A. A. DAVE, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against the judgment and decree of the learned Judge City Civil Court 9 court Ahmedabad dismissing the plaintiffs suit with costs. ( 2 ) THE facts giving rise to this appeal in a nut-shell are as under :- The plaintiffs are the permanent residents living in the municipal limits of the city of Ahmedabad and carrying on occupation of keeping milch cattle and Selling:- milk. They had kept their cattle sheds within the municipal limits of the city of Ahmedabad and were personally looking after them. However the defendant Municipal Corporation of the city of Ahmedabad issued notices dated 26-12-1963 7 and 26-3-1964 respectively asking them to remove their milch cattle within two months from the walled city of Ahmedabad falling which they were threatened with prosecution. The plaintiffs therefore filed a suit alleging that the notices issued by the defendant Municipal Corporation were illegal uaauthorised and beyond the powers under the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act 1949 or the by laws framed thereunder and that they were not bound to comply with the said notices. They stated that the cattle sheds were kept clean according to the terms of the licence and that their cattle did not cause any damage nuisance or annoyance to the health life or safety of the citizens of the round about area; that the defendant had no power to cause loss of the plaintiffs occupation trade and business; that the said notices were discriminatory in the sense that while they prohibited keeping of milch cattle for the purpose of selling milk they did not prohibit keeping of cattle as such or horses or other animals in the city area for private use. According to the plaintiffs there was no distinction between the premises where milch cattle for sale of milk were kept and where cattle and horses were kept for private use. Thus the by-laws framed under the said Act and the notices issued pursuant to the same were discriminatory and opposed to the guarantee contained in Article 14 of the Constitution of India; that they were also violative of the fundamental rights under Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution to carry on occupation trade or business of their choice. It was therefore alleged that secs. It was therefore alleged that secs. 376a 376 and 458 and the by-laws and the rules made thereunder empowering the defendant and its officers and the notices issued thereunder were violative of the fundamental rights of the plaintiffs guaranteed under Articles 14 and 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India. They therefore stated that the said by-laws were unconstitutional and void and were not binding on them. The defendant Municipal Corporation by its written statement ex. 9 contended that no cause of action had arisen to the plaintiffs as alleged by them as no notices under sec. 458 of the said Act were served on then. They denied that the relevant provisions of the Act by-laws and the rules made thereunder were discriminatory or prohibitory in nature as alleged by the plaintiffs. They denied that they were arbitrary capricious and colourable exercise of the power for collateral purpose. They stated that those provisions were not violative of the Article 14 or 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India; that the by-laws were validly framed after following proper procedure prescribed in that behalf. Under the circumstances they prayed that the suit be dismissed with costs. From the pleadings of the parties the learned Judge framed issues at ex. 24. According to the learned Judge sec. 376-A read with sec. 376 (1) (c) (d) of the Act was not violative of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India. The learned Judge also held that the by-laws framed under sec. 458 of the Act were not prohibitory in nature and were not ultra vires the Constitution of India as alleged. In view of his findings the learned Judge dismissed the plaintiffs suit. Against the said judgment and decree the plaintiffs have preferred the present appeal to this court. ( 3 ) MR. H. B. Shah learned Advocate for the appellants raised the following contentions before me (1) that sec. 376a is unconstitutional as being violative of the fundamental rights under Article 14 of the Constitution; (2) that the notices exs. 13 14 and 15 are violative of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution; (3) that the by-laws framed under sec. 458 which prohibited keeping of milch cattle for sale of milk are unconstitutional as being arbitrary and discriminatory under Article 14 of the Constitution. 13 14 and 15 are violative of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution; (3) that the by-laws framed under sec. 458 which prohibited keeping of milch cattle for sale of milk are unconstitutional as being arbitrary and discriminatory under Article 14 of the Constitution. (4) that the said by-laws are unconstitutional also under Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. IN support of these contentions Mr. Shah urged that is the instant ease the effect of the by-laws was that the private persons who keep milch cattle within the walled city of Ahmedabad for their private use were exempted from the operations of the Act while the persons who keep milch cattle for the purpose of selling milk were penalised and were not permitted to keep the same within the four walled portion of the city. According to Mr. Shah the by-laws therefore framed under sec. 458 of the Act were clearly discriminatory and prohibitory in