Judgement JUDGMENT:- This second appeal by the plaintiffs which raises some interesting questions of law is directed against the decree dated 30th May, 1970, of the Assistant District Judge, Dibrugarh, by which the suit of the plaintiffs was dismissed on reversing the decree of the trial Court made in their favour. 2. The case of the plaintiffs was that the land in dispute measuring 28 bighas 2 kathas 14 lechas was firstly held by their father Sambhunath on annual patta and on his death it was settled in their favour as heirs of Sambhunath. Taking advantage of the fact that they (the plaintiffs) were minors, the defendant managed to secure possession of the land in the year 1960. When the plaintiffs grew up in years and learnt about their rights in the land they approached the defendant for restoring possession of the land to them but the defendant turned back on their legitimate demand. Having been left with no alternative they filed the suit claiming khas possession of the land on declaration of their title thereto. 3. The suit was resisted by the defendant who traversed the allegations of fact made by the plaintiffs and pleaded that the suit was not maintainable inasmuch as it was, practically speaking, a suit for challenging the settlement of the land made with him and that such settlement was immune from challenge in Civil Court. According to the defendant, the plaintiffs father had made over khas possession of the land to him on 23-9-59 and then he (the plaintiffs father) made a petition to the Sub-deputy Collector praying that the patta of the land be issued in favour of the defendant. The Sub-deputy Collector, the defendant alleged further, cancelled the patta in favour of the plaintiffs father, converted the land into khas ownership of the Government, and thereafter he issued annual patta in favour of the defendant. The defendant asserted that he had been in continuous possession of the land for a long number of years without any break. The trial Court settled the following issues: (1) Whether this Court has jurisdiction to try the suit? (2) Whether the suit land was the property of the deceased father of the plaintiffs? (3) Whether the plaintiffs have any subsisting title in the suit land? (4) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree for ejectment of the defendant? The trial Court settled the following issues: (1) Whether this Court has jurisdiction to try the suit? (2) Whether the suit land was the property of the deceased father of the plaintiffs? (3) Whether the plaintiffs have any subsisting title in the suit land? (4) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree for ejectment of the defendant? (5) What other reliefs are the plaintiffs entitled to? Under issue No.1 the trial Court held that on the basis of the pleadings adopted by the defendant the latter must be deemed to have admitted in terms of Rule 5, Order VIII, Civil Procedure Code, that the patta of the suit land currently stands in the name of the plaintiffs and that as such the plaintiffs can legitimately come to the Civil Court for declaration of their title to the land. Issues Nos.2, 3 and 4 were also found in favour of the plaintiffs with the consequence that their suit was decreed with costs. 4. On appeal by the defendant the learned Assistant District Judge set aside the finding of the trial Court that the defendant must be deemed to have admitted the plaintiffs title in the land on the date of the suit, and then held, on assessment of the material on record, that it was the defendant, and not the plaintiffs, who at present have lease-hold right in the land. Other distinct findings recorded by the Assistant District Judge were that the annual patta of the land at present is in favour of the defendant and that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that they have subsisting title in the land. Another finding returned by the first appellate Court was that the plaintiffs have no right to challenge in Civil Court the settlement of the land made in favour of the defendant. 5. The plaintiffs having felt aggrieved with the findings recorded by the Assistant District Judge and the decree made by him came up in second appeal to this Court. 6. Sri Das urged, practically speaking, two points in support of the appeal. Firstly, he submitted that the Munsiff had rightly held on the basis of the written statement filed by the defendant that the latter had admitted that the plaintiffs are at present the annual lease-holders of the land in dispute and that consequently they were under no legal obligation to prove that fact by leading evidence. Firstly, he submitted that the Munsiff had rightly held on the basis of the written statement filed by the defendant that the latter had admitted that the plaintiffs are at present the annual lease-holders of the land in dispute and that consequently they were under no legal obligation to prove that fact by leading evidence. In the second place, Sri Das submitted that the Assistant District Judge had gone legally wrong in holding that the suit is not maintainable in law. Shri N.M. Lahiri, who appeared for the defendant-respondent, joined issue with Shri Das on both the points. For proper appreciation of the first point raised by Shri Das, it is necessary that a brief reference to the parties pleadings be made. In paras 1 to 4 of the plaint it was stated that the land in dispute once stood in the name of the plaintiffs father on "one years patta", that at the time of the death of their father the plaintiffs Nos.1 and 2 were respectively aged 2 years and 6 months, and that after the death of their father the land was leased out in their favour in their capacity as "the heirs of the late patta holder" and that "the Government did not cancel the said patta, or did not serve any notice etc." In para 1 of the written statement the defendant alleged that the plaintiffs suit "is not based on facts" and that he (the defendant) "does not admit any statement of the plaintiffs plaint". In para 2 of the written statement it was alleged by the defendant that the plaintiffs father had delivered the possession of the suit land to him on 23-9-1959 and he had then submitted a petition to the Sub-Deputy Collector requesting for issuing a patta of that land in favour of the defendant, and that the Sub-Deputy Collector on cancelling the patta in favour of the plaintiffs father and making the land Government property issued the annual patta in respect thereof in his favour. It was alleged further that the plaintiffs objection respecting the issue of patta in favour of the defendant does not fall within the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and as such the suit is not triable by the Civil Court. 