ORDER K.B. Asthana, J. - This is a Plaintiff's appeal from an appellate decree of dismissal of her suit for recovery of rent and damages and for eviction of the Defendants Respondent from the accommodation in suit. 2. The facts necessary for understanding the controversy raised in this appeal may be briefly stated. The Plaintiff Smt. Haliman was a tenant in a part of a big house in which in other parts there were three other tenants viz. Abdul Sattar, Mohammad Ahmad and Abdul Majid, each having separate accommodation. Smt. Haliman purchased the house and thereafter filed an application u/s 3 of the UP (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act (herein-after referred to as the Act) for permission to file a suit for eviction against the said three tenants on the ground that her family had expanded and she was in genuine need of greater accommodation, the accommodation occupied by her was too small for the need of the big family. Separate objections were filed before the RG and EO by the said three tenants, they denied the allegations of the Applicant-landlady and pleaded that she was not in genuine need of the accommodation and pressed their own need for the accommodation. After considering the need of the Applicant-landlady on the basis of the material on record but without discussing the case of the respective tenants as to their need, the ADM passed the following order on 25-5-1964: Accordingly, I hereby grant her permission to sue any one of the three opposite parties for eviction. The choice is left to her and she would not be entitled to sue more than one of the opposite parties Mohammad Ahmad, Abdul Majid and Abdul Sattar. 3. Against the above order of the ADM, Abdul Sattar appears to have filed a revision u/s 7(3) of the Act. It is not clear from the record whether the other two tenants also filed any revision. The revision of Abdul Sattar was dismissed by the Addl. Commr. on 17-7-1964. On 21-7-1964 Smt. Haliman, the landlady, instituted the suit giving rise to this appeal against Abdul Sattar on the allegation that she had obtained permission for his eviction from the DM u/s 3 of the Act and has terminated the tenancy by a notice u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Commr. on 17-7-1964. On 21-7-1964 Smt. Haliman, the landlady, instituted the suit giving rise to this appeal against Abdul Sattar on the allegation that she had obtained permission for his eviction from the DM u/s 3 of the Act and has terminated the tenancy by a notice u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is not necessary to refer to the other pleas in the plaint as nothing turns upon them in this appeal. In his written statement Abdul Sattar pleaded, inter-alia, that the permission obtained was inoperative and ineffective in law being vague, discriminatory and leaving the decision to landlady herself to pick and chose the tenant against whom the suit for eviction could be filed. 4. The learned Munsif, who tried the suit, held that the permission granted u/s 3 by the DM was a valid permission not open to challenge before a civil court and the tenancy of the Defendant having been terminated by a valid notice u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, he was liable to be evicted. The suit of the Plaintiff was decreed for eviction and other reliefs. On appeal by Abdul Sattar, the learned Civil Judge, who heard the appeal, took the view that there being no permission in law as contemplated by Section 3 of the Act, the suit of the Plaintiff was barred. On this preliminary point the learned Civil judge allowed the appeal, set aside the decree of the court below and dismissed the Plaintiff's suit. Now the Plaintiff-landlady has come up in second appeal before this Court. 5. The only point for decision arising in this appeal is whether the learned Judge of the lower appellate court was right in taking the view that the order of the ADM dated 25-5-1964 did not in law amount to a permission for bringing a suit for eviction of the Defendant Abdul Sattar as contemplated by Section 3 of the Act. 6. Sri Bashir Ahmad, learned Counsel appearing for the Plaintiff-Appellant, contended that under the law no particular form in which the permission is to be granted has been prescribed and it is not necessary that the order should ex facie contain the name of the tenant against whom the permission is granted. 6. Sri Bashir Ahmad, learned Counsel appearing for the Plaintiff-Appellant, contended that under the law no particular form in which the permission is to be granted has been prescribed and it is not necessary that the order should ex facie contain the name of the tenant against whom the permission is granted. The learned Counsel further contended that the permission granted by the ADM would not be called in question before a civil court and its validity could not be attacked collaterally in the suit as there was no lack of jurisdiction on the part of the ADM to grant the permission, no mandatory rules of procedure were breached and no principles of natural justice were violated, as all the three tenants were heard. The submission was that mere defect in the form in which the permission was granted even if appeared to the civil court to be wrong could not serve a ground for setting aside it in the suit, the remedy lay, if any, by way of filing a writ petition Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. A further argument was raised that in any view of the matter Defendant Abdul Sattar, having filed a revision u/s 7(3) before the Commr., would be bound by the order passed against him in revision and the permission ought to be treated as against