nature. He submitted that the effect of the by-laws would be that the present appellants would be prohibited from conducting the trade or business of their choice which was guaranteed to them under Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. He therefore urged that sec. 458 and the by-laws framed thereunder were violative of Articles 14 and 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution and therefore they were ultra vires void and inoperative. ( 4 ) IN order to appreciate the contentions raised by Mr. Shah it will be worthwhile to refer to the relevant sections and the by-laws framed by the Municipal Corporatian in order to find out whether they were discriminatory and prohibitory in nature as alleged by the learned Advocate for the appellants. Sec. 376 of the said Act says that (1) Except under and in conformity with the terms and conditions of licence granted by the Commissioner no person shall (a) keep in or upon any premises any article specified in the rules. (I) in any quantity or in excess of the quantity specified in the rules as the maximum quantity of such article which may at one time be kept in or upon the same premises without a licence and. . . . . . Sec. 376a is material for the purpose of this appeal. (I) in any quantity or in excess of the quantity specified in the rules as the maximum quantity of such article which may at one time be kept in or upon the same premises without a licence and. . . . . . Sec. 376a is material for the purpose of this appeal. It sayswherever the Commissioner is of opinion that the use of any premises for any of the purposes specified in sub sec (1) of sec. 376 is dangerous to life health or property or is causing a nuisance either from its nature or by reason or the manner in which or the conditions under which the use is made and such danger or nuisance should be immediately stopped the Commissioner may not with standing any thing contained in sec 376. require the owner or occupier of the premises to stop such danger or nuisance within such time specified in such requisition as the commissioner considers reasonable. and in the event of the failure of the owner or occupier to comply with such requisition the Commissioner may himself or by an officer subordinate to him cause such use to be stoppedthus if secs. 376 and 376a are read together it will be very clear that under the sec. 376a only in order to stop danger or nuisance to the public the Municipal Commissioner has been authorised to require the owner or occupier of the premises to stop such danger or nuisance within such time specified in such requisition as the Commissioner thinks reasonable. This section no where makes any distinction between person and person. This section does not also completely prohibit a person from doing a particular trade of his choice. It cannot therefore be said by any stretch of imagination that sec. 376 read with sec. 376a of the Act is in any way violative of Article 14 or Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution as submitted by the learned Advocate for the appellants. Nobody could complain if the Municipal Corporation was entrusted with the requisite power to stop the acts of nuisance or danger to the public health. The learned Advocate for the appellants has been unable to show as to how sec. 376a is in any way violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 14 or 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India. In fact Mr. The learned Advocate for the appellants has been unable to show as to how sec. 376a is in any way violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 14 or 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India. In fact Mr. Shah did not specifically plead before me that sec. 376a is violative. He however laid stress on the by-laws framed by the Corporation under sec. 458 of the Act under which a person keeping milch cattle in the walled city of Ahmedabad was prohibited from keeping milch cattle in that area. By-law No. 4 relates to keeping of milch cattle in the walled city of Ahmedabad framed by the Municipal Corporation of the city of Ahmedabad. It Says that ( 5 ) A person shall not be entitled to a licence to use any place for keeping milch cattle in the walled city of Ahmedabad and in city surveyed village sites except in the following cases:- (1) The Municipal Commissioner may allow stabling of milch cattle in the area prohibited in the following circumstance :- (a) The milch cattle are kept for bonafide private use only (B) The number of milch cattle so kept is not more than three with their young ones necessary for milking purposes the Stabling arrangement of the milch cattle shall be in conformity with the prescribed by-lawsin respect of areas not prohibited above no person shall be entitled to a licence to use for keeping milch cattle a stable which does not fulfil the conditions prescribed by by-law 6. MR. Shah made a grievance that this by-law permits keeping of milch cattle in the area prohibited for bona fide private use while at the same time it prohibits keeping of milch cattle in the walled city of Ahmedabad if the owner wanted to sell milk. According to Mr. Shah this by law was clearly discriminatory in nature. He referred to Article 14 of the Constitution which says14 The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of laws within the territory of India. He urged that in the instant case a private person keeping milch cattle for personal use was permitted to keep them in the prohibited area while a person who wanted to pursue a trade of selling milk by keeping