M/s. Jado Ram Hira Lal v. Prescribed Authority — 1972 DIGILAW 548 (ALL)

JUDGMENT K.N. Singh, J. - This is a petition Under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking relief for the issue of a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the Prescribed Authority under the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, not to proceed with the landlord's application filed against the Petitioner u/s 21 of the said Act. The Petitioner, Messrs Jado Ram Hira Lal, which is a partnership firm, has filed the present petition through Suraj Mal, a registered partner of the firm. The Petitioner has been a tenant of premises No. 6/28, Bara Bhai Ki Gali, (sic) Agra, since long. It has been carrying on Arhat business in the premises in dispute. Sri Babu Ram Agarwal, Respondent No. 2, is the landlord of the premises in question. After the enforcement of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Act, Sri Babu Ram Agarwal filed an application before the Prescribed Authority u/s 21 of the Act with a prayer that the building be released in his favour and the Petitioner be evicted from the accommodation in question. The Petitioner thereupon filed the present petition before this Court challenging the validity of the proceedings initiated by the landlord u/s 21 of the Act for the Petitioner's eviction. 2. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner contended that the Petitioner cannot be evicted from the premises in dispute unless a notice u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was given to him terminating his tenancy and since no such notice had been given by the landlord the Petitioner cannot be evicted from the premises in question. Learned Counsel further urged that the provisions of Sec 106 of the Transfer of Property Act were mandatory and the Petitioner cannot be ejected from the accommodation in dispute u/s 21 of the Act without complying with those mandatory provisions and without having recourse to Civil Court. 3. The impugned Act is a special Act regulating the letting, fixation of rent, eviction and matters connected therewith for providing relief to the general public as there is scarcity of housing accommodation. Section 21 of the Act lays down conditions and circumstances under which a landlord may apply before the Prescribed Authority for eviction of a tenant from the building under tenancy or any specified part thereof. Section 21 of the Act lays down conditions and circumstances under which a landlord may apply before the Prescribed Authority for eviction of a tenant from the building under tenancy or any specified part thereof. If the Prescribed Authority is satisfied that any of the grounds enumerated in Sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Act exists, he may order eviction of the tenant from such accommodation. The grounds on which a tenant is liable to be evicted Under Sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Act are that the building is bonafide required by the landlord himself or any member of his family or that the building is in a dilapidated condition and requires demolition and new construction. Under Sub-section (2) of the said section the Prescribed Authority may, on an application of the landlord, order the eviction of a tenant from any surplus land appurtenant to the building under tenancy or from a portion thereof. Sub-section (3) lays down that before an order of eviction is passed against the tenant a reasonable opportunity of hearing shall be given to the parties concerned. Sub-section (4) of Section 21 further provides that an order of eviction may be passed by the Prescribed Authority Under Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) notwithstanding the fact that the tenancy has not been determined. Sub-section (5) of Section 21 lays down that on the passing of an order Under Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2), the building or part or appurtenant land, as the case may be, shall stand released in favour of the landlord. Sub-section (6), however, lays down that on the expiration of a period of thirty days from an order Under Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2), the tenancy of the tenant shall stand determined in its entirety or, as the case may be, in respect of any party or appurtenant land released in favour of the landlord. Section 22 of the Act provides for appeal against the order passed u/s 21 of the Act. Section 23 of the Act empowers the Prescribed Authority to use such force as may be necessary for evicting any tenant against whom an order is made u/s 21 or on appeal u/s 22 as the case may be. Section 22 of the Act provides for appeal against the order passed u/s 21 of the Act. Section 23 of the Act empowers the Prescribed Authority to use such force as may be necessary for evicting any tenant against whom an order is made u/s 21 or on appeal u/s 22 as the case may be. If any person other than a tenant against whom an order u/s 21 or u/s 22 is passed is found in actual possession he is also liable to be evicted and the landlord is entitled to be put into possession. Thus it is dear that Section 21 confers power on the Prescribed Authority to pass an order of eviction against a tenant or release an accommodation or land appurtenant to the building in favour of the landlord and Section 23 powers the Prescribed Authority to those orders without having recourse to civil court. 4. The scheme contained in Sections 21, 22 and 23 of the Act with regard to determination of tenancy and eviction of a tenant is quite different than that contained in Sections 106 and 111 of the Transfer of Property Act. Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, as applicable to the State of Uttar Pradesh, requires giving of thirty days' notice by the landlord to a tenant for termination of monthly tenancy of an immovable property. Section 111 of the said Act lays down that the lease of immovable property shall stand determined on the expiry of the period of notice given u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. In the absence of a requisite notice no suit for ejectment; is maintainable as no order of eviction can be passed at the instance of the landlord from a building or land without determination of lease in accordance with the provisions of Sections 106 and 111 of the Transfer of Property Act. The U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, however, is a special. Act which lays down a different scheme for determination of tenancy and ejectment of a tenant. Sub-section (4) of Section 21 clearly lays down that an order of eviction can be passed against a tenant Under Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) of the said section even though f the tenancy is not determined. Act which lays down a different scheme for determination of tenancy and ejectment of a tenant. Sub-section (4) of Section 21 clearly lays down that an order of eviction can be passed against a tenant Under Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) of the said section even though f the tenancy is not determined. The proviso to Sub-section (4), however, makes exception to this rule that no such order shall be made in the case of a tenancy created for a fixed term by a registered lease deed. In that case the order of eviction can be passed only after the expiry of the term: fixed in the registered lease. In all other cases the order of eviction can be passed by the Prescribed Authority on tike existence of any of the grounds enumerated in Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 21 of the Act. Sub-section (6) of Section 21, however, lays down that the tenancy of a tenant shall stand determined in its entirety on the expiry of the period, of thirty days from the order passed Under Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) of Section 21 of the Act. 5. It was urged hat there is inconsistency in Sub-Sections (4) and (6) of Section 21 of the Act and the provisions contained in Section 23, (sic) as an order of eviction can be passed Under Sub-section (4) notwithstanding the fact that the tenancy is not determined, while Sub-section (6) lays down that the tenancy shall; be determined on the expiry of the period of thirty days from the date of the order Under Sub-section (1) or Sub-Section (2) of Section 21 of the Act. Section 23 further confers power on the Prescribed Authority to enforce an order of eviction passed u/s 21. Thus, it was contended, an order passed Under Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 21 can be enforced immediately by the Prescribed Authority u/s 23, even before the tenancy is determined Under Sub-section (6) of Section 21 of the Act. Prima facie, there appears to be some inconsistency as suggested by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner but on a careful examination of the various provisions of the Act no such inconsistency is discernable. 6. Prima facie, there appears to be some inconsistency as suggested by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner but on a careful examination of the various provisions of the Act no such inconsistency is discernable. 6. Section 16 of the Act confers power on the District Magistrate to require a landlord to let any building or a part of a building which is or which may fall vacant or is likely to fall vacant to any person specified in his order. Such an order is called the allotment order. The District Magistrate is further empowered to release the whole or any part of the building which may be the subject matter of allotment or any land appurtenant thereto in favour of the landlord. Such an order is called release order. Sub-section (2) of Section 16 lays down the circumstances on the existence of which the District Magistrate may pass the release order. No such order of release shall be passed unless the District Magistrate is satisfied that the building or any part thereof or any land appurtenant thereto is bonafide required, either in its existing form or after demolition and new construction, for occupation by himself or any members of his family or any person for whose benefit it is field by him either for residential purpose or for purposes of any profession, trade, calling or where the landlord is a trustee, of a public charitable trust, for the, objects of the trust, or that the building or any part thereof is in delapidated condition and is required for purpose of demolition and new construction or that any land appurtenant thereto is required by the landlord for constructing one or more new buildings or for dividing the land into several plots with a view to the sale thereof for construction of new buildings. If the landlord is able to satisfy the District Magistrate about the existence of any of the conditions mentioned in Sub-section (2) of Section 16 of the Act the District Magistrate is empowered to pass a release order. If any person other than the tenant is in occupation of the released accommodation, the District Magistrate on an application of the landlord is empowered to evict such a person. This District Magistrate is authorised by Sub-section (4) to use shah force as may be necessary to put the landlord in possession of the building or part thereof. If any person other than the tenant is in occupation of the released accommodation, the District Magistrate on an application of the landlord is empowered to evict such a person. This District Magistrate is authorised by Sub-section (4) to use shah force as may be necessary to put the landlord in possession of the building or part thereof. Similarly the District Magistrate is empowered to evict an unauthorised person and to put the allottee into