JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, J. - The Notified Area Garhmukteshwar enforced levy of toll tax with effect from April 1, 1964. The levy was, inter alia, on laden cycles, laden motor lorry and laden motor truck etc. Laden motor lorry or laden motor trucks were liable to pay a toll of Rs. 4/- for entering into the limits of Garhmukteshwar. Respondents 2 to 6 operated motor vehicles on Bulandshahr-Siana-Garhmukteshwar route. The Town Area Committee did not permit them to enter its limits without paying the toll of Rs. 4/-. Aggrieved they made an application to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate praying that the rate of toll was excessive and the amount should be reduced to Rs. 1. 25 per day. This application was rejected on October 20, 1970. The Respondents filed appeals before the Additional Commissioner, Meerut. At this stage they also challenged the validity of the levy itself. The Additional Commissioner held that on a true construction of the relevant entries which mention laden motor lorry or laden motor truck, passenger lorry or passenger trucks were not included specially when they did not pass through the limits of the town area. Since the Respondents' buses come to Garhmukteshwar, stop there at the stand and then return to Bulandshahr, they did not come within the purview of the entry and were not liable to pay toll at all. He quashed the assessment of toll on the Respondents vehicles at the rate of Rs. 4/- per trip. Aggrieved the Notified Area Committee instituted a writ petition in this Court. The learned Single Judge held that no appeal lay to the Addl. Commr. His order was bad on that account. He also held that the imposition of the tax was invalid because the Sub-Divisional Magistrate who sanctioned the proposals and the rules had no power to do so because there was no valid delegation in his favour. On these findings the writ petition was dismissed without going into the merits of the case and deciding the question whether the relevant entry covered passenger vehicles also. 2. In the present appeal Pandit Kanhaiya Lal Misra appearing for the Appellant Committee challenged the finding regarding powers possessed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. Sections 15-A and 15-B of the U.P. Town Areas Act lay down the procedure for imposition of a tax including toll tax. 2. In the present appeal Pandit Kanhaiya Lal Misra appearing for the Appellant Committee challenged the finding regarding powers possessed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. Sections 15-A and 15-B of the U.P. Town Areas Act lay down the procedure for imposition of a tax including toll tax. Under it the Town Area Committee is to frame proposals and the rules are settled by it after inviting objections. The settled proposals are considered by the Prescribed Authority or the District Magistrate, as the case may be, and sanctioned. Thereafter the matter goes to the State Government and after the State Government's sanction the Town Area fixes a day for the imposition of the tax. The prescribed authority or the District Magistrate thereafter notifies the imposition in the prescribed manner. In this procedure the Prescribed Authority or if none is appointed the District Magistrate is given the power to sanction the proposals and then to notify and enforce the rules in the prescribed manner. 3. Section 4 of the Act provides: The Prescribed Authority or if none is appointed the District Magistrate, by written order or subject to such conditions and restrictions as he may think fit to impose, delegate all or any of the powers conferred on him by this Act or by rules framed under this Act, other than his power u/s 39-A to the officer-in-charge of the Sub-Division in which the Town Area is situated or to any other stipendiary officer of the Revenue Staff of the district above the rank of the Tahsildar. Provided that (the Prescribed Authority or if none is appointed the District Magistrate) may at any time revise an order passed by such officer under the powers so delegated. It appears that there is no prescribed authority for the Notified Area Committee of Garh Mukteshwar. The District Magistrate delegated his powers to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate by an order which runs as follows: The power conferred upon the District Magistrate by United Provinces Act II of 1914 (as amended by U.P. Act No. 11 of 1929) or rules framed under this Act, other than his power u/s 39-A are hereby delegated to the officer-in-charge of the Sub-Division in which Town Areas are situated. 4. 4. Before the learned Single Judge it was submitted on behalf of the operators that the delegation by the District Magistrate was confined to the powers possessed by him on the date when he passed the order of delegation. This order did not govern powers conferred upon the District Magistrate by the Legislature subsequent to the passing of the Older of delegation. Sections 15-A and 15-B were enacted by U.P. Act XXIII of 1950. The power of sanctioning proposal conferred by Section 15-B(1) was not in existence when the District Magistrate passed the order of delegation and, therefore, that order of delegation will not entitle the Sub-Divisional Magistrate to sanction the proposals framed by the Notified Area Committee. 5. The central point to be considered is whether Section 4 permitted delegation of powers which may be possessed by the District Magistrate from time to time; and in the next place whether the District Magistrate really intended to delegate all such powers. 