court has any inherent jurisdiction to review its own judgment, save in a few circumstances such as where there has been abuse of the process of Court, or fraud played upon the Court or where petty clerical errors or mistakes have been made. 15. In Krushna Mohan and others v. Sudhakar Das1, Narasimham and Mohapatra, JJ., held that a Magistrate cannot invoke his inherent jurisdiction to revise his orders under section 145 (6) because sub-section (6) of section 145 in express terms confers finality on that order. 15. In Krushna Mohan and others v. Sudhakar Das1, Narasimham and Mohapatra, JJ., held that a Magistrate cannot invoke his inherent jurisdiction to revise his orders under section 145 (6) because sub-section (6) of section 145 in express terms confers finality on that order. Where, however, an order under section 145 (6) of the Criminal Procedure Code, is itself a nullity due to the failure to serve the required preliminary notices under sub-section (1) of section 145 on all the parties, the Magistrate may invoke his inherent powers and ignore the same; but he cannot revise it merely because he considers that a party who had due notice of the proceedings and was absent on the date fixed for hearing, satisfied him that there were sufficient reasons for his absence on that date. 16. In Ram Cherey v. Ram Priya Das2a question arose as to whether personal service on the opposite party is or is not possible in a given case. It was held that the question was not one which could be agitated in the trial Court after the disposal of the case and that, the discretion exercised by one Magistrate could not be made the subject matter of objection before his successor". In this connection, Misra, J. observed that: "......The inherent powers of the High Court as well as of criminal Courts generally are wide, but the powers so recognised by law are designed to meet only those cases for which there is no provision in the code......" 17. In Hariram v. The State3, Abdul Hakim Khan, J. dealing with an application for the transfer of the case, obsered with regard to the inherent power of a Court, thus: "......No legislative enactment dealing with the procedural law can provide for all the cases that may arise and it is an established proposition of law that a Court of justice must possess inherent powers apart from the express provisions of law which are necessary to its existence and the proper discharge of duties imposed upon them by law...... In this view of the matter every Court whether civil or criminal, in the absence of any express provision to the contrary, shall be deemed to possess, as inherent in its very constitution, all such powers as are necessary in the course of the administration of justice. In this view of the matter every Court whether civil or criminal, in the absence of any express provision to the contrary, shall be deemed to possess, as inherent in its very constitution, all such powers as are necessary in the course of the administration of justice. The rule of inherent powers has its source in a latin maxim "Quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur id sine quo ipsa esse non potest" which means that "when the law gives anything to anyone, it gives also all those things without which the thing itself could not exist......" 18. The question Whether criminal proceedings could be stayed came up for cansideration before Kumarayya, J. (as he then was) in Penumarti Janikamma v. Chunduru Appanna3. The learned Judge observed that: "....No doubt it is open to a party to make a request for the stay of the criminal case pending disposal of the civil suit between the same parties on the same subject matter, and the Magistrate, according to some of the High Courts, even apart from the provisions of section 344, Criminal Procedure Code, has inherent jurisdiction to stay proceedings before him or postpone the inquiry; but these discretionary powers are to be exercised sparingly and only if there is sufficient and reasonable cause". 19. In Ramibai v. Nathu and another5, the accused were dispossessed by police pending trial. The accused were then acquitted after trial. Krisbnan, J. held that the Court has inherent power to restore possession. The learned Judge observed that: "......Thus, one comes to the conclusion that every criminal Court has got inherent power to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of process of any Court, or otherwise, to secure the ends of justice; but a criminal Court other than a High Court cannot invoke this power if there is already an express provision in the Code in this regard ............... It is the duty of every such Court to act rightly and failry according to the circumstances towards all parties involved, even in the absence of an express prevision in the Code. The only caution is that there should be a pressing call for justice, and the cause is generally similar to the one under the nearest analogous section of the Code......" 20. The only caution is that there should be a pressing call for justice, and the cause is generally similar to the one under the nearest analogous section of the Code......" 20. In Narasingha Rao v. Sricharan Panda1, the question arose as to whether possession of property, after cancellation of the order under section 145, could be returned to the party from whose custody it was taken. The learned Judge observed that: "......Even if an order of the Magistrate delivering possession to a party after cancellation of an order under section 145 may not come within section 517 (1), it would fall Within the scope of the inherent powers of the Magistrate. It is now well settled that the Subordinate Magistrates possess inherent powers apart from the express provisions of law which are necessary to their existence and proper discharge of duties imposed upon them by law. Every Court whether civil or criminal, in the absence of an express provision to the contrary, shall be deemed to possess as inherent in its very constitution, of such powers as are necessary in the course of administration of justice. This power is, however, not to be exercised contrary to express provisions of the code and must be used cautiously........" 