JUDGMENT : P. Govindan Nair, J. 1. This is an appeal by the 10th defendant. The suit was for declaration of title and recovery of the plaint property. The trial court passed a decree in the following terms: OTHERS LANGUAGE 2. There was an appeal, and a further second appeal to the High Court. Both appeals were dismissed. The High Court decree is dated 28th January 1954. Several applications styled execution petitions were filed by the plaintiff, the penultimate one having been dismissed on 22nd January 1960. Thereafter, the application dated 25th January 1966 was moved which was also termed as an execution petition. The prayer therein was for the ascertainment of the property to be delivered over to the plaintiff and for delivery of the property with mesne profits. Objection was taken by the appellant, the 10th defendant, that the application is barred by limitation. This objection was upheld by the first court. In appeal, the appellate court took the view that the applications made though styled as execution petitions, must be understood as applications made for the passing of a final decree, the decree passed in the case being incomplete and in that view, held that there was no bar of limitation. It therefore allowed the appeal and directed that the application dated 25th January 1966 be dealt with in the trial court and a final decree passed. It is from this order that this appeal is taken and the question is whether the view taken by the appellate court can be sustained. 3. There is, no doubt, a specific direction in the so-called decree that has been passed in the case which apparently purports to finally dispose of the suit, that the identity of the property to be delivered over to the plaintiff as well as the question of the quantum of mesne profits must be determined in execution. Counsel for the appellant would contend that this may be a wrong decree but nevertheless a decree which is binding on the parties till it is set aside in appropriate proceedings and the only remedy available to the plaintiff who is termed by the appellant as 'the decree-holder' is to execute the decree and this necessarily implies that the application for execution must be in accordance with the provisions of the Limitation Act. It is therefore submitted that the application dated 25th January 1966 having been made more than three years after the dismissal of the previous application the order passed by the first court should be upheld. 4. A number of decisions have been referred to in the course of arguments. It is now well-settled and as far as suits for partition are concerned when a court determines the rights of the parties to the shares and does not decide which items after division by metes and bounds should be delivered over to the plaintiff the decree that is passed in the case is only a preliminary decree and any reminder to the court to pass the final decree by applications are not applications in execution but applications to proceed with the trial for the passing of the final decree. We need only refer to the decision of the Travancore-Cochin High Court in Madhava Menon vs. Esthapanose and Another, AIR 1952 Travancore-Cochin 428. This decision has referred to three Full Bench decisions of the Cochin High Court in Anantharama Iyer vs. Ramanatha Iyer, 15 Cochin, L.R. 237, Krishna Menon vs. Narayana Menon, 20 Cochin L.R. 397 and Ranga Naicken vs. Kesava Naicken, 37 Cochin L.R. 275. 5. The appellate court has referred to the decision of the Travancore-Cochin High Court in Thariakose Kathanar vs. Chacko Mathu, 32 T.L.J. 689. This decision also has taken the same view as in the later Travancore-Cochin decision and has perhaps gone a little further from that for, inference has been made in that decision to the decision of the Culcutta High Court in Puran Chan vs. Radha Kishen, 19 Cal. 132 and the view taken by the Calcutta High Court therein approved. We find the Calcutta decision is based on facts similar to the facts of this case. After having passed a decree for possession of certain lands, the decree did not provide for mesne profits for the period for which mesne profits should have been decreed. The court directed that the amount of mesne profits should be ascertained in the execution department. The question was whether it was open to the decree-holder to contend after having filed certain petitions for execution that he was merely reminding the court to pass a final decree and there was no bar of limitation. The court directed that the amount of mesne profits should be ascertained in the execution department. The question was whether it was open to the decree-holder to contend after having filed certain petitions for execution that he was merely reminding the court to pass a final decree and there was no bar of limitation. The view was taken that the applications though styled as execution petitions were only reminders to the court to pass the final decree and there was no bar of limitation. 6. We think the same must be the position on the facts of this case. The court was bound in the nature of the contentions that have been raised which are discernible from the decree that has been passed in the case, not only to determine the quantum of the right of the plaintiff in the plaint property but also necessarily to determine the specific piece of land recoverable from the defendant by the plaintiff and should have passed a decree as visualised in section 51 (a) of the Code of Civil Procedure which is the proper provision applicable. This has not been done. The decree in the case already read can only therefore be understood as a preliminary decree. This is so notwithstanding the fact that the court directed that the further matters regarding the identity of the property and the quantum of the mesne profits will be determined in execution. This direction must be treated as ineffectual. We do not think that a court can decline to discharge its functions by directing some other court—we are treating the trial court and the execution court as different courts—to discharge its functions. The execution court has only limited power. It cannot add to or vary the decree and can only deal with matters relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. The decree said to have been passed in this case is incomplete and unexecutable. So we have necessarily to understand the decree as a preliminary decree. The plaintiff cannot be said to be estopped from contending that the court should proceed to pass a final decree because he had previously applied for execution of the so-called decree. In fact, it was not contended before us that there is any estoppel. So we have necessarily to understand the decree as a preliminary decree. The plaintiff cannot be said to be estopped from contending that the court should proceed to pass a final decree because he had previously applied for execution of the so-called decree. In fact, it was not contended before us that there is any estoppel. We are unable to accept the argument of counsel for the appellant as long as the term the decree stood, it was not open to the party in the suit to contend that it is not an executable decree. That it is not an executable decree is evident from the decree. It becomes a final decree only when all the matters are determined. We therefore think that the appellate court is right in the view it has taken. We dismiss this Second Appeal. We may however add that it will be open to the appellant to raise objection if any, other than the plea of limitation in the trial court. 7. We direct the parties to bear their costs in this appeal.