7. It was alleged further that the plaintiffs objection respecting the issue of patta in favour of the defendant does not fall within the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and as such the suit is not triable by the Civil Court. 7. The principal point debated in this Court was about the interpretation of Rule 5 of Order VIII, Civil P.C. That Rule runs as under: "Every allegation of fact in the plaint if not denied specifically or by necessary implication, or stated to be not admitted in the pleading of the defendant, shall be taken to be admitted except as against a person under disability: Provided that the Court may in its discretion require any fact so admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admission". Analysed, the Rule states that every allegation of fact in the plant- (a) If not denied specifically, or (b) If not denied by necessary implication, or (c) If not stated to be not admitted, in the pleading of the defendant it shall be taken to be admitted by the defendant. There are 2 exceptions to the legal presumption which the Rule raises under the circumstances mentioned therein, they being that the presumption shall not be raised as against a person under disability and that the Court may in its discretion require that any fact presumed to be admitted may be proved otherwise than by such admission. Tersely put, the main body of the Rule states that if a particular allegation made in the plaint is neither specifically denied nor by necessary implication, nor stated to be not admitted, then it shall be taken to have been admitted by the defendant. I find from the written statement filed by the defendant Harendra Biswas that in para 1 of the document he had specifically stated not only that the plaintiffs suit "is not based on facts" but he had gone further to assert that he "does not admit any statement of the plaintiffs plaint". The defendant did not stop at mere denial of the allegations made by the plaintiffs but detailed the facts on the basis of which his denial of the plaintiffs allegation was based, namely, that the plaintiffs father delivered the possession of the land to him on 23-9-1959; and had thereafter petitioned the Sub-Deputy Collector for issuing a patta in the defendants favour and that that was done. In the context of such pleadings of the defendant I fail to comprehend how could it be held by the Munsiff, or how it could be contended on behalf of the plaintiffs that the defendant should be taken to have admitted that the title in the land vested in the plaintiffs on the date of the suit or that the plaintiffs held the patta of the land on that date. The specific allegation of the defendant that he did not admit any statement made by the plaintiffs in the plaint tentamounts unequivocally to the denial by him of the facts set out in the plaint. 8. The proviso appended to R.5 gives wide discretion to the Court to call upon the plaintiff to prove a fact otherwise than by the presumption which may be raised on the footing of the pleadings adopted by the defendant, and this exercise of discretion may, inter alia, be spelled out of the issues settled by the trial Court. It is obvious that if an issue is framed by the trial Court respecting a particular allegation made by the plaintiff then the question whether or not that fact has been admitted in the written statement will no longer be open, the Court having notified the plaintiff by the frame of the issue that he had to establish by appropriate evidence the subject covered by the issue. A glance at the issues raised between the parties in the present case will at once reveal that the trial Court had actually called upon the plaintiffs to prove that they had a subsisting title in the land on the basis of annual patta issued in their favour after the death of their father. Once an issue had been settled respecting that part of the plaintiffs case and the parties had been directed to lead evidence in support of their rival contentions, the trial Court ceased to have sanction of the law in holding that the plaintiffs need not prove the facts giving rise to the issue of which the burden had been placed on them, or that those facts can be taken to have been proved on the basis of the defendants pleading. I hasten to add that the pleadings of the defendant can surely be availed of while discussing the parties evidence bearing on a particular issue but those pleadings in the circumstances stated cannot be the sole basis for holding the issue proved. I have therefore no misgivings in my mind that the learned Assistant District Judge was right in differing from the view of the Munsiff that the factum of the plaintiffs title in the land stood proved from the pleadings of the defendant and on that account the plaintiffs were not obliged to prove the facts pleaded by any other form of evidence. 