him. 7. I am not impressed with any of the arguments raised by Sri Bashir Ahmad for the Plaintiff-Appellant. I may deal first with the question as to the effect of the revisional order of the Commr., passed on the application of Abdul Sattar. I do not think the revisional order, which was one of dismissal, would have any effect in so far as the order of the ADM dated 25-5-1964 is concerned as by that revisional order it was allowed to stand. No change came in the position of the parties on account of the dismissal order of the Commr. Moreover, the order of the Commr. was taken up in revision u/s 7-F of the Act to the State Govt. and when the present suit was filed and the written statement was filed the revision was pending. It could not, therefore, be said that Abdul Sattar had conceded to the order of the Commr. Moreover, the order of the Commr. was taken up in revision u/s 7-F of the Act to the State Govt. and when the present suit was filed and the written statement was filed the revision was pending. It could not, therefore, be said that Abdul Sattar had conceded to the order of the Commr. I think the court below rightly took into consideration the order of the ADM dated 25-5-1964 as the one granting permission. 8. I have quoted above the form in which the order was passed. It is clear from it that the order left it to the decision of the Plaintiff-landlady as to against which of the tenant and for which accommodation she would bring a suit for eviction. Section 3 of the Act affords a protection to a tenant who is in occupation of an accommodation and what is required by that section is that there should be the permission of the DM for eviction of the tenant. Can it be said in the instant case, considering the manner in which the ADM passed the order, that his order was final as a quasi judicial determination, conferring permission on the landlady to bring a suit to evict Abdul Sattar. After the passing of that order yet it was open to the Plaintiff-landlady to apply her own mind to either file a suit against Abdul Sattar or against the other tenants. If she thought that the suit for eviction be brought against the other tenants--Abdul Majid and Mohammad Ahmad, any one or either of them, it becomes clear then that the suit will be brought after the Plaintiff-landlady made her choice it will therefore be her decision to evict Abdul Sattar and not the decision of the DM. I think there has not been any vagueness in the order but the manner in which the ADM thought to decide the case shows that he abdicated his function. Once an order shows such a defect or infirmity and when the law envisages an application of his mind by the DM for passing a final order without leaving anything for further consideration by a third party and if such a scope is left in the order, there occurs a blatant breach of the fundamental rules of legal procedure and will bring the case within the mischief of there being no decision, that is, no order as contemplated by law. 9. Much reliance was placed by Sri Bashir Ahmad on a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Rameshwar Dayal v. Sohan Lal 1963 AWR 175 in support of his contention that no special form of order is prescribed and the order granting permission need not mention any name and also for the proposition that the order was not open to challenge in a civil court but I do not think the ratio of the decision helps the learned Counsel so far as the facts and circumstances of the instant case are concerned. Here I have found that the manner in which the order has been passed by the ADM is not at all contemplated under the law and cannot be countenanced by the civil court as it amount to no order in the eye of law. The jurisdiction vested in the ADM had not been exercised as he left it to the Plaintiff-landlady to finalise the order for filing the suit against the chosen tenant, the choice not being of the DM but that of the Plaintiff-landlady herself. Further it is the duty of the DM to consider the need of the tenant to be proceeded against before the passing of the order as held by a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Asa Singh v. B.D. Sanwal 1968 AWR 572 . A copy of the order passed by the ADM is on record and I have already observed that it does not consider separately the need of each of the tenant. Even if I assume that the lack of consideration of discussion will only make the order erroneous and not make it without jurisdiction yet I consider it was the duty of the ADM to consider the need, the jurisdiction being quasi judicial. The terms of the order confer the power to decide that material question on the Plaintiff-landlady as she was to pick and chose after considering which accommodation was needed by her and which accommodation was not genuinely required by any one of the three tenants. In this view of law the order suffers from an error of jurisdiction. The terms of the order confer the power to decide that material question on the Plaintiff-landlady as she was to pick and chose after considering which accommodation was needed by her and which accommodation was not genuinely required by any one of the three tenants. In this view of law the order suffers from an error of jurisdiction. I share the view of the court below that on ground of public policy also such an order passed u/s 3 of the Act should not be countenanced as it leaves a power in the hands of the landlord to strike a bargain with any of the two tenants and yet obtain through the Court the accommodation needed. 10. As a result of the discussion above, I see no merits in this appeal and dismiss it with costs. Appeal dismissed.