21. In Subhlal Gope v. State of Bihar2, a committing Magistrate who discharged the accused under section 209 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, in the absence of the complainant, later on accepted the complainant’s application made on the same day for the review of his order and for the restoration of the case. B. P. Sinha, J., held that a Magistrate has the inherent power to undo a Wrong even though there is no such express provision in the Code. 22. In Pigot v. Ali Mahammad Mandal3, a special Bench of the Calcutta High Court observed that: "......Though the Criminal Procedure Code contains no provision analogous to section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code, criminal Courts, no less than civil Courts, have inherent power to make such orders as are necessary in the ends of justice. Such power is not, however, to bo exercised capriciously or arbitrarily, but ex debito justitiae on sound general principles and subject to the statutory provisions applicable to the matter......". 23. Such power is not, however, to bo exercised capriciously or arbitrarily, but ex debito justitiae on sound general principles and subject to the statutory provisions applicable to the matter......". 23. In Lalit Mohan Deb Burman v. Hridoy Ranjan Deb Burman4, J.N. Datta, Judicial Commissioner, observed that where there is no specific provision, the criminal Court, no less than the civil Court, has inherent power to mould the procedure to enable it to pass such orders as the ends of justice require, 24. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion, is that the Criminal Procedure Code is no doubt an exhaustive one. It is exhaustive only with regard to the matters specifically dealt with by it. Absence of any provision on a particular matter, does not mean that there is no such power. In the absence of a provision, the Court must act on the principle that every procedure should be understood as permissible, till it is shown to be prohibited by law. No legislative enactment dealing with the procedural law can provide for all the cases that may arise. The Courts of justice must, therefore, possess inherent powers, apart from the express provisions of law, which are necessary to their existence and proper discharge of duties imposed upon them by law. In the absence of any express provision to the contrary, every Court, whether civil or criminal, must be deemed to possess as inherent in its very constitution, all such powers as are necessary in the course of the administration of justice. When the law gives anything to any one, it also gives all those things without which the thing itself could not exist. It is thus well settled that the subordinate Magistrates possess inherent powers, apart from the express provisions of law. From a discussion of the aforesaid cases, it is also seen that (i) in the matter of splitting up of a case, (ii) in regard to the examination of witnesses, (iii) cancellation of bail already granted, (iv) for stay of proceedings, (v) for restoration of possession after the disposal of the case, or (vi) for restoration of a complaint which was dismissed for the absence of the complainant, the criminal Courts have always inherent powers to do the right thing and to undo a wrong, for securing the ends of justice. 25. 25. Section 228,Indian Penal Code, and section 480 of the Criminal Procedure Code, no doubt provide that the Courts have powers to punish for certain offences relating to the administration of justice but tho:e powers have nothing to do with the inherent powers of the criminal Courts. Although the criminal Courts have got inherent powers for discharging the duties imposed upon them by law and for securing the ends of justice, and for a fair and smooth trial of the case, those powers should be exercised according to sound judicial principles, and not arbitrarily. Thus, we hold that there is no express provision in the Criminal Procedure Code with regard to the splitting up of a case, which prohibits a Subordinate criminal Court from exercising its inherent jurisdiction to pass Ian order splitting up a case, which is before it. 26. The learned Special Magistrate has therefore, obviously erred in holding that he had no power to split up a case for any valid reason. 27. The decision strongly relied upon by Sri P. Venkateswarlu, i.e., Sri Eswaraswamy Temple represented by its Trustee v. Jangan Nagaiah and others1, does not relate to the exercise of the inherent powers by the subordinate Courts. It only lays down that under section 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code, which relates only to High Courts, the subordinate Courts cannot be considered to have inherent powers under that section. 