milch cattle in the prohibited area was not permitted to do so. He urged that in the instant case a private person keeping milch cattle for personal use was permitted to keep them in the prohibited area while a person who wanted to pursue a trade of selling milk by keeping milch cattle in the prohibited area was not permitted to do so. This clearly amounted to discrimination and it violated the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution. ( 6 ) MR. Mayur D. Pandya learned advocate appearing on behalf of Mr. G. N. Desai for the respondent Municipal Corporation on the other hand urged that in instant case the act of the Municipality in framing by-laws cannot be said to be discriminatory because it did not prohibit the occupier to carry on his trade. He can as well sell the milk in the walled portion of the City if the milch cattle are kept outside the walled city of Ahmedabad. Secondly he urged that this by-law cannot be said to be discriminatory in nature for the simple reason that between the same class of persons there was no discrimination. The bylaw merely enjoined on the persons who wanted to trade in milk to keep their milch cattle outside the walled city of Ahmedabad. Therefore so far as the by-laws in general were concerned there was no discrimination between them. He submitted that it was open the Government to frame any legislation or any by-law prescribing such Acts for certain classes of people. If the classification is genuine and is made on certain well defined principles there was no discrimination if a particular act is permissible and the other is not and cannot be said to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Mr. Pandya in support of his case referred to the case of the State of Bombay and another v. F. N. Balsara A. I. R. 1951 Supreme Court 318 wherein at page 326 at para 19 the following observations were madei now come to S. 39 of the Act which has been impugned on the ground that it offends against Art. 14 of the Constitution which states that the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. The meaning and scope of this Article has been fully discussed in the case of Chiranjit Lal v. The Union of India 1950 0 SCR 869 and the principles laid down in that case may be summarized as follows:-1 The presumption is always in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment since it must be assumed that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and its discriminations are based on adequte grounds. 2 The presumption may be rebutted in certain cases by showing that on the face of the statute there is no classification at all and no difference peculiar to any individual or class and not applicable to any other individual or class and yet the law hits only a particular individual or class. 3 The principle of equality does not mean that every law must have universal application for all persons who are not by nature attainment or circumstances in the same position and the varying needs of different classes of persons often require separate treatment. 4 The principle does not take away from the State the power of classifying persons for legitimate purposes. 5 Every classification is in some degree likely to produce some inequality and mere production of inequality is not enough. 6 If a law deals equally with members of a well defined class it it not obnoxious and it is not open to the charge of denial of equal protection on the ground that it has no application to other persons. 7 While reasonable classification is permissible such classification must be based upon some real and substantial distinction bearing a reasonable and just relation to the object sought to be attained and the classification cannot be made arbitrarily and without any substantial basis. THE Supreme Court quoted with approval a passage from Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States which guaranted equal protection of the laws summed up by Professor Wills in these wordsthe guarantee of the equal protection of the laws means the protection of equal laws. It forbids class legislation but does not forbid classification which rests upon reasonable grounds of distinction. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the objects to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate. It forbids class legislation but does not forbid classification which rests upon reasonable grounds of distinction. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the objects to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate. It merely requires that all persons subjected to such legislation shall be treated alike under like circumstances and conditions both the privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed. The inhibition of the amendment was designed to prevent any person or class of persons from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating and hostile legislation. It does not take from the states the power to classify either in the adoption of police laws or tax laws or eminent domain laws but permits to them the exercise of a wide scope of discretion and nullifies what they do only when it is without any reasonable basis. Mathematical nicety and perfect equality are not required. Similarly not identity of treatment is enough. It any state of facts can reasonably be conceived to sustain a classification the existence of that state of facts must be assumed. One who assails a classification must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis. SIMILAR view was taken by the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Krishna Dalmia and others v. Justice S. R. Tendolkar and others A. I. R. 1958 Supreme Court 538 wherein it was observed thatit is now well established that while article 14 forbids class legislation it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislations In order however to pass the test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled namely (i) that the classification must be founded on intellegible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and (ii) that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The classification may be founded on different basis namely geographical or according to objects or occupations or the like. What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration. It is also well established by the decisions of Supreme Court that article 14 condemns discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by a law of procedure. What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration. It is also well established by the decisions of Supreme Court that article 14 condemns discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by a law of procedure. IT will thus be seen that Article 14 forbids class legislation but does not forbid reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation. Merely because persons are permitted to keep milch cattle within the prohibited area for the purpose of their private use it cannot be said that when a restriction Was put on persons keeping milch cattle for the purpose of sale of milk it was discriminatory in nature. Here was a reasonable classification between Persons who kept milch cattle for the sale of milk and Persons who kept the same for their private Use I am unable to agree with Mr. Shah that this classification was not based on any rules or basis. The purpose of framing the bylaw is very clear. The Municipal Corporation wanted to regularise the sale of milk at the same time seeing that the trade was not harmful and did not affect injuriously the health of the public or cause annoyance to the public. The by-law therefore did not forbid a person to sell the milk in the prohibited area. It merely prohibited him to keep milch cattle in that area. It cannot therefore be said by any stretch of imagination there Was total prohibition of following a particular trade of ones choice. Here the Corporation merely regularised the trade by keeping the milch cattle outside the walled city of Ahmedabad. I am therefore unable to agree with Mr. Shah that the act of the Municipality in framing this by-law was arbitrary in nature. No facts have been alleged or proved on behalf of the appellants to show how this by-law is discriminatory in nature. Mr. Shah however referred to the case of Tahir Hussain v. District Board Muzaffarnagar A. I. R. 1954 Supreme Court 630 wherein it was observed thatwhere therefore certain district Board frames a bye-law to the effect that no person shall establish or maintain or run any cattle market in the district within its jurisdiction the bye-law is not one passed for regulating the market but for prohibiting a person from holding it. Such a bye-law in face of the provisions of Section 174 is obviously beyound jurisdiction. The bye-law as well as the order under it interferes with the fundamental right of the petitioner under Art. 19 (1) (g) as it prevents him from carrying on the business of holding the market. It is thus in conflict with Art. 19 and is void. RELYING on these observations Mr. Shah urged that in the instant case as the present appellants were prohibited from keeping their milch cattle in the walled city of Ahmedabad they were virtually prevented from doing the business in that portion and hence the act of the Corporation would be hit by Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. I am unable to agree with him. The case before the Supreme Court can clearly be distinguished from the facts of the instant case. There the by-law was framed by Muzaffarnagar District Board to the effect that no person shall maintain or run any cattle market within its jurisdiction. That by-law virtually totally prohibited a person from holding a market in a particular area. That by-law was framed under sec. 174 of the Uttar Pradesh District Local Boards Act. Sub-secs. 1 and 2 of sec. 174 of the Act stated that the power of the Board to make by-laws was to be exercised for the purpose of promoting or maintaining the health safety and convenience of the inhabitants of the area within its jurisdiction and that this power included the power to regulate markets. In view of these particular wordings the Supreme Court was of the opinion that this by-law did not merely regulate but it totally prohibited the person from holding a market and hence it interfered with the fundamantal right under Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. As stated earlier the by-law in the instant case does not prohibit the present appellants from doing their business of selling milk within the walled city of Ahmedabad. It only prohibited them from keeping milch cattle. As already shown earlier. it was within the competence of the Corporation to frame by laws under which it can regulate the business keeping in view the health safety and convenience of the public and in order to stop any nuisance by prohibiting the keeping of milch cattle in a large number in the area. As already shown earlier. it was within the competence of the Corporation to frame by laws under which it can regulate the business keeping in view the health safety and convenience of the public and in order to stop any nuisance by prohibiting the keeping of milch cattle in a large number in the area. Reliance was also placed on the case of Rashid Ahmed v. The Municipal board Kairana A. I. R. 1950 Supreme Court 566 by the learned Advocate for the appellants. This case also could easily be distinguished. The facts of this case showed that by-law No. 2 of the by laws of the Municipal board which came into force on 1-1-1950 provided that no person shall establish any new market or place for wholesale transactions without obtaining the previous permission of the Board and no person shall sell or expose for sale any vegetable fruit. etc. at any place other than that fixed by the board for the purpose; and by-law No. 4 permitted the grant of a monopoly to a contractor to deal in wholesale transactions at the place fixed as a market. In anticipation of these by-laws the monopoly right to do wholesale business in vegetable for three years was auctioned by the municipal board and granted to the highest bidder and a place was also fixed as the market where such business could be carried on. The petitioner who had been carrying on wholesale business in vegetables at a rented shop within the municipality for two years before the by-laws came into force applied for a licence to carry on his business at his shop but this was rejected on the ground that there was no provision in the by-laws authorising the grant of any such license and he was prosecuted for contravention of the by-laws. He applied under Art. 32 of the Constitution for the enforcement of his fundamental right as a citizen to carry on his business which was guaranteed by Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. On these facts it was held that. . . He applied under Art. 32 of the Constitution for the enforcement of his fundamental right as a citizen to carry on his business which was guaranteed by Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. On these facts it was held that. . . THE prohibition in by-law No. 2 became absolute in the absence of provision authorising the issue of a license and in as much as the municipal board had further put it out of its power to grant a license to the petitioner by granting a monopoly the restrictions imposed were not reasonable within the meaning of Art 19 (6) of the Constitution and the by-laws were accordingly void. . IN the instant case as already stated earlier there is no total prohibition here. There is no denial of any licence to the appellants. The appellants are not prohibited from selling the milk in the walled city of Ahmedabad. They are only prohibited from keeping their milch cattle within the area of the Municipal Corporation. It can not be said that the restriction put by the defendant is not reasonable as stated in Article 19 (6) of the Constitution. There was a reasonable classification in which persons keeping milch cattle for their bonafide personal use were permitted to do so while the persons wanted to trade in milk were prohibited from keeping the milch cattle in that area. 1 therefore do not agree with Mr. Shah that this classification was not reasonable and that the by-law was violative of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. Both the cases relied upon by Mr. Shah could easily be distinguished and do not help him so far as the present case is concerned. ( 7 ) IN the instant case it cannot be said that any invidious distinction or discrimination has been made by the Corporation in framing the bylaws between persons similarly situated. There is no doubt that persons who pursue trade of selling milk will be keeping a large herd of cattle. There would be hundreds of such persons in a big city like Ahmedabad and they would be maintaining hundreds of cattle. These cattle are required to be taken out for the purpose of grazing. Appellant No. 1 has admitted in his cross-examination that he is taking the cattle out for the purpose of grazing. There would be hundreds of such persons in a big city like Ahmedabad and they would be maintaining hundreds of cattle. These cattle are required to be taken out for the purpose of grazing. Appellant No. 1 has admitted in his cross-examination that he is taking the cattle out for the purpose of grazing. It is but natural that they would be a cause of annoyance and inconvenience to the members of the public. The stink of their urine and excreta would be a danger to the public health. Thus no question of any inequality or unequal treatment as envisaged in Article 14 of the Constitution would arise. Similarly as there is no prohibition on the appellant to pursue their trade nor is there total restric tion regarding keeping of milch cattle in other part of the city of Ahmedabad except the walled portion of the city it cannot be said that it is not a reasonable restriction in the interest of general public. In my opinion therefore the act of the Municipal Corporation in framing the by-laws is not hit by the provisions of Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution also. No such consideration would arise in the case of persons keeping milch cattle for their bona fide personal use. Thus it can reasonably be said that here was a case of reasonable classification between two sets of persons persons keeping milch cattle for their private use and persons keeping milch cattle for the purpose of selling the milk. The learned Advocate for the appellants has been unable to show that any invidious discrimination has been made between the persons of the same classification interse. ( 8 ) UNDER the circumstances the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. .