6. Section 4 entitles the District Magistrate to delegate all or any of the powers conferred on him by the rules framed under it. The only exception was that he could not delegate his powers u/s 39-A. No other limitation or prohibition was placed upon the discretion of the District Magistrate in the matter of delegation of his powers. The District Magistrate was authorised to subject the delegation to such conditions and restrictions, as he thinks fit to impose. In the next place the proviso authorised him to revise the orders passed by the officer under the powers so delegated. These features clearly show that the legislative intent behind Section 4 was to give a blanket power to the District Magistrate to delegate all or any of the powers possessed by him from time to time. Section 4 contemplates that the District Magistrate can delegate his powers generally. If he does not want to do so then he has to subject the delegation to such conditions and restrictions as he may deem fit. Unless there is any restriction the delegation will be general and unrestricted. If by a particular order the District Magistrate says that he delegates all powers possessed by him, then the powers are delegated without any condition or restriction. The delegated officer can exercise the powers conferred on the District Magistrate at the time when an occasion requires its exercise. 7. If by a particular order the District Magistrate says that he delegates all powers possessed by him, then the powers are delegated without any condition or restriction. The delegated officer can exercise the powers conferred on the District Magistrate at the time when an occasion requires its exercise. 7. Coming to the actual order of delegation it is at once clear that the District Magistrate did not think fit to impose any condition or restriction upon delegation of powers. The delegation is general. The only exception was in relation to the powers conferred by Section 39-A. Otherwise all powers possessed by the District Magistrate under the rules or the Act were delegated by this order. In the context of Section 4 the reasonable construction of this order appears to be that the District Magistrate did not intend to keep back any of the powers conferred upon him and that he intended that the delegated officer should exercise the various powers mentioned in the rules or the Act from time to time whenever an occasion arises for their exercise. 8. Similar questions have frequently arisen in relation to legislation by reference. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn. Vol. 36 at page 471, Paragraph 716 it has been stated: If the enactments are merely repealed in part, or modified by the addition or alteration of words, the question arises whether it might not have been the intention of the incorporation statute to adopt them as for the time being in force. In Sutherland Statutory Construction, 3rd Edn., Vol. II Paragraph 5207 it is stated: A statute may refer to the another statute and incorporate a part of it by reference. There are two-types of statutes: statute of specific reference, as its name implies, refers specifically to a particular statute by its title or section number. A general reference statute refers to the law on the subject generally. An example of this type of reference is a provision that contracts made under the statute are to be let in the manner now provided by law. Similar examples can be found in those statutes which incorporate CPC to govern the tribunals created by them. For example, several enactments have adopted the CPC for governing the procedure in enquiries under those acts. 9. Similar examples can be found in those statutes which incorporate CPC to govern the tribunals created by them. For example, several enactments have adopted the CPC for governing the procedure in enquiries under those acts. 9. In Mani Ram v. State 1952 ALJ 243 the extension of Sections 180 and 185 of the Municipalities Act in relation to notified areas came up for consideration. It was observed at page 248 that: The instant case must be distinguished from cases where an enactment incorporates or adopts the entire Jaw regarding a particular matter contained in another enactment. For example, several enactments have adopted the CPC for governing the procedure in enquiries under them it has never been contended that those enactments have adopted the CPC which was current at the time when they were enacted and that subsequent amendments in it would not be deemed to have been adopted. It has been taken for granted in all such cases that the CPC that is current at the time when the enquiry takes place would govern it. For example, in suits under the U.P. Tenancy Act of 1939 the procedure laid down in the CPC barring certain sections was to be observed. This has not been taken to mean that the CPC that was current in 1939 was to be followed. In a suit tried in 1948 the CPC that was current in 1948 was to be followed. When the legislature adopted the entire law on a particular subject, it is legitimate to presume that it adopted it together with all subsequent amendments. But when a legislature adopts only particular provisions out of an enactment the same presumption cannot be drawn and the presumption that can be drawn would be that the legislature selected those provisions out of the enactment on account of their particular contents and that it intended to apply only those contents. 10. To the same effect is the following paragraph in Sutherland Statutory Construction, 3rd Edn., Vol. 2 paragraph 5208: A statute which refer to the law of a subject generally adopts the law on the subject as of the time the law is invoked. This will include all the amendments and modifications of the law subsequent to the time the reference statute was enacted. 11. In the present case the order of delegation was general in nature and intent. This will include all the amendments and modifications of the law subsequent to the time the reference statute was enacted. 