28. Then coming to the merits, we find that the learned Special Magistrate has dealt with each of the allegations made by the prosecution in support of its case for splitting up of the prosecution case against some of the accused persons. Even if the Special Magistrate has an inherent power to split up a case, it is he that should find that some of the accused persons are obstructing the fair and smooth trial of the case, or not observing the decorum of the Court, etc. Since he has come to a conclusion that the accused persons are not obstructing the proceedings in any manner, it would not be fair for us to reverse that finding. If the learned Special Magistrate found that the smooth trial of the case, at this stage, has not been obstructed by any of the accused persons, certainly he was justified in dismissing the petition filed by the prosecution for splitting up of the case. If the learned Special Magistrate found that the smooth trial of the case, at this stage, has not been obstructed by any of the accused persons, certainly he was justified in dismissing the petition filed by the prosecution for splitting up of the case. If, however, at any future date, the Magistrate finds that some or any of the accused persons are obstructing the progress of the case or not maintaining the decorum of the Court, or causing obstruction to the fair and smooth enquiry of the case in any manner, the Magistrate will, certainly exercise his inherent powers, which he has for splitting up of the case of those accused persons. With these observations, we dismiss the petition. Kondaiah, J.-I have had the advantage of perusing the judgment prepared by my learned brother Sriramulu, J. and I am in entire agreement with the conclusions arrived at by him. In view of the importance of the question raised, I prefer to express my opinion in my own words: 30. This Criminal revision case by the Public Prosecutor gives rise to a short but interesting question of procedural law, whether the trial or enquiry Court is competent to split up the case of such of those accused who cause obstruction to its proceedings at the P.R.C. enquiry and enquire them separately? 31. In order to appreciate the scope of the question, it is profitable and necessary to briefly refer to the intendment and purpose of Courts and the Code of Criminal Procedure. The constitution of the Courts, civil or criminal, is for the purpose of administering real and substantive justice, in accordance with law and procedure to the parties that appear in the causes before them. To regulate the procedure to be followed by Courts in respect of criminal matters, Code of Criminal Procedure has been enacted by the Central Legislature. The prime, if not the sole, intendment and object of the Code of Criminal Procedure is to ensure a full and fair trial to the accused and therefore, the provisions of the Code are designed to further the ends of justice and not to frustrate them by introducing innumerable technicalities. The concept of ‘full and fair trial’ must be in accordance with Well-established and Well-understood notions or principles of natural justice. Vide (i) W.Slaney v. State of Madhya Pradesh1, and (ii) T. H. Hussain v. M.P. Mondkar2. The concept of ‘full and fair trial’ must be in accordance with Well-established and Well-understood notions or principles of natural justice. Vide (i) W.Slaney v. State of Madhya Pradesh1, and (ii) T. H. Hussain v. M.P. Mondkar2. The framers of the Code, have indeed, provided an exhaustive procedure in respect of all masters specifically mentioned in the Code. It admits of no doubt that it is not humanly possible for any Legislature to visualise and prescribe procedure for all matters that arise in Court for all times. In view of the changing times and circumstances, a number of cases or situations not visualised or contemplated by the Legislature may arise in Courts. To meet such unforeseen cases and situations and to administer real and substantive justice it cannot be said that the Courts are powerless on the ground that no specific provision in that regard has been enacted, in the Code. The Courts, in such circumstances, evolved What is known as ‘rule of inherent jurisdiction’ and applied the same to regulate their proper and effective functioning in the discharge of their duties, to get over the technicalities and to secure the ends of justice. The concept and content of inherent jurisdiction is based and founded on a latin maxim "Quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur id sine quo ipsa esee non potest", which means that ‘when the law gives anything to anyone, it gives also all those things. without which the thing itself could not exist........ 32. The existence of inherent power in the Courts to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or to secure ends of justice has been very Well recognised by the Courts With regard to some matters, not provided for by the Code. It is pertinent to notice that prior to 1923 and before enacting section 561-A of he Code of Criminal Procedure, the subordinate Courts and the High Court stood in the same position in so far as the inherent jurisdiction is concerned. In view of the decision of the Allahabad High Court, in G. Dunn v. King Emperor3, to the effect that it had no power to direct the expunction of objectional matter from a record, the Central Legislature by section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Amendment Act, 1923 inserted section 561-A With a view to put an end to any controversy in that regard. Section 561-A is nothing but a statutory recognition of the possession of inherent power by the High Courts to secure the ends of justice. It did not invest any new powers or increase the jurisdiction already vested in the High Courts. The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court in the absence of any specific provision in the Code prior to the insertion of section 561-A, has been recognised by the judicial committee and the Supreme Court, which We shall presently refer. It is apposite to refer to the following observations of the Privy Council, with regard to the scope and effect of section 561-A, in Emperor v. Nazir Ahmad4. "It has sometimes been thought that section 561-A has given increased powers to the Court which it did not possess before the section was enacted. But this is not so. The. section gives no new powers, it only provides that those which the Court already inherently possess shall be preserved and is inserted, as their Lordships think, lest it should be considered that the only powers possessed by the Court are those expressly conferred by the Criminal Procedure Code, and that no inherent power had survived the passing of that Act". To the same effect is the decision of the judicial committee in Jairam Das v. Emperor 5, which reads as follows: "section 561-A of the Code confers no powers. It merely safeguards all existing inherent, powers possessed by a High Court necessary (among other purposes) to secure the ends of justice". The aforesaid view of the Judicial Committee has been approved by the Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Nairn1 . 