possession. Sub-section (8) of Section 16 further lays dawn that the allottee shall be deemed to become a tenant of the building from the date of allotment or where he is unable to obtain allotment by reason of a stay order or by reason of the occupation of such building or part thereof by any other unauthorised person, the tenancy shall commence from the date on which the allottee is able to obtain possession. Section 17 provides conditions of making allotment order and Section 18 makes provision for appeal against the allotment and release order. If the landlord in whose favour the order of release is passed abuses the release order and does not utilise it for the purpose for which it was released the District Magistrate may treat the building or part thereof as vacant and allot it to any other person u/s 19 of the Act. 7. Ch. IV of the Act contains provisions regulating eviction. Sections 20, 21 and 23 regulate eviction of a tenant. Sub-section (1) of Section 20 imposes a bar on the filing of a suit for eviction of a tenant except in accordance with the provisions contained in Sub-section (2) of Section 20. Sub-section (1) takes away the right of a landlord to file civil suit for the eviction of a tenant. Sub-section (2) of Section 20 however enumerates the grounds on the existence of one more of which a suit for eviction can be filed by the landlord before the Civil Court. Section 21 confers power on the Prescribed Authority to pass an order for the eviction of a tenant from the building or any part thereof if it is satisfied on the application of the landlord that any of the grounds enumerated in Clauses (a) and (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 21 exist. Section 21 confers power on the Prescribed Authority to pass an order for the eviction of a tenant from the building or any part thereof if it is satisfied on the application of the landlord that any of the grounds enumerated in Clauses (a) and (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 21 exist. Similarly by Sub-section (2) of Section 21 the Prescribed Authority is empowered to order eviction of a tenant from any surplus land appurtenant to the building under tenancy provided it is satisfied that the land is required for constructing one or more new buildings or dividing it into several plots with a view to the sale thereof for purposes of construction of new buildings. The conditions enumerated in Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 21, on the existence of which the Prescribed Authority is empowered to order eviction of a tenant from the building or land or part thereof are the same as enumerated in Sub-section (2) of Section 16 of the Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 16 confers power on the District Magistrate to pass an order of release in favour of the landlord whenever there is vacancy. But if such accommodation is in possession of a tenant and the landlord is able to satisfy the Prescribed Authority that any of the grounds enumerated in Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 21 exist, the building or any specified part thereof may be released in favour of the landlord. The Prescribed Authority is empowered by Sub-section (4) to order for the eviction of the tenant in order to put the landlord into possession. The order for eviction of a tenant under Sub-section (1) can be passed even before the tenancy is determined. The effect of Sub-section (5) of Section 21 is that once an order is passed Under Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) of Section 21 of the Act for eviction of a tenant, the building or part or appurtenant land thereof shall stand released in favour of the landlord. Sub-section (6), however, lays down that the tenancy of a tenant shall stand determined in its entirety on the expiration of a period of thirty days from the order of eviction passed Under Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) of the said section. Sub-section (6), however, lays down that the tenancy of a tenant shall stand determined in its entirety on the expiration of a period of thirty days from the order of eviction passed Under Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) of the said section. Sub-sections (4), (5) and (6) of Section 21 make it abundantly clear that the order of eviction can be passed Under Sub-sections (1) and (2) of the section even before the tenancy of a tenant is determined but the order of eviction only amounts to an order of release in favour of the landlord and does not determine the tenancy. Instead the tenancy shall stand determined only on the expiry of thirty days from the date of the order of eviction passed by the Prescribed Authority Under Sub-sections (1) and (2) of the section. 8. An order of eviction passed Under Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 21 can be enforced by the Prescribed Authority u/s 23 of the Act by ejecting the tenant or any other person found in actual occupation and for putting the landlord into possession of the building or part thereof as the case may be by use of such force as may hi necessary. If the various sub-clauses of Section 21 are considered along with the provisions of Section 23 and a harmonious construction is placed on those provisions, it will be clear that a tenant against whom an order Under Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 21 has been passed is not liable to be dispossessed from the building or part thereof in respect of which an order of eviction may have been passed, before the expiry of thirty days from the date of such order. In the result, the actual eviction of a tenant cannot take place before the determination of tenancy as contemplated by Sub-Section (6) of Section 21 of the Act. If harmonious interpretation is given to the various sub-sections of Sections 21 and 23 of the Act