11. In the present case the order of delegation was general in nature and intent. The only exception being in regard to the powers conferred u/s 39-A. The order of delegation should be deemed to be a delegation of all the powers possessed by the District Magistrate from the time to time. Whenever an occasion arises, the delegatee will have all such powers that are in existence at that time. 12. We are therefore of opinion that the order of delegation authorised the Sub Divisional Magistrate to exercise the powers conferred on the District Magistrate by Sections 15-A and 15-B. There was hence no invalidity in the levy of toll by reasons of the sanction having been granted by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. 13. The next question is whether the Notified Area Committee was justified in imposing the toll tax upon passenger buses. It appears that in the beginning the Notified Area Committee was doubtful whether passenger vehicles were covered by the entry 'Laden Motor Lorry'; it referred the matter to the State Government. The State Government clarified the position to the effect that it covered vehicles carrying passengers also. Thereafter the Committee started levying the toll tax on passenger vehioles. 14. The first rule provides: No person shall bring within the limits of the Town Area Garhmukteshwar a head load, or bahangi load or a laden vehicle or laden animal in respect of which toll is leviable in Schedule A appended to these rules. Schedule A consists of 18 entries. Entry No. 16 is: Laden motor, lorry or motor truck--4/-. 15. Laden cycle. 14. Laden horse ekka. 13. Laden hand cart drawn by less than four men. Note 2 to Schedule A provides: If any animal or vehicle is loaded with articles on which the toll is leviable at different rates, the toll shall be charged for the class for which highest rate of toll is prescribed. Schedule B gives a list of the articles exempted from assessment of toll tax. Paragraph 4 says: Bonafide personal luggage or a railway passenger and bus holder articles of employees coming on transfer. Paragraph 5 lays down: All articles belonging to the Government or any local body imported or exported on behalf of Government or local body. Schedule B gives a list of the articles exempted from assessment of toll tax. Paragraph 4 says: Bonafide personal luggage or a railway passenger and bus holder articles of employees coming on transfer. Paragraph 5 lays down: All articles belonging to the Government or any local body imported or exported on behalf of Government or local body. Similarly Paragraph 6 refers to: All articles belonging to the Government or any local body imported or exported on behalf of Government or local body. Reading the rules and the schedules as a whole it is evident that the word 'laden' has been used with reference to the various kinds of vehicles to indicate that they are laden with goods or articles, and not human beings. For example entry No. 15 mentions 'laden cycle'. A cycle cannot enter the territories without being driven by some body and if that was the intent of the rule the entry would have mentioned the word cycle simpliciter. Taking the second note as well as the various paragraphs of the two schedules into consideration it is clear that schedule B gives a list of articles which are exempted. In paragraph 4 of schedule B bonafide personal luggage of a railway passenger and bus holder articles of employees coming on transfer have been exempted. Obviously the luggage would have to be carried by some one either carried by vehicle or on head. Surely the entry "Head load" cannot include a case where a man is carrying his child on his head. This construction of the schedule is corroborated by the Hindi version of the rule. There entry 1 says: "Sir per laday bojh". Entry No. 15 says 'bojh say ladi cycle'. Entry No. 16 says 'bojh say ladi gari athwa motor truck'. The word 'laden' in English version has been used to include both the Hindi words 'bojh and Ladi'. Clearly 'bojh' refers to goods or articles. The opening paragraph of Schedule I emphasises that that toll shall be realised where the weight of the load does not exceed 5 Kg. in the case of a head load or Bahangi load or 40 Kg. in the case of a cart or an animal or any other vehicle. At all these places the word 'load' clearly points to goods or articles as constituting the load, and not human beings. 15. in the case of a head load or Bahangi load or 40 Kg. in the case of a cart or an animal or any other vehicle. At all these places the word 'load' clearly points to goods or articles as constituting the load, and not human beings. 15. For these reasons we are of opinion that the vehicles laden with passengers were not within the purview of the entry and no toll was payable on them. 16. For the Committee it was urged that these vehicles were liable to pay toll tax if they are carrying luggage in addition to passengers. On facts that question does not arise in the present case. We express no opinion about it. 17. It was also urged that the finding of the learned Single Judge is that no appeal lay to the Commissioner. It is unnecessary to consider this question because for the Appellant committee itself it was pressed that the Court may give its finding upon the validity of the rules and correct construction to the entry and that has been done. On the view taken by us the Respondents' vehicles laden with passengers were not liable to tax. This was the view taken by the Commissioner, hence no useful purpose will be served in quashing the order of the Commissioner. 18. In the result the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs.