ORDER G.C. Mathur, J. - The petitioner Company submitted under Section 3 of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, draft standing orders for certification to the Certifying Officer. Objections were filed to the draft standing orders and after considering those objections the Certifying Officer amended the draft standing orders and certified them as amended. Against the order of the Certifying Officer the petitioner Company preferred an appeal. The appeal was fixed for hearing on March 26, 1970, but on that date the petitioner's representative did not appear. The Appellate Authority, accordingly, passed the following order : "The appeal has been taken up today. The appellants are absent despite notice. The respondent workmen and the Standing Orders Officer on behalf of the Certifying Officer are present. It is already 12.40 P. M. in the day. There is no communication on behalf of the appellants. The appeal in the absence of the appellants is dismissed in default. Inform all concerned." On April 3, 1970, the petitioner Company made an application to the Appellate Authority for setting aside the order dismissing the appeal in default and for hearing the appeal on merits. The reason for non-appearance on the date of hearing given was that the Counsel for the Company, who had been instructed to appear, fell ill. By an order dated April 16, 1970, the Appellate Authority rejected the application on the ground that there was no provision for setting aside an ex parte order. The petitioner has challenged both these orders. 2. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that there is no power in the Appellate Authority to dismiss an appeal in default. There is no provision either in the Act or in the Rules framed thereunder which empowers the Appellate Authority to dismiss an appeal in default. The scheme of the Act also does not contemplate the dismissal of an appeal in default. Section 3 provides for the submission of draft standing orders to the Certifying Officer. Section 4 lays down the conditions under which standing orders shall be certifiable. Section 5 provides for the certification of standing orders. Subsection (1) of Section 5 provides for the giving of the notice to the trade union of the workmen or to the workmen. Subsection (2) then provides for the giving of an opportunity of hearing to the employer and the workmen or their representative. Section 5 provides for the certification of standing orders. Subsection (1) of Section 5 provides for the giving of the notice to the trade union of the workmen or to the workmen. Subsection (2) then provides for the giving of an opportunity of hearing to the employer and the workmen or their representative. It further provides that the Certifying Officer shall decide whether or not any modification of or addition to the draft submitted by the employer is necessary to render the draft standing orders certifiable under this Act. Sub-section (3) then provides that the Certifying Officer shall after decision under sub-section (2) certify the draft standing orders after making such modifications as he may find necessary. It is obvious that the Certifying Officer has to decide whether or not any modification of or addition to the draft submitted is necessary irrespective of the fact whether all the parties availed of the opportunity of being heard or not. The statute casts a duty upon the Certifying Officer to consider the draft standing orders on merits and to decide whether any modification or addition therein is necessary or not to render them certifiable, It is clear that the Certifying Officer cannot, even if the employer does not appear, refuse to perform his duty cast upon him by sub-sections (2) and (3) and dismiss the case in default. 3. Against the order of the Certifying Officer a right of appeal is conferred on any person aggrieved by it. Subsection (1) of Section 6 requires that the. Appellate Authority, "shall by order in writing confirm the standing orders either in the form certified by the Certifying Officer or after amending the said standing orders by making such modifications thereof or additions thereto as it thinks necessary to render the standing orders certifiable under this Act." Section 6 empowers the Appellate Authority to do only two things, namely, (1) confirm the standing orders in the farm certified by the Certifying Officer, or (2) confirm the standing orders after amending them by making necessary modifications or additions. Apart from these two powers, no other power has been conferred upon the Appellate Authority. Therefore, the scheme of Sections 5 and 6 clearly shows that an appeal has to be decided by the Appellate Authority on merits and cannot be dismissed in default. 4. Apart from these two powers, no other power has been conferred upon the Appellate Authority. Therefore, the scheme of Sections 5 and 6 clearly shows that an appeal has to be decided by the Appellate Authority on merits and cannot be dismissed in default. 4. In the Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. S. Chenniappa Mudaliar, AIR 1969 SC 1068 the Supreme Court had to consider whether an appeal to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal could be dismissed in default or not. Sub-section (4) of Section 33 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, which governed the matter, was in these terms: "The Appellate Tribunal may, after giving both parties to the appeal an opportunity of being heard, pass such orders thereon as it thinks fit, and shall communicate any such orders to the assessee and to the Commissioner." The Supreme Court held that the Scheme of the provisions of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, relating to the Appellate Tribunal was that it had to dispose of an appeal by making such orders as it thought fit on the merits. It further held that the Tribunal had to go into the correctness or otherwise of the points decided by the Departmental Authorities in the light of the submissions made by the appellant and that this could only be done by giving a decision on merits on question of facts and law and not by merely disposing of the appeal on the ground that a party concerned had failed to appear. In Smt., K.L. Sehgal v. Commr., Allahabad 1971 All LT 595 ; ( AIR 1971 All 573 ), a Division Bench of this Court had to consider the question whether the Commissioner sitting in revision under Section 3 (3) of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, could dismiss the revision in default. Section 3 (3) ran thus: "The Commissioner shall hear the application made under sub-section (2) and he may, if he is not satisfied as to the correctness, legality or propriety of the order passed by the District Magistrate or as to the regularity of proceedings held before him alter or reverse his order, or make such other order as may be just and proper." The Division Bench held that the Commissioner had no power to dismiss the revision in default. It observed that the Commissioner could not satisfy himself as regards the correctness, legality or propriety of the District Magistrate's order or as to the regularity of proceedings, unless he examined the proceedings 'before the District Magistrate and went through the revision application. It held that the type of the order, which the Commissioner was empowered to pass, could only be passed on the merits of the case. The Bench further held that there was no indication in Section 3 of the Act that the Commissioner could dismiss a revision in default. 5. The position of the Appellate Authority under the Industrial Employment Standing Orders Act is similar. He is required either to confirm the Standing Orders in the form certified by the Certifying Officer, or to confirm them after amending them by making necessary modification or additions thereto. This can only be done if the Appellate Authority applies its mind to the matter and decides, the appeals on merits. The duty cast upon the Appellate Authority by sub-section (1) of Section 6 cannot be performed by dismissing the appeal in default, but can only be performed by deciding the appeal on merits. I am, therefore of the opinion that the Appellate Authority had no power or jurisdiction to dismiss the appeal filed by the petitioner Company in default. 6. The writ petition is, accordingly, allowed with costs and the order of the Appellate Authority dated March 26, 1970, dismissing the petitioner's appeal in default, is quashed. The Appellate Authority will re-entertain the appeal and after giving the parties a fresh opportunity of being heard decide the same on merits.