33. There appears to be no direct decision of any High Court recognising inherent jurisdiction in the subordinate criminal Courts. However several High Courts have expressed the view that every Court has inherent power to see that the trial is properly conducted and the ends of justice are not defeated in the absence of express provisions in the Code as it is not possible or easy to visualise all the possible situations and contingencies. However several High Courts have expressed the view that every Court has inherent power to see that the trial is properly conducted and the ends of justice are not defeated in the absence of express provisions in the Code as it is not possible or easy to visualise all the possible situations and contingencies. Absence of any provision in respect of a particular matter should not be construed that there is no such power for the Court to deal With such a situation vide (i) Muhammad Sulaiman Khan v. Muhammad Tar Khan2, (ii) Rahim Sheikh v. Ali Mohammad Mandal3, (iii) Chunilal v. Municipal Borough, Ahmedabad4, (iv) Ram Cherey v. Baba Ran Priya Das5, (v) Rami Bai v. Nathu6(vi) Narasirigha Rao v. Sricharan Panda7and (vii) Subhlal v. State8. 34. For the foregoing reasons, the subordinate criminal Courts which have a statutory duty and obligation to conduct the trial or enquiry fairly, smoothly and effectively must be held to possess inherent jurisdiction and power in the absence of any specific provision in the Code either prohibiting or providing for the exercise of such power in respect of any matter as it is really essential for their effective and smooth functioning in accordance with law and procedure. 35. This brings us to examine ‘‘whether the Court has inherent power to split up the case of the accused who cause obstruction to its proceedings?” 36. There is no specific provision either in the Code or Criminal Rules of Practice enabling the Court to split up a case at the trial or enquiry when some of the accused are found to be causing obstruction to the proceedings. It may be noticed that rule 18 of the Criminal Rules of Practice, 1966 framed by this Court With the approval of the Governor by virtue of the powers conferred on it under Article 227 of the Constitution read with section 554 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, empowers the Court to separate the case of the absconding accused from that of the others and proceed With their trial or enquiry separately, but it has no application to the case on hand. 37. It may be noticed that section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowering the High Court to invoke its inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of the process in any Court or to meet the ends of justice, is not applicable to the instant case. 37. It may be noticed that section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowering the High Court to invoke its inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of the process in any Court or to meet the ends of justice, is not applicable to the instant case. However, it should not be understood that the High Court has no power under section 561-A to pass appropriate orders directing the subordinate criminal Courts to split up the case against such of those accused who cause obstruction to its proceedings in the enquiry or trial, on an application filed by the State. No decided case taking the view that the subordinate criminal Courts have no inehrent jurisdiction or power of any kind, has been brought to our notice. The decision of our learned brother Obul Reddi, J., in Sri Eswaraswamy Temple represented by its Trustee v. Jangam Nagaiah and others8relied upon by the accused does not advance their plea. Therein it was held that section 561-A does not invest inherent powers in subordinate criminal Courts. 38. The inherent jurisdiction of a Court has to be exercised sparingly and with due care and caution and only in appropriate cases either to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court or to secure the ends of justice. Where all or some of the accused obstruct, prevent or interfere with the Court’s proceedings or create disturbance by raising slogans singing songs, expressing no faith in the Courts and the manner of administering justice, it must be held [that it is not possible for that Court to function effectively, smoothly and in a dignified manner. The Court atmosphere must be calm and the proceedings have to be carried with due care and dignity and the Court is entitled to function in a calm, dignified and judicious atmosphere. Otherwise, it is not possible to function as a Court of law in the discharge of its duties. The Court in such circumstances can certainly invoke its inherent jurisdiction to regulate its work and proceedings as it amounts to preventing abuse of process in that Court and also to secure the ends of justice. The trial or enquiry Court must be held to have inherent jurisdicion and power to split up the case of the accused who cause obstruction to its proceedings, which is necessary for effective dispensing of justice. The trial or enquiry Court must be held to have inherent jurisdicion and power to split up the case of the accused who cause obstruction to its proceedings, which is necessary for effective dispensing of justice. This view of ours gains support from a decision of the Calcutta High Court in "Akhil Bandhu Ray v. Emperor1, wherein relying upon its earlier decisions in Badhu Lal v. Chattu Gope2, Bigot v. Alt Mohammad Mandal3, and Rahim Sheikh v. Emperor4, it was held by a division Bench that the Magistrate was empowered at the time of framing charges to split up the case of persons charged With conspiracy to commit cheating and breach of trust owing to misjoinder and order de novo trial of one group and there was no illegality or impropriety in what the Magistrate has done in that case as the Magistrate had inherent power to pass such order as was necessary for ends of justice. 