9. Shri Das invited this Courts attention to a number of authorities including those of the Supreme Court bearing on the interpretation of Rule 5. The first of such authorities cited is reported in AIR 1964 SC 538 , Badat and Co. v. East India Trading Co. The Supreme Court observed therein, that Rules 3, 4 and 5 of Order VIII form an integrated Code dealing with the manner in which allegations of fact in the plaint should be traversed and the legal consequences flowing from their non-compliance. The written statement must deal specifically, it was stated further, with each allegation of fact in the plaint and when a defendant denies any such fact, he must not do so evasively but answer the point of substance. If his denial of a fact is not specific but evasive, the said fact shall be taken to be admitted, and in such an event the admission itself being proof, no other proof is necessary. But under the proviso to Rule 5 the Court may, in its discretion, require any fact so admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admission. This interpretation of Rules 3, 4 and 5 by the Supreme Court does not help advance the contention of the plaintiffs that the defendants pleadings are capable of yielding the conclusion that he had admitted their title to the land on the date of the suit. Para 1 of the written statement wherein it is mentioned that the plaintiffs suit is not based on facts and that the defendant does not admit any statement made in the plaint clearly negatives the submission made on behalf of the plaintiffs that the main body of Rule 5 can be invoked in this case. Para 1 of the written statement wherein it is mentioned that the plaintiffs suit is not based on facts and that the defendant does not admit any statement made in the plaint clearly negatives the submission made on behalf of the plaintiffs that the main body of Rule 5 can be invoked in this case. I feel satisfied that that Rule cannot be availed of by the plaintiffs because of specific non-admission by the defendant of all the facts set out in the plaint. The Supreme Court, it will be noticed, laid emphasis on the fact that the denial when evasive is no denial in the eye of law. However in our case it cannot be urged for a moment that the denial made in para 1 of the written statement was evasive in any manner. The denial made was clear cut and categorical. This conclusion is reinforced by the circumstance that all conceivable issues arising from the plaint were framed end the burden of each one of them placed on the plaintiffs. In view of this factual situation I see no necessity of burdening this judgment with discussion of other authorities cited at the bar on behalf of the appellants. Therefore the first Point raised by Shri Das is demonstrably without merit. 10. This takes me to the consideration of the second question canvassed by Shri Das, viz., that the Assistant District Judge was wrong in holding that the claim made in the plaint is not triable by the Civil Court. This point arises on the terms of Section 154 of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886, hereinafter called the Regulation. Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of S.154 is to the effect that except when otherwise expressly provided in the Regulation or in Rules issued under the Regulation, no Civil Court shall exercise jurisdiction in "questions as to the validity or effect of any settlement, or as to whether the conditions of any settlement ate still in force." It was urged before the Assistant District Judge, as was done in this Court, that even if settlement of the suit land had been made in favour of the defendant, the plaintiffs are entitled to have a decision from the Civil Court about their rights in that land on the basis of Section 39 of the Regulation. This latter section, inter alia, provides that no person shall, merely on the ground that a settlement has been made with him or with some person through whom he claims, be deemed to have acquired any right to or over any estate, as against any other person claiming rights to or over that estate. Shri Das urged, and I think rightly, that a person having a right to an estate shall be entitled to seek a declaration of his right from the Civil Court as against the person who has succeeded in setting settlement of that land despite what is stated in Cl.(a) of Section 154(1). This proposition was also not contested by Shri N.M. Lahiri though he emphasized that the plaintiffs-appellants were not proved to have any right in the suit land and that as such they could not have filed the suit which in practical terms means challenging the settlement made in favour of the defendant. Shri Das urged on the other hand that since the plaintiffs father had once secured the annual patta of the land in dispute and since after his death such patta had been issued in their favour and that patta has not been cancelled till this day, the plaintiffs have a subsisting right to the land in dispute and such right they are surely entitled to enforce through a Civil Court. In the background of the arguments urged by the two counsel, the first point that falls for determination is whether the plaintiffs have a subsisting right to the land in dispute. 11-12. The undisputed facts are that annual patta of the land in dispute was originally issued in favour of the plaintiffs father and that after his death annual patta was also issued in favour of the plaintiffs. Shri Das submitted that the last patta issued in favour of the plaintiffs was in the year 1963. The suit culminating in this appeal was filed on 12-7-1967. Therefore the plaintiffs did not have any patta during the period that intervened between 1963 and the date of the institution of the suit. Though Shri Das did not agree with the finding of the Assistant District Judge that the patta at present is in the name of the defendant but that being a finding of fact it is not open to challenge in second appeal. Though Shri Das did not agree with the finding of the Assistant District Judge that the patta at present is in the name of the defendant but that being a finding of fact it is not open to challenge in second appeal. It is mentioned in the judgment on which the decree under appeal is based that "............it is the defendant who happened to be the present annual lease-holder". To ensure that no injustice had been done, specially when the plaintiffs happen to be minors. I permitted the parties counsel to take me through the evidence. That evidence established beyond doubt that the latest patta is in the name of the defendant and not that of the plaintiffs. The best proof of that fact is furnished by the statement of the plaintiffs next friend who is none other than their own mother Biraja Sardar P.W.1. She testified that the Patta of the land first stood in the name of her husband, the fattier of the plaintiffs, that after the death of her husband the patta was issued in the names of the plaintiffs, that subsequently the patta was issued in favour of the defendant, and that her objections before the Sub-Deputy Collector against the grant of patta to the defendant having failed she filed the present suit without taking recourse to the remedy of appeal against the Sub-Deputy Collectors order. In the face of this statement of the plaintiffs mother I see no escape from the conclusion that it is the defendant who is the latest patta holder of the land. 13. The real question that was debated in this Court centres round the point whether the plaintiffs hold any right in the land despite the fact that the defendant, according to their own admission, has been in possession of the land since the year 1960, and that the evidence on record establishes that he is the present patta holder of the land. The precise point raised by Shri Das was that once an annual patta is issued in the name of one person that patta automatically is renewed from year to year in terms of clause 3 of the patta until notice is given either by the patta holder or the Government that a renewal of the patta is not desired. Clause 3 of the patta is in the following terms:- "3. Clause 3 of the patta is in the following terms:- "3. You shall have no right or title in the Scheduled lands beyond the said period of one year and will not be entitled to compensation except as provided in clause 5 for growing crops, fruit trees or buildings left standing on the land at the determination of this lease. But unless you or Government, shall on or before ............... serve on the other party with a written notice to the effect that a renewal of the lease is not desired in respect of all or any of the scheduled lands this lease shall be renewed for another year on such land revenue as Government may determine". Apparently if no notice communicating non-requirement of the renewal of the lease is given, the lease is "renewed for another year" on such land revenue as the Government may determine. Whereas Shri Das wanted this Court to hold that renewal, in the absence of a notice and despite non-issue of a new patta, would be from year to year, Shri Lahiri vehemently canvassed that at the best the renewal shall be for one year more and that in the absence of a patta the lease-holder cannot maintain any suit for declaration of his right to the land covered by the Patta. He cited 1959 Assam LR 239, Md. Masum v. State of Assam, in support of his submission. It was held by Division Bench in that case that the right to get a renewal does not by itself confer any right in the land on the holder of the patta of that land and that a patta holder has no right to bring a suit for declaration that the patta should have been renewed in his favour when he has no subsisting right to the land itself. The High Court negatived the contention that clause 3 of the patta not only gives the patta holder a right to get his patta renewed but also a right in the land Until the patta is cancelled. At the highest, the High Court observed, the patta-holder has a right to get the patta does not give him a right in the land itself. Shri Das was unable to cite any contrary authority of this High Court subsequent to this decision. At the highest, the High Court observed, the patta-holder has a right to get the patta does not give him a right in the land itself. Shri Das was unable to cite any contrary authority of this High Court subsequent to this decision. Sitting singly I am bound by the proposition of law laid down in the case of Md. Masum. Therefore the plaintiffs-appellants cannot maintain an action for declaration of their subsisting title to the land in dispute. 14. There is abundant authority of this Court on the point that the right of the patta holder comes to an end when he relinquishes the land or the Revenue Authorities serve a notice on him intimating their intention to cancel the patta. Reference is invited in this connection to ILR 1957 Assam 437, Babur Ali v. Ramgopal Chaudhury. It is the case of the defendant Harendra Biswas that the father of the plaintiffs had voluntarily surrendered possession to him in the year 1959 and had then moved the Sub-Deputy Collector for cancellation of the lease in his name, and that thereafter the lease was granted to him (the defendant). That defence of Harendra Biswas has been accepted by the learned Assistant District Judge and Shri Das could not satisfy this Court that that conclusion of the Assistant District Judge is either assailable in second appeal or it is factually incorrect. Therefore the facts of the case in hand are covered by the principle that on relinquishment of the land the rights of the patta-holder terminate though no notice in terms of clause 3 of the annual patta is served on him by the Government. It follows that the second point raised by Shri Das is also without substance. 15. No other point was raised in this Court for or against the appeal. 16. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed. However since the plaintiffs are minors I direct that the parties shall bear their own costs in all the 3 Courts. Appeal dismissed.