no provision is rendered nugatory. In case, however, the interpretation as suggested by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is given, Sub-section (6) of Section 21 shall be rendered nugatory, because if the tenant is dispossessed from', the accommodation forgiving effect to Ian order of release and the landlord is put into possession, no relationship of landlord and tenant can subsist. In case, however, the interpretation as suggested by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is given, Sub-section (6) of Section 21 shall be rendered nugatory, because if the tenant is dispossessed from', the accommodation forgiving effect to Ian order of release and the landlord is put into possession, no relationship of landlord and tenant can subsist. The question of determination of tenancy arises only when the tenant is in occupation of the tenanted premises. The determination of tenancy terminates the relationship of landlord and tenant. Such an event Under Sub-section (6) of Section 21 is contemplated only on the expiry of thirty days from the date of the order of eviction passed Under Sub-sections (1) or (2) of that lection. The actual dispossession of the tenant from the building or part thereof released, in favour of the landlord can be done only after the tenancy is determined i.e. on the expiry of thirty days from the date of the order of eviction. In our opinion this must have been the intention of the legislature as the legislature cannot be presumed to enact inconsistent provisions in a statute. It is well settled principle of law that court should adopt the principle of harmonious interpretation in considering the validity of an Act and an interpretation which gives effect to the various provisions contained in the Act should be fallowed in preference to the interpretation which may render some provision of the Act nugatory. We prefer to follow the principle of harmonious interpretation and hold that there is no inconsistency between Sections 21 and 23 of the Act. 9. The aforesaid discussion would show that the provisions contained in Sub-section (6) of Section 21 of the Act are substantially the same as contained in Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act as applicable to the State of Uttar Pradesh because tenancy is determined only after the expiry of thirty days from the order passed Under Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) of Section 21 of the Act. The tenancy of a tenant is not terminated prior to the expiry of thirty days from the date of the order of eviction. Under the Transfer of Property' Act, tenancy stands determined on the expiry of thirty days of the notice served u/s 106 of that Act. The tenancy of a tenant is not terminated prior to the expiry of thirty days from the date of the order of eviction. Under the Transfer of Property' Act, tenancy stands determined on the expiry of thirty days of the notice served u/s 106 of that Act. The protection to a tenant granted under both the Acts in this respect is substantially the same, although the scheme contemplated under the provisions of the Act for regulating the creation and determination of tenancy and eviction of a tenant is quite different than that contained in the Transfer of Property Act. 10. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner then contended that the provisions of the impugned Act are repugnant to the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, arid since the latter Act has been enacted by the Central Legislature, Sections 18, 21 and 38 of the impugned Act are void, in our opinion the Transfer of Property Act is a general law which regulates the relationship of landlord and tenant in its various aspects while the impugned Act is a special Act enacted for the purpose of meeting the problem of scarcity of accommodation in the urban areas. If the State Legislature had legislative competence to enact the special Act and if it has received the assent of the President, the special law, namely, the provisions of the impugned enactment, shall prevail within the state notwithstanding the fact that the said provisions are repugnant to an existing law enacted by the Central Legislature. We shall deal with this question later in detail. 11. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner further urged that the subject-matter of the impugned legislation falls under entry 18 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. Hence the State Legislature had no legislative competence to enact the impugned Act which contains provisions contrary to those contained in the Transfer of Property Act. Learned Counsel contended that the subject of legislation with regard to the control of tenancy in buildings does not fall within the Concurrent List. Hence the State Legislature cannot enact any law contrary to the provisions contained in any existing law enacted by the Central Legislature. In order to appreciate the Petitioner's contention, we have to examine the provisions of the Constitution conferring power on Parliament and the State Legislatures for enacting laws. 12. Hence the State Legislature cannot enact any law contrary to the provisions contained in any existing law enacted by the Central Legislature. In order to appreciate the Petitioner's contention, we have to examine the provisions of the Constitution conferring power on Parliament and the State Legislatures for enacting laws. 12. Article 246 of the Constitution confers powers on the Parliament and Legislatures of States for legislation and enumerates the subject matters of laws which may be made by Parliament and the State Legislatures. The matters enumerated in List I (Union List) fall within the exclusive power of Parliament to make laws while the subject matters enumerated in the State Legislatures for enacting laws. List III of the Seventh Schedule (Concurrent List) enumerates matters in respect of which laws can be framed both by Parliament as well as by the State Legislatures. Clause (2) of Article 254 of the Constitution lays down that where a law made by the Legislature of a State with respect to one of the matters enumerated in Concurrent List contains any provision repugnant to the provisions of ah earlier law made by Parliament or an existing law with respect to that matter, then the law so made by the Legislature of such State shall, if it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent, prevail in that State. The provisions contained in Part XI of the Constitution regulate the legislative relations of Parliament and the State Legislatures. The distribution of legislative powers in the Constitution makes it clear that if there is an existing Act or law made by Parliament in respect of a matter falling within the Concurrent List, the State Legislature can enact a law repugnant to the existing law made by Parliament and the State law has received the assent of the President, in that event the State law shall prevail in the State notwithstanding the fact that contrary provisions exist in the existing law made by Parliament. 13. The Act in question is referable to entry of the Concurrent List which runs thus: Transfer of property other than agricultural land registration of deeds and documents. The creation of tenancy, regulation of relation between the landlord and the tenant and other indental matters regulating tenancy in buildings are matters which are eminently covered by the transfer of property other than agricultural land. The creation of tenancy, regulation of relation between the landlord and the tenant and other indental matters regulating tenancy in buildings are matters which are eminently covered by the transfer of property other than agricultural land. The legislative entry "transfer of property" is a wide one. While interpreting a legislative entry wide amplitude should be given to it. It contemplates making of laws on the subject of transfer of property including incidental and allied matters which may reasonably be covered by this entry. Under entry 6 of List III no law can be framed by Parliament in respect of agricultural land. The entry, however, confers power on the Parliament as well as State Legislature to enact laws with regard to transfer of property of every kind except the agricultural land. The provisions contained in the impugned Act do not regulate the agricultural land. On the other hand the Act regulates the relationship of landlord and tenant and the creation and determination of tenancy and other incidental matters relating to the buildings and land appurtenant thereto. In our opinion the impugned Act is covered by entry No. 6 List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. It is conceded that the impugned Act was reserved for the consideration of the President and that it has received his assent as required by Clause (2) of Article 254 of the Constitution. The provisions of the impugned Act, therefore even if repugnant to the provisions contained in the Transfer of Property Act--(a Central and existing law made by the Central Legislature)--shall prevail in the State. We, therefore, hold that the provisions of the impugned Act even if repugnant to the provisions contained in the Transfer of Property Act are valid and shall prevail in the State of Uttar Pradesh. 14. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner contended that the impugned Act has been enacted by the State Legislature in pursuance of entry 18 of List II, of the Seventh Schedule and not under entry 6 of the Concurrent List. Entry 18 of List II runs as follows: 18. The land, that is to say, the rights in or over the land, land tenures including the relations of landlord and tenant and the collection of rent; transfer and alienation of agricultural land; land improvement and agricultural loans; colonization. Entry 18 of List II runs as follows: 18. The land, that is to say, the rights in or over the land, land tenures including the relations of landlord and tenant and the collection of rent; transfer and alienation of agricultural land; land improvement and agricultural loans; colonization. The above entry in List II confers power on State Legislature to enact laws with respect to land including rights in or over the land, land tenures including the relations of landlord and tenant and collection of rent and transfer and alienation of agricultural land, land improvement and agricultural loans and colonization. No doubt the relationship of landlord and tenant is subject matter of legislation entrusted to State Legislature exclusively under entry 18 of List II teat this is confined to land only. Entry 18 does not contemplate making of laws regulating the relations of landlord and tenant in respect of buildings and: houses. No doubt the word "land" used in certain other context may include house or house property, but if entry 6 of List III is taken into account while considering the scope of entry 18 of List II it would be cleat that the framers of the, Constitution maintained a distinction between a law regulating the relations of landlord and tenant in land simpliciter and Immoveable property other than land. Entry 18 comprehends enactment of a law relating to land and agriculture and its improvement while entry 6 of List III contemplates making of laws relating to transfer of property other than land. The specific entry at serial No. 6 of List III takes away land from the ambit of property. 15. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner relied upon a Full Bench case of this Court in Raman Das Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, AIR 1952 All 703 . In that case the competence of the State Legislature to enact the U.P. (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 was challenged. It was urged on behalf of Raman Dass that Section 3 of the U.P. (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act (No. III of 1947) was ultra vises as the Provincial Legislature had no power to enact the said Act. The Full Bench repelled the contention and held that the State Legislature was competent to enact the U.P. Act III of 1947. The Full Bench repelled the contention and held that the State Legislature was competent to enact the U.P. Act III of 1947. While dealing with the question, the Full Bench observed that the Act was covered by item No. 21 of List II of the Government of India Act, 1935, which is equivalent to entry No. 18 of List II. No doubt the Full Bench made an observation that the U.P. (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, was covered by item 2 of List II of the Government of India Act, 1935, but it further observed that the 1947 Act was also covered by item No. 8 of List III of the Government of India Act, 1935, which conferred power on the Central Legislature as well as on the Provincial Legislatures to (sic) law with respect to "Transfer of Property". Item No. 8 of List III of the Government of India Act, 1935, is equivalent to entry (sic) of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. The Full Bench thus upheld the validity of 1947 Act on the ground that the State Legislature had legislative competence to enact the same by referring to item No. 8 of List III of the Government of India Act, 1935. The Petitioner's contention that the Full Bench laid down that all matters of legislation in respect of regulation of tenancy of buildings and accommodations fell within the State List exclusively and that it was not covered by any of the items of the Concurrent List cannot be accepted. 16. We have already examined the relevant entries in the Seventh Schedule and have held that the impugned Act is referable to entry 6 of the (sic) list and not to entry 18 of the State List. We find support for our view from the observations of the Supreme Court in Indu Bhushan Bose Vs. Rama Sundari Debi and Another, AIR 1970 SC 228 . In that case their Lordships of the Supreme Court considered the scope of entry 18 of Lift II and entry 6 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and observed that laws in respect of non-agricultural property are dealt within the Transfer of Property Act and would much appropriately fall within the scope pf entry 6 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution read with entry 7 of the same list. 17. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner urged that since the law laid flown by the Full Bench of our Court in Raman Pass is in conflict with the observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of Indu Bhushan v. Ram Sundri, the question requires consideration by a larger Bench. As already observed, the Full Bench of our Court also held that the 1947 Act was referable to item No. 8 of List III of the Government of India Act. There is, therefore, no conflict in the two decisions and we do not consider it necessary to refer the matter to a larger Bench as we are not taking any view contrary to the law laid down by the Full Bench. 18. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner then urged that the impugned Act placed unreasonable restrictions on the tenancy rights of the Petitioner which violate Article 19 of the Constitution. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner however failed to point out the restrictions placed by the impugned Act which may be characterised arbitrary or unreasonable. The restrictions laid down under the Act are reasonable and necessary in public interest. Apart from that, in view of the emergency declared Under Article 359 it is not open to the Petitioner to challenge the validity of the impugned Act on the ground that it violates Article 19 of the Constitution. 19. Lastly, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner urged that the tenancy rights being rights in property are protected by Article 31 of the Constitution. The impugned Act permits determination of tenancy and eviction of a tenant, thus there is deprivation of property without there being any provision for payment of compensation. Hence the Act is void. In our opinion the argument is devoid of any substance. Article 31 deals with right to property, it lays down that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. Compensation is required to be paid for the acquisition of property and if no such compensation is provided for, the law authorising the acquisition of property shall be void. Clause (2-A) of the Article, however, makes it clear that a law which does not provide for transfer of ownership or right to possession of any property to the State it shall not be deemed to provide for compulsory acquisition of the property. Clause (2-A) of the Article, however, makes it clear that a law which does not provide for transfer of ownership or right to possession of any property to the State it shall not be deemed to provide for compulsory acquisition of the property. The impugned Act does not provide for the acquisition or transfer of ownership right, nor there is any acquisition by the State. The impugned Act merely regulates the relation of landlord and tenant in buildings, it is therefore not a law for the compulsory acquisition or requisition of property. 20. In view of our above discussion, we hold that the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, XIII of 1972, is valid. The Petitioner has failed to show that the Prescribed Authority has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the application filed by the landlord u/s 21 of the Act. The petition thus fails and is accordingly dismissed. The interim order dated 9-10-1972 is vacated.