39. Whether the splitting up of the case against such of those accused who cause obstruction to Court’s proceedings is or is not to prevent abuse of the process of the Court or to secure the ends of justice is a question of fact depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The guide lines for the Court in shaping its conclusions on this aspect are: (i) Whether the enquiry or trial Court cannot proceed effectively, speedily and smoothly and in a dignified manner or it is likely to be dragged on indefinitely or delayed if the case is not split up against such of those accused who cause obstruction or disturbance? and (ii) Whether or not any substantial prejudice to the accused by splitting up the case and trying different sets of accused separately, would be caused? The subordinate criminal Court before whom the proceedings are obstructed or disturbed has on a consideration of the entire facts and circumstances to decide whether it can have an effective and smooth enquiry or trial or the case has to be split up. Whether Or not there is any impediment, disturbance, trouble or interference for the Court, to have a fair, full, effective and smooth enquiry or trial, is one of fact to be arrived at or decided by that Court. Whether Or not there is any impediment, disturbance, trouble or interference for the Court, to have a fair, full, effective and smooth enquiry or trial, is one of fact to be arrived at or decided by that Court. If the Court opines that it can get on with the case without any real obstruction or impediment to its proceedings, it need not invoke its inherent power to split up the case. If it feels otherwise, the Court is competent to split up the case. The finding of the enquiry or trial Court that there is an obstruction, impediment, or disturbance and it is not possible for it to proceed effectively, fairly and smoothly with the enquiry or trial being one of fact, will not normally be interfered with by the revisional Court, unless such finding is not supported by any material or perverse or vitiated by any illegality or irregularity. The enquiry Court in the case on hand was of the view that the acts alleged to have been committed by the respondents herein did not amount to disturbing or obstructing its proceedings and it could go on With the enquiry without any difficulty. We are not persuaded to disturb the aforesaid finding on facts arrived at by the enquiry Court who had seisin of the matter. 40. For all the reasons stated, the questions must be answered in the affirmative holding that the trial or enquiry Court has inherent power to split up the case against the accused who cause obstruction to its proceedings and enquire them separately. But, however, in view of our finding on merits the revision case must be and is hereby dismissed, with a direction to the lower Court to complete the enquiry, as expeditiously as possible. 41. But, however, in view of our finding on merits the revision case must be and is hereby dismissed, with a direction to the lower Court to complete the enquiry, as expeditiously as possible. 41. Before we part with the case, we may add that it is proper and desirable to make a suitable amendment to rule 18 of the Criminal Rules of Practice, 1966, by the High Court by virtue of the powers conferred on it under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and section 554 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and with the previous approval of the Governor of Andhra Pradesh so as to put an end to the controversy and settle the procedure in this regard beyond the realm of controversy in view of the fact that in a considerable number of cases now pending in subordinate criminal Courts of our State, some of the accused professing a particular political faith are said to be openly defying the authority of the Courts challenging the rule of law, insulting the Courts, raising slogans and singing songs and thereby obstructing or trying to obstruct the proceedings of the Courts. Hence the following amendments to the Criminal Rules of Practice are suggested: (1) Rule 18 may be amended by adding the following clause: “If one or more accused obstruct the proceedings of the Court or prevent the Court from functioning in a dignified or effective manner by raising slogans or in any other manner, the Court can split up the case against such of the accused thus causing obstruction and annoyance and take up their case separately and proceed with the case as and when the said accused are prepared to take their trial and have the enquiry proceeded against them in an orderly and peaceful manner. If all the accused in any such case create the above situation, the Court may adjourn the case till such time as it deems fit and necessary.” (2) A new rule to the following effect rule 18 (ii) may be added thus: “The Court shall allow armed guard or escort inside the Court during the trial or enquiry whenever necessary or whenever the situation warrants. The Court may take such action as it deems fit, proper and necessary to conduct its proceedings smoothly and effectively, consistent with the dignity of the Court.” K.N.